Celsus

Hi all,

I've been reading Keith Whitelam's The Invention of Ancient Israel: The Silencing of Palestinian History, and in preparation for my upcoming debate with Hugo Holbling, I thought I might quiz the learned members of this forum about Realism and the philosophy of History. As some of you may have noticed, I take a Scientific Realist position (i.e. that science can accurately describe reality) for the sciences, but I am beginning to be convinced that realist notions of history are implausible. I'd welcome thoughts from those familiar with NT scholarship since with the exception of Robert Price's Deconstructing Jesus, this sort of critique seems almost entirely ignored by NT scholars (or perhaps I haven't read enough).

For example, an emerging consensus here seems to be that the Historical Jesus may or may not exist, but a good position to assume is one of agnosticism (with some leaning to either side of the spectrum): This is essentially an antirealist position (defined in theological terms of "Believer", "Agnostic", etc.) in that the truth of the past cannot be known. Such a position recognises that the writing of history is a political act, and preconceived notions and ulterior motives are strong influences on the final product of a text. In such a context, Josephus, as much as the Gospel authors, are guilty of revising history, and the difficult question of unravelling the past is made clear by the difference in weights that different ancient writers are given as "historians". Hence, Price's Girardian mimetic analysis in Deconstructing Jesus, while far-fetched, show exactly the problems in coming up with any sort of methodology in unravelling historiographies that are so intertwined with myth. So much for any realist notions of a historical Jesus.

Whitelam approaches the Hebrew Bible from an unapologetically postmodernist position, and begins by drawing heavily on Edward Said (who is in turn drawing on Foucault). Thus:

• It is not easy to make these connections between biblical scholarship and the political context in which it is conducted and by which it is inevitably shaped. For the most part, they are implicit rather than explicit. The connections will be denied by many, decrying any such analysis as politically motivated, as part of the modern fad of deconstruction and revisionism in history, or as an outrageous attack upon the objectivity of biblical scholarship. Biblical studies has remained aloof, a kind of academic ghetto, from many of the contemporary movements which have swept through academia questioning and undermining its claim to disinterested objectivity. The study of the social and political context in which it has been undertaken, which inevitably compromises its critical distance, is in its infancy. The gradual exposure of the interrelationship of the discipline of biblical studies with politics will provide a better understanding of the forces which have helped to shape the imagination of the past that has monopolized the history of the region.
  
  (p. 23)

He then critiques Halpern's forensic model (also well-loved by 2-trick apologists--particularly the use of standards as used in a court of law) as inadequate for a historiographic methodology, employed primarily as a propaganda to ensure a reader's trust in both the reality of history and the objectivity of the researcher presenting his finds. Whitelam notes further:

• The realization that accounts of the past are invariably the products of a small elite and are in competition with other possible accounts, of which we may have no evidence, ought to lead to a greater caution in the use of such accounts to construct Israelite history. Their value for the historian lies in what they reveal of the ideological concerns of their authors, if, and only if, they can be located in time and place. . . . To continue with this venture [of trusting historical texts], as more and more texts are removed from the historian's grasp, runs the risk of being reduced to writing a 'history of the gaps': not the gaps in our data, a given for any historian, but 'a history of the gaps' analogous to the 'theology of the gaps' which nineteenth-century scholars and clerics tried in vain to construct as they struggled to come to terms with increasing scientific discoveries.
  
  (p. 33)

It's worth taking the trouble not to lapse into the genetic fallacy as committed by certain notable philosophers of science and sociology of science practitioners: Although the historical context of various Biblical theories are noted here, we should let them stand or fall on their merits. What would then remain is a critique of methodology in that the preconceived notions of scholars has shaped their judgement of methodological rigorousness. What is (or is not) an appropriate form of scholarship for biblical studies?

Can a realist position of history still be salvaged when the methodological underpinnings are so undermined by the examination of the contexts in which the theories are formed?

Thoughts welcome...

Joel

Doctor X

Celsus:

Some quotes you might find helpful. I "finished" Thompson's book The Historicity of the Patriarchal Narrative--it more finished me! . . . "By the shift of 'lmyl m#$!! in comparison to Nuzi tablet of ZZzzzzzzzzzzz."

