Horia Plugaru

In his paper `The Argument from Reason for the Nonexistence of God`, steven Conifer attacks what he calls `the Feign-allegiance Reply`(I`ll call it FAR). Although I think that he succesfully shows FAR to be a failure, I also think that there is a further point which an atheist can make against FAR. First I will formalise FAR and then I`ll show how the criticism of FAR can be improved.
FAR P1 If God were to make his presence clear to humanity, then most humans will worship him and follow his commands out of selfish reasons.
P2 But God wants all people to worship him ... out of sincere appretiation and love for him.
C Therefore, God doesn`t to make his presence clear to humanity.

Conifer attacks P2, showing that even if most people would belive in God for selfish reasons (in case God would clearly reveal his presence) God should still clearly reveal his presence to humanity.

But I think P1 can be attacked too.Why should we think that if God reveals clearly his presence, mostpeople will worship him for selfish reasons? In fact, it is very plausible to think to the contrary: if humans would know that there really exists a being who created the whole universe for them, gave them life, loved them and prepared a beautiful heaven for them - all out of purely unselfish reasons- they will sincerly love and appreciate this being. After all, I think it`s safe to say that if x donates a house in, say, Beverly Hills to y, y will trully love and appreciate x for this. Why should we think people will behave differently when it comes to God?
OBJECTION
A theist may object by saying that I am assumung a very optimistical view about human nature. In fact most humans are so inherently egoistical and immoral-he might say- that it`s improbable that most of them will be able to sincerly love|appreciate god even if they`d know all the good God has made for them and will make in the afterlife.
RESPONSES
R1 I am NOT assuming such a optimistical view. I don`t claim that most humans are able to sacrifice their life , for ex, for the good of others; or that most would unselfishly help smb if they don`t have something to gain or that most are able to love their neighbour unconditionally. Rather, I am defending a much more modest claim- most of them are able to feel true love-appreciation for those who make great acts of altruism toward them and who help them to fulfil their selfish interests. Most humans may not be as moral as they should be, but they are not THAT immoral either.
R2 But let`s suppose that R1 fails. Humans really are that immoral. In this case it will follow that God is responsible for this-since he created them - so his supposed moral perfection can be doubted: if free-will is compatible with a predisposition to do bad, it follows that it is also compatible with a predisposition to do good.So why didn`t God create us with this last predisposition? That would be what we would expect from a loving and all-good deity and that would also be a solution to the problem of moral evil0as Grange shows in his NONBELIEF AND EVIL 101-6. Of course, the theist might reply saying that the predisposition in question is not God`s fault but rather it is the result of the Fall. But as Martin-ATHEISM 442-3 and Drange-NONBELIEF 174-5 have argued, this response is a complete failure.
So the theist can`t escape my attack: his defence is implausible and besides, it raises serious questions about the existence of his deity.
CONCLUSION I conclude that P1 fails.

Horia Plugaru, Philosophy Department Of Bucharest University, Romania, Europe.

PS It is true that Conifer in his second criticism of FAR "Second, assuming that God is omniscient..." seems to suggest that P1 may be doubious. But this clearly is not as a direct criticism as mine and besides,his saying is compatible with the weaker thesis that only a small number of humans will authentically love God if he would clearly reveal his presence.

-DM-

[Thank you for your feedback regarding <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/steven_conifer/ar.html" target="_blank">The Argument from Reason for the Nonexistence of God</a> by Steven J. Conifer. E-mail notification has been sent to the author. Although there are no guarantees, you might want to check back from time to time for a further response following this post. And for what it's worth, I agree that people would generally tend to love and appreciate such a being as a god who created the whole universe for them, gave them life, loved them and prepared a beautiful heaven for them, and then clearly revealed his existence. --Don--]

-DM-

Steven J. Conifer responds:

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Thank you, Professor, for your feedback. Your points are well taken. However, I do not attack your P2 anywhere in my article, nor would I ever attack any such premise. I am sure, after all, that if God exists (and is as monotheists typically describe him), then he wants all people to worship him out of sincere appreciation and devotion. I instead attack both P1 and the idea that P1 somehow entails "God is justified in remaining hidden from humanity (by endowing them with the capacity to reason that they actually possess)," on which FAR (as you call it) relies. Thanks again for reading my article and for submitting your comments on it.

Best Wishes,
Steven J. Conifer

Horia Plugaru

Still, Conifer's attack on FAR CAN be improved.

Although Conifer insists in his response to the topic I started that he attacks in his article FAR's P1, I still don't think that he does this. Everything he says against FAR is in fact compatible with P1's truth.

For example, in his first criticism (let's call it Cr1) of FAR, Conifer says that God should reveal his presence (even if P1 is true) because there already exist millions of humans who are susceptible of following God's commands out of selfisheness. So even if God desires sincere devotion from humans as my P2 states, he should still reveal his presence, despite the fact that in doing this God might not receive the desired response -mentioned in my P2- from humans, but rather the opposite one. The reason for this is that God's intention -which is the result of P2 and consists in not giving humans the opportunity to follow his commands out of selfish reasons - seems compromised anyway. (This is why I continue to think that Conifer attacks the idea that P2 -and not P1- entails "God is justified in remaining hidden from humanity").

As I have already said, this is a valid criticism of FAR but not of P1. Conifer does not even imply here that the statement "If God were to make his presence clear to humanity then most humans will worship him and follow his commands out of selfish reasons" is somehow problematic or false. To do this, he should defend at least one of the following thesis: "There are no good reasons to accept P1" or "There are good reasons to reject P1" (I defend this last, strong thesis). However, he does neither of these.

Similar things can be said about Conifer's Cr3 (which, by the way, is Theodore Drange's Argument from Confusion) and Cr4. Both are irrelevant to the issue of P1's truth or falsity. Again, they are compatible with P1'S validity. (I have already reffered to his Cr2).

But, MUCH MORE IMPORTANTLY, even if Conifer indeed attacks P1 as he claims, it seems that -with all due respect- he misses the point of my first post. The main issue is not whether he attacks P1 or P2, but rather that there is a further point which an atheist can make against FAR. In case Conifer really does attack P1 in his paper, he can consider my argument simply as a FURTHER attack on P1.
To be sure, my criticism of P1 may be mistaken. But Conifer does nothing to show this (in fact, he admits that my points are "well taken") and so I wonder: why didn't he accept my line of attack? It clearly attacks P1 by showing P1's falsity and it's also obvious that my line of attack is different from Conifer's Cr1-4.

P.S.: I am not a Proffesor and I apologise for confusing Conifer about this. The thing is that here in Romania the PH.D. of the University of Bucharest is considered to include, besides Proffesors, also lectors, assistants, preparators and students. Althought I belong to this department, I am actually a student. Again, Mr. Conifer, please accept my apologises for not making this clear in the first place.

Respectfully,
Horia Plugaru, a Philosophy student from the University of Bucharest.

-DM-

Steven Conifer responds:

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"Thanks, sir, for your additional remarks. I will take them under advisement. Thanks also for clarifying your status at the University of Bucharest. I wish you luck in your future academic endeavors.

Best Wishes,
Steve Conifer"