sophie

John : it is a big mistake to think that language is an a priori requirement for understanding.

This language would be expressible as regular expressions. L1 is intended to convey the existential representatives of understanding. What makes a human not be confused between cups, a 32C, a second cup and a black and white cup. What is the language of representation which uniquely indentifies things we seem to know, things we understand, truths we learn. How can we distinguish between true and false in the existentional sense. A language is necessary for the outcome to be regular in nature and unique in apparence.

It is this reasoning which makes me, and others rationalise the requirement of an encoding language. It is not a language to be spoken and we will only learn its basis through observation. Realising it is there gives neuroscience a chance to put its best foot foward.

Luiseach

Hi John:

So you're saying that language is a representation of what we think of as our understanding, and not understanding itself.

Okay, how's this:

If we say/think/write/express the following ---> 'I understand such-and-such about X,' this statement in itself is not the literal experience of understanding something about X, but rather a representation of the inner, private experience of understanding something about X.

By the way, and as an aside, do you agree with Wittgenstein's criticisms of private language theory?

Now that I look again at what I wrote about language and understanding, I think that the wording of my extrapolation was clumsy and vague!

Let me try again.

How about this?

There is no consciousness of understanding without language...we may experience understanding of X, but without the language to represent what it is we understand, we cannot be conscious of it.

[Aside: Goodness, does this mean that our conscious understanding of X is never immediate, but always retrospective? I would think so.]

Is this not the workings of the private language of understanding to which Sophie refers, then? L1, in other words?

Righto...so understanding is the mind grasping the significance of perceived regularities in 'reality,' and generalising from this for use in the assessments of any given situation/problem.

However, John, don't you agree that when we learn 'axioms' (or truths?), they are clothed in language - which is metaphorical, representative?

Using your example about the experience of getting wet when it rains: we don't learn this axiom/truth solely through the experience of standing outside in the rain whilst we get soaked. The understanding of the raw experience of soggy discomfort being linked to the wet stuff falling from the sky is, in human cultures, represented using language. Zebras may understand the causual link between rain and sogginess as well as we do, but zebras - unlike us signifyin' primate types - don't talk about the causal link between rain and sogginess. Zebras don't use language to represent their understanding of realities. Humans, on the other hand, express their understanding through language.

The analogy doesn't work. There is a world (please excuse the pun) of difference between a planet and a self-aware living being. Both are made of the same 'stuff,' but the main difference is that planets are not aware of being planets, and they certainly don't develop languages to represent their understanding of being planets. We, on the other hand, are self-aware systems that use language to represent our understanding of things (ourselves, our brains, realities, etc.). We are matter that has developed self-awareness and a system of symbolic value with which to express our understandings of the realities we encounter.

Certainly, like you point out, our brains implement languages. These languages, however, have innate beginnings within our brains...can we not hypothesise that the self-aware brain is hardwired with the predilection for language use?

By the way, and correct me if I'm wrong Sophie, but I think Sophie is using the word 'language' in a metaphorical sense, to represent how the matter of the brain works. (I may be mistaken!)

From my point of view, I hesitate to think of the inner workings of the brain as a language in the same sense as a public language like English or Mandarin. But I think Sophie is suggesting that the inner workings of the brain can be read or understood as a language - as a 'code' that can be read. Again, I could be misinterpreting Sophie's theory here.

Perhaps we could come up with a better word to describe the process of understanding that would cover both humans and zebras, but certainly not planets?

I don't think you're making something of nothing, and I completely understand your reservations about viewing language as a requirement for understanding (especially given the excellent zebra example).

The physical experience of understanding X (i.e. the neurological processes that accompany understanding, grasping, realising, connecting, etc.) does occur without the need for a public language.

However.

We are not zebras - we are conscious, self-aware, language-using systems. Our experience of understanding X is not the same as a zebra's experience of understanding X, because our brains are not limited to the immediate apprehension of the facts of X. We conceptualise our understandings of X using a public language, which is a representation of our conscious understanding of X.

So, human understanding (that is self-aware and conscious and represented) is different from zebra understanding (conscious, but not self-aware or represented), because we, unlike zebras, have a highly-developed language that we use to articulate our understanding.

Hmmm...

The 'private language' of the brain (whatever that is...after all, it's private, and cannot be accessed directly) is Sophie's term for the experience of apprehension of reality (I think!)...this level of understanding can be shared by humans, zebras and elephants.