Anyways, the summary at the end is good:

It seems to be a need to make current belief attached to something concrete in the past--"real." You cannot argue with Newton, son, the ball hits the ground. Similarly, you cannot argue with whatever someone attaches to the Bible if you can show it historical--that is the gist of the argument.

Remove history and the religions based on the text--more appropriately, use it as a tool for justification--lose their "special" character they think they hold above "other people's myths."

Politically, it seems much of the OT stories exist to "justify" a great past--and present . . . "Look . . . Jepathe'hemafar'la did lay with Mir'e and begat Gol'whateVah who founded the land you are on as promised to us by Big Daddy . . . get out!"

Obviously, currently political "difficulties" in the Middle East has religious relevance--those who believe in a United Monarchy that ended at the west bank of the Yangtze River . . . this is "wishful" or "mythic" thinking, but it is "justification" for "we get everything BECAUSE we always were suppose to have it," just as "Manifest Destiny" "justified" invading Des Moines. . . .

--J.D.

Celsus

Hi Doctor X,

Thanks for the quotes, but I'm already aware of this sort of stance... The whole bevy (is that the right term? ) of minimalists from Thomson, Lemche, Davies, Whitelam, Van Seters et al. make this point against biblical scholarship (with Robert Price joining in from the NT perspective to a lesser extent). Whitelam draws on Thomson and Davies in particular, while picking out Halpern and others as his targets. What I'm looking for is whether a Realist position can be salvaged. Particularly, I'm thinking of Bede (yoohoo!) who seems to argue that postmodernist critiques have no place in scholarship(?), and also of the response from NT scholarship since what little I've read of it seems to completely ignore these problems raised. Secondly, the breakdown of consensus in ANE scholarship and the complete lack of any consensus in HJ scholarship should be a clear hint at the problems of historiography as practiced by Biblical scholars. Further comments welcome of course.

Joel

Doctor X

Not to hijack you . . . but the "problem" Thompson, and the others you note create is very similar to the one Schweitzer created with his "quest for the historical Jesus:"

You remove the historical basis of belief . . . you suddenly wonder why you should believe.

In his early work, Thompson, in my opinion, waffles an "answer"--just as Schweitzer just c conjures up an "immeasurably great man."

I will show my [Vast.--Ed.] ignorance by asking you what you mean by a "Realist" position that wish to see if it can be salvaged.

For example, with regards to NT, Koester and others just ignore the Historical Junior--"such questions should not be asked"--in a way they are "right" because the various religious beliefs at different periods were based on belief of history rather than actual history. However, those who show layers and development undercut the "certainty" some scholars have when they speak of "the teachings."

Is this the area you are writing about? I do not wish to blather on with uselessness [Never stopped him before.--Ed.]

--J.D.

Peter Kirby

There is a book titled The Myth of the Historical Jesus and the Evolution of Consciousness published by the Society of Biblical Literature that consists entirely of this sort of critique (applied to J. D. Crossan). I got it on interlibrary loan, but I couldn't get past a few dozen pages because, frankly, deconstructionism bores me to tears.

Major equivocation there. If the truth of whether there was a historical Jesus is not conclusively settled, then the truth about the past cannot be known generally? There are many non-pomo scholars who think that questing is a waste of time and yet produce historical scholarship on early Christianity. (I suppose that this can be critiqued too--but the bankruptcy of all early Christian studies does not follow from an agnostic position on the HJ.)

Those who are pro, con, or neutral on the existence of a HJ can attempt to base their position on an assessment of the ancient evidence. So such a position does not necessarily involve any recognition of the idea that "writing of history is a political act" as the basis of the position.

best,
Peter Kirby

Celsus

Oops, I apologise for my oversight. Scientific realism is the philosophy that scientific theories are representations of reality. From Fuller's Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History of Our Times:

• On the one hand, philosophical resistance to realism stems from a fear that an indefinite extension of current theories will not necessarily lead to truth, but simply a self-reinforcing dead end. On the other hand, philosophical enthusiasm for realism rests on the intuition that the degree of success enjoyed by current theories is a sign of their future success in new domains.
  
