Freethought & Rationalism Archive

rainbow walking · 07-06-2003, 11:35 AM

I found Bill Snedden�s postulate of inter-subjective morality an intriguing concept which led me to the following possibilities:

The Natural Path To Inter-Subjective Morality

Humans have a natural ability to adapt to their environment and to adapt their environment to themselves. Humans do so by observation of their environment and mimicking those environmental behaviors they observe to be most proficient to their survival.

It is likely that the first humans observed other predatory animals surviving by hunting in packs and began to do the same. It is probable that man�s first inkling of moral necessity arose from these conditions during group hunts.

Man also adapts to his environment by observing the behavior of his fellow man. During these observations man probably began to make the first value assignments relative to his group endeavors. The subsequent observations man would have made as a result of the group effort and its success would naturally lead him to value the efforts of individuals who helped ensure a successful hunt. These value assignments may have taken the form of rewards for contribution in being allowed first pick of the best part of the kill.

Man probably observed that some of his fellow hunters were naturally endowed with qualities that contributed to the survival and success of the hunt. Some may have been more observant of the patterns of the prey and better equipped the group to track and find their game. Others may have been better equipped to throw stones or spears more accurately and thus assure a kill. Others may have been equipped with ferocious temperaments and instilled courage in the group during the kill of bigger, more dangerous game. Others may have been equipped with greater strength and able to carry larger portions of meat back to the waiting women and children. Man would have been able to observe these natural endowments and how they each contributed to the success of the group hunt.

From these observations each man in the group probably learned to find a contributing role in the hunt and assure himself and mate a portion of the kill. Such men would come to appreciate the role each played and begin to value the contributions of each. In the event one of the group was killed or lost, the entire group would have come to understand that each member was valuable in securing the survival of the group. So man began to assign value based on an expectation of future contributions by each individual member.

From this point man would probably begin to take measures to ensure peaceful co-existence and equitable sharing of the game among the contributing members. Thus inter-subjective concepts of value were born and based on anticipated future contributions to the group by each individual member.

And morality is born out of natural conditions.

Thus morality is nothing more than a groups expectation of future contributions to the group by each individual in the group. Any behavior that would hinder those future expectations of contribution would be deemed wrong and any behavior that assured the realization of group expectations would be deemed right.

From this foundation comes personal value assignment and the mutual agreement that all members have value based on expectation of future contributions to the survival of the group.

bd-from-kg · 07-06-2003, 12:27 PM

rainbow walking:

Almost all of your post is devoted to outlining a theory as to how certain observable attitudes, preferences, behavioral traits, etc. might have come to be common to most humans. But what does this have to do with the question?

Suppose that (like people in an earlier time) we could observe the kinds of traits that you describe but had no idea why most people have them. How would this affect the "intersubjective morality" concept that you describe here? For that matter, suppose that these traits had a supernatural origin. How would this impact your theory, and why?

It seems to me that all that's really needed here is the observation that humans have such-and-such a fundamental nature. Why they have it is really quite irrelevant. I find this obsession with evolutionary explanations of human behavior in the context of moral theory rather baffling.

rainbow walking · 07-06-2003, 01:08 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
rainbow walking:

Almost all of your post is devoted to outlining a theory as to how certain observable attitudes, preferences, behavioral traits, etc. might have come to be common to most humans. But what does this have to do with the question?

Suppose that (like people in an earlier time) we could observe the kinds of traits that you describe but had no idea why most people have them. How would this affect the "intersubjective morality" concept that you describe here? For that matter, suppose that these traits had a supernatural origin. How would this impact your theory, and why?

It seems to me that all that's really needed here is the observation that humans have such-and-such a fundamental nature. Why they have it is really quite irrelevant. I find this obsession with evolutionary explanations of human behavior in the context of moral theory rather baffling.

Hi bd,
The evolutionary explanations serve to draw out the naturally endowed propensities. That's why they are offered. Most theists seem to think a god is necessary to assign value, but if some sort of explanation or description isn't forthcoming of how man could have come to the place of assigning value naturally, then the theist imagines he has a valid point. My description above only accentuates the claim that all moral assignment is natural and goes further to describe a possible path for that natural inclination to have followed to get us where we are today.

The only recourse the theist has is to start pleading ID.

rainbow walking · 07-07-2003, 08:04 AM

bd from kg: Almost all of your post is devoted to outlining a theory as to how certain observable attitudes, preferences, behavioral traits, etc. might have come to be common to most humans. But what does this have to do with the question?

Suppose that (like people in an earlier time) we could observe the kinds of traits that you describe but had no idea why most people have them. How would this affect the "intersubjective morality" concept that you describe here? For that matter, suppose that these traits had a supernatural origin. How would this impact your theory, and why?

