Hugo Holbling

I am starting this thread to discuss relativism with Anthony Adams and anyone else who cares to join in. In particular, i shall attempt to answer the questions posted by Keith Russell in the Materialism thread. My general aim will be to defend relativism in the interests of debate with those who perhaps do not understand it, do not know enough about it, or are familiar with it and just want to see it killed off once and for all.

The following caveats will apply:

1. I do not have as much spare time as i would like; therefore, should this thread prove popular, i will only be able to respond to a limited number of participants. I hope AA will take up the slack.

2. I will not discuss specific categories of relativism, at least initially; if you want to talk about cognitive relativism, for example, please start another thread or refrain from dragging this one too far off-topic.

3. I am choosing to defend a minority position in the hope that we can all learn from the debate. The moment i am attacked in place of relativism, my particpation will end.

Let us begin!

Firstly, let us be clear what we mean by "relativism". In the Materialism thread i posted a link to the IEP entry for relativism, which i think gives a nice overview of the subject. This prompted the questions i will deal with shortly. The first line of that entry states:

I want to make it clear from the outset that i do not accept this description, nor should i accept a mischaracterization provided by my opponents. This kind of formulation gives rise to the criticism exempified by Primal's comment:

As Anthony Adams has said in the Materialism thread, it is silly to identify relativism with any absolute assertion, since the dichotomy we are concerned with here is precisely absolute/relative. Nevertheless, most criticism comes from this assumption, as in this amusing attempt. The claim that relativism is self-refuting is an interesting one, but not when it is based on the idea of an absolutist relativism.

The IEP article goes on to find common threads that we may use as a basis for our discussion:

Unless anyone wishes to argue to the contrary, i shall assume that there are no difficulties with confining ourselves to a discussion of these two points. I shall deal with Keith Russell's questions in the hope of expanding on what we mean by this assertion and denial.

Keith asked:

1. This first objection is easily dealt with in the form we see it, as we make choices all the time without knowledge of which should be priviledged over others. I assume, therefore, that Keith is asking about demarcation criteria; i.e. given that no standpoint is priviledged over any other, how do we decide which is "best" for us? This is best answered by the concept of intersubjectivity, of which i shall provide two examples here.

The first is one i described in basic form in the Materialism thread: the concept of beauty. We are all familiar with the platitude "beauty is on the eye of the beholder", but it is surprising how few people cry "relativist!" when they hear this, it being no more than the assertion that beauty is relative to the subject. With apologies to the ladies if i give the impression of treating them like objects :notworthy , let us proceed.

I shall make the assertion to you all that Veronica Varekova is the most beautiful girl in the world. (Let us leave aside for our purposes here the question of how i could possibly know this...) I then state that she is moreover ever so slightly more beautiful than Laetitia Casta. Here i run into trouble - how i can i say "more beautiful" without an objective standard to compare them to? Suppose that i begin to discuss this concept of beauty with you, perhaps in another thread. I claim that, for example, blue eyes are more beautiful than brown and some others agree with me - already we have reached an intersubjective agreement to call blue eyes more beautiful than brown. If agreement can be reached on a number of qualities that ought to be possessed by our mythical perfect girl, we have our intersubjectively defined criteria for rating girls, a popular sport among heterosexual males. A relativist may take part in this pastime without fear of refuting himself...

My second example concerns the concept of human rights. There has been much noise made about the objective or otherwise existence of such rights, or whether they are of God or the Devil. Let us suppose that, in my case, i am sitting in front of a fire one night conducting armchair philosophizing, when it occurs to me, being a public-spirited fellow, that the world would be a better place in my opinion if everyone had basic human rights that were acknowledged by all and enforced by law. I do not care in the slightest whether this position is justifiable ultimately by reference to God or Objective Morality or pragmatic considerations; i decide, for whatever reasons, that human rights are the way ahead. The next day i set about attempting to persuade you all that you should agree that the world would be a better place with my idea; perhaps i now refer to pragmatism, or God if you are religiously inclined, or perhaps i try force of rhetoric. If i succeed in gaining significant agreement then i may petition parliament, or try to publicize my ideas to a wider audience. Eventually i may succeed in achieving a declaration of recognition of human rights from some suitably high authority that my idea makes a difference. All the while, human rights need not be based on anything more than an intersubjective agreement to agree as to what kind of world we want for ourselves and how best to bring it about.

