Thomas Metcalf

This is how the finetuning argument is supposed to work, as I understand it.

We discover some really improbable fact or conjunction of facts (or better, conjunctive fact[1]). Let's call this conjunctive fact "F." And we say "F is improbable enough, given the conditions at the beginning of the universe, that we ought to try to explain F." And so we say "Maybe Someone finetuned the universe to make F obtain." And then we survey our understanding for the sort of being ("S") that would have the desire and ability to finetune the universe to make F obtain. If we don't already have good reasons for disbelieving in S, we suppose that S finetuned the universe for F to exist.

Now to bring it down to the traditional monotheistic finetuning argument. Our conjunctive fact F is: the universe permits physical life. Let's grant that F is very improbable, given the conditions at the beginning of the universe. Now the sort of being S that might have the power and desire to bring about a universe in which F obtains is the God of traditional monotheism.[2] So we say that S finetuned the universe so that F would obtain, and therefore, monotheism is true.

But wait a minute. There's also the question of how improbable F has to be to make the supposition of finetuning a sound one.[3] I think we'd say that if there were a 51% chance of ~F and a 49% chance of F, we wouldn't really feel comfortable in positing God as an S. Even if there were an 80% chance of ~F and a 20% chance of F, to claim that God finetuned the universe would seem a bit hasty, but not as unreasonable. If there were only a 0.000000001% chance of F, then the hypothesis that God finetuned the universe seems to look more and more promising. (That is, if we grant the argument.)

Let's stop and take stock. The finetuning argument is motivated by the discovery of an improbable conjunctive fact F, and the more improbable it is, the more likely there is a being S who finetuned the universe so that F would obtain. The God of traditional monotheism is the sort who would care a lot about F's obtaining, so the proponent argues that we ought to suppose God exists.

Now, it is a well-known fact about probability that the probability of a conjunctive fact obtaining is equal to the probability of each of its conjuncts obtaining, multiplied together. So the probability of a conjunctive fact that comprises two improbable conjuncts will be very low indeed. And the probability that yet a third improbable conjunct will obtain is lower still. Now take {F} to be the set of facts within the conjunctive fact F, and our domain to be the set of all facts about the universe[4]. Then V ~ {F}, the difference of the universal set and {F}, will be the conjunctive fact about the universe that we don't explain with God. Let this set be {F*}.

Okay. {F*} has far more members than {F}. This is obvious. And indeed, any specific fact about the way the universe is now has a rather low probability of obtaining, given the way the universe began. {F*} contains such members as "the string 'l3kd9sf' appears in this message board post" and "there are no pencils on my desk" and "I am wearing a t-shirt with the name of the band 'Bangs' on it" and "I have another class today before I go home." If you think about the way things were at the beginning of the universe, it was very unlikely for any of those specific facts to obtain. And therefore, it was very, very unlikely for the conjunctive fact comprising those facts to obtain, because we get the probability of that conjunctive fact by multiplying the probabilities of their conjuncts.

Suppose, conservatively, that {F*} has a billion members, and {F} has ten. What these are other than "physical life is possible," I don't know, but it's conceivable that there are some. Now suppose that the probability of a great many of the facts in {F*} depends upon the facts in {F} (because without physical life, it's doubtful that I would exist or that "l3kd9sf" would appear in this post or that there would be a desk that satisfies the predicate "my desk"), so the probability of some of the members of {F*} is at least as low as {F}. I think it's pretty evident that the probability of {F*} is in fact much lower than {F}. There are a great many more facts in {F*}, and there's no reason to think these members are much, much more probable than the members of {F}, especially because some of them depend on the members of {F} and therefore suffer the probability reduction that comes with conjunction.

The lesson we learned above is that the more improbable F is, the more likely there's a Someone S who finetuned the universe for F. So the conclusion that someone S finetuned the universe so that the facts in {F*} (call this person "God*") would obtain is far greater than the probability that someone finetuned the universe so that {F} (call this person "God") would obtain.

Here's the last part of my argument. I say God cannot possibly be the same person as God*, and it's not the case that both can exist, because if either exists, then only one person finetuned the universe[5]. They're just way too different. God* cares about all the things God doesn't care about. There's nothing in monotheistic doctrine that says God cares about whether there are any pencils on my desk, and in fact, given the general concept of God, it's doubtful that He would. The sort of being that cares about everything except physical life really doesn't sound anything like God.

But according to the argument from finetuning, God exists, and, as I've argued, God* must exist. We have everything we need for a modus tollens: if the argument from finetuning is sound, then God and God* exist; it is not the case that God and God* exist; therefore, the argument from finetuning is unsound.

I look forward to any comments anyone has to offer.



_____

[1] Every fact entails a conjunctive fact, and every conjunctive fact entails at least one fact. If F is a fact, then "F is a fact" is a fact, and "'F is a fact' is a fact" is a fact, and so on. We can leave these out for the purposes of the later exercise; perhaps we should restrict our domain to facts not of the above variety.
[2] I assume here that God desires physical life for His purposes and not disembodied minds -- a case can certainly be made that these would serve His purposes better.
[3] I think here is where both the finetuning argument and what will be something of a parody argument later break down.
[4] Or almost. See note #1.
[5] Or at least, if God exists, then no one else finetuned the universe. If God* exists, then traditional monotheism is false, regardless of whether God exists.

Jobar

So, Thomas, is what you are saying that *any* given fact or collection of facts, approaches infinite improbability, if we calculate from the beginning of the universe?

