Freethought & Rationalism Archive

stephan huller · 03-10-2013, 05:36 PM

I have been reading and rereading the Philosophumena's description of the longer Marcionite gospel of Mark and I started to wonder - is philia a male-to-male phenomenon? I mean, yes there are examples of philia between a man and a woman in ancient literature. But surely this was exceptional. Isn't the entire concept of philia reserved for male relationship - not necessarily homosexual, but a love which is assumed to be inter pares.

In Alcestis it is the friendship between Hercules and Admetus, and in Helen the spousal relationship between Helen and Menelaos mirrors that of the male-to-male philia (indeed one in which Helen has become the man and Menelaos the woman). But generally it must have assumed to be true that women were incapable of being friends with men (two thousand years before When Harry Met Sally).

As such isn't the longer gospel of Mark really establishing male pairs as the vehicle for Christian salvation?

Toto · 03-10-2013, 05:44 PM

Philia is often translated as "friendship." There are people who claim that men and women can't be "just friends" without a sexual overtone, for which the Greeks had another word (or two).

Philia says:

Quote:

As Gerard Hughes points out, in Books VIII and IX Aristotle gives examples of philia including:

"young lovers (1156b2), lifelong friends (1156b12), cities with one another (1157a26), political or business contacts (1158a28), parents and children (1158b20), fellow-voyagers and fellow-soldiers (1159b28), members of the same religious society (1160a19), or of the same tribe (1161b14), a cobbler and the person who buys from him (1163b35).

So it sounds like philia would most often be man to man, but not always.

outhouse · 03-10-2013, 06:03 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by stephan huller

I have been reading and rereading the Philosophumena's description of the longer Marcionite gospel of Mark and I started to wonder - is philia a male-to-male phenomenon? I mean, yes there are examples of philia between a man and a woman in ancient literature. But surely this was exceptional. Isn't the entire concept of philia reserved for male relationship - not necessarily homosexual, but a love which is assumed to be inter pares.

In Alcestis it is the friendship between Hercules and Admetus, and in Helen the spousal relationship between Helen and Menelaos mirrors that of the male-to-male philia (indeed one in which Helen has become the man and Menelaos the woman). But generally it must have assumed to be true that women were incapable of being friends with men (two thousand years before When Harry Met Sally).

As such isn't the longer gospel of Mark really establishing male pairs as the vehicle for Christian salvation?

Besides Toto being correct

Sometimes the use of man, didnt always mean male according to Yales proffessor. Pauls use of "man" in places was dual use.

stephan huller · 03-10-2013, 07:36 PM

But the examples from marriage and child rearing are eliminated because of what we are told in the Philosophumena. the Gospel of Mark in the hands of the Marcionites extolled man to man love and friendship

stephan huller · 03-10-2013, 08:05 PM

References to philia in Clement

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And he refers to the Creator, as the Statesman (o politikos) by way of eminence, in his book of this name (o politikos); and those who lead an active and just life, combined with contemplation, he calls statesmen (politiko). That department of politics which is called "Law," he divides into administrative magnanimity and private good order, which he calls orderliness; and harmony, and sobriety, which are seen when rulers suit their subjects, and subjects are obedient to their rulers; a result which the system of Moses sedulously aims at effecting. Further, that the department of law is founded on generation, that of politics on friendship and consent (τὸ πολιτικὸν δὲ πρὸς φιλίας καὶ ὁμονοίας), Plato, with the aid he received, affirms; and so, coupled with the laws the philosopher in the Epinomis, who knew the course of all generation, which takes place by the instrumentality of the planets; and the other philosopher, Timaeus, who was an astronomer and student of the motions of the stars, and of their sympathy and association with one another, he consequently joined to the "polity" (or "republic"). Then, in my opinion, the end both of the statesman, and of him who lives according to the law, is contemplation. It is necessary, therefore, that public affairs should be rightly managed. But to philosophize is best. For he who is wise will live concentrating all his energies on knowledge, directing his life by good deeds, despising the opposite, and following the pursuits which contribute to truth. And the law is not what is decided by law (for what is seen is not vision), nor every opinion (not certainly what is evil). But law is the opinion which is good, and what is good is that which is true, and what is true is that which finds "true being," and attains to it. "He who is," says Moses, "sent me." In accordance with which, namely, good opinion, some have called law, right reason, which enjoins what is to be done and forbids what is not to be done. [Strom 1.25.166.1]

