Matthew_Green

I was reading an essay some time ago by British New Testament scholar Michael Goulder called "The Explanatory Power of Conversion Visions". Goulder believes that it's perfectly logical that if we were to grant that the "group visions" or "post-mortem" appearances of Jesus to his disciples have any historical validity to them, they might best be described as "collective delusions" and thus we could develop a theory as to why these "collective delusions" occured. Goulder believes that a "collective delusion" (sometimes called a "mass hallucination") is what best describes the group visions of say, the Virgin Mary at Fatima or perhaps a group vision of some other supernatural figure.

Christian apologist William Lane Craig objects to the idea that the "post-mortem" appearances of Jesus were "collective delusions" or "subjective group visions". He objects to it on two grounds, 1.) Collective delusions/group visions do not explain the empty tomb and 2.) collective delusions/group visions do not explain the diversity of appearances in the gospels and 1st Corinthians 15.

Craig's first objection is fatally flawed because it demonstrates an appalling ignorance of historical epistemology on his part. Craig conflates the nature of an historical event, with the cause of an historical event. In this case, we have to distinguish between a description/explanation regarding the nature of an historical event with a theory of causation regarding the event. In this case, "collective delusions" can describe the nature of an event (i.e. the post-mortem appearances of Jesus) without specifying or explaining its cause. Only a theory of causation would have to explain any empty tomb. Only a theory regarding the cause of an event (regardless of how we choose to describe the nature of the event in question) would have to explain the empty tomb, not any description of the event's nature itself. Thus Craig is mis-placing the burden of explanatory power; the burden of explanation lies in the theory of causation behind the "collective delusions" and the empty tomb, not in any description of the post-mortem appearances as "collective delusions".

To illustrate this principle, suppose that Craig was able to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that the post-mortem appearances were supernatural to the satisfaction of differeing faith-groups such as, say, Muslims or Zoroastrians. Would proving that the post-mortem appearances of Jesus were supernatural mean that God had raised Jesus from the dead and that the Christian gospel is true? No, it wouldn't.

A Muslim could merely reply that Allah had caused the supernatural visions of Jesus in order to test the faith of Muslims. Same with Zoroastrians; they could argue that Ahura-Mazda had caused these post-mortem appearances of Jesus in order to test the faith of Zoroastrians. Thus, both Muslims and Zoroastrians would have a theory of causation as to why the event happened regardless of how one choses to describe the nature of the event. A Muslim could argue that Allah wanted to test the faith of Muslims so he inspired Joseph of Arimethea to re-bury the body elsewhere and then sent an angel or a demon of some sort to appear to the disciples of Jesus as to fool them into thinking that Jesus had risen from the dead.

In fact, a Muslim or Zoroastrian could even accept a naturalistic description of the post-mortem appearances as Goulder and I (I am adopting Goulder's argument here) propose, believing that Allah/Ahura-Mazda had indirectly caused these "collective delusions" by putting all the necessary ingredients in place. Thus they can accept "collective delusions" as a description regarding the nature of the post-mortem appearances and chose to propose a "test of faith" theory as their theory of causation for both the empty tomb (how it got empty) and the post-mortem appearancs (why they occured, regardless of their nature, whether they are naturally-caused collective delusions or supernaturally-caused group visions). One can even adopt the naturalistic description that I have proposed and remain entirely agnostic about the theory of causation regarding these delusions and the empty tomb; one can accept that these delusions occured and not know why or why the tomb wound up empty. Craig's first argument is thus answered.

As to Craig's second argument, that "collective delusions" do not explain the diversity of appearances, I think there are two ways of effectively answering this argument. First, this argument builds on the ignorance underlying Craig's first objection; this argument also conflates the nature of an event with the cause of the event and thus this objection likewise mis-places the burden of explanatory power. But suppose Craig corrected himself and his ignorance on this matter. Would Craig be right about the need to explain the diversity of post-mortem appearances? Again, he would not.

The problem is that the gospels clash with each other as well as 1st Corinthians 15. Consider where the first appearances of Jesus to his disciples are supposed to take place. Matthew and Mark suggest that the first appearance of Jesus to his disciples is to take place at Galilee while Luke and John have it occur in Jerusalem. Even more trouble-some is to whom Jesus is said to have appeared first. Luke says that all Eleven of the disciples except Judas Iscariot were present. John's account contradicts this by suggesting that doubting Thomas was absent, leaving us with only 10 disciples, not eleven as Luke suggests. 1st Corinthians 15 says that Jesus appeared to James and then to the "Twelve". So which is it? 12, 11, or 10?