  (p. 90n)

Unfortunately, biblical scholarship has nothing close to any sort of consensus (the strongest consensus that may ever have been found used to lie in the Documentary Hypothesis, but has since broken down, with most scholars throwing out E for example), so I'm not sure if I'm asking a fair question or not. However, thoughts are still welcome. The different theories of the composition of the Qumran sect might be a better test case, since there is much more material evidence to deal with.

Joel

Doctor X

Celsus:

Ah! Okay!

I will give you a story you may or may not find useful, then back off because I think posters like Peter will have more concrete information.

At the danger of micturating some posters off, I never liked the idea behind the Jesus Seminar. As one mentor joked, "I think they have conclusively proven Jesus once said, 'the.'" Basically, everyone finds the Jesus they want and pretend it is a science.

Another mentor--NT scholar--chided me that I missed Funk's genius. As he explained:

Anyways, I have found the "deconstructionistic" approach--as one put it "a mark means whatever you want" to be a cop-out. Ignorance of the history undercuts any theory. I think some scholars are uncomfortable that their 400 page tome really depends on some assumptions they have made.

Other scholars seem comfortable with this ambiguity--we really do not know for sure if Jesus "existed," and if we did we still do not know for sure what he said or did . . . if anything. This pisses some off who want to be "scientific."

Right, enough, I will enjoy lurking.

--J.D.

Celsus

Thanks for the recommendation, Peter.
Of course not: It's just an example to lead on to the larger question about the reliability of ancient texts as evidence.
Of course, as in the sciences. But that begs the question of what constitutes "scholarship" and whether a theory is more reliable than another. Most scientists ignore the philosophy of science, yet produce outstanding work. But the battle still takes place in the halls of the philosophy of science, whereas the discussion seems nonexistent in Biblical studies. Hence the reason I wish to raise it in this extremely inadequate arena.
Yes it is possible, but the way in which the questioning of texts is carried out seems to point to an underlying uncertainty about textual formulation. The critique of textual sources generally (as seen by the likes of the Jesus Seminar) involves removing texts that are already known to have been taught (i.e. not unique), as being interpolations (based on 2nd century factionalisation), etc. On what basis can we then judge, considering that much of what we can find out of the past is lost forever (hence "radical" reconstructions obviously favour Nag Hammadi Gnosticism, or Essene(?) Rechabitism--because that's the only source of nonChristian evidence available). I know I'm treading a fine line between the genetic fallacy and sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). But the question remains, is a realist position salvageable (note that it would please me greatly if it were so, but I seriously doubt it)?

Joel

Celsus

A note to all,

This entire thread is a practice run for my debate against Hugo Holbling, in which I'm taking a more extreme position than I actually hold, for the sake of drawing attention to the problems at hand, and looking at possible responses. Secondly, I am genuinely interested in the responses to this thread, as I've not really seen them discussed.

Doctor X,

The deconstructionist approach is not being used as a cop-out here. In fact, your cited scholar T.L. Thomson is very much a minimalist and in the deconstructionist mode, though you may not notice it. What he (and others) is doing is questioning embedded assumptions in biblical scholarship. Whitelam writes:

• The attempt to provide an alternative conception of the past to that which has emerged from the discourse of biblical studies over the last century or more can only give partial voice to those populations who have been silenced by our modern studies. It is obvious that any counter-history is contingent and partial. What is most important, however, is the exposure of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century biblical studies. For, as Inden (1986:445) says of Indian history, a deconstruction of the discourse in which students of India have been inducted is a necessary first step: only after the nature and implications of this discourse have been exposed can Indologists hope to think their way out of it [Note: Peter has already pre-empted this, so I'll just say that the question of methodology should be begged no longer]. . . . Only after we have exposed the implications of this invention will Palestinian history be freed from the constraints of biblical studies and the discourse that has shaped it.
  
  (p. 36)

What I'm trying to do then is extend this question wider to NT scholarship as well, since most of the posters here are more familiar with that.

Joel

Doctor X

Okay . . . another stupid question:

Are you defining--or is it defined--that a deconstructive approach to NT would involve recognizing that assumption of historical accuracy behind the texts?

If that is the case, I understand what you mean by Thompson and your quote--getting rid of the assumption.

Can you give an outline of the position you plan to take for the purpose of debate?

--J.D.