This sounds very much like the Christian heretics accused by Celsus of stealing from both Plato and the Persians for their mysteries. Again in Book Two:

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For, if faith were a mere human habit, as the Greeks supposed, it would have been extinguished. But if it grow, and there be no place where it is not; then I affirm, that faith, whether founded in love (ἀγάπης), or in fear, as its disparagers assert, is something divine; which is neither rent asunder by other worldly friendship (ὑπὸ ἄλλης φιλίας κοσμικῆς), nor dissolved by the presence of fear. For love (ἀγάπη), on account of its friendly alliance with faith (τὴν πίστιν φιλίᾳ), makes men believers (τοὺς πιστοὺς ποιεῖ); and faith, which is the foundation of love, in its turn introduces the doing of good (ἡ δὲ πίστις ἕδρασμα ἀγάπης ἀντεπάγουσα τὴν εὐποιίαν); since also fear, the paedagogue of the law, is believed to be fear by those, by whom it is believed. For, if its existence is shown in its working, it is yet believed when about to do and threatening, and when not working and present; and being believed to exist, it does not itself generate faith, but is by faith tested and proved trustworthy. Such a change, then, from unbelief to faith -- and to trust in hope and fear, is divine. And, in truth, faith is discovered, by us, to be the first movement towards salvation; after which fear, and hope, and repentance, advancing in company with temperance and patience, lead us to love and knowledge. Rightly, therefore, the Apostle Barnabas says, "From the portion I have received I have done my diligence to send by little and little to you; that along with your faith you may also have perfect knowledge. Fear and patience are then helpers of your faith; and our allies are long-suffering and temperance. These, then," he says, "in what respects the Lord, continuing in purity, there rejoice along with them, wisdom, understanding, intelligence, knowledge." The fore-mentioned virtues being, then, the elements of knowledge; the result is that faith is more elementary, being as necessary to the Gnostic, as respiration to him that lives in this world is to life. And as without the four elements it is not possible to live, so neither can knowledge be attained without faith. It is then the support of truth. [ 2.6.30.2]

And again later in Book Two it is fucking obvious that Clement holds the same beliefs as these Marcionites and the Letter to Theodore confirms the existence of the same gospel:

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Such a fear, accordingly, leads to repentance and hope. Now hope is the expectation of good things, or an expectation sanguine of absent good; and favourable circumstances are assumed in order to good hope, which we have learned leads on to love (τὴν ἀγάπην χειραγωγεῖν μεμαθήκαμεν). Now love turns out to be consent in what pertains to reason (ἀγάπη δὲ ὁμόνοια ἂν εἴη τῶν κατὰ τὸν λόγον), life, and manners, or in brief, fellowship in life (κοινωνία βίου), or it is the intensity of friendship and of affection, with right reason (ἐκτένεια φιλίας καὶ φιλοστοργίας μετὰ λόγου ὀρθοῦ), in the enjoyment of associates (περὶ χρῆσιν ἑταίρων). And an associate is another self (ὁ δὲ ἑταῖρος ἕτερος ἐγώ); just as we call those, brethren, who are regenerated by the same word (ᾗ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς τοὺς τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ἀναγεννηθέντας προσαγορεύομεν). And akin to love is hospitality, being a congenial an devoted to the treatment of strangers. And those are strangers, to whom the things of the world are strange. For we regard as worldly those, who hope in the earth and carnal lusts. "Be not conformed," says the apostle, "to this world: but be ye transformed in the renewal of the mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God."

Hospitality, therefore, is occupied in what is useful for strangers; and guests (epixenoi) are strangers (xenoi); and friends are guests; and brethren are friends. "Dear brother," says Homer.

Philanthropy, in order to which also, is natural affection, being a loving treatment of men, and natural affection, which is a congenial habit exercised in the love of friends or domestics, follow in the train of love. And if the real man within us is the spiritual, philanthropy is brotherly love to those who participate, in the same spirit. Natural affection, on the other hand, the preservation of good-will, or of affection; and affection is its perfect demonstration; and to be beloved is to please in behaviour, by drawing and attracting. And persons are brought to sameness by consent, which is the knowledge of the good things that are enjoyed in common. For community of sentiment (omognwmosunh) is harmony of opinions (sumfwnia gnwmpn). "Let your love be without dissimulation," it is said; "and abhorring what is evil, let us become attached to what is good, to brotherly love," and so on, down to "If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, living peaceably with all men." Then "be not overcome of evil," it is said, "but overcome evil with good." [Strom 2.9.1]

And the mystical union with the male other who is Jesus is repeated again later in Book Two:

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But God being by nature rich in pity, in consequence of His own goodness, cares for us, though neither portions of Himself, nor by nature His children. And this is the greatest proof of the goodness of God: that such being our relation to Him, and being by nature wholly estranged, He nevertheless cares for us. For the affection in animals to their progeny is natural, and the friendship of kindred knowers is the result of intimacy (φυσικὴ μὲν γὰρ ἡ πρὸς τὰ τέκνα φιλοστοργία τοῖς ζῴοις ἥ τε ἐκ συνηθείας τοῖς ὁμογνώμοσι φιλία), but the mercy of God is rich toward us, who are in no respect related to Him; I say either in our essence or nature, or in the peculiar energy of our essence, but only in our being the work of His will. And him who willingly, with discipline and teaching, accepts the knowledge of the truth, He calls to adoption, which is the greatest advancement of all. "Transgressions catch a man; and in the cords of his own sins each one is bound." And God is without blame. And in reality, "blessed is the man who feareth alway through piety. [ibid 2.16.]

And again:

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We are taught that there are three kinds of friendship (Τριττὰ δὲ εἴδη φιλίας διδασκόμεθα): and that of these the first and the best is that which results from virtue, for the love that is founded on reason is firm; that the second and intermediate is by way of recompense, and is social, liberal, and useful for life; for the friendship which is the result of favour is mutual (κοινὴ γὰρ ἡ ἐκ χάριτος φιλία).

And the third and last we assert to be that which is founded on intimacy; others, again, that it is that variable and changeable form which rests on pleasure. And Hipppodamus the Pythagorean seems to me to describe friendships most admirably (τᾶν φιλιᾶν ἃ μὲν ἐξ ἐπιστάμας θεῶν): "That founded on knowledge of the gods, that founded on the gifts of men, and that on the pleasures of animals." There is the friendship of a philosopher (φιλοσόφου φιλία), -- that of a man and that of an animal. For the image of God is really the man who does good, in which also he gets good: as the pilot at once saves, and is saved. [2.19]

and again in Book Four:

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For to live is common to the mortal nature, that is to man, with that to which has been vouchsafed immortality; as also the faculty of contemplation and of self-restraint, one of the two being more excellent. On this ground Pythagoras seems to me to have said that God alone is wise, since also the apostle writes in the Epistle to the Romans, "For the obedience of the faith among all nations, being made known to the only wise God through Jesus Christ;" and that he himself was a philosopher, on account of his friendship with God (ἑαυτὸν δὲ διὰ φιλίαν τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν φιλόσοφον). Accordingly it is said, "God talked with Moses as a friend with a friend." That, then, which is true being clear to God, forthwith generates truth. And the gnostic loves the truth. [4:3]

and again:

