Thomas Metcalf

Chris McHugh has provided a novel and intriguing defense against the evidential argument from evil in an Internet debate[1] and a message board post[2], as well as elsewhere in the literature[3]. In the present post, I will examine whether McHugh's "Expectations Defense" ("ED") succeeds against the evidential argument from evil. I argue that ED only has a hope of working in defense of a significantly different version of God ("GB") from the God of the apologists[4] ("GC"), and even then, it must ultimately fail because of similarities between GB and GC.

Here's a statement of ED from McHugh:

In response to one of my message board posts[6], McHugh writes:

There seems to be a confusion immediately. McHugh is taking my position to be that the existence of widespread intense apparently gratuitous suffering and premature death is inconsistent with the existence of GC. Yet those who propound the evidential argument from evil take the current amount of suffering to be strong (but not deductively certain) evidence against the existence of GC.

With this point clear, let us examine whether ED successfully defends GC against the evidential argument from evil. I wish to draw a distinction[8] between the God of the apologists, GC, and the God of the Bible, GB. We know that GC and GB are de dicto distinct; the former is defined to be maximally great, and, more crudely, the being for whose existence such apologists as Anselm, Descartes, Swinburne, and Plantinga have argued. An extended description of GC is available within Hoffman and Rosencrantz[9]. GC is maximally great, which means he possesses every great-making property, such as powerfulness, great knowledge, moral goodness, and the like, all maximally. There can be no one more powerful or more knowledgeable or morally better than GC. Now, it is these three properties in particular that have led atheologians and other non-Christians to present arguments from evil. To these atheologians, the existence of widespread intense apparently gratuitous suffering and premature death seems surprising given the existence of GC.

McHugh's response is that, in fact, this situation should not be surprising at all, given the statements in the Bible. McHugh believes that the Bible gives good evidence of God's allowance of intense suffering. Therefore, to McHugh, we should not be surprised to see intense suffering in the present day either.

Yet all we can conclude for certain at this point is that GB should be expected to permit intense suffering; this says nothing about GC, unless it can be shown that GC is identical to GB. In fact, GC should not be expected to permit this much intense suffering; such is the motivation for the evidential argument from evil, and McHugh seems to grant that this point has some force with a recognition that there needs to be a defense such as ED in the first place. But while it is correct that GB permits large amounts of intense suffering, this seems to be evidence that GB is not identical to GC; after all, the latter is maximally great and this entails the ability and motivation to prevent gratuitous suffering. If GB is the sort of being that allows for gratuitous suffering, and there seem to be good reasons to think he is, then GB is simply not maximally great. ED only tells us that God permits lots of intense suffering, not that he has good reasons to permit this suffering.

At this point, one could say that McHugh has successfully defended the existence of a god that's not identical to the god that occupies the focus of much of Western analytic philosophy of religion. Therefore, some might take his conclusion to be irrelevant in the larger picture. But I think the Bible makes it clear that GB is in fact maximally great, in which case all the intense suffering GB allows and seems to condone is evidence that GB is internally inconsistent. After all, the Bible states that God is omnipotent[10], omniscient[11], and states in numerous places that God is worthy of worship as morally good[12]. These seem to be the characteristics of a maximally great being, or at least, a being that is maximally proficient in the relevant great-making characteristics to be able and willing to prevent any needless suffering. If this is so, it seems that while the Bible provides reason to think God will permit a very great amount of suffering, it also provides reason to think God won't, and the evidential challenge remains.

I conclude that the evidential argument from evil poses a real challenge to GC, and as if this weren't enough, that the contradictory behavior and descriptions of GB give reason to think this being does not exist either. While the Bible provides reason to think God will permit a large amount of suffering, this is no evidence that his permission of a large amount of suffering is in fact justified. McHugh seems to recognize the problem here:

It seems to me that a defense against the evidential argument from evil would have to show that God is justified in permitting this much intense suffering, not simply that he is likely to do so. This would require an independent defense, beyond ED, such as UPD or FWD perhaps. Yet UPD fails against the evidential argument from evil. I find FWD to be very poor indeed, but that's a discussion for another thread. But I think it must be acknowledged on all sides that ED is insufficient.