2. Keith's second question is a good one, and prompts us to look back at the relativist denial that any standpoint should be priviledged. It does not follow, however, that reason must be abandoned by our intrepid relativist. While rationalists may indeed asert that positions supported by reason ought to be privileged, reason itself is a tool which may be used whenever we wish. If i consider it useful to employ reason as a criterion of validity i may do so, once again based on an intersubjective agreement to agree that arguments supported by reason are "better" than those that aren't. Nowhere do i need to suppose that reason is the absolute standard by which validity is defined.

3. Given that our relativist need not abandon reason, the answer to how he may defend a standpoint may of course include reason. Consider also that justification is based on argument from accepted foundations, these themselves earlier accepted on the basis of argument from accepted foundations, and so on. Hence the antifoundationalist critique in modern epistemology and the questions that bother relativists: how can we come between language and the world (Wittgenstein)? How can there be a privileged "God's-eye view" (Putnam)? How can it make sense "to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to interpret it or reinterpret that theory in another" (Quine)? How can the signified not be "already in the position of the signifier" (Derrida)? Isn't it the case that "whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system" (Saussure)? Doesn't that mean that "every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the others, to other concepts, by means of a systematic play of differences" (Derrida again)? Is Rorty right that "since there is nothing beyond vocabularies which serves as a criterion of choice between them, criticism is a matter of looking on this picture and on that, not of comparing both pictures with the original"?

In a sense, relativism strips away the power (cf. Foucault) associated with ontologies and democratizes concepts such as truth. Some people are concerned at criticism of foundationalism because they think that truth by intersubjective agreement may result in agreement about "bad" things, like Nazism, but this merely tells us that if we want a better world for ourselves we shall have to work for it, convincing others along the way that Nazism is bad but human rights are good.

4. A relativist's choice of standpoint is no more arbitrary than anyone else's, unless he makes decisions by throwing a die. None of the possible standpoints may be priviledged over the others, but some are more useful than others in achieving specific aims. For example, i stand more chance of convincing Keith in debate by appealing to reason; for a neo-Nazi, i'd probably need recourse to rhetoric. Neither can it be said that refusing to priviledge any standpoint over another makes them all equal unless we are chasing the spectre of absolutism.

I think this is enough to be getting on with! I look forward to AA adding his comments and any criticisms from others. I shall try to add something more substantial addressing the claim that relativism is self-retuting but it may have to wait until next weekend, as may any reply requiring a lengthy response. I leave you with Rorty:

Keith Russell

Hugo:

Thanks for giving my questions such a thoughtful response.

I'm going to start at the end, since I don't have much time today, either.

You said:
"For example, i stand more chance of convincing Keith in debate by appealing to reason; for a neo-Nazi, i'd probably need recourse to rhetoric. Neither can it be said that refusing to priviledge any standpoint over another makes them all equal unless we are chasing the spectre of absolutism."

Is relativism, then, only good for dealing with other people? Is it a paradigm useful only when one person attempts to persuade another?

I understand--and agree--that one should deal with people by recognizing their subjective, personal 'learning styles', and/or by appealing to their individual, particular interests, beliefs, values, etc. (But, this sounds more like the tactics of corporate 'get-ahead' books, than philosophy--at least to me.)

And, none of it relates to whether the notion of human rights is valid, or whether Nazism is wrong (or false, bad, invalid, evil--or whatever other qualitative term one wishes to use).

You gave the example of someone who has the idea that human rights were a good idea, using relativism (intersubjectivity) to helps persuade others that human rights are a good idea.

I think a good philosophy, though, should help one not only to promote what one believes to be good ideas, but must first provide a means by which one can verify that one's beliefs are good (or beneficial, important, moral--or whatever other qualitative term one wishes to use).

Relativism, as you've described it, seems to start in the middle, when one already has a belief, and wishes to interact with others.

It doesn't seem to be much help if one wants to know how to choose (or evaluate) a belief, from among the multitude of complex and often contradictory beliefs available.

How does a relativist choose? How do you decide when reason is or is not appropriate, when you're alone?

Keith.

Gurdur

You seem to be making a false dichotomy between reason and intersubjectivity.

How does a relativist choose ?
In much the same way as anyone else today chooses; you look at your values and the entire range of possible values, examine them , argue with other people about them, then repeat the same process for determing how best to fulfill those values.

