Peter Kirby

Hello,

I'm new to this forum, though I am a familiar sight in Biblical Criticism&Archaeology. Bear with me if I am walking on well-tread ground.

Back in 1998 (at the age of 17 or so), I wrote a response on alt.atheism to a certain poster (apparently David Buddrige) titled "An Atheist's Answer." That post can be read here:

http://home.earthlink.net/~kirby/philo/god-ethic.html

In the past week, somebody (Derek Butler) sent me an e-mail with a critique of that Usenet post.

Trouble is, I have been away from philosophy and ethics so long that I am not ready to do some heavy duty thinking. So I turn to the think tank that is IIDB.

Please feel free to respond to Kirby or Butler. Please feel free to pick out a particular point for your criticism or to expand upon as much material as you want. I am just trying to get some ideas cooking.

Here is the response of Butler to my post:

Let me see if I can formulate the above as some form of logical argument.


(1) Objectively, there are things that all men ought to do (an objective ethic).


(2) The Christian theist view provides an adequate explanation of an objective ethic.


(3) All other views fail to provide an adequate explanation of an objective ethic.


(4) Thus, the Christian theist view is the most reasonable.


How do you support (1)? If you take your conclusion seriously, it is because you know that God exists, has revealed Himself in the Bible, and His statements about an objective ethics must be true. That is what you claim: without God, you have no reason to call anything wrong or right. But since you are using your conclusion as an assumption - i.e. Christian theism is true - you are arguing in a circle.


On the other hand, suppose that there is some independent support for an objective ethic, apart from assuming Christianity. Some thinkers have proposed human nature or equality as a basis. You allude to a sort of intuition or self-evidence about certain moral propositions. Whatever it is, there is some reason for thinking that there is an objective ethic, apart from assuming your doctrines. In which case, your conclusion is false: we have reason to call some things wrong or right apart from Christian theism.


So, first of all, your argument is either circular or self-refuting.

The error here is the author himself assumes his two premises are coherent and lead to saying theistic morality is wrong. His second point does not hold, for example. Natural law is part of the argument in suggesting there is objective right and wrong (which the author appears to admit there is). That this is part of the argument for objective reality does not become self-refuting for Christian theism. Romans is a good example of the acknowledgement of the 'law' being written on our hearts, in our natures. The argument breaks down when the author calls the law on our hearts 'independent' support and thereby divorced from Christianity, or God. Its author, the bible suggests, is a deity, and God at that! Granted, that is a premise, but so is the author's point. Nothing self-refuting in either case.


On the first argument being circular: perhaps it shouldn't be taken that way. We all have starting premises in every argument. The Christian worldview fundamental starting premise is 'God.' The atheist can recognize that in any argument, and should account for it, but that is not the argument breaker. The atheist likewise says there is no god. Fair enough, no surprise there. It will therefore be part of his or her premise in making his or her case in these kinds of discussions. Christians can recognize that, without jumping up with "Ah, you don't believe in God" everytime that premise helps determine an argument.


On a more finer point then, #1 above is the same premise shared by the atheist, but then he says the Christian can't have this view because the Christian thinks God wrote it, and that is circular. The premise is the same: both writers think there is objective moral truth. Rape is always wrong. The argument is that the source of the law helps point to a God. If you see a book, you know there's an author. The atheist agrees, but discounts God as the author, and says it is man, on the heart, natural, etc.


The argument attempted above in the 4 points is that without God as the author, what constitutes right and wrong, pr more precisely, how can we know it.

Now, for the second part, you assume that Christian theism provides an adequate explanation of objective ethics. Basically, you have defined 'good' as 'like God'. In terms of the Euthyphro dilemma of Plato, instead of the gods commanding something because it is good, something is good because the gods command it. In this case, morality is arbitrary (just as arbitrary as if I defined 'good' as 'whatever I say', which seems to be your charicature of atheists). For if God were a killer or liar, then those would be 'good' things.


