Amaleq13

It comes from logic, Don, given the conception of an act of "free will" as one that could have had a different outcome (ie not entirely determined by prior events). Perfectly certain foreknowledge logically precludes that possibility. If the outcome of one's apparent choice can be known with perfect certainty before it is made, it cannot be considered truly "free" because it could not have been otherwise. There is really no difference between that scenario and a rigged game. One only has the illusion of a free choice.

This holds true, I think, whether the perfectly certain foreknowledge is actually held by an entity or even if it is only theoretically possible given sufficient prior information (ie deterministic universe lacking any omniscient entity).

The only real hope we have for free will is the notion that it is impossible for anyone to have sufficient knowledge of the relevant prior factors to render perfect predictions of future outcomes.

In other words, as long as no one can predict my choices with perfect certainty beforehand, I can at least pretend my will is free. Take that away, and you can't even pretend.

IMHO, the best (only?) way a theist can reconcile this is by assuming God provides free will to us by willingly limiting God's omniscience. Many Christians to whom I have presented this, however, seem uncomfortable with the idea of a God lacking knowledge of the future even if that limitation is self-imposed. One more inherently problematic aspect to belief in an omni-max deity, I suppose.

The atheist, I think, has to rely on the notion that the incredible complexity of the human brain results in an "emergent phenomenon" that is not entirely dependent on prior events (ie consciousness).

IMV, some degree of faith/unsubstantiaed assumption is required for both positions to retain a belief in free will.

My money would be on free will existing only as an illusion but one that is unlikely to ever be dispelled by objective evidence.

(any continuation of this discussion will likely be moved to the appropriate forum but feel free to do so via PM)

Petergdi

Why? Remember that God is supposed to be a-temporal so it is a mistake to use before and after relative to God's awareness.

This introduces the ideas of "before" and "after" relative to God as if we thought that God was subject to time.

Peter.

GakuseiDon

Thanks Amaleq, I've sent you a PM.

Amaleq13

One can only claim God is "atemporal" if one also claims that God never acts within our space-time. If God's knowledge can be said to exist in our space-time prior to our apparent choice, the logical problem persists. This is precisely what perfectly certain foreknowledge describes.

It is an incoherent claim to assert God both is and is not atemporal. This is not a problem for the faithful as they routinely make incoherent claims about an omnimax deity but it is a problem for anyone concerned about logic.

No, it is as though God is acting within our space-time and holding perfectly certain knowledge about the outcomes of our seemingly free choices. If the perfectly certain prior knowledge exists in the same space-time continuum as the choice, the notion that it can be considered "free" is logically precluded.

Solo

This idea has been brilliantly played in Volker Schloendorff's 2004 film The Ninth Day. A gestapo operative in the occupied Luxembourg tries to destroy a local bishop who is hostile to the Concordat between Hitler and the Vatican. He lifts a local priest from the notorious Mauthausen camp and promises to free him for good if he co-operates and writes a letter denouncing his superior. In the battle of wits and wills between the two men, Gebhardt, the gestapo smooth-talker advances the same theory of Judas as you have. The plot is very clever and the acting great. Maybe you want to see the movie to understand the application of the Judas-loved-Jesus theory.

Jiri

JoeWallack

JW:
If we go to the original related narrative:

Mark

The prophecy source is:

"as it is written of him"

There is no obvious reference from the Jewish Bible. There is an obvious reference from another significant source for "Mark", Paul:

1 Corinthians 11

Is Paul the writing that "Mark" is referring to? Even if the above is not original than it is probably Fake Paul circa late 1st century and still before "Mark" was written.

This also brings us a step closer to Marcion. The claim of Judas prophecy fulfillment that orthodox Christianity claims is INTER (between Bibles) actually started out as INTRA (within the Gospel) prophecy fulfillment. Jesus predicted it and than it happened. This exorcises the Jewish Bible as a necessary component of prophecy fulfillment. Hell-o Marcion.

The first Editors of "Mark", "Matthew"/"Luke", make ridiculous claims of prophecy fulfillment from the Jewish Bible. Are they trying too hard because they are Reacting to a source which has no non-ironic prophecy fulfillment from the Jewish Bible?