Golly, I'm exhausted now...

sophie

Luiseach,

OK, so if we call L2, conscious thought, and proceed to prime an example of a baby stranded on a desert island without being able to mimic L3, would we then be able to say L2 is the language of consciousness. As such if it is the language of consciousness, I would have no choice but to agree with your suggestion that L2, as the go-between, is not formed solely by or as the conscious L1; I would think that L2 is also formed by the acquired L3.

In one case L2 is formed by the influence of L3 through conscious communication together with the urges/impulses which L1 would place on L2 to foster conscious thought.

In the other case L3 would be formed through conscious observation of desert island reality together with the urges/impulses which L1 would place on L2 to foster conscious thought.

In either case L2 is the language of consciousness. Private reality and the observable world intersect at L2.

(this part is ignorable)
Now would one not say that L2 can develop in and of itself, for itself after some primal development shifts between L1 and L3, and as such L2 becomes truth-in-itself. Additionally as a truth-in-itself the furthest L2 should be able to develop would be to be a truth-machine, a glorious consciousness (perhaps with a copy of the world within).

sophie

Luiseach, on your 666th post, you numbered the beasts correctly concerning your understanding of the distinctions I tried to make between L1, L2 and L3. This is how I see things today :

L1 : a private language of the brain. The language of unique representations of understanding of reality.

L2 : the language of consciousness - a semi-private language.

L3 : public languages like English, French and Intel Assembler.

Luiseach

lol! Well spotted, Sophie...and the pun is greatly appreciated as well


Interesting...I agree, especially, with the modifications to L2 (that is, viewing consciousness as a semi-private language, as a junction between received public language L3 and the brain's neurological processes involved in understanding L1).

[Edited to add]

However, I'm really interested in L1...the private 'language' of the brain...by 'representations of understanding of reality,' do you mean the literal, physical changes that occur in the brain's structure to accommodate its apprehensions of realities?

excreationist

leyline:
And my "is different to" and "is touching" examples are similar to that love example... they don't fit the logical pattern A->B, B->C thing either or really concern cause and effect - so things like love aren't that special in this regard. Non-emotional things like "is different to" fit the same pattern as "is in love with".

leyline

excreationist

"And my "is different to" and "is touching" examples are similar to that love example... they don't fit the logical pattern A->B, B->C thing either or really concern cause and effect - so things like love aren't that special in this regard. Non-emotional things like "is different to" fit the same pattern as "is in love with"."

Ah .....now i see what you mean. Yes i would agree that it isn't just emotional things that are sometimes outside cause and effect thinking. Aspects of QM are like that too of course, as well as the examples you gave.

I was just emphasising one particular aspect of truth, the holistic truth and pointing out why it doesn't work in that case. I was also writing in the context of my general perspective with regard to truth in this thread. That is that truth generally is holistic. It is part of our identity and culture and the way we relate to the world, thus a complete abstract cause and effect understanding of 'truth' as a whole will fail, ........while in itself abstraction with cause and effect is as good a candidate for a truth generating relationship as any other, and that includes its relationship to truth itself. Its just a different kind of truth about 'something' because its a different kind of relationship to that 'something'.

As a side note..... the "is touching" and "is different to" examples are of course things that can be abstracted from something without getting involved. Like quantities as you say. But both can also be interpreted emotionally too. The 'group hug' for example can emotionally be felt as actually agreeing with the logical relationship of A->B, B->C, therefore A->C. So to go to the other extreme and state that emotion is outside logic would also be to miss things. I am sure that with a little imagination we could construct a similar emotional interpretation for "is different to" that agrees with the logic train.

For me what this shows is how relative truth is, and how different interpretations reveal different truths about things.

sophie

Luiseach you're really interested in L1...the private 'language' of the brain...by 'representations of understanding of reality,' and you asked if I meant the literal, physical changes that occur in the brain's structure to accommodate its apprehensions of realities?

Along with the following excerpt you presented from
Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, eds., A Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) 368. - At best, perhaps, we could convince our subjective selves that we understand via a supposed 'private language,' but would we be able to convince others of the existence of this language without undermining its privacy?

I am willing to discuss this private language in another thread and show that the excerpt from A Companion to Epistemology is not substantially true.

You seem willing enough so I will prepare the topic as "The private language of the brain".

Tazz10m

You are correct that it "seems" to...but that doesn't mean that it does.

Try considering it in 'pureness'.