Now you might object that God does not actually do that. Even supposing that your interpretation of the Bible is correct, that does not adequately resolve the Euthyphro dilemma. For I could just as easily object that I do not condone killing or lying, but that does not make the ethic any less arbitrary. We reject the idea that an objective ethic could be contingent upon an actual being, because we cannot imagine a world where rape is an objectively good thing, but we could imagine a creator that condones it.

The Euthyphro dilemma is a good one. Something is good because the gods say it is, not because it is inherently good per se. God, the world's only justified utilitarian. Maybe it's true? Good then flows from the character of the god, not from the thing itself. Loving your enemies becomes a higher good then loving your friends, because the first is against our nature, and the second serves us. Just thinking out loud.


But if God making something good because the gods command it doesn't make good arbitrary, but dependent on the character of the person defining it. Just as if you were perfect, your morality and what you say is good would be perfect. In Plato's world of imperfect gods (see cartoon logic below) that would indeed make (bear with me) good and morality capricious. No one things 'good' is capricious, Christian or atheist. A perfect person - you, me anyone - would speak perfect morality, and make things good simply because that is our character. If we are not good, likewise, we might not be trusted with making the morality laws.

You claim that atheists have "no basis for saying that anything is right or wrong, other than to assert (without any basis for doing so), that a thing is right or wrong." But, even so, theists are no better off here. Theists simply assert that what God says is objectively good. Now a theist might say that God is omniscient and thus knows objective ethics, but this begs the question at hand: How can one, even God, know what is objectively right and wrong? Saying just that "God said so" is no better an explanation than your atheist charicature of simply asserting. If knowledge of objective right and wrong is a problem, then it is a problem for everyone, theist and atheist alike.

Indeed, it is a 'problem' for everyone, point taken. Atheists do indeed have a basis for saying things are right and wrong. Some don't though, and some say there is really no fundamental or objective right and wrong. I heard a university student, when confronted with the argument, suggest that rape must therefore not always be wrong, because there is no objective truth. I don't think most atheists would agree with her (surprisingly). Christians make this cheap shot, but they are wrong (atheists make cheap shots too, see below). We all have grounds for saying what constitutes the source of objective morality. All are premise-based. Some serve us better than others. Tarot cards tend not to work as well as a Judaic-Christian ethic. Animism seems to not work as well as the philosophical framework of atheism even, particularly embedded in western liberal democracies.

So, secondly, Christian theism doesn't provide an adequate explanation of objective ethics.

It certainly does, though you don't have to buy it. Christian theism provides a very coherent explanation, as does your position. Both might be true, or neither, or one of them. Logically it seems to me one of them is true, and one is partially so. If Christianity doesn't provide an adequate explanation, then why does the atheist's position work? "Because it's right" cries for the question "on what grounds?" or when you write "even so" above (in para. beginning "You claim"), are you agreeing atheists have no grounds? I think they do, but I am wondering if you think so.

There is a trivial refutation to your third point. A false dichotomy is made between atheism and Christian theism. If the Christian theist explanation of morality is adequate, surely the Islamic theist explanation of God revealing Himself through the Koran is just as well.

Why? The grounds for accepting a deistic explanation or source of morality is not simple making the claim. Nor is the truth or falseness of one metaphysical claim sufficient to allow all metaphysical claims. The Islamic explanation may be true or not. It should be judged not simply on its claim, and neither should the Christian claim. You touch here, interestingly, a good argument against all religions being the same. They are clearly not, simply because they are religions or claim revelation. Not all political philosophies are true simply for being of type, nor all economic systems simply because they share the fact of being 'economic'systems. Claims to religious truth are perhaps the most complicated, by nature, but to be fair to the religions of the world, they have in common that most people believe them. Seems they might have a thing going.

Philosophers such as Michael Martin have proposed the theory of the ideal observer. The ideal observer doesn't have to be actual for us to know what one would do. If you accept the Christian theist explanation as adequate, it is again difficult to see what on what basis you could criticize this alternative. You might say that Martin wears a band that says, "What would Jesus [or Buddha] do, assuming that he really existed."


I do not myself accept these systems, but they are alternatives that are sufficient to refute your argument.

The existence of alternative explanations does not in and of itself constitute a refutation, does it? I like the ideal observer theory, not having heard it before. Maybe that's conscience, written on the heart (I'm not suggesting by God for the sec, just saying what it might actually be…more real than ideal) so that we all know truth, broadly defined more or less, and agree on the fundamental truths of objective morality. And differ, it seems by and large, on the ethics or practice.

One explanation of human rights is based on the fundamental principle of the equality of people and their interests. Thus, you would not do unto others what you wouldn't like, as Confucius said. Similarly, you may do what you wish while harming none, as the Wiccan Rede states. This sort of principle is fairly universal throughout humanity, not restricted to any religion.

The universality could form part of the natural law argument in this case. That other religions might contain a principle also in Christianity doesn't refute Christianity, nor does Christianity saying the same thing refute other religions. But more importantly, the 'fundamental principle of equality' is an important concept, and judging on what I see when I look around, not as practiced as one might except of a fundamental principle. Many societies do not inherently believe in fundamental equality, including the Arab world, and China. It may not even be what is being taught in this 'quotation'. Just thinking out loud again…it is a restraint on one's actions, not to impinge on others. It could include not doing them good they wouldn't want done, couldn't it? I would want the gospel preached to me if I didn't believe, as it was, so I must preach it to others? Ironically, yes, but atheists might not see it that way. Maybe it's like the "eye for an eye" which is not aimed at making everyone blind as the retort goes, but was a proverbial statement to limit justice. The punishment for wrong must be in relation and proportion to the wrong committed, not an 'eye' more. Taken literally, that verse would only apply to losing eyes, which makes the people losing ears look marginalized.


The fundamental principle of equality then, is to my eye (no pun intended) not a fundamental principle at all, but an ideal. All morality may be that. Maybe there are platonic 'forms' behind our ideals? Maybe the ideal observer is god if not conscience…

And I submit that this more closely approximates the real reason why we do certain things and prohibit others than any divine command theory. Morality is a human matter concerning the fair interaction of people. Imagine, as an analogy, that there were advanced aliens who were very strong, smart, and moral. If these aliens ceased to exist, would that suddenly take away human rights and absolve people of obligations to one another? Of course not, gods and aliens are irrelevant.

Define fair, and on what basis. I'm not saying you're wrong, but if we are possessed of this notion of fair, it is appropriate to ponder its source. If we say a deity, fine. If we say ourselves, we are acknowledging moral law written on our hearts, just as the Bible says. That it might be part of our nature does not in and of itself constitute an argument against deity. I think divine command theory is not the full explanation of Christians, but part of the explanation, and perhaps adopting the illustration above, the ideal observer. Makes sense to me (without being air tight). I think the alien analogy is not quite relevant, unless you were thinking the ideal observer thing again?

Thus, I conclude that your argument from objective ethics to the Christian God is faulty threefold. Moreover, divine command theory has some serious problems of its own.


On another note, you imply that if you did not believe in an afterlife, you would do any evil so long as you could get away with it.


Now this is a subjective statement rather than an argument. Many atheists find adequate motivation to perform altruistic or socially beneficial acts, as shown by the fact that they do them. They may attribute this to a love for their fellow man instead of fear of an imagined deity. That you do not share such a feeling only informs us about your psychology. The technical term for one with your (non)sentiments is psychopath, one who doesn't have a sense of right and wrong that isn't imposed upon him (by government, gods, or whatever). In that case, I recommend that you continue believing until you can work out your problem, while hoping that your imagined god doesn't command you to seriously injure anyone - as you have said, you would have no reason for disagreeing.

This is a bit unfair, the attribution to fear, and a bit par for the course too. For example, the Bible says love compels, and the fear spoken of in Scripture is often awe. I also suspect the person was not saying he had the urges to go do random violence, but was adopting the illustration of Doestovoky, that without God, all things are permitted. A bit of an unfair play to then call him a psychopath, but it does make feed the argument, "big bad nutty Christians. Look here they are confessing it."

Put differently, you ultimately have different values than an atheist. By your own description, you are basically one who is looking solely for his own pleasure even at the expense of anyone else. You happen to believe that the pay day will be after you die, when God rewards you for your blindfold obedience, but you are a hedonist nonetheless. On the other hand, an atheist who helps others isn't doing it for her own pleasure, but rather she fundementally values other people and is concerned for their welfare. Now who could be called more morally sensitive, the atheist who does good because it's right and because she cares for others, or the Christian who does whatever his imagined god says because he fears the fires of hell?

If the atheist does something because for they fundamentally value _______ (fill in the blank, other people, doing good, etc) then that is hedonistic. You write "an atheist who helps others isn't doing it for her own pleasure, but rather she fundementally [sic] values other people." She values. She has pleasure. Not philosophical or self-sacrificing, but because she values. Doing good can be in sync with making us smile. Nothing dramatic in that, though many react to it. We have been 'taught' that is wrong, but is it? The Christian is generally doing good for the love of good, as is the atheist, yes? Our culture tells us we should not take too much pleasure in doing good, but that is faulty. There is a good book out by John Piper called Christian Hedonism, which reclaims the concept and the word and says that is what God is mostly about. Christians are not to look out for their own pleasure, Atheists are not the most altruistic people on the planet either. I think in retrospect you would agree many people do good because they want to do good, it is part (though not all) of our nature, and not because of fears of the fires of hell.

Now the sad part about all of this is, I think that deep down you don't believe things are wrong just because God forbids them, and you don't do what is right just out of hope of a more pleasant experience after death. You're saying this because you have been inculcated in the Christian religion, and you desperately need some apologetic to show unbelievers how wrong they are. You might try to make it sound better by saying you do good for the love of God, but even this is rationalization. You know that it is wrong to butcher people. You don't need anyone to tell you. You can feel it in your heart. You can see the harm and suffering that is caused to others. You can do what is good out of genuine compassion. I can too!

Non-thinking Christians say things are wrong simply because God forbids them, and other things right simply because God allows them. This is the Islamic concept of haram, which simply means forbidden. Things are permitted or forbidden. Non-thinking atheists might think (paradox there) this is how Christians approach morality. In truth, we both know things are wrong and right for a variety of reasons, often social and cultural even.


Acknowledging deity as the source of ultimate truth and moral law does not eliminate love or compassion from the equation, or pleasure. Things felt in the heart are natural law, written there by a deity perhaps. You can see that, so can I. You say the source of that isn't God, I say it is. But neither cheapens our care, does it? Now who is judging whom? There is no rationalization in according a metaphysical source to objective truth or morality. Just as there is no rationalization in saying it is within us. But judging from the track record of humanity, deists and non-deists alike, 'feeling it in our heart' ain't working so good.

You don't need an old book of fairy tales with some mythical god-thingumy to tell you what to do. Religionists hijacked human morality for their own purposes. Take it back! Instead of obeying dictates out of fear of imaginary gods, we should do good out of genuine love for our fellow man. We must not repress the tragedy of death, but rather we must accept that our life will end and make the most of it while we're here. We have to face life on its own terms, without hiding behind comforting myths, without gods.

Human morality is a complex thing, and I wouldn't accuse atheists or religionists of hijacking it. Your conclusion is intriguing: "We should do good out of genuine love." Indeed. There is humility in most religion (and the empirical evidence all around us) when it suggests we haven't yet achieved that for some reason. Not because we keep ascribing the source of morality to deity, but simply because we can't achieved the love you desire. Atheists are not, I assume you might agree, better lovers for having said morality has some other source than deity. Are they? So the problem in the world is the majority who believe, and the minority who don't have it right? But why might the objective truth simply overwhelmed our hearts and made us all nice?


The old book of fairy tales seems to have something to say about this, and some pretty bright minds find the god-thingumy angle a good one. It's a wild story, to be sure. How could it be otherwise?