Joseph

http://www.errancywiki.com/index.php/Main_Page

aa5874

Now, from where did Paul get 1 Corinthians 11.23-25? It is almost certain that he did NOT receive it from the Lord.

All the 1st century Pauls are FAKE. There was not one single Jesus believer or Pauline Church before the Fall of the Jewish Temple.

And the author of the gMark was not aware or influenced by any Pauline writings. gMark's Jesus spoke in parables so that the Jews would remain in sin , however the gospel of the Pauline Jesus is VERY CLEAR AND DETAILED.

The Pauline writings does not appear to be a source for the author of gMark at all, this author of gMark seems confused about the resurrection, but critical information in the Pauline writing should have been known that over 500 people saw Jesus in a resurrected state.

All the Pauline Epistles and Acts of the Apostles are after the writings of Justin Martyr, or after the middle of the 2nd century.

Petergdi

I'm assuming that you are thinking of the argument found in David Widerker's "A problem for the eternity solution" or something very similar. If so, I think you have misunderstood. There is no logical problem with the idea that past events are contingent upon our present choices. That is to say that if we had made a different choice then the past leading up to that choice would have been different. It seems very odd, but there is no logical problem with the idea. (i. e. it does not lead to a contradiction - there has been a lot of work on the idea that the past may be contingent on present choices since the time of William of Ockham and if this were actually logically impossible then I think someone would have made a successful argument to that effect by now.)

Indeed, I know of no good solution to the problem of reconciling my ability to make choices with the observed facts of nature which does not make the past partially contingent on my present choices. I do not mean by this that I can alter the past, but rather that the past would have been different had I made a different choice. Since attempting to convince myself that I cannot make choices does seem to lead to a contradiction, a solution in which the past is partially contingent on my choices is logically preferable to one which denies that I can make choices.

I'm not claiming that I entirely buy this line of reasoning, because it is a rather mindboggling idea. But I do not believe it in any way violates logic. You might look at section 5.11 in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on compatibilism. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#5.1

I claim nothing of the sort.


The "omnimax deity" of popular atheism often only superficially resembles normal monotheistic conceptions of God. You can't get away with it in serious philosophical discussions where the participants know full well that no one has ever produced a sound proof or disproof of any of the classical conceptions of God. Someone who doesn't know this can easily mislead by what seem to be very plausible logical proofs or disproofs of the existence of God. Any purported demonstration of a logical incoherency inherent in the idea of God needs to be looked at with the knowledge that if it really worked it would make the proposer one of the most famous people in history.



No it isn't. If the prior knowledge would have been different if the choice had been different there is no contradiction.

Peter.

Amaleq13

No.

I never made that claim. The contradiction I am arguing is between the notion of perfectly certain foreknowledge and the notion that one could have chosen otherwise (ie truly free choice). If it is known with perfect certainty before one makes an apparent choice, it makes no sense to claim that choice was free because the perfectly certain nature of the foreknowledge precludes any possibility that you could have chosen otherwise.

You have to choose between two doors at 3pm local time.

Before the universe was even created, God knew with perfect certainty that you will choose door #1.

Is there any possibility you could choose anything except door #1? Not without denying God's perfect foreknowledge.

In what sense can this be considered a "free choice" when there is really only one possible outcome?

You certainly do whenever you assert that God is "atemporal" yet still somehow acts within our space-time. You can't have it both ways except by faith.

No, I get the notion from theists and primarily Christians. Similar difficulties arise from discussion of singularities so there is no need to get one's panties bunched.

If the prior knowledge was perfectly certain, there appears to be no actual possibility for you to have chosen otherwse and, therefore, no reasonable basis upon which to declare your "choice" to have been free. The contradiction stands and the perception of free will exposed as an illusion. This holds true whether the perfectly certain foreknowledge is held by a god or by some amazingly powerful computer. Truly free choice is logically incompatible with anyone's ability to consistently make 100% accurate predictions.

And this discussion continues to be inappropriate for this forum. I'm engaged with Don via PM and not really interested in another but you do not appear to be properly grasping my argument. :wave: