xorbie

I have been thinking recently about morality. It seems to me that there seem to generally be two different types of morals. Each person has their own morals, or code of ethics. People also have principles, which they generally try to allign with whatever their view is of Morality (the other type of morals). This would be your generic 10 commandments-esque objective morality.

However, people often act outside of their principles. Now, if you consider your own set of morals to be what you consider "right" then why would you ever do what you consider "wrong"?

It seems to me that morals are some sort of subset of aesthetics. For instance, we all have a general feeling (I hope) that killing is wrong, that causing others pain is wrong. Why? Because when we hear of this, we have this sort of gut, visceral reaction of dislike, much like viewing something ugly or distasteful. Now perhaps this isn't really aesthetics at all, but it seems that morality is not based on any logical, objective ability, but rather some visceral reaction people have to certain reactions.

Nowhere357

I agree. This is the "moral sense" or moral awareness. We codify what we "see" into a system of morality.

Morality deals with an individuals interrelation with others (and the world), sort of a group awareness.

It seems to me that if something is "objective", then it's the same for everyone, like gravity. Morality is subjective, but it's based on the very real group dynamic.

Alonzo Fyfe

There is no moral "sense". The only thing we have a capacity to "sense" is our own likes and dislikes -- and to make this the root of morality is to say "what you like is right, and what you do not like is wrong."

How would such a moral sense work? Are "goodon" and "badon" particles emitted from the thing we are evaluating, and we can somehow "perceive" these through a special "moral sense organ" simply by thinking about the thing in question? A "moral sense" is non sense.

And what happens when we criticize something else. When we say "stealing is wrong" are we really saying that "You have this sense that stealing is wrong," and nothing more than that? What if they don't have this sense? What if they have it, but they simply don't care?

Or, are we telling them, "I sense that stealing is wrong?" He would answer by saying, "Then don't steal." He would be perfectly justified in asking, "Why should I care about this stupid 'sense' you claim to have?" And, indeed, why should he be any more concerned with our 'sense' that it is wrong than we are with his 'sense' that it is not wrong? Who wins when two people 'sense' different things?

It is true that morality is concerned with like and dislikes -- but it is concerned not with what we DO like, but with what we SHOULD like. It has to do with whether a given 'like' or 'dislike' is itself good or bad.

And the measure of the value of a 'like' or 'dislike' is taken exactly the same way we measure the value of everything else, by looking at whether the 'like' or 'dislike' itself would tend to fulfill desires. A 'like' that fulfills desires is morally good; one that thwarts desires is morally bad (evil).

But, the thing is, we do not measure 'likes' and 'dislikes' by our own desires alone. It's not, 'I like it, therefore it is good,' or 'I dislike it, therefore it is bad.' But, rather, 'That particular like, if universal among the population, would be good for us, therefore it is good; that particular like, if everybody had it, would be bad for all of us generally, therefore it is evil."

People SHOULD have good desires, and they SHOULD NOT HAVE bad desires. Desires that are neither good nor bad are morally neutral.

Another way of making the same point: Moral statements are not statements of the form of "I like X" or "I do not like Y". Moral statements are of the form "X is good for us," "Y is bad for us" (where X and Y are, themselves, likes and dislikes). Now, we don't think that there is anything mysterious in people investigating questions about whether exercise is 'good for you' or drugs are 'bad for you.' Likewise, superstition and religion are not needed to make any sense of debates about whether 'a dislikeof mixing church and state is good for us,' for example.

Note: Though people do not argue, "I like X, therefore X is good," but people often do hold, "X is good, therefore I like it." Anybody with a desire to do good would draw this conclusion. These 'morality as taste' and 'morality as sentiment' and 'morality as aesthetics' theories get morality exactly 180 degrees wrong. They put the sentiment before the value. When, in fact, the value comes before the sentiment.

The main issue is that, you don't need any type of special 'super-natural' value property to sense to put the 'good' before the 'like'. All you need to recognize is that your likes are not the only likes that exist in the universe. And the relagionship between 'good' and 'likes' may need to consider 'likes' other than your own -- the likes of other people -- who exist and which are as real as anything else on the planet.

scumble

I think xorbie has a valid point, when referring to a kind of revulsion to certain things, like perhaps killing your own children, which most people agree is bad. It wouldn't be very good for the survival of humans.
I'm not sure how much is physically inherent and how much is learnt. With things like stealing, we know how much trouble it causes, especially with items that are useful in someone else's life, the pains of loss and so on. If people are always stealing, it leads to mistrust, defensiveness, insecurity, and hence people are more unhappy.
I suppose there could be some kind of social evolution because people eventually come to a consensus through many interactions. People also talk and share thoughts and feelings.
Much of it is probably inherent in our nature, but conventions help to organise feelings, or something...

Alonzo Fyfe

Is it wrong because it is not good for the survival of humans? Or is it wrong because we have a revulsion? These are not the same thing. We may very well like things that are not good for the survival of humans. (Maybe it was good for our ancestors to like these things, but not us.) For example, being territorial may be fine for creatures wielding sticks and stones, but not for people with nuclear weapons. Unrestrained consumption may work out well for 100,000 people occupying a continent, but not for 6 billion people occupying a planet.