It seems to me that all that's really needed here is the observation that humans have such-and-such a fundamental nature. Why they have it is really quite irrelevant. I find this obsession with evolutionary explanations of human behavior in the context of moral theory rather baffling.

rw: What I find even more baffling is the basis of this objection. All you're really saying is that we should just pull the "how" out of our language and forestall any further scientific inquiry once we establish that something is just "natural".

Do you imagine when a theist asks you why men can even comprehend the concept of value without a god, and you answer "oh, it's just natural" that they are going to except this as a viable stand-alone explanation and just say "Oh"?

Or is it possible that you might then be confronted with an additional query of "How?" Never mind the fact that in your objection you've equivocated the "how" with the "why", if we follow your reasoning out to its logical conclusion no further scientific investigation is needed for anything. I am mystified and truly baffled that you think seeking answers to both the "how and why" is irrelevant.

bd-from-kg · 07-07-2003, 10:38 AM

rainbow walking:

Quote:

The evolutionary explanations serve to draw out the naturally endowed propensities. That's why they are offered. Most theists seem to think a god is necessary to assign value, but if some sort of explanation or description isn't forthcoming of how man could have come to the place of assigning value naturally, then the theist imagines he has a valid point.

What a theist might believe or imagine is beside the point. Your thread is titled �Moral foundations�, not �How to argue with a theist�.

Besides, by offering what�s essentially a �just so story� which has virtually no evidentiary support, you�re opening yourself up to a �refutation� along the lines of, �The latest evidence shows that that�s not how we came to be the way we are, so your theory is bunk�.

Moreover, you�re opening yourself up to the charge of �believing on faith�, which is the very charge that you should be leveling against the theist. Since there�s no real evidence that your version of the story is true, why do you believe it? Because it�s what you want to believe? Because it seems plausible to you? But the theist can give the same justifications for his beliefs.

If your theory really only depends (as I believe it does) on �how we are� and not how we got that way, why give your imagined theist a line of attack that can easily be foreclosed by refusing to speculate on the process by which we came to be the way we are?

Anyway, you have to realize that the theist will never be satisfied with historical explanations of this kind for (at least) two reasons:

(1) No historical explanation can ever be complete. If you successfully trace human nature to natural selection and thus to evolution, he�ll ask �Sure, but how did life get started?� (Hint: Goddidit.) And if you come up with a completely satisfactory explanation of how life got started, he�ll ask, �Sure, but how did the universe get started?� (Hint: Goddidit.) You can�t win this game.

(2) He considers them completely irrelevant, because he thinks that morality derives from God, not from human nature.

Here�s an example of how a theist is almost certain to respond to our (or any) evolution-based moral theory. This is from C.S. Lewis�s book Miracles:

Quote:

If the fact that men have ideas such as ought and ought not at all can be fully explained by irrational and non-moral causes [i.e., by the operation of �mechanical� natural laws] then these ideas are an illusion. The naturalist is ready to explain how the illusion arose. [Lewis outlines one such theory here; substitute your preferred brand.]

This account may (or may not) explain why men do in fact make moral judgments. It does not explain how they could be right in making them. It excludes, indeed, the very possibility of their being right. For when men say �I ought� they certainly think they are saying something, and something true, about the nature of the proposed action, and not merely about their own feelings. But if Naturalism [were] true... all moral judgments would be statements about the speaker�s feelings, mistaken by him for statements about something else (the real moral quality of actions) which does not exist.

Thus the theist�s fundamental objection to your moral theory is not so much that it�s incorrect, but that it�s not a moral theory at all: not, that is, what he would call a moral theory. No account of the sort you offer can even begin to answer this kind of objection.

Quote:

All you're really saying is that we should just pull the "how" out of our language and forestall any further scientific inquiry once we establish that something is just "natural".

Why would you think that? The question of how we got to be the way we are is fascinating and well worth investigating. I just don�t think that it�s sensible to base your moral theory on the answer � especially on one possible answer when we don�t yet know the correct answer.

Look. If I want to know how to get some pork chops for dinner tonight, it�s enough to tell me where there�s a good grocery or meat market nearby. You don�t have to tell me the entire history of Chicago or of how the local Kroger�s came to be built. These things may be interesting, but they�re not relevant. Even if your history were completely wrong, I�d be fine as long as you were right about where the Kroger store is.

Quote:

Do you imagine when a theist asks you why men can even comprehend the concept of value without a god, and you answer "oh, it's just natural" that they are going to except this as a viable stand-alone explanation and just say "Oh"?