No doubt that Craig can bring his midrashic harmonizing tools to the rescue and suggest that the gospels and 1st Corinthians 15 are reconciable . Alrighty, let's give Craig the benefit of the doubt here and agree with him that they can be harmonized. Does this give us a diversity of appearances? Not exactly. Craig wants the gospels and 1st Corinthians 15 to be read as though they were prima facie, or face-value historical documentation. But how can he with a straight face, ask his would-be critics to read them as such and then suggest the need for harmonization? The problem is that you cannot suggest the need for harmonization and then treat them as face-value eye-witness accounts. As Robert M Price, points out,the very need for harmonization shows that the documents might still be true, despite appearances to the contrary, not that they are true as they stand. Thus the need for harmonization shifts the benefit of the doubt to the critic, not the documents. If we are to treat any documents as face-value historical narration, then the benefit of the doubt is given to the documents and the burden of proof shifts to the critic to show that the documents are in error.

If we admit the need for harmonization, this shows that the benefit of the doubt must be given to the critic who would question the historicity of the documents and the burden of proof shifts to the defenders of such documents, who would argue for the historicity of such documents despite appearances to the contrary. Defenders of the documents would have to argue for a plausible harmonization scheme if they can show that there is a historical core fact(s) underlying the event(s) described in these documents. They would need to then harmonize as many secondary details as plausible. Only having done so can the defenders, then, argue for the historical relability of any such documents. My answer to Craig's second objection is: what diversity?

Thus Craig's objections are answered and "collective delusions" remain a plausible option for understanding what may or may not have happened on that first Easter morning.

Matthew

GakuseiDon

Actually, Muslims believe that Jesus wasn't crucified at all. I think the official word is that it only appeared that He was crucified, and then at some stage Allah took Him up to Heaven. But this doesn't really invalidate your point.

Matthew_Green

You are right. This is very true of Muslims and although this doesn't invalidate my point, it does make me realize that my hypothetical scenario (Craig proving to Muslims that the post-mortem appearances are inescapably supernatural) presupposes that Craig has indeed convinced Muslims of his "four facts" which he thinks that the majority of New Testament scholars accept (I'd like to see Craig convince Muslim scholars of these four facts now that I think about it!)

Matthew

Amaleq13

I thought they believed that someone was crucified in his place.

Mathetes

I think it is more something like God changed him in the cross by someone else that looked like him. Which is close to the docetic versions and the Gospel of Peter, if I recall correctly.

Which I may not.

--------Edited to add:

Forget about this bullshit that I just said. Here is what the Koran says:

Richard Carrier

There is a problem of terminology here. In psychology, there is a categorical difference between a delusion and a hallucination. A hallucination is the presentation of an actual veridical sensory experience that is not genuine (i.e. not caused by external input to the relevant organs). A delusion is a recalcitrant belief contrary to the facts. Someone who met a stranger and fanatically believed it was Jesus is suffering from a delusion. Someone standing alone who nevertheless claims to be seeing a stranger whom he takes to be Jesus is having an hallucination. The difference is important, because the physical and psychological causes, and range of possible outcomes, differs in each case. Paul's "vision" on the road to Damascus, per Acts, was probably an auditory hallucination (with an amorphous visual component). The "belief" of Cleopas and his unnamed friend that a stranger they both met on the road to Emmaus was really Jesus was probably a delusion (assuming that story isn't an outright invention).



This paragraph is very hard to follow. I think you should try to take more time to explain what you are getting at.



Okay. But this is not what Craig is arguing. Craig's argument is that a theory that requires two different elements to explain two facts is more ad hoc than a theory that requires only one element to explain those same two facts. He is incorrect about that. But not for the reasons you articulate here. In short, Craig is saying "a resurrection" explains both facts, by being one cause of both facts, whereas anything you might contrive (including supernatural trickery) requires two separate events (as opposed to one resurrection) to explain those same two facts, i.e. each fact has a different cause. Tracing the causal chain back to a single agent doesn't help, since any two events can eventually be traced back to a common cause (e.g. the Big Bang). Thus, to say that "Demons both sent delusions and got the body removed" is a more complex theory than saying that "Jesus rose, thereby in that one same act caused both the empty tomb and the appearances." Craig is right about that much. Where he goes wrong is in presuming that we should always side with the "less complex" theory. That is easily refuted, and is not a principle accepted in science or history. Craig is correct, though, that if everything else were equal we should side with the less complex theory. The error he makes is in presuming everything else is equal between his theory and any other, when it often is not.