We go back to the fallen nature of man. Paul no less said "The good I want to do, I can't do. The evil I do not want to do, I do." Freud put it this way: "Man is a wolf to man." Or did he mean Christians are wolves to the rest of the world, and atheists are all the nicer bunch? Our problem appears to be nature. And if we say society corrupts, who built that? If the 'systems' are at fault, we can begun to look at the authors to lay blame.


The Christian worldview has it philosophical and other conundrums. God made the world free, we went sour, and He's working it all out, redeeming and atoning. The atheist says "We're by-products of a big bang, love because that's what's in your heart, and the rest is bonkers." Greater men than you and I have long debated the premises and assumptions on both counts. The interest has to be (asides from the strong argument of intellectual curiosity!) in making it all better, and accounting for why it isn't. Maybe that's too simplistic, but in any event, onward and upward!

[oh, getting preachy here...steps off soap box :-)]

Ditto.


Best regards…

There is the exchange. Have at it!

best,
Peter Kirby

Dr. Retard

The big problem with Butler is that he doesn't seem to recognize the argument under criticism. It's an argument for the existence of God, from objective morality. It's supposed to persuade atheists, especially atheists who accept objective morality. Kirby's criticisms are directed at this argument; they seek to show that the argument isn't persuasive. But Butler seems to think that Kirby is trying to argue for atheism, from objective morality.

So Butler just doesn't 'get the point'. In all fairness, though, Kirby errs in stating that since "there is an objective ethic, apart from [Christianity]", "your conclusion [Christianity is most reasonable] is false". The conclusion needn't be false, just unsupported by this argument.

Butler also confuses "'God thinks X is good' entails 'x is good'" with "'God thinks X is good' makes 'x is good'". God's omniscient, so if he thinks something, he's right. But his thinking so doesn't make that truth so -- his thinking so is instead a reflection of that truth. God, by definition, can't be wrong about ethics, but that doesn't mean that ethical truths are constituted by, or made true by, God's opinions. Butler misses the difference:

Butler also looks self-servingly selective about the questions he presses:

"Because God said so" also cries for the question "on what grounds?". This reinforces Kirby's original point that when it comes to morality, theism and atheism sink or swim together.

Now moral arguments to Christianity tend to neglect all other possibilities, and so the arguments are fallacious. But:

Well, yes, it does, if the alternative explanations are at least as good as the explanation being laid at our feet. For then we have no reason to go with your favored explanation, and no reason to accept the argument.

Butler also confuses (i) performing an action because you value the action's goal, and (ii) performing an action whose goal is to bring you pleasure:

Actions done in order to bring about a valued goal are not 'hedonistic'; that is, unless the goal is indeed one of obtaining pleasure. We value all sorts of things, and we act on those values. Not all of those valued things are valued inasmuch as they involve our own pleasure. Now, one might maintain that people's valuing things is, in a different sense, simply a matter of personal pleasure. You could offer the claim that to value something is to be disposed to feel pleasure when you think about it. But that's a different issue than whether our actions are motivated by goals of obtaining pleasure.

So actions done in order to obtain Heaven, because Heaven is so pleasant, are indeed, to that degree, hedonistic. Actions done in order to make others' lives more rewarding are not, to that degree, hedonistic. They are instead altruistic. (Another question is whether this valuing of others' lives ought to be direct and underived (you simply want people to be better off), or instead derivative from valuing an overarching formal principle of behavior (you want to do the right thing, you believe that helping others is right, and that's in what sense you value helping others).

A lot of the other stuff said looks confused to me.

Wiploc

I'm not going to work thru the whole thing a line at a time on spec. If you'll point out what you think is key, or what part gives you trouble, or even just what you want to tackle first, I'll take a shot at it.

I will say this though: When he threw down the gauntlet thus,

he was taking the affirmative. He was saying that he can give logical reasons that we ought to be good if there is a god.

When you called him on that, he didn't defend --- he evaded. Nowhere in his answer does he explain how he can do what he says you can't do.

While any other part of his screed might be interesting to refute, I suggest you hold his feet to the fire on this particular point. Any move he makes to justify religious morality can be matched with an identical justification of non-religious morality.
crc

jlowder

Let's consider each premise of this argument in turn.

