The AntiChris

You're gonna have to read the whole thread.

Chris

Ted Hoffman

Oh Gawd!

[ September 21, 2002: Message edited by: Intensity ]</p>

The AntiChris

Ok.

Check out the end of page 7 - bd-from-kg describes in some detail his particular take on objective morality.

Chris

Ted Hoffman

Thanks, I have decided to read the whole damn thread anyway. On Monday, you will hear from me.

Agnos1

And Intensity, be sure to ingnore the impertinent and lengthy post by "yours truly" at the end of page 11. I'm obviously no match for the intellect found around here!

I'll just sit back and absorb all these higher thoughts. <img src="graemlins/notworthy.gif" border="0" alt="[Not Worthy]" />

Ted Hoffman

[ September 23, 2002: Message edited by: Intensity ]</p>

Ted Hoffman

Jeez, I only managed to reach page 5. My, my, my, aren't the posts long and intellectually stimulating!

Agnos1,
You sound like you are being too hard on urself. I will read your posts. Remember, irrespective of the abrasive veil of intellectual virtuoso most people adorn here, deep down, everyone is pretty ignorant (ie we are all looking for answers - no one has figured out everything). So dont allow yourself to be bulldozed out of the discussion and regard your contributions in a deprecating manner.

I guess I will reach page 11 on thursday or so.

[ September 23, 2002: Message edited by: Intensity ]</p>

Longbow

So would you agree, then, that it is possible to create purely conceptual subjects? Or, must all subjects be conceptualizations of something that it is ultimately tied to the physical world?

I don't understand how you can say that moral statements aren't true or false but then turn around and say that they are a part of reality. You clearly think that they are not part of the physical world. And you think that they are not at all like mathematics. Are they a special class of things? What does this mean (if they are)? What wuold it mean to make statements about them? You are setting them up as being completely different from everything both metaphysically and epistemologically.

And, with regard to math, you seem to be saying that mathematics is analytic. Would you say that all a priori propositions are analytic? In any case, it strikes me as particularly odd that you say that mathematics has nothing to do with reality. I think the reason is because by "reality" you mean "physical world". If you take "reality" to be "that which is represented by all true propositions", then would morality and math be "part of reality"? Why, then, wouldn't "morality" be "that which is represented by all true moral propositions"? Is morality part of the physical world but not representable by true propositions? What could such a thing be and how could we ever know of it?

And, finally, if you take "reality" as I have defined it above, would you say that it is a subset of (or perhaps equal to) the physical world?

Ted Hoffman

I have read the whole thread. My take is that there is NO objective morality, and my reasons are largely the same as the ones that koy advanced.

It has been a great read.

bd-from-kg

Longbow:

I’m not quite sure what you mean by “creating” a “conceptual subject”, but otherwise my answer is “yes” to the first question and “no” to the second. Mathematical “subjects” are purely conceptual; they are not conceptualizations of something that is ultimately tied to the physical world.

Obviously statements are a part of reality. If I say “The Absolute is glissential”, it is a fact about reality that I said “The Absolute is glissential” (even though I have no idea what this statement could mean). Since moral statements are not propositions, I have no idea how they could be part of reality (or not part of reality) in any other sense. Anyway, I didn’t say that moral statements are part of the physical world (which is trivially true); I said that they have to do with the physical world. For example, if I say, “Smith should not have killed Jones for his money”, this statement clearly refers to an event in the physical world. Mathematical statements do not have this property: “2 + 3 = 5” does not refer in any way to any object or event in the physical world. Similarly, “The Absolute is glissential” does not appear to refer to the physical world.

If by “a priori proposition” you mean a proposition that can be known to be true independently of any evidence, then yes, all such propositions are analytic. Certainly true mathematical propositions are analytic.

Not quite. If anything exists besides the physical world, I would consider that to be part of “reality” too. However, I do not consider concepts (such as numbers) to “exist” in the sense that (e.g.) physical objects do. Mental phenomena such as thoughts, emotions, etc. are also “real”, but their nature is still subject to dispute. If, as some say, they are ultimately physical (not just caused by or epiphenomena of events in the physical world, but aspects of the physical world itself – emergent phenomena as some put it) the fact that they are “real” is an immediate corollary of the fact that physical phenomena in general are real. But if not, they are still clearly “real” – that is, they exist.

Repeat after me: moral statements are not propositions. Also, I don’t agree with your definition of “reality”. I would say that “reality” is that which distinguishes one possible world from another. Or to put it another way, it is “that which is represented by all propositions which are true in this world, but not in all possible worlds.” Mathematical truths are true in all possible worlds, so they are not part of reality, nor do they refer to reality. Propositions about thoughts and emotions, on the other hand, are not true in all possible worlds, which is why such things as thoughts and emotions are “real”.

Well, I don’t take it as you have defined it, but in any case it would necessarily include at least the physical world; it could not be a proper subset of it.

Because there are no moral propositions.

No. It is neither part of the physical world nor representable by propositions, whether true of false.

Not so. As I explained in my reply to Agnos1 on Sept. 14, moral statements are similar in nature to certain other principles of rational action. Perhaps the best example is Occam’s Razor. This is sometimes stated, “The simplest explanation (consistent with the facts) is best.” But this begs the question of what “best” means in this context. It’s also impossible to say in what sense it is “true”. It is clearly not a tautology, but if it’s an empirical statement, what counts as evidence for or against it? Obviously, nothing. In fact, it is difficult to see how we could evaluate any such supposed evidence without applying Occam’s Razor. This rule is an essential part of our methodology for evaluating evidence; what methodology could we use to determine whether we should adopt the rule?

These difficulties are avoided if we put Occam’s Razor in a different form: “Always prefer the simplest explanation that is consistent with the facts”. In this form it is clear that Occam’s Razor is not a proposition at all, so questions of its truth or falsity (and thus of how we “know” that it’s true) do not even arise. It is a principle of rational action: to be rational is (among other things) to prefer the simplest explanation consistent with the facts.

The same comments apply to the Principle of Induction. In fact, in both cases a careful analysis will show that it is impossible to say exactly what the principle says. What constitutes the “simplest” explanation? What beliefs “count” as “facts”? How often does a regularity have to be observed before we are justified (in fact, rationally compelled) to expect it to occur the next time? What, for that matter constitutes the “next time”? How confident should we be that this expectation will be fulfilled? If we try to construe these principles as factual propositions, these difficulties are insuperable. But if we interpret them as principles of rational action, all becomes clear. They are both partial descriptions of the methodology used by rational people to acquire beliefs; it is not possible to spell out this methodology precisely, but clear-cut violations of these principles are plainly incompatible with it.

My idea is that moral principles have a similar metaphysical and epistemic status to principles like these. What exactly this status is is a matter of considerable dispute, but few people deny that Occam’s Razor and the Principle of Induction are valid in some important sense. I’m content with claiming that moral principles are valid in this same sense without worrying overmuch about exactly what this sense is. But since you seem to really be into such metaphysical issues, you might want to delve into this question.