This is true, but for methodological reasons that have to do with the formal structure of an argument to the best explanation. Personally, I don't think your attempt to create a veneer of simplicity over what are actually more complex theories will actually work to defeat Craig's point.



To the contrary, such diversity is actually predicted by the collective vision theory, and would be less likely on an objective theory like Craig's. If Jesus really did rise and speak to people, they should all agree on what Jesus looked like, for example. That is, in fact, the definition of an objective appearance. Only if each person is fabricating the experience individually would there be significant differences in how Jesus appeared to each of them. Such disagreement is, in fact, the most telltale sign of hallucinatory or delusional experiences. So Craig's second argument is actually the exact opposite of the truth.

This should not be taken too far, though, since we know that collective experiences are highly susceptible to anchoring and suggestion--thus, if one person (especially a respected leader) describes his vision to another, that other will tend to see the same things he was told the first person saw (presuming both have contextually-related hallucinations). And when the experiences are simultaneous, anchoring and suggestion have immediate effects to attenuate the experience (and the participants' memories) to agree with each other--again, especially when a respected leader is anchoring the experience and everyone there shares the same basic expectations.

Likewise, we have the added problem that we do not have any detailed account from any actual witness. The only eyewitness account we have at all is Paul's (in Galatians, for example--Acts doesn't count, since Paul didn't write that), and he is terribly vague as to the details. Thus, the experiences may have differed in all kinds of ways that simply weren't recorded--to the contrary, a believer (like the author of a gospel) would operate on the presumption that his sources all saw the same thing, and therefore would only choose to record the details their accounts share, and tend to ignore as errors or unresolvable questions any details that disagree. So the sources themselves will have gone through a strong filter of bias toward normalizing the experiences on the record, thus concealing the full truth of what was actually seen.

Obviously this normalization was not total, since any given gospel includes more than one differing account--but only insofar as its author believed Jesus could and did really appear in different ways to different people. Thus, such a superstitious dogma actually was a boon for us, since it led them to "let pass through" the filter, so to speak, some evidence that the experiences were not objectively real--even as that filter destroyed so much more evidence of that which we could have had, if for example we had detailed accounts written by eyewitnesses like those we have from some pagans who routinely saw gods (e.g. Aelius Aristides).

Matthew_Green

Sorry about this. I included a parenthetical reference to "mass hallucinations" for the benefit of readers. I don't think that "mass hallucinations" is the correct description for whatever post-mortem "appearances" might or might not have happened. I was thinking that most readers would be more familiar with the term "mass hallucination" than with the term "collective delusion". In fact, I think "mass hallucination" is a misnomer but unfortunately people will better understand what point I am trying to make if I include this type of allusion, regardless of how inaccurate or imprecise it might be technically speaking. Hypoethetically if I asked, say, my mother (a Protestant fundamentalist who never completed college) if she agreed that the alleged "appearances" of the Virgin Mary to a group of people at Fatima was a "collective delusion" she might respond that she doesn't know unless I explain what a "collective delusion" is to her. If I asked her if she thought it was a "mass hallucination" then she would agree because she is more familiar with that term regardless of how inaccurate or imprecise a term it is. So that was the reason I included it. I don't endorse the term but it was only for the benefit of anyone else reading this.

My apologies; I'll try to explain what I am getting at but let me apologize in advance if my attempt to make it simpler backfires and I just make the explanation more complex

My point is that Craig was conflating the nature of an historical event with its cause. Before I elaborate further, I would like to point out that I agree with you about any post-mortem "appearances"- that they are naturally-caused 'group visions'. Now, I am not sure whether 'group vision' or 'collective delusion' (or whateve we choose to call it- it doesn't really matter since we both agree on what they are despite the term we use for it) is an explanation or description of the post-mortem "appearances". Regardless of whether it is an explanation or description, it only pertains to the nature of the post-mortem "appearances", not their cause.

If we choose to describe or explain (again, I'm not sure which one better applies) any post-mortem "appearances" as 'group visions' it would only serve as a description/explanation regarding the nature of any post-mortem "appearances". This doesn't explain why any 'group visions' or 'collective delusions' happened beyond the mere fact that they did. Any explanation of why is a theory of causation. The cause of such "appearances" is something completely different from the nature of these "appearances" (any theory/description about a historical event's nature will always be different from any theory about the historical event's cause be it the alleged "appearances" of Jesus to his disciples or what-have-you).

My point was that Craig was putting the burden of explanatory power on a theory/description of the historical event's nature (in this case the post-mortem appearances) rather than it's cause where it should belong. Craig's epistemology is inconsistent on this point. He believes that the post-mortem "appearances" of Jesus were supernatural appearances/supernaturally-caused visions (this is his description/explanation regarding it's nature) and his theory about their cause is the resurrection of Jesus by Yahweh. The problem is that other faith-groups could accept that the "appearances" of Jesus were supernatural appearances/supernaturally-caused visions, etc. but yet their theory of causation (why these supernatural appearances happened, not merely the fact that they did) might be the "divine trickery/test-of-faith". In fact other such faith-groups (Muslims, Zoroastrians, Mithra-worshippers, Jews, etc) could accept that the "appearances" were supernatural believing that their deity directly caused them, or they could accept that these 'group visions' were naturally-caused, believing that their deity indirectly caused them by placing all the necessary ingredients in place.

This was the point I was trying to make; Craig's criticism is mis-placed. He accepts the "appearances" as supernaturally-caused and yet his theory as to the cause of these "appearances" is that they were caused by the resurrection because the Christian gospel, he would have us believe, is true. But he turns around and criticizes his non-supernaturalist critics for proposing any naturalistic description/explanation of the nature of these "appearances" as if it was up to this to explain the empty tomb, when in reality, it is any naturalistic theory of causation which would have the explanatory burden of explaining any empty tomb.

I was under the impression that Craig was arguing this. I thought that I unintentionally made my argument above more complex to the point that it was difficult to understand. Can you point out any flaws in my argument now that I have (hopefully) simplified the wording of my argument?

So Craig is arguing that the resurrection has more parsimony than any "divine trickery" explanation? I might agree that the supernaturalist theories ( the resurrection, divine trickery) are more parsimonous than a naturalistic explanation, but any "divine trickery" explanation seems to me to be just as parsimonous as Craig's "resurrection" theory. (I hope I'm wrong about this! :thumbs: )

Really? That's interesting! Just curiously, why would everything else not be equal between his theory and any other (whether a supernaturalist "trickery" theory or a naturalistic "vision" theory)? If you have time, I'd like to hear a brief explanation but I understand if time-constraints prevent that.

It's a good thing I am majoring in history then!

I don't disagree with you here regarding "collective vision theory". My point, rather, was that Craig is question-begging by taking the gospels and 1st Corinthians 15 as face-value historical documentation. There might have been a diversity of appearances but Craig's basis for inferring them is illegitimate in this case. Craig might be milking the gospels and Pauline epistles for details that might not exist. In affect he might be over-reaching and almost inventing details for "collective vision" theories to explain. For instance, Matthew and Luke both seem to disagree at where the first post-mortem Christophany occured. Matthew says it was in Galilee and Luke says it was in Jerusalem. Craig is begging the question that there is no contradiction between the two by assuming (almost without argument) that both Christophanies occured; he is almost reading between the lines what migh not be there, milking the New Testament for details that might not exist. Therefore there might not be the diverse data that Craig takes there to be- hence my quote of Robert Price.

Matthew

Boomeister

As a former Christian, I think I can think of a Christian response to this: That you are making up wild theories in order to not believe it actually happened. Mass hallucinations? really? Can a group of people really get the same hallucination? Their brain processes can be in-sync with someone else's brain processes in the same way? Maybe if they are all exposed to the same environmental factor that is causing a hallucinogenic effect, maybe a toxin in the air? But even then, would they have the same hallucinogenic effect? Can grief get so extreme that all the people would have the same hallucinogenic effect in responding to it?
I'm not an expert in this, so I could be wrong. I just doubt it.

Rather than coming up with a theory like this, why don't we just say, the story isn't true. They didn't see Jesus, there was no empty tomb, and that the story is made up. That seems more plausible to me.


Boomeister

jonesg

Hysterical people do have the same delusion and its easy for them to have a vision. They probably didn't see Jesus, they saw God in each other.
If there was no Jesus then there is an empty tomb because there was no Jesus to put in it.
Most likely he did live and did bring the message attributed to him.
The message attributed to Jesus did not come out of thin air, if he didn't bring it, then who did?...and why jump thru hoops to deny Jesus when the message attributed to him is here.?

Diogenes the Cynic

Which message are you referring to? There are several.