Maybe it would be clearer if you add, �If I want something or want to keep it, I value it. And I also value (derivatively) things that I think will help me get the things I want. That�s my concept of value.� Of course the theist won�t buy this, because that�s not his concept of value. When he talks about �value� he means a mysterious thing called �intrinsic value�, meaning that some things just have �value� whether anyone wants them or not. Thus an evolutionary (or any naturalistic) explanation of how you (or humans in general) came to want, and thus to value, certain things isn�t going to cut any ice with him. In the end, you�re simply talking about entirely different things. You can�t give an evolutionary explanation of how some things came to have �intrinsic value� because there�s no such thing as intrinsic value.

rainbow walking · 07-07-2003, 02:00 PM

Ah bd...good explanation. Consider me un-baffled

Thanks for the clarification, me brain is mucho gracious also.

Alonzo Fyfe · 07-07-2003, 03:36 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
Thus the theist�s fundamental objection to your moral theory is not so much that it�s incorrect, but that it�s not a moral theory at all: not, that is, what he would call a moral theory. No account of the sort you offer can even begin to answer this kind of objection.

This is an excellent post.

I wanted to make a slight comment about the above snippet. This is not, substantially, a 'theist's objection' -- as with the rest of your objections here. I raise the same objections -- but without any theist assumptions.

My fear is that by calling these 'theist objections', you may (unintentionally) perpetuate the myth that they have no merit -- that they are ultimately to be discarded with theist claims generally.

Theists are not wrong about everything, but just some things. The type of arguments that you (correctly) criticize here are the types of arguments that deserve criticism -- the criticisms are among the things that the theists are right about.

And it does, indeed, give the theist additional ammunition when one takes a bad position against which the theist has sound objections.

The theist counter-proposal is to say that there exists 'intrinsic values' -- manufactured by God, woven into the very fabric of certain states of affairs, with an awareness of these values written directly on the human soul. There are countless problems with this counter-proposal as well.

But there is no law of God or nature that says that two people who enter into a dispute cannot, ultimately, BOTH be wrong.

rainbow walking · 07-07-2003, 06:15 PM

rw: Yes, there is a contradiction residing in the theist's claim that there is intrinsic value in man out of one side of his face and then saying there is something intrinsically wrong with man out of the other. Of, course the theist will claim the value trumps the wrong iff man returns to god.

So why can't there be "natural" intrinsic value to man?

Ah, the theist will claim god created nature and thus endowed man with intrinsic value thru nature.

Hmmm...

Yet nature appears indifferent and even antagonistic towards man in evolving all these nasty little viruses that could wipe man's existence away? So where's the intrinsic value passed along?

The theist would likely argue that these are god's messengers sent to drive man back to god, one way or the other.

Hmmm...

So the only solution is no intrinsic value?

But the survival instinct appears to be a sort of intrinsic value added genetic codification. It's definitely a valuable additive to man's survival but it isn't a man specific value but appears to be intrinsic to all life while each life form has a unique expression of it.

Hmmm...

So how do we explain this survival codification intrinsic to life? Is there a natural explanation?

I'm at an impasse. ???????

Cojana · 07-08-2003, 08:45 AM

Morality are a subjective principled value,conformity to this principle by others are the proscribed acceptence,per,,

07-06-2003, 11:35 AM	#1
rainbow walking Veteran Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Erewhon Posts: 2,608	Moral foundations I found Bill Snedden�s postulate of inter-subjective morality an intriguing concept which led me to the following possibilities: The Natural Path To Inter-Subjective Morality Humans have a natural ability to adapt to their environment and to adapt their environment to themselves. Humans do so by observation of their environment and mimicking those environmental behaviors they observe to be most proficient to their survival. It is likely that the first humans observed other predatory animals surviving by hunting in packs and began to do the same. It is probable that man�s first inkling of moral necessity arose from these conditions during group hunts. Man also adapts to his environment by observing the behavior of his fellow man. During these observations man probably began to make the first value assignments relative to his group endeavors. The subsequent observations man would have made as a result of the group effort and its success would naturally lead him to value the efforts of individuals who helped ensure a successful hunt. These value assignments may have taken the form of rewards for contribution in being allowed first pick of the best part of the kill. Man probably observed that some of his fellow hunters were naturally endowed with qualities that contributed to the survival and success of the hunt. Some may have been more observant of the patterns of the prey and better equipped the group to track and find their game. Others may have been better equipped to throw stones or spears more accurately and thus assure a kill. Others may have been equipped with ferocious temperaments and instilled courage in the group during the kill of bigger, more dangerous game. Others may have been equipped with greater strength and able to carry larger portions of meat back to the waiting women and children. Man would have been able to observe these natural endowments and how they each contributed to the success of the group hunt. From these observations each man in the group probably learned to find a contributing role in the hunt and assure himself and mate a portion of the kill. Such men would come to appreciate the role each played and begin to value the contributions of each. In the event one of the group was killed or lost, the entire group would have come to understand that each member was valuable in securing the survival of the group. So man began to assign value based on an expectation of future contributions by each individual member. From this point man would probably begin to take measures to ensure peaceful co-existence and equitable sharing of the game among the contributing members. Thus inter-subjective concepts of value were born and based on anticipated future contributions to the group by each individual member. And morality is born out of natural conditions. Thus morality is nothing more than a groups expectation of future contributions to the group by each individual in the group. Any behavior that would hinder those future expectations of contribution would be deemed wrong and any behavior that assured the realization of group expectations would be deemed right. From this foundation comes personal value assignment and the mutual agreement that all members have value based on expectation of future contributions to the survival of the group.