Oh, and Hugo Holbling, a great OP !
:notworthy

Hugo Holbling

You are taking my words out of context here, Keith. I was discussing how to persuade people in the light of relativism, showing that your comment about rejecting reason need not follow. I would employ reason when talking to you because you say that you use rationalist demarcation criteria; this says nothing about the validity or otherwise of relativism.

Of course it does. The point is that a relativist does not consider Nazism intrinsically wrong; the notions of Good and Bad are dispensed with in favour of an intersubjective agreement as to what we shall call good and bad, based on shared values and goals.

Surely one's belief's are important to oneself? Am i reading you correctly in that you still want a foundationalist epistemology? If so, that is not relevant here (although it will be later on when i come to making some further comments on relativism); your question was asking "given relativism, how can we decide between ideas?", and i have explained how to do so. You must appreciate that relativists are having done with the concept of one methodology or set of demarcation criteria being intrinsically better than any other, without reference to some presupposition such as utility or rationality.

You are not alone, Keith. Gurdur has answered you better than i could, methinks.

Thanks!

So it seems. A relativist can have both!

Oxymoron

How does one come about this knowledge? Clearly, a single counter-example fells this, and the set of all standopints is going to be enormous. Clearly, it is either an article of faith or requires some rational justification, which would seem to privelege rationalism over other justifications.

Kantian

Relativism is the result of a deep skepticism of the possibility of truth, of right and wrong actions, etc, etc. The radical skeptic is more likely to look at the context of whatever is under question than to isolate whatever and treat it as an independent object, free of epistemic impurities.

In spite of certified practitioners of Philosophy 100, the radical skeptic denies the possibility of knowledge without presupposing that there is such a thing as knowledge.

How is that the case? Surely the phrase 'knowledge is impossible' seems to presuppose that there exists something called 'knowledge' that is not possible. Therefore this basic claim is self-contradictory.

[A refresher in Russell's theory of description]

However, since knowledge is not a singular noun, but an abbreviated description for 'the X that is correct information,' the skeptic's sentence logically reads as 'there is nothing that is correct information.' The apparent word, 'knowledge' has disappeared from the skeptic's sentence.

In deeper grammar, definite descriptions are not names, and sentences with definite descriptions are not singular, but actually general sentences.

Therefore, the philosophical position of skepticism may be expressed without suffering any inconsistencies.

~Transcendentalist~
__________________
Reason has often led us into transcendent metaphysics that "overstep the limits of all experience, [and] no object adequate to the transcendental ideal can ever be found within experience."

Hugo Holbling

Clearly your assertions are not as clear as you would like. How are you going to justify your single counter-example as priviledged over all others?

Kantian:

:notworthy

I was going to post something on the supposed self-refuting nature of relativism, but your efforts made it superfluous - at least for now...

*sinister laugh*

Oxymoron

That's a different question! Let's go back one step: in order to be a relativist, I must believe that all standpoints are equally unprivileged. How can I possibly know this?

It may be possible to state what the some of the characteristics of a privileged standpoint might be. If so, we can certainly classify any particular standpoint by the extent that it fulfils these criteria. If the criterion is "the ability to make accurate predictions about the world", then things start to get interesting.

John Page

False. Relativism can also be said to be the result of observation and analysis.

I think I understand what you are getting at, but the concept of (our perception of) an object free from epistemic impurities seems oxymoronic! Of course, you will probably label me as a radical skeptic because I'm looking at espistemic knowledge in the "context of whatever is in question".

Following through, one might conclude that the radicalness of any skepticism is relative to (i.e. a function of) how abstract the context has become. This is the case of the very radical skeptic examining the relations between the contexts. I would continue, but I doubt it would eliminate the pollution of experience from my mind.

I followed the link to Russell's theory of descriptions. Thanks. I would like to point out, however, that no F is G in fact. An F may be considered a G during the process of perception and we can intersubjectively agree that F is in fact G for the purpose of identification.

Cheers, John

John Page

Hugo:

You quoted the above from IEP. I would like to make a distinction between:

a) a point of view as "opinion" and
b) point of view as in "viewpoint"

I have accepted, perhaps wrongly, that there is an approach to reasoned thought that requires one to examine opposites and alternatives. In this way, one's opinion may become less subjective through analysis of different viewpoints.

Arguably, it is this practice of decreasing subjectivity that we are exercising in the debate herein. Let us all argue the toss and when all is said and done review the outcomes and how they are relative to each other.

Cheers, John