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Neither, then, the hope of happiness nor the love of God (τὸν θεὸν ἀγάπη) takes what befalls ill, but remains free, although thrown among the wildest beasts or into the all-devouring fire; though racked with a tyrant's tortures. Depending as it does on the divine favour, it ascends aloft unenslaved (τῆς θείας ἀπαρτωμένη φιλίας ἀδούλωτος ἄνω περιπολεῖ), surrendering the body to those who can touch it alone. A barbarous nation, not cumbered with philosophy, select, it is said, annually an ambassador to the hero Zamolxis. Zamolxis was one of the disciples of Pythagoras. The one, then, who is judged of the most sterling worth is put to death, to the distress of those who have practised philosophy, but have not been selected, at being reckoned unworthy of a happy service. [4.8]

and again:

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But the apostle, writing to us with reference to the endurance of afflictions, says, "And this is of God, that it is given to you on behalf of Christ, not only to believe on Him, but also to suffer for His sake; having the same conflict which ye saw in me, and now hear to be in me. If there is therefore any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of love, if any communion of spirit, if any bowels and mercies, fulfil ye my joy, that ye may be of the same mind, having the same love, unanimous, thinking one thing. And if he is offered on the sacrifice and service of faith, joying and rejoicing" with the Philippians, to whom the apostle speaks, calling them "fellow-partakers of joy," how does he say that they are of one soul, and having a soul? Likewise, also, writing respecting Timothy and himself, he says, "For I have no one like-souled (ἰσόψυχον), who will nobly care for your state. For all seek their own, not the-things which are Jesus Christ's."

Let not the above-mentioned people (= Valentinians), then, call us, by way of reproach, "natural men" (yukikoi), nor the Phrygians either; for these now call those who do not apply themselves to the new prophecy "natural men" (yukikoi), with whom we shall discuss in our remarks on "Prophecy." The perfect man ought therefore to practise love, and thence to haste to the divine friendship, fulfilling the commandments from love (κἀνθένδε ἐπὶ τὴν θείαν φιλίαν σπεύδειν, δι' ἀγάπην ἐκτελοῦντα τὰς ἐντολάς). And loving one's enemies does not mean loving wickedness (τὸ δὲ ἀγαπᾶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οὐκ ἀγαπᾶν τὸ κακὸν), or impiety, or adultery, or theft (οὐδὲ ἀσέβειαν ἢ μοιχείαν ἢ κλοπήν); but the thief, the impious, the adulterer, not as far as he sins, and in respect of the actions by which he stains the name of man, but as he is a man, and the work of God.

Assuredly sin is an activity, not an existence: and therefore it is not a work of God. Now sinners are called enemies of God -- enemies, that is, of the commands which they do not obey, as those who obey become friends, the one named so from their fellowship, the others from their estrangement, which is the result of free choice; for there is neither enmity nor sin without the enemy and the sinner. And the command "to lust not," (ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐχ) not as if the things to be desired did not belong to us, does not teach us not to entertain desire, as those suppose who teach that the Creator is different from the first God, not as if creation was loathsome and bad (for such opinions are impious). But we say that the things of the world are not our own, not as if they were monstrous, not as if they did not belong to God, the Lord of the universe, but because we do not continue among them for ever; being, in respect of possession, not ours, and passing from one to another in succession; but belonging to us, for whom they were made in respect of use, so long as it is necessary to continue with them. In accordance, therefore, with natural appetite, things disallowed are to be used rightly, avoiding all excess and inordinate affection. [4.13.93.3]

I think this section is also another commentary on that antithesis in the gospel between the gospel and the Law with respect to the commandment 'do not lust' (

MrMacSon · 03-10-2013, 08:34 PM

adelphopoiesis?