07-08-2003, 08:45 AM	#9
Cojana Senior Member Join Date: May 2003 Location: Reseda, California Posts: 651	purely academic Morality are a subjective principled value,conformity to this principle by others are the proscribed acceptence,per,,

Thread Tools	Search this Thread
Show Printable Version	Search this Thread: Advanced Search

07-06-2003, 12:27 PM	#2
bd-from-kg Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2000 Location: King George, VA Posts: 1,400	rainbow walking: Almost all of your post is devoted to outlining a theory as to how certain observable attitudes, preferences, behavioral traits, etc. might have come to be common to most humans. But what does this have to do with the question? Suppose that (like people in an earlier time) we could observe the kinds of traits that you describe but had no idea why most people have them. How would this affect the "intersubjective morality" concept that you describe here? For that matter, suppose that these traits had a supernatural origin. How would this impact your theory, and why? It seems to me that all that's really needed here is the observation that humans have such-and-such a fundamental nature. Why they have it is really quite irrelevant. I find this obsession with evolutionary explanations of human behavior in the context of moral theory rather baffling.

07-07-2003, 08:04 AM	#4
rainbow walking Veteran Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Erewhon Posts: 2,608	bd from kg: Almost all of your post is devoted to outlining a theory as to how certain observable attitudes, preferences, behavioral traits, etc. might have come to be common to most humans. But what does this have to do with the question? Suppose that (like people in an earlier time) we could observe the kinds of traits that you describe but had no idea why most people have them. How would this affect the "intersubjective morality" concept that you describe here? For that matter, suppose that these traits had a supernatural origin. How would this impact your theory, and why? It seems to me that all that's really needed here is the observation that humans have such-and-such a fundamental nature. Why they have it is really quite irrelevant. I find this obsession with evolutionary explanations of human behavior in the context of moral theory rather baffling. rw: What I find even more baffling is the basis of this objection. All you're really saying is that we should just pull the "how" out of our language and forestall any further scientific inquiry once we establish that something is just "natural". Do you imagine when a theist asks you why men can even comprehend the concept of value without a god, and you answer "oh, it's just natural" that they are going to except this as a viable stand-alone explanation and just say "Oh"? Or is it possible that you might then be confronted with an additional query of "How?" Never mind the fact that in your objection you've equivocated the "how" with the "why", if we follow your reasoning out to its logical conclusion no further scientific investigation is needed for anything. I am mystified and truly baffled that you think seeking answers to both the "how and why" is irrelevant.

07-07-2003, 02:00 PM	#6
rainbow walking Veteran Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Erewhon Posts: 2,608	Ah bd...good explanation. Consider me un-baffled Thanks for the clarification, me brain is mucho gracious also.

07-07-2003, 06:15 PM	#8
rainbow walking Veteran Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Erewhon Posts: 2,608	rw: Yes, there is a contradiction residing in the theist's claim that there is intrinsic value in man out of one side of his face and then saying there is something intrinsically wrong with man out of the other. Of, course the theist will claim the value trumps the wrong iff man returns to god. So why can't there be "natural" intrinsic value to man? Ah, the theist will claim god created nature and thus endowed man with intrinsic value thru nature. Hmmm... Yet nature appears indifferent and even antagonistic towards man in evolving all these nasty little viruses that could wipe man's existence away? So where's the intrinsic value passed along? The theist would likely argue that these are god's messengers sent to drive man back to god, one way or the other. Hmmm... So the only solution is no intrinsic value? But the survival instinct appears to be a sort of intrinsic value added genetic codification. It's definitely a valuable additive to man's survival but it isn't a man specific value but appears to be intrinsic to all life while each life form has a unique expression of it. Hmmm... So how do we explain this survival codification intrinsic to life? Is there a natural explanation? I'm at an impasse. ???????

Freethought & Rationalism Archive

The archives are read only.