John Page

In a couple of threads recently I've come across two skeptics seemed convinced that one only needs an epistemology and not an ontology. My position is that one needs both for a coherent philosophy and I've been asked to explain how my philosophy meets this requirement :-

Sir, I'm putting the same requirements on any philosophy. To be brief:

1. How can one *know* anything unless one *exists*?
2. How can I *explain* knowledge of my own existence?
3. How do *explain* my knowledge of other things that *exist*?
4. What is the *I* that *knows*?

With these issues, I hope it is clear why my underlying ontological question "How do *I* (me, that exists, the man that is typing to you now) *know* things?" or, another way "How can knowledge be without things that exist?"

On to Nialscorva's question on how my philosophy meets my own requirements. Well, its first axiom is "This ontology exists". Irrespective of whether you concur with the ontology or not, one can regard this statement as an epistemological claim (round 1 to Nialscorva). On the other hand, one may regard this axiom as more an existential claim or statement since no specific knowledge is imparted. (round 2 to me?)

In fact, what I am trying to do here is to draw any reader to their own first hand account. To claim the first axiom is false is to deny ontologies can exist. If you consider the first axiom to be true then the basis of debate is formed, i.e. an intersubjectively agreed frame of reference that we know something and it exists.

This introduction is longer than intended but I hope it is clear why I think an expistemology and ontology are required and how those requirements might be met. Conclusion: An epistemological claim without a complementary ontology is mere conjecture and true or false are meaningless alone.

Cheers, John

Feather

Fair enough:

1) Irrelevent question: if "I" don't exist, then I'm purely a construct and "knowledge" is as meaningless to me as whoever or whatever is constructing me is meaningless to me.

2) Can't be done by any means: either a thing exists or it doesn't. At best I can explain the parameters and conditions of my own existence in relation to other things that exist.

3) See (2)

4) The "I" is also irrelevent very similarly to why the question of "existence" as posed in (1) is irrelevent.

It's quite simple: Either things exist, of which "I" am a subset, or they don't. Either my perceived reality is the "truth" or it isn't. I have no way of testing or falsifying any combination of these two conditions, and therefore can posit any of them with equal confidence--i.e. none. The quest is meaningless. If we exist then the "truth" or "falseness" of our perceived reality is irrelevent--we can't ever tell. If we don't exist, well, see (1) above.

AnthonyAdams45

But, Feather, isn't it fair to say that, as a skeptic, you don't have an epistemology? In which case, John wouldn't expect you to need an ontology either. I think you went a long way toward proving his point.

I have always supposed epistemology and ontology to be necessarily linked. I still need more time to think about your overall premise, but I definitely understand your disquiet.

John Page

Feather:

Thanks, and I concur pretty much with your reasoning as to whether we exist. My question is, though, how do we explain our knowledge if it?

For example, my existence might be an illusion created in a laboratory experiment on consciousness - there might be an *I* that exists but not the one that I think I am.

IMO, the existential claim "I exist" can only be made coherent (i.e. known by more than one person) by exposing and explaining the transition from a first-hand experience to the phenomena that generates it. This brings me back to my philosophical requirement of wanting to know how I know things - for I trust my own judgement as little as that of others.

Cheers, John

_______________________
"I have been Foolish and Deluded," said he, "and I am a Bear of No Brain at All." Winnie-ther-Pooh
________________________

Feather

Oh I have an epistemlogy: namely I am (or am training to become at any rate) a scientist.

However, the epistemological system that is science does not require any particular ontology. Any given scientist can suppose that the epistemological system he applies when doing an experiment determines what is "really real" or that said experiment merely determines what it is possible to perceive as real. Neither one can show the other is "wrong," because it simply isn't possible to step outside "reality" whether it is perceived or not (at this point).

If it becomes possible one day to determine whether the reality we observe is indeed incomplete, then I might consider the need for an ontology. Until then it doesn't matter. All that matters is perception and observation--a purely epistemological viewpoint, if you will.

John Page

I don't agree with your statement. Surely, no amount of scientific data has meaning without an ontological framework through which it may be interpreted.
Cheers, John

Feather

The point is that no set of data supports any particular ontological view as valid.

I suppose at the very minimum one might "require" that "a reality exists" in order to interpret data--but I view this as the trivial view. The problem is it doesn't describe the nature of the reality (i.e. doesn't claim the reality is objective, subjective, or other) and therefore I don't think could be considered a valid ontology, but is certainly sufficient for the interpretation of data.

So, in short, I'd answer in the negative: an ontological position isn't necessary to interpret data.

John Page

I don't disagree with this but I'm taking the position that an ontology is required. The ontology selected, IMO, is driven by physiology, perception etc. As a relativist, I agree that no particular ontology is any more "valid" than the next.

(Assuming you take the view that) We are part of reality, and this goes back to my argument that data about reality alone is meaningless, it needs to be interpreted to arrive at the description you refer to. An ontology puts this in perspective. Let me suggest that one person might view light/dark as the primary differentiator above all other (a la book of genesis), another might suggest true/false as the most important characteristic in describing reality. I hope this makes clearer why I am asserting that the ontological framework is that which makes it possible for the data of our perceptions to become "known" in an epistemology.

It should be obvious that I disagree with this given my comments immediately preceeding. Your premise is knowledge exists (or even, perhaps, exists a priori). Succinctly, my argument is that this very statement is your ontology, perhaps because you see knowledge and lack of knowledge as the primary axis of philosophy. However, as you yourself have suggested, no particular ontology is valid.

Cheers, John

Plump-DJ

Doesn't that take all meaning away from the request for an ontology and epistemology? I mean why even bother if in the end coherent philosophy 'A' with ontology 'B' and Epistemology 'C' is no more valid ("corresponding to reality") then any other philosophy with an ontology and epistemology. Is that what you're saying or have I missed something?

Relativism seems to destroy the meaning behind such things, which are surely attempts to explain and understand 'that which is'.

Odemus

You might be splitting hairs over an issue that could be separated into something like a "strong" or "weak" ontological perspective.

I think Feather is simply saying (using a practical analogy) that a scientist is perfectly willing to conduct and analyze experiments and their results without debating the existence of his brain which lends him the ability to do so.

Yes?