Where our evolved dispositions diverge from what is good for our survival as a species, which wins out? If you argue that the evolved dispositions are the mark of right and wrong, then, in instances where these diverge, it would be WRONG to subordinate our evolved dispositions to the survival of the species.

Ethics is not a matter of aesthetics or taste, because there is no guarantee that what worked in the past will work in the future, or even the present.

But, I would also argue that the survival of the species is not vital to ethics either. We can preserve the species by perminently freezing a bunch of DNA and shipping it off into the cold of space. But that seems inadequate. Or, if the only way to preserve the species is for its few surviving members to live forever and enture perpetual suffering, I find no rational basis for an objection to their decision to avoid perpetual hell, even if it meant the end of the human species. It is the quality of life that matters, not the quantity of life.

Bad Kitty

Weren't there societies in the past who had no problem killing their children -- as a "sacrifice to the gods", or for various other reasons (bringing luck to the harvest, keeping away evil spirits, etc.)...

And in fact, female infanticide an issue even today in China and India.

Wouldn't that prove that what we are calling OUR intrinsic revulsion for this action (killing our children) is just a result of a certain society's conditioning?

Michelle

yguy

Why would you think antipathy to the idea of infanticide is culturally imparted? Does it not make at least as much sense to say the tolerance of infanticide is culturally imparted?

Nowhere357

I agree it's a putative sense only. However, your conclusion that this would reduce morality to mere opinion does not follow. Or at least, if relative morality can be elevated above mere opinion, then surely so can relative morality based on a putative sense.

I think of it as an heritable instinct that guides our behavior as we relate to groups, but your description is more colorful. Hitler had an freakish overabundance of badon receptors! (And "non sense" is a nice touche also, btw,)

These questions apply to relative morality in general, and not just morality based on the putative "sense".

Yes. Maybe this is what we detect with the putative sense, and what elevates it above mere "likes and dislikes".
Morality codifies how we deal with others, and rises above personal likes and dislikes, evidenced by the fact that we can take action based on our morality which may be detrimental to the individual. Such as taking risks to help people in need.

I basically agree with this. I think however that this measuring must take place from the pov of whatever group we're talking about. If we think of an individual as a group of one (I talk with and relate to myself all the time), then you've described how we might start to develop a basic moral system.

But I think morality begins to really have meaning when we look at an individuals interrelations with groups. For example, most of us will alter our behavior and even take risks for the benefit of our immediate family. We may allow risks to our family for the benefit of our country. Or species, or planet. Those are the big ones that most people can "see", but there are many others, overlapping and free flowing, such as membership in a club - where we might make minor sacrifices such as donation$.

Yes. You just expanded the person's awareness from that of an individual, to that of a member of a group.

And we know good desires from bad by considering the relevant group pov. Strictly speaking, "desires" (like actions) have no inherant goodness or badness. The context must be considered, and this is what the group pov provides.

I agree. The "us" is the relevant group. I think you tend to see the group as "the human race" and that's fine.

I think I disagree with this. It seems to me that we recognize the value because of the taste/sentiment/aesthetics.
"I like X, therefore X is good," and "X is good, therefore I like it" are problematic, because they involve a shift in perspective from the individual to the group - you seem to have captured the point where the basic individual morality (approach pleasure/avoid pain) submits to the greater good.

But I suspect this is more a semantic matter than a real disagreement.

I imagine that's why no-one has postulated a supernatural value property.

That's right. This is where the putative moral sense come into play. People see it or they don't, or rather they see it with varying amounts of clarity.

Yes. The change in perspective.

Consider the way a colony of ants or a hive of bees functions like a single organism - seeming to have a group mind.
Consider the billions of living cells which comprise a single creature such as a human - and apparently give rise to an actual group mind!

So I see no problem with thinking of morality as codification of our putative moral sense. We may actually be sensing genetic information, or we may actually be sensing group mind.

Nowhere357

Good point. It seems to me that at first, we learn to not steal in order to avoid punishment. As we mature, the "morally aware" begin to avoid stealing even if punishment is not an issue. They see - become aware - feel - that it's "wrong".

Killing (humans) is probably a better example. Most of us would not kill except in self defense regardless of the possibility of punishment. The daily news would seem to contradict this, but then I'm an optimist.

Nowhere357

I think this is a great example.

Just as we temper our personal likes and dislikes by using reason, so too we temper our moral awareness with reason. Our instincts can steer us wrong, which is probably why we evolved cortex. A moral system - morality - must involve reason. It also involves a putative moral "sense".

Philosophy Dictionary
moral / non-moral
Distinction between types of value, judgments, or propositions. Although a precise line is difficult to draw, there seems to be a genuine difference between universalizable moral concerns that impinge upon other people and merely personal matters of taste. For example:
"Murder is wrong." is a moral assertion, but
"This coffee is good." is a non-moral assertion.

moral sense
A putatively innate human faculty for distinguishing right from wrong. In the moral intuitionism of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, the moral sense motivates proper conduct by enabling us to perceive the distinctive pleasure of moral rectitude.