stephan huller · 03-10-2013, 08:46 PM

exactly. But the believers are so homophobic that they can't allow for the fact that Christianity is all about male to male love and friendship. So they say that the latest discovery of Clement's writings is a forgery. These people, man. This is precisely the reason why believers - i.e. partisans - should only have a limited role in determining 'what is true' about their religion. With Jews it is 'maybe most of you are completely unrelated by blood to Abraham' and derive you origins from converts in Central Asia - that's where the lying starts. With Christians it is - maybe the problems in the Catholic Church aren't a recent 'aberration.' Maybe they go back to the earliest most ancient period ...

stephan huller · 03-10-2013, 08:54 PM

Look at what Clement says:

Quote:

Now love turns out to be consent in what pertains to reason (ἀγάπη δὲ ὁμόνοια ἂν εἴη τῶν κατὰ τὸν λόγον), life, and manners, or in brief, fellowship in life (κοινωνία βίου), or it is the intensity of friendship and of affection, with right reason (ἐκτένεια φιλίας καὶ φιλοστοργίας μετὰ λόγου ὀρθοῦ), in the enjoyment of associates (περὶ χρῆσιν ἑταίρων). And an associate is another self (ὁ δὲ ἑταῖρος ἕτερος ἐγώ); just as we call those, brethren, who are regenerated by the same word (ᾗ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς τοὺς τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ἀναγεννηθέντας προσαγορεύομεν).

WTF? These people who go around in circles and say basically - 'we know Jesus was a Jewish rabbi' - there is no reasoning with them. Clement clearly is saying the same thing here is what is presented in the Letter to Theodore. Thank God we live in a society which is liberal enough to embrace - or even consider - these truths again. These hoaxers counted on an anti-intellectual knee jerk - 'are you saying Jesus is gay?' - to win.

The answer is - 'no we're not saying that Jesus was gay.' But whatever Jesus was in the beginning was adapted to the beliefs, practices and doctrines of Greek philosophy - hence the heretics are all philosophers (= 'gnostic' is only a philosophical term).

stephan huller · 03-10-2013, 09:56 PM

Continuing to cite from the Stromata, Clement makes specific reference to the 'friendship' of Empedocles as being compatible with Christianity (just as reported of the Marcionites) in Book Five:

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Respecting faith we have adduced sufficient testimonies of writings among the Greeks. But in order not to exceed bounds, through eagerness to collect a very great many also respecting hope and love, suffice it merely to say that in the Crito Socrates, who prefers a good life and death to life itself, thinks that we have hope of another life after death.

Also in the Phaedrus he says, "That only when in a separate state can the soul become partaker of the wisdom which is true, and surpasses human power; and when, having reached the end of hope by philosophic love, desire shall waft it to heaven, then," says he, "does it receive the commencement of another, an immortal life." And in the Symposium he says, "That there is instilled into all the natural love of generating what is like, and in men of generating men alone, and in the good man of the generation of the counterpart of himself. But it is impossible for the good man to do this without possessing the perfect virtues, in which he will train the youth who have recourse to him." And as he says in the Theaetetus, "He will beget and finish men. For some procreate by the body, others by the soul;" since also with the barbarian philosophers to teach and enlighten is called to regenerate; and "I have begotten you in Jesus Christ," says the good apostle somewhere.

Empedocles, too, enumerates friendship among the elements, conceiving it as a combining love: "Which do you look at with your mind; and don't sit gaping with your eyes." (ὁ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ φιλότητα συγκαταριθμεῖται, συγκριτικήν τινα ἀγάπην νοῶν, ἣν σὺ νόῳ δέρκευ μηδ'ὄμμασιν ἧσο τεθηπώς)

Parmenides, too, in his poem, alluding to hope, speaks thus: "Yet look with the mind certainly on what is absent as present, For it will not sever that which is from the grasp it has of that which is Not, even if scattered in every direction over the world or combined." [5.2]

And again later in the same book:

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Wherefore also man is said "to have been made in [God's] image and likeness." For the image of God is the divine and royal Word, the impassible man; and the image of the image is the human mind. And if you wish to apprehend the likeness by another name, you will find it named in Moses, a divine correspondence. For he says, "Walk after the Lord your God, and keep His commandments." And I reckon all the virtuous, servants and followers of God. Hence the Stoics say that the end of philosophy is to live agreeable to nature; and Plato, likeness to God, as we have shown in the second Miscellany. And Zeno the Stoic, borrowing from Plato, and he from the Barbarian philosophy, says that all the good are friends of one another. For Socrates says in the Phoedrus, "that it has not been ordained that the bad should be a friend to the bad, nor the good be not a friend to the good;" as also he showed sufficiently in the Lysis, that friendship is never preserved in wickedness and vice (φησὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ Σωκράτης ὡς οὐχ εἵμαρται κακὸν κακῷ φίλον εἶναι οὐδ'ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῷ μὴ φίλον, ὅπερ κἀν τῷ Λύσιδι ἀπέδειξεν ἱκανῶς, ὡς ἐν ἀδικίᾳ καὶ πονηρίᾳ οὐκ ἄν ποτε σωθείη φιλία). And the Athenian stranger similarly says, "that there is conduct pleasing and conformable to God, based on one ancient ground-principle, That like loves like, provided it be within measure. But things beyond measure are congenial neither to what is within nor what is beyond measure. Now it is the case that God is the measure to us of all things." Then proceeding, Plato adds: "For every good man is like every other good man; and so being like to God, he is liked by every good man and by God." At this point I have just recollected the following. In the end of the Timoeus he says: "You must necessarily assimilate that which perceives to that which is perceived, according to its original nature; and it is by so assimilating it that you attain to the end of the highest life proposed by the gods to men, for the present or the future time." For those have equal power with these. He, who seeks, will not stop till he find; and having found, he will wonder; and wondering, he will reign; and reigning, he will rest. And what? Were not also those expressions of Thales derived from these? The fact that God is glorified for ever, and that He is expressly called by us the Searcher of hearts, he interprets. For Thales being asked, What is the divinity? said, What has neither beginning nor end. And on another asking, "If a man could elude the knowledge of the Divine Being while doing aught?" said, "How could he who cannot do so while thinking?" [5.14]

and in Book Six:

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The Gnostic is such, that he is subject only to the affections that exist for the maintenance of the body, such as hunger, thirst, and the like. But in the case of the Saviour, it were ludicrous [to suppose] that the body, as a body, demanded the necessary aids in order to its duration. For He ate, not for the sake of the body, which was kept together by a holy energy, but in order that it might not enter into the minds of those who were with Him to entertain a different opinion of Him; in like manner as certainly some afterwards supposed that He appeared in a phantasmal shape (dokhsei). But He was entirely impassible (apaqhg); inaccessible to any movement of feeling -- either pleasure or pain. While the apostles, having most gnostically mastered, through the Lord's teaching, angel and fear, and lust, were not liable even to such of the movements of feeling, as seem good, courage, zeal, joy, desire, through a steady condition of mind, not changing a whit; but ever continuing unvarying in a state of training after the resurrection of the Lord.

And should it be granted that the affections specified above, when produced rationally, are good, yet they are nevertheless inadmissible in the case of the perfect man, who is incapable of exercising courage: for neither does he meet what inspires fear, as he regards none of the things that occur in life as to be dreaded; nor can aught dislodge him from this -- the love he has towards God. Nor does he need cheerfulness of mind; for he does not fall into pain, being persuaded that all things happen well. Nor is he angry; for there is nothing to move him to anger, seeing he ever loves God, and is entirely turned towards Him alone, and therefore hates none of God's creatures. No more does he envy; for nothing is wanting to him, that is requisite to assimilation, in order that he may be excellent and good. Nor does he consequently love any one with this common affection (οὐδὲ ἄρα φιλεῖ τινα τὴν κοινὴν ταύτην φιλίαν), but loves the Creator in the creatures (ἀλλ' ἀγαπᾷ τὸν κτίστην διὰ τῶν κτισμάτων). Nor, consequently, does he fall into any desire and eagerness; nor does he want, as far as respects his soul, aught appertaining to others, now that he associates through love with the Beloved One (συνὼν ἤδη δι' ἀγάπης τῷ ἐραστῷ), to whom he is allied by free choice, and by the habit which results from training, approaches closer to Him, and is blessed through the abundance of good things.