Consider (1). It is useful to define the meaning of an "objective ethic." Ordinarily (and perhaps somewhat crudely) we say that something is objective just in case it exists independently of mind, while something is subjective if it is dependent on a mind. To say that ethics is objective, then, is to say that ethical properties are properties of actions and states of affairs (and are NOT properties of minds).

While it is probably true that most Christians believe (1) on the basis of God's existence or the Bible, a proponent of the above argument (hereafter, the "proponent") doesn't have to assume God's existence in order to defend an objective ethic. One might defend an objective ethic on the secular grounds that it is presupposed by our first-order moral beliefs. The basic idea behind such an argument is that common sense and ordinary moral intuition presuppose an objective ethic. Clearly, one need not appeal to God or the Bible in order to defend such an argument. In fact, some prominent atheist philosophers have defended such an argument. John Post defends the argument from first-order moral beliefs in his book, The Faces of Existence. Post's argument convinced Quentin Smith; see Smith's book, Ethical and Religious Thought. (For a relevant excerpt available on the web, see http://www.qsmithwmu.com/metaethics_quentin_smith.htm -- especially section 23.3). Finally, Michael Martin alludes to an argument like the argument from first-order moral beliefs in his book, Atheism, Morality, and Meaning. So, clearly, one can affirm (1) on purely secular grounds. The crucial question is whether an objective ethic provides any evidence for Christian theism over competing views, including atheism.

This brings us to premise (2). According to (2), "The Christian theist view provides an adequate explanation of an objective ethic." In reply, we may ask, "How? How, precisely, does Christianity explain an objective ethic?" Merely asserting that Christianity explains an objective ethic does not actually constitute the explanation. So what feature of Christianity explains an objective ethic?

Perhaps God or God's existence. However, part of the concept of God is the idea that God is essentially morally good. Since moral goodness is part of the concept of God, any attempt to explain an objective ethic by appealing to God is a circular explanation.

Critics of the above argument agree with the proponent that there is a special relationship between God and an objective ethic. However, the proponent's understanding of that relationship is backwards. Far from explaining an objective ethic, God presupposes an objective ethic. Indeed, one might say that an objective ethic helps explain God!

As for (3), in my experience, people who defend moral arguments like this one are rarely familiar with the various nontheistic defenses of an objective ethic. Such people are even less likely to have attempted a refutation of all such views. Notice, however, that in order to defend (3), the proponent must refute "all other views." If the proponent fails to refute even one other view, (3) is not proven. Contrary to Butler, the existence of alternative explanations does not show that (3) is false, but such explanations, if unrefuted, show that (3) is not proven.
I do not find any refutations of alternative views (that affirm an objective ethics) in Butler's reply.

(As an aside, I don't think that Martin's defense of Ideal Observer Theory is convincing. Contrary to what you write, I think it is unclear whether a Martinian Ideal Observer would contemplate dishonesty with a feeling of disapproval. For more information, see my forthcoming review of Michael Martin's book, Atheism, Morality, and Meaning, on the Secular Web.)

In conclusion, even if one agrees that (1) is true, (2) is false and (3) is at best unproven and at worst false.

Jeff

jlowder

Some additional comments...

The question is what makes God's commands objectively morally good. Based upon the definition of objective I provided in my earlier post, a morality based upon divine commands is not objective, since it entails that moral properties are properties of a mind (God's mind), not properties of actions or states of affairs. Thus, if objective moral goodness exists, it must exist independently of God.

I would take a different approach. If the theist says that God knows objective moral truths, what does the theist think he is communicating by such a sentence? If morality is truly objective, then there are moral truths that do not depend on God's existence and God knows such truths. If, on the other hand, divine subjectivism is true (and morality is dependent on God's will), then to say that "God knows objective ethics" doesn't say anything more than, "God knows how he feels about morality." However, when the average person talks about God's knowledge of ethical truths, I don't think the second meaning is what they have in mind.

Jeff

P.S. I also agree with what Dr. Retard and wiploc wrote concerning the weaknesses of Butler's reply.