Glorygirl

have anyone read this article "God and Moral Autonomy" by James Rachels? if you did can you please help me with this question
1. How does Rachels define God and Worship?
2. What is Rachels's argument that it is irrational to believe in God?
thanks

Refractor

I haven't read that article, but if Rachels is like most other atheists, he'll claim it is irrational to believe in God because there are some magnificent "natural processes" (even though they are unobserved and unproved) that are capable of mindlessly causing complex universes to pop into existence, and cause fully-functional, living organisms to self-assemble out of non-living chemicals.

Thus, believing in a God is not necessary because we have plenty of mystical, unproven "natural processes" to believe in instead.

wordfailure

Hello Glorygirl

Rachels doesn't seem to directly define God, but only refers to "...the conception of God as a fitting object of worship". This is really probably all that is necessary for his argument. To ensure that we're all on the same page, he does, by way of explanation, give an example : "First, the worshiper believes that certain sorts of things are the case: for example, that the world was created by an all-powerful, all-wise being who knows our every thought and action; that this being cares for us and regards us as his children; that we are made by him in order to return his love and live in accordance with his laws, and that if we do not live in a way pleasing to him, we may be punished... "

He seems to consider worship to be the act of demonstrating subservience, or assuming the role of subservience.

The argument seems to be that one cannot be both subservient to the moral commands of another entity and an autonomous moral agent. From this he seems to conclude that if the concept is flawed, there is no god. (Sort of like "If the glove doesn't fit, you must acquit")


Although atheist myself, I think this conclusion stretches the arguments too far. The arguments do not directly address the question of the existence of a god or gods. However, the problems he notes with conceptualizations and the resulting religious beliefs are real, IMO.

student739

"To say "I will follow so-and-so's directions no matter what they are and no matter what my own conscience would otherwise direct me to do" is to opt out of moral thinking altogether."

Yet it is not clear what Rachels is claiming here. If he is claiming that in virtue of making this statement that one ceases to be a moral agent, then he is clearly incorrect. I believe that the fairest reading of Rachels is that this is what he is claiming.

However, even if rather than or in addition to making this statement, if on the extreme one were alternatively to attach oneself to a machine which ensured complete internal and external adherence to so-and-so's directions, it is still quite plausible that one does not lose his or her status as a moral agent if it is further the case that that attaching of oneself to this machine was itself an exercise of moral agency.

While Rachels' discussion of worship prior to making this claim is interesting, and as such I do not regret having read it, it seems very doubtful that his conclusion follows from the premises he has introduced.

[edit: added the following]

Reading Rachels' opening paragraph I thought he was going to argue something to the effect: "God is said to be a being which, if it exists, is alone worthy of worship. Without resorting to a question-begging definition of "worship", if any being is worthy of worship, there will be multiple beings worthy of worship. Therefore God will not exist if God is defined as a being alone worthy of worship."

I think that would have been more effective.

student739

wordfailure

Hello Student739,

You're not really arguing that the act of surrendering moral autonomy serves to retain moral autonomy after the surrender, are you? I would say moral responsibility is not surrendered, but that's not precisely the same thing.

student739

wordfailure said, "You're not really arguing that the act of surrendering moral autonomy serves to retain moral autonomy after the surrender, are you? I would say moral responsibility is not surrendered, but that's not precisely the same thing."

Well, first I will say that I do not believe my rejection of Rachels' argument as I read it depends upon my answer to this, but I will nonetheless answer you to clarify what I had in mind. Certainly though a full discussion of it would be grounds for another thread.

It seems, for example, that if I were to exercise my moral agency with the end of attaching myself to a machine which would cause myself at all times to think and act according to a particular set of rules, that I would in fact continue to exist and would thereafter continue to be morally responsible for all thoughts I think and actions I take.

What is meant by being "morally autonomous" other than that if one is such a thing, that one is responsible for his or her actions?

Certainly in such a case *someone* would be responsible for the actions I would thereafter take. Perhaps as an analogy consider if I were to shoot a gun at a man from thirty meters, would I be morally responsible only for the trigger being pulled, or would I be morally responsible as well for the bullet penetrating the chest of my intended target. Certainly it is both, is it not?

As neither forcing myself to live out a certain kind of life by attaching myself to a machine or shooting a man to death are themselves basic actions, but are certainly both actions which consist partly in basic actions, I do not know where you would find fault with such an analogy on grounds such as these.

I suppose I could change the analogy to one of firing myself from a canon at a man from 30 meters and killing him but not myself and it may be clearer, but that would be a bit too silly for me I suppose

[edit: puncutation]

student739

wordfailure

We are considered to be the cause of the effects of our actions. It is in this sense that we are 'responsible'. 'Autonomy' means we are self-directed. Regardless of whether or not one is responsible or held to be responsible, one cannot be both subservient and autonomous.

Sorry for the abbreviated reply-- I'm late for work.

student739

If then continuing exercise of moral autonomy is not required for continuing moral responsibility, and it seems to me that it is not required, then I fail to see why even completely losing one's ability to exercise his or her moral autonomy is so unthinkable.

Considering the example I have already given, perhaps you could attempt to explain to me why Rachels would think that the loss of the ability to continue to exercise one's moral autonomy is so unacceptable?

student739

wordfailure

In my opinion, the final section of .the piece Objections and Replies directly deals with your questions, particularly number 2.

I suppose I should confess that I find the arguments in the entire piece a bit convoluted. For example, he says "The upshot is that we cannot justify the suspension of our own judgment on the grounds that we are deferring to God's command; for if, by our own best judgment, the command is wrong, this gives us good reason to withhold the title "God" from the commander." I know what he's saying, but it seems a really odd way to say it. It seems almost intentionally disconnected from reality to me. Word games. I also think the Wittgenstein part actually weakens the argument. Seems like when people use the "language games" accusation they'd better have their own house in order