Ubercat

It has been explained to you repeatedly, without an inkling of comprehension on your part.

-Ubercat

Ubercat

So when will you show that we have the slightest reason to take your old myths more seriously than any other old myths? You apparently want to live your life as if a pumped up Murphy's law is in charge. Ie. "Just on the off chance that some psychotic evil god is in charge, and wants to torment people forever, then I will do what I think will save me from that fate." Never mind that you're choosing to limit your life experience based on this paranoia. Again, do you live your life hiding under the bed? If not, why not? Why do jebus and his evil papa get a special pass, yet nothing else does?

Just because you wish really hard for us to go to hell, wont make it so.

-Ubercat

Wayne Delia

Your inability to produce any evidence of eternal torment, combined with everyone else's inability to produce the same evidence, is what qualifies it as a superstition.

"Can be real" is materially different from "is actually real." In order to include the possibility of eternal damnation in your so-called risk analysis, you need to establish the "is actually real" proposition.

Why don't you hold your own position to the same standard?

You admit your position is uncertain, and you are using that uncertainty to insist that it must be treated as if it was certain. Why are you unwilling to do that with the refutation?

Just as is the case with your argument. The problem is, you're trying to use the uncertainty of your position to claim it should be taken seriously, yet you are unwilling to take seriously any other claim on the same basis of its uncertainty. That's a double standard, which is very hypocritical.

That's the pot calling the kettle black.

WMD

Wayne Delia

Duh. What you're ignoring is that there's no supporting evidence; no independent corroboration outside the Bible.

That isn't the way it is, though, because it's only your strawman argument. The argue that Julius Caesar was a Roman emperor, for example, is supported by coins known to be authentic which bear the likeness of Caesar's visage. No such evidence exists for the paranormal, metaphysical, supernatural claims of the Bible. The Biblical claims are circular precisely because the only evidence you care to offer is the Biblical claims themselves, nothing else.

That's already been pointed out to you: the Wager, as a syllogism, is sound (the logic doesn't contradict itself), but invalid (the premises are not established to be valid). A very similar argument would be "If your nephew is a monkey, then you are a monkey's uncle." Just like the Wager, it is logically sound, but as an argument, it is invalid. (Unless, of course, your nephew is a monkey.)

Any argument can be constructed from sound logic, such as the one above - "If your nephew is a monkey, then you are a monkey's uncle." The validity of the argument depends on whether the premises are established. The premise of Pascal's Wager (that eternal punishment exists and should be avoided) isn't established.

In conclusion, if you accept that Pascal's Wager is sound AND valid, then... quite literally... on the same line of reasoning... you accept that you are a monkey's uncle.

WMD

Wayne Delia

But you are depending on this "uncertainty" to beg for acceptance of the uncertain proposition. When it comes to someone else's uncertain argument, all of a sudden, the uncertainty works against them, while you are trying to make uncertainty work for you. That's very hypocritical.

In risk analysis, an uncertain proposition is discounted by means of "expected value." For example, in a lottery, a ticket might cost $1, with a top prize offered of $1,000,000. The prize is guaranteed to be awarded if the number is selected, and the accounts have been audited by an independent accounting firm. Should a person then buy a ticket? Not buying a ticket guarantees that an opportunity to win the million is lost. It all depends, of course, on the "expected value" of the proposition. If two million tickets are sold, and the prize is one million, the expected value of each ticket is 50 cents per ticket - that's how much one can "expect" to win based on the odds against winning.

Now, suppose there's a proposition that for the $1 lottery ticket, the prize is an unlimited, infinite amount of money. There is no independent accounting firm which will verify that the prize exists and will be awarded. The prize may or may not be awarded, depending on the whim of the person heading up the lottery payout. Should a person buy a ticket? One cannot use the "uncertainty" of the whole proposition to determine any kind of "expected value." Nor can one compare the cost of $1 per ticket as "reducing to zero" in the event the prize does not actually exist, due to the proposed prize being infinite. It's still a cost of $1, so Pascal's Wager is analogously wrong.

Would you buy a lottery ticket in anticipation of an "uncertain" infinite prize? A simple yes or no will do.

WMD

Mageth

Correct. For the sake of argument. But remember, the argument addresses the first premise of Pascal's Wager - the threat of eternal torment (and consideration of a sort of God who would subject people to such).

No, this God may or may not be associated with eternal torment. That is what we are addressing here. The question in front of you is if it is safe for you to believe that God is "associated with eternal torment".

Again, we're talking Mageth's Hellish Wager here, not Pascal's Wager. What MHW does is "tell you" to lack belief in a God that would subject people to eternal torment, as that is the less risky belief.

