Ierrellus

tronvillain,

IMO, any dualism is a two-world's theory. I had mentioned Dennett and Carruthers according to their articles on animal consciousness not because either of them supports any ideas of mine (which are closer to Gallup's}, but because I hoped to free this thread from the epistemological nihilism that has bogged down so many other threads by indroducing other kinds of valid opposition to these ideas.

As for space aliens who are unaware of sound, I know of no such beings. The creatures mentioned in my thread all have the same senses we have, but their senses vary from ours in intensity for usage not in kind of usage!

Let me opt out of explaining genomeic evolution. Someone else has apparently taken it to a spinoff thread, where I am sure it will get its just linguistic criticism. In that thread I agree with Bill and Dennett, such scales are of complexity, not of merit.

Yes, human babies below four years of age are conscious. Yes theory of the mind as a prerequisite for consciousness is Carruthers' main thrust.

Ierrellus

PAX

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Ierrellus

Laurentius,

Did you "know" anything before you learned your definition of knowing?

Here's what I tried to do. 1. I tried to establish the barest definition of what "self" entails--the conjunction in a brain of sensory and somatic data. 2. I tried to suggest that those who depend on anthopomorphic or solypsistic arguments present dead-end arguments simply because each argument can be reduced to not-knowing and denial of the existence of objects external to bodies. Thus logically, the definition of self I gave would not work. There would be no known objects from which senses could receive information. 3. I tried to show animals with brains as adapting to environments by sensory feedback. It would be possible that, if these other animals adapt to environments by using sensory feedback, the development of a concept of self in such animals could compare with our own.

Echolocation involves sound and hearing. What senses does a bat have that I do not have? How does the bat's cerebral cortex compare with mine?

Ierrellus,

PAX

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snatchbalance

Ierrellus,

No, I don't see any real hubris here. I do think that there are several aspects of the problem that are getting mixed together here:

1. Subjectivity, One can never get into another's brain. Ultimately, all experienc is personnal.

I recognise this, but it is also obvious that there is enough in common between us to allow some measure of communication.

I would also state that it is obvious that there is some interspiecies commonality.

2. Perseption, different people, different animals, different types of animals have different eqipment. Again, while I would agree that it is impossible for me to dectect an insect with my own sonar equipment, it seems obvious that both me and the bat are capable of detecting insects.

3. Behavior, how does one know that a person likes you? Not by what is said, but by his behavior towards you. When a dog spontaneously come up and licks my face, and follows me around, and wags his tail when he sees me; that dog likes me. Can I get inside his experience any more than I can get into my girlfriend's experience of liking me? No way. But what do thier resective behaviors indicate?

Anyway, it seems that two camps have deveoped, one emphasizeing the inherant subjectivty of all experience; the other emphasizing the obvious commonality of some experience(Include me with the later group).

SB

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Ierrellus

snatchbalance,

Thanks for your response. It is quite accurate. In all of the research I have done on papers on animal consciousness, the same aspects of the problem become problematic and the same two camps of thought as you mentioned emerge.

Is there any way in which philosophy can offer mediation? In 1995 Daniel Dennett wrote an aticle in which he expressed his exasperation over the entire issue. He thought there were two many agendas behind the debates. Animal Rights activists led the debates.

Ierrellus

PAX

Ierrellus

All,

Before we continue the following discussion, can we agree on a fundamental premise logically or disagree with it logically?

Premise 1. Unless the human organism has a perception of its environment that, to some degree, accurately expresses what is beyond its body, it cannot survive. Environment cares less who or what should or should not survive. Is it not true then that the most factual data about an environment to which an organism can obtain determines the degree to which the organism survives?

Ierrellus

P.V.

tronvillain

Ierrellus:
So? There is no inhererent problem with dualism - you can divide the world into two parts in countless ways.

You'll really have to specify what the other kinds of valid opposition to these ideas are. As far as I know, my views are quite similar to those of Dennett.

You seem to be claiming that echolocation is just better hearing, when it is obviously not. You admitted as much yourself when you said "Sonic pictures of what a human fetus looks like in the womb is an example of using echolocation the the same way as a bat does." We are analagous to space aliens who are unaware of sounds - we require the sonic information to be presented to us in a visual format in order for us to understand it.

tronvillain

Ierrellus:
You have similar sensory apparatus, but you differ in your processing of sensory data. Can you transform auditory information into visual information? Even if you can, is this eve analagous to what a bat does?

snatchbalance

Tron,

You seem to be focusing in on the difference in peseptive equipment between bats and humans.

I think there are a number of similarities that should be noted:

Both are predatory mammals. Both search for and hunt down prey. Both get hungry. Both reproduce sexualy. Both evolved in similar environments. Both metabolise fats, protiens and carbohydrates. Both utilise brains, spinal cords, and central nervous systems. Both breath air. Both get tired and sleep. Both age and die. To cite but a few examples.

Is there a possibilty for a commonality within all this?

sb

DRFseven

That's because you are talking about perceptive equipment!

Ierrellus

tronvillain,

Dennett's concept of cognition (SEP) is that any system of cognition can be broken down into simpler systems, which can eventually be broken down into binary systems. Thus my computer has some degree of cognition under Dennett's description.

I am not working here with computers or computer logic, but with homology. The Humprey book I refer to in my argument concerns homology. Dennett praised the book highly, even though the homologious trait Humprey writes about is an organism's capacity to be aware.

I read an excellent encycopedia entry about the difference between homology and analogy. Homology would indicate that a bat's arm and a human arm share a common ancestry. Analogy would indicate that a bat and a fly have wings for flight, but have no common ancestry.

The argument from homology can be criticised because of function. The bat arm and the human arm have different functions. The argument from analogy is about function only, not about ancestry. Dualism of any sort could not critically approach the problem of function in homology. Consequently, the homology must admit
correspondence beween function and ancestry.


Ierrellus

PAX