So that on these accounts he is compelled to become like his Teacher in impassibility. For the Word of God is intellectual, according as the image of mind is seen 'in man alone. Thus also the good man is godlike in form and semblance as respects his soul. And, on the other hand, God is like man. For the distinctive form of each one is the mind by which we are characterized. Consequently, also, those who sin against man are unholy and impious. For it were ridiculous to say that the gnostic and perfect man must not eradicate anger and courage, inasmuch as without these he will not struggle against circumstances, or abide what is terrible. But if we take from him desire; he will be quite overwhelmed by troubles, and therefore depart from this life very basely. Unless possessed of it, as some suppose, he will not conceive a desire for what is like the excellent and the good. If, then, all alliance with what is good is accompanied with desire, how, it is said, does he remain impassible who desires what is excellent?

But these people know not, as appears, the divinity of love. For love is not desire on the part of him who loves; but is a relation of affection, restoring the Gnostic to the unity of the faith, -- independent of time and place. But he who by love is already in the midst of that in which he is destined to be, and has anticipated hope by knowledge, does not desire anything, having, as far as possible, the very thing desired. Accordingly, as to be expected, he continues in the exercise of gnostic love, in the one unvarying state.

Nor will he, therefore, eagerly desire to be assimilated to what is beautiful, possessing, as he does, beauty by love. What more need of courage and of desire to him, who has obtained the affinity to the impassible God which arises from love, and by love has enrolled himself among the friends of God?

stephan huller · 03-10-2013, 10:33 PM

More:

Quote:

But such a good conscience preserves sanctity towards God and justice towards men; keeping the soul pure with grave thoughts, and pure. words, and just deeds. By thus receiving the Lord's power, the soul studies to be God; regarding nothing bad but ignorance, and action contrary to fight reason. And giving thanks always for all things to God, by righteous heating and divine reading, by true investigation, by holy oblation, by blessed prayer; lauding, hymning, blessing, praising, such a soul is never at any time separated from God. Rightly then is it said, "And they who trust in Him shall understand the truth, and those faithful in love shall abide by Him." You see what statements Wisdom makes about the Gnostics.

Conformably, therefore, there are various abodes, according to the worth of those who have believed. To the point Solomon says, "For there shall be given to him the choice grace of faith, and a more pleasant lot in the temple of the Lord." For the comparative shows that there are lower parts in the temple of God, which is the whole Church. And the superlative remains to be conceived, where the Lord is. These chosen abodes, which are three, are indicated by the numbers in the Gospel -- the thirty, the sixty, the hundred. And the perfect inheritance belongs to those who attain to "a perfect man," according to the image of the Lord. And the likeness is not, as some imagine, that of the human form; for this consideration is impious. Nor is the likeness to the first cause that which consists in virtue. For this utterance is also impious, being that of those who have imagined that virtue in man and in the sovereign God is the same. "Thou hast supposed iniquity,' He says, " [in imagining] that I will be like to thee." But "it is enough for the disciple to become as the Master," saith the Master. To the likeness of God, then, he that is introduced into adoption and the friendship of God (καὶ φιλίαν τοῦ θεοῦ), to the just inheritance of the lords and gods is brought; if he be perfected, according to the Gospel, as the Lord Himself taught. [6.9]

and finally:

Quote:

Accordingly, love makes its own athlete fearless and dauntless, and confident in the Lord, anointing and training him; as righteousness secures for him truthfulness in his whole life. For it was a compendium of righteousness to say, "Let your yea be yea; and your nay, nay."

And the same holds with self-control. For it is neither for love of honour, as the athletes for the sake of crowns and fame; nor on the other hand, for love of money, as some pretend to exercise self-control, pursuing what is good with terrible suffering. Nor is it from love of the body for the sake of health. Nor any more is any man who is temperate from rusticity, who has not tasted pleasures, truly a man of self-control. Certainly those who have led a laborious life, on tasting pleasures, forthwith break down the inflexibility of temperance into pleasures. Such are they who are restrained by law and fear. For on finding a favourable opportunity they defraud the law, by giving what is good the slip. But self-control, desirable for its own sake, perfected through knowledge, abiding ever, makes the man lord and master of himself; so that the Gnostic is temperate and passionless, incapable of being dissolved by pleasures and pains, as they say adamant is by fire.

The cause of these, then, is love, of all science the most sacred and most sovereign.

For by the service of what is best and most exalted, which is characterized by unity, it renders the Gnostic at once friend and son, having in truth grown "a perfect man, up to the measure of full stature."

Further, agreement in the same thing is consent. But what is the same is one. And friendship is consummated in likeness; the community lying in oneness (ἥ τε φιλία δι' ὁμοιότητος περαίνεται, τῆς κοινότη τος ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ κειμένης). The Gnostic, consequently, in virtue of being a lover of the one true God, is the really perfect man and friend of God, and is placed in the rank of son. For these are names of nobility and knowledge, and perfection in the contemplation of God; which crowning step of advancement the gnostic soul receives, when it has become quite pure, reckoned worthy to behold everlastingly God Almighty, "face," it is said, "to face." For having become wholly spiritual, and having in the spiritual Church gone to what is of kindred nature, it abides in the rest of God. [7.11.68.3]

03-10-2013, 05:36 PM	#1
stephan huller Veteran Member Join Date: Jun 2010 Location: seattle, wa Posts: 9,337	Was Philia Generally Assumed to Be Male-to-Male? I have been reading and rereading the Philosophumena's description of the longer Marcionite gospel of Mark and I started to wonder - is philia a male-to-male phenomenon? I mean, yes there are examples of philia between a man and a woman in ancient literature. But surely this was exceptional. Isn't the entire concept of philia reserved for male relationship - not necessarily homosexual, but a love which is assumed to be inter pares. In Alcestis it is the friendship between Hercules and Admetus, and in Helen the spousal relationship between Helen and Menelaos mirrors that of the male-to-male philia (indeed one in which Helen has become the man and Menelaos the woman). But generally it must have assumed to be true that women were incapable of being friends with men (two thousand years before When Harry Met Sally). As such isn't the longer gospel of Mark really establishing male pairs as the vehicle for Christian salvation?

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03-10-2013, 07:36 PM	#4
stephan huller Veteran Member Join Date: Jun 2010 Location: seattle, wa Posts: 9,337	But the examples from marriage and child rearing are eliminated because of what we are told in the Philosophumena. the Gospel of Mark in the hands of the Marcionites extolled man to man love and friendship

03-10-2013, 08:34 PM	#6
MrMacSon Senior Member Join Date: Mar 2012 Location: South Pacific Posts: 559	adelphopoiesis?

03-10-2013, 08:46 PM	#7
stephan huller Veteran Member Join Date: Jun 2010 Location: seattle, wa Posts: 9,337	exactly. But the believers are so homophobic that they can't allow for the fact that Christianity is all about male to male love and friendship. So they say that the latest discovery of Clement's writings is a forgery. These people, man. This is precisely the reason why believers - i.e. partisans - should only have a limited role in determining 'what is true' about their religion. With Jews it is 'maybe most of you are completely unrelated by blood to Abraham' and derive you origins from converts in Central Asia - that's where the lying starts. With Christians it is - maybe the problems in the Catholic Church aren't a recent 'aberration.' Maybe they go back to the earliest most ancient period ...

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