Wouldn't that imply that all facts, being incredibly improbable, require some S to explain them, by the FTA?

And can we build some sort of space drive from all this?

Silent Dave

<devilsadvocate>

Say that there are two subsets within {F*} -- those facts that follow deterministically from {F} and those that do not. Call the first group {F%} and the second {F$}. The Christian could say that, since the facts in {F%} (Mercury is currently at its apehelion) follow deterministically from {F}, it requires no explanation beyond an explanation for {F}, while those facts in {F$} (there are no pencils on my desk) are the result of human free will.

</devilsadvocate>


Dave

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Jobar :

That's a consequence. The farther forward in time we go, and the more facts we're seeking to explain, the less probable they get.

As long as they get to a certain point of improbability. Proponents of FTA say "physical life is possible" is past this point, so anything past the improbability of "physical life is possible" must therefore also require some S to explain them. And there's quite a lot that's even less probable than "physical life is possible."

I think I heard a whale bemoaning its fate: "Oh, no, not again!" And I hope my argument will help to doom FTA to the same sort of fate.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Silent Dave :

Good objection.

I'd say the subset that's identical to the unity of {F%} and {F$} is a proper subset of {F*}. There's no reason to think all the facts in {F*} are members of {F%} or {F$}. Suppose complete determinism is false. Then, if God exists, then quantum events introduce indeterminacy all over the place, and this adds a lot of improbability to the outcome. But if God* exists, God* is choosing for these quantum events to come out the way they do (using God's magical control of quanta, or whatever), and this explains the radically improbable results.

Suppose that determinism is true for everything, and that everything was fated after the initial event (that contained chance). It seems that a slightly different event would have led to a slightly different outcome. God just chose one of the events that led to physical life's possibility. Suppose that 1% of the events led to life's possibility. So the chance of a life-permitting universe was only 1%, on the assumption of naturalism. Now suppose that 0.00001% of the events led to life's possibility and the facts in {F*}. It was highly improbable for the facts in {F*} to obtain, and only kind of improbable for those in {F} to obtain. The chance for the facts in {F*} to obtain is very low, on the assumption of God, but very high, on the assumption of God*.

In sum, we're still going to need to explain why F* obtained, because either there are events that would have been random, or the randomness must have occurred in the very beginning. Some events could have happened differently, and a more powerfully explanatory version of God (that would be, God*) would explain these events differently.

Even free will decisions are explainable better if we suppose God* exists, and another way God* is different from God is that He influences some putatively "free will" decisions instead of a complete laissez-faire policy.

Tercel

Hi Thomas,

I think your argument is unecessarily complex. The FTA as you describe it is simply committing the lottery fallacy and that is effectively the flaw you are exposing in a rather overly complicated way. Unfortunately numerous defenders of the FTA do commit this fallacy when presenting the argument, so I can hardly fault you for a strawman.

Basically the problem lies as follows: This is not how the FTA is supposed to work.

Simple improbability does not provide onus for "explanation". That is the lottery fallacy. The correct view is that "An event occured (F). What is the likely cause of F?".

The question of design hinges on asking which of the following is more likely:
1) That random chance was responsible and caused this result.
2) That design was responsible and caused this result.

They can be evalutated against each other by asking the following questions:
-What a priori probabilities do we assign to the possibilities of random chance creating a universe (A) vs an intelligent agent doing so(B)?
-Given that random chance was creating a universe what is the probability of F occuring (C)?
-Given that an intelligent agent was creating a universe what is the probability of F occuring (D)?

Given that we observe F, we can then compare the two values of A * C and B * D: If A*C is greater than B*D then random chance is the likely cause and if B*D is greater then design is the likely cause.

The point of FTA argument is to say that D is significantly greater than C. (To the extent that they outweigh the contributions of A vs B) And thus B*D is greater than A*C. And hence the FTA concludes that it is unlikely to be the case that:
one universe exists AND it was not designed.

Silent Dave

Tercel--

That's an excellent statement of FTA, and I can see its appeal to professional apologists. It would have absolutely no effect on me, however, since the a priori probability I assign to B is zero.


Dave

Theli

I think the old problem with the design argument still exists.
It seems to ask:
What is most probable? This particular world created by chance, or created by a god wanting the world to be just like this?
Obviously, at first the latter seems much more probable.

Let us instead ask what the probability is for the given god to exist and wanting this particular world to exist.
It should be less, as we are now introducing yet another being. Ockhams Razor should apply.

Jeremy Pallant

Actually it was a bowl of petunias.

the_cave

Actually, I think that this is the weak spot...first, I don't see how God* doesn't care about physical life, even if he cares about pencils (or even if he cares about pencils more). But more importantly, I think that the FTA (is that the right acronym?) implies a certain amount of teleology. The point is that the universe has a purpose, illustrated by the unlikelihood of our existence--I've always thought that the argument was basically equivalent to the Strong Anthropic Principle, but I could be wrong. Now if the purpose was to make us, then anything else that contributed to that fact--or that is a consequence of that fact--is just as important as we are. It seems that you would reason, upon seeing me build a house, that I cared a great deal about sawdust, right angles, and level planes. You're wrong about the sawdust, and though you're partly correct about the angles and planes, neither one (nor any one of the other myriad aspects of the house) is as important to me as the one single fact that I'm building a house.

But I'm still hoping we can get Jobar's space drive out of this somehow.