Notes

[1] Formal Debates and Discussions: Theism or Atheism: McHugh vs. Krueger
[2] Existence of God(s): Theism or Atheism: McHugh vs. Krueger
[3] Chris McHugh "A Refutation of Drange's Arguments from Evil and Nonbelief", Philo vol. 5 no. 1 (Spring-Summer 2002).
[4] By this I mean the "maximally great" being of Anselm and his successors, as well as, it appears, McHugh.
[5] McHugh "Formal Debates and Discussions: Theism or Atheism: McHugh vs. Krueger".
[6] Thomas Metcalf "Existence of God(s): Theism or Atheism: McHugh vs. Krueger."
[7] McHugh "Existence of God(s): Theism or Atheism: McHugh vs. Krueger."
[8] This distinction, and some of these objections, are similar to what Theodore Drange presents in "McHugh's Expectations Dashed", Philo vol. 5 no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2002).
[9] Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosencrantz, The Divine Attributes.
[10] See in particular Luke 1:37.
[11] See Hebrews 4:13.
[12] See in particular Isaiah 5:16, John 3:16, and Isaiah 30:18.
[13] McHugh "Formal Debates and Discussions: Theism or Atheism: McHugh vs. Krueger".

K

Thomas:

Very well done. I would take it one step further.

The existence of any evil whatsoever is proof positive that the traits of a maximally great being can not be maximized independent of each other. Any defense regarding the presence of evil ultimately rests in limiting GC's omni-benevolence due to another trait (such as the omni-wisdom of a plan for a greater good). If the traits of GC can not be maximized independently, then there is no reason to believe that the Existence trait can be maximized independently either. Without strict independence of the traits of GC, the argument for its existence evaporates.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by K :

This is an interesting point. I've thought along similar lines before, but I'd like to see how you take it further...

I think I understand. If God were less wise, he would eliminate even the evil that's necessary for a greater good.

Then by "God's existence trait is maximized" you would mean "God exists", and by "God's existence trait is not maximized" you would mean "God doesn't exist."

Of which particular argument are you speaking?

Thomas Metcalf

This might be a useful and shorter way to say what I said in the first post in this thread.

The Expectations Defense points us to some evidence that God, if he exists, allows lots of apparently pointless suffering. But the atheist already grants this point. The atheist questions whether God, if he exists, is justified in allowing this much suffering. The two are separate questions.

I hate to use such a cliché example, but: Suppose I were to assert that Hitler is not morally good. The apologist for Hitler might say, "Wait a minute -- we shouldn't expect Hitler to display evidence of his moral goodness. Just take the Holocaust for example." But this would not be evidence that Hitler is morally good, only that Hitler is expected to permit and to cause lots of suffering. But this is not in dispute. What is under scrutiny is whether Hitler is morally good, and this depends on whether he was justified in permitting and causing lots of intense suffering and premature death. All of our evidence suggests that he was not, and merely pointing to examples of his permission and causation of intense suffering and premature death doesn't tell us he was justified in such actions.

Jobar

It seems to me that saying we should expect GB to allow great amounts of evil is equivalent to saying that GB in not omnibenevolent. If GB is omnibenevolent *and* omnipotent, then He would be able to find a path which leads to the unknown ultimate good (postulated by the Unknown Purpose Defense) without causing the suffering of His creations.

I think that the ED shoots McHugh's argument in the foot.

Dr Rick

Not if the ultimate good is logically contingent upon the allowance of evil, in which case it would be impossible for even an omni-god to avoid allowing evil to obtain the ultimate good. Since we don't know what the ultimate good is, we cannot determine if evil or its allowance is logically necessary for it.

Rick

Ernest Sparks

Please remind me why the God of the Apologists is designated "GC". What does the "C" mean? Thanks.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Ernest Sparks :

Good question. It's left over from "God of Christianity."

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Jobar :

Well, yeah, kind of. It is indeed saying that GB isn't omnibenevolent, or at least, that we have good reason to think he's not because it doesn't seem plausible that all this suffering, and all the suffering in the Bible, was logically necessary for a greater good. But there still could be some suffering, as long as it's logically necessary for a greater good -- it's just not plausible that this much is.

Dr Rick

How can we determine how much suffering is plausible for a unknown greater good?

Rick