Belief or Nonbelief in eternal torment and in a God that would subject people to eternal torment is the option being addressed - not belief or nonbelief in God.

You have failed to address the issue at hand.

And your repetition of your formulation of Pascal's Wager will get you nowhere. Once again, PW fails in its attempt "tell you to take action to avoid eternal torment." Nonbelief is certainly an option. In light of the fact that "the threat of eternal torment" remains a superstition, acting on Pascal's Wager is irrational. (Again, your insistence in the need to "prove" the superstition a superstition and in the resulting "uncertainty" is not in the least compelling to a rational person. It would only appeal to someone that puts stock in superstitions.)

Back up a step there. The question to be addressed is "is there risk in believing that God will subject people to eternal torment?" MHW indicates that there is. Therefore, the rational position is to lack belief in "eternal torment". And this post of yours completely fails to address MHW.

Hey, Mageth's Hellish Wager provides you some help there. It informs you that it's more prudent to lack belief in a God that will subject people to eternal torment. If you want to believe in God, believe in a God that would not do such a thing. It's the rational thing to do.

Zing! That's the sound of my post going clear over your head. Do you understand arguments, and how sometimes an assumption is made in order to make the argument? And how, for example, MHW is a specifically formulated, directed argument at the first premise of PW, and is not indicative of what I may or may not believe, or argue, about the existence of God?

Hint: I'll argue till the cows come home, or until someone actually comes up with some rational reason to believe (which PW fails miserably in doing; it's actually just about the worst argument there is for belief) in defense of the position of nonbelief.

BTW, under Mageth's Hellish Wager, I'm quite possibly in a safer position than you, since I, by default lack belief in a God that would subject people to eternal torment.

enemigo

You've got that backwards... an argument's validity has to do with the structure/internal consistency... soundness refers to whether or not the premises are actually true.

Mageth

Why the hell would I want to perform risk analysis on a threat that is clearly just a superstition, a threat for which no evidence can be presented, a threat which is derived from the ramblings of some ancient religious texts???

Again, you're asking me to act irrationally based on a superstition. As there is *absolutely no reason* to put any stock at all in the superstition, not one iota of a reason to believe even that it might be true, I have absolutely no need whatsoever to "prove the certainty" that it is a superstition.

For it is clearly a superstition. And will remain so until you or someone else can demonstrate that it is not.

You fail to recognize that you have no "argument from uncertainty". I am absolutely certain that it is a superstition, and to act on superstition is irrational.

Wayne Delia

Sure it is, because a god is proposed which rewards non-belief.

Here's a huge problem you're having: You keep parrotting that Pascal's Wager doesn't specify which god to follow, but Pascal explicitly limited the choices between the Roman Catholic Christian God and no gods at all. Your failed agenda is along the lines of "Get them to believe in some sort of god out of fear, guilt, greed, and self-interest, then casually mention the Christian God as a possible viable alternative among all the possible gods." It doesn't work, because you have a whole fleet of carts before the horse. That's why you are constantly ignoring the non-belief option. You're actually committing the logical fallacy of "Stolen Concept" - you're assuming a particular proposition (that avoiding all forms of eternal torment require a belief in the corresponding god) in order to establish the opposite (that a god such as "God Z" possibly exists, who rewards all nonbelievers with salvation).

In order to get to that point, you'll need to establish that the eternal punishment is an actual threat. If you can't, or won't, do that, by your own line of reasoning, you'll sign up to buy a $1 lottery ticket from any con artist who claims an infinite, but unsubstantiated, payout.

That's where the "Stolen Concept" comes in: your conclusion here includes the possibilty of God Z, but in order to get to that point, you had to exclude God Z from the possibility of existing (or, more accurately, you swept it under the carpet).

The Wager only provides an illogical way of helping those who already believe feel better about what they believe. It does nothing in the way of logical persuasion, because the premises are invalid.

Once again, you are dishonestly characterizing someone else's position. You seem to do that with compulsive frequency.

WMD

Wayne Delia

While that is an accurate portrayal of submitting to superstitious threats, it's not a proper analogy to the dangers of eternal torment. All the things you mention above actually exist. We can point to actual cases with evidence of drive-by shootings, people who have suffered aneurisms, and rotting bedposts collapsing. On the other hand, there is no evidence whatsoever for the actual threat of eternal torment.

However, the point is taken that it would be insane to live one's life in fear and dread of all sorts of superstitions or extremely unlikely catastrophes. My favorite is getting my son to laugh by warning him he should always live in fear of getting hit by the RMS Queen Mary on the New Jersey Turnpike. As far-fetched as it is, it's more likely than eternal damnation in hell, because both the Queen Mary ship and the New Jersey Turnpike both actually exist.

WMD