Thomas Ash

Jan:

I think you're basically outlining compatibilist freewill. In repsonse to Theli's criticism, I don't think it's problematic to see an easy distinction between you and the universe. 'You' is the part of the universe you consciously experience as 'you.'

Devilnaut

tron:

But, if you are to ultimately choose pumpkin pie, then that was no more an option for you than the idea of spontaneously flying to mars w/o a spaceship. Both are subject to strict physical constraints.

However, I do see where you're coming from. I suppose that between these two ideas (taste in pie VS spontaneous spaceflight) we can make a distinction between external forces and internal forces. If the immediate physical forces operating on an event are (were) taking place internally to the subject, then under the compatibilist position, the initiation of the event would have been a manifestation of the subject's free will.

Actually, I would refine this a little to say that if the immediate physical forces operating on an event were for the most part internal, then the initiation of said event constitutes free will.

Would you say that this is accurate?

xeren

You know, i really don't see what the argument is here. I wasn't taking a standard definition, and then drawing conclusions from it, i was taking a Standard Definition, then giving an instance of it! So there is really nothing to argue about except that maybe you don't agree with the standard definition. If so, take it up with
<a href="http://www.xrefer.com/entry/551636" target="_blank">xrefer</a>, not me:



jeez

[ December 02, 2002: Message edited by: xeren ]</p>

Kharakov

Doesn't the amount of money you have determine how free your will is?

tronvillain

Yes, if it gives you more available options. I suppose you could argue that it generally just gives you different options rather than more options, in which case it wouldn't.

Zadok001

"Doesn't the amount of money you have determine how free your will is?"

*Zadok001's head explodes.

K

tron:

This would be the same kind of free will that an alarm clock has. It might go off at 7:00, but if its settings were different, it could go off at 6:00. The setting of the alarm clock would be very similar to your preference for pumpkin pie - it results from the alarm clock's structure and inputs from its environment. I think it would be strange to say that the alarm clock had free will even though it were capable of going off at many different times. In the end, how is a human being whose outputs are determined any different from the alarm clock in this example?

Theli

Jan Haugland...

But, what factor(s) would make you lean towards A?
If there are none, and your final choice (A or B) is uncaused (random) it cannot constitute a choice. Choice is a process, and all processes require set factors and situations.
Hence, your definition of free will is contradictory.
You can approach the problem by asking this: Can you think of a choice in real life that has no set conditions or causes?
Uncaused choice between A and B is in itself a paradox. The fact that you know the alternatives, and sees a difference between them are both causes.

Tronvillian...

Actually, they are just 2 parts of one common problem. External force and it's relation to free will.
No external force- nullifies the choice, external force- guides the choice.

"Randomly picking one" requires prior conditions also, it's not "free". You must know how many you can pick, and wich alternatives there is.
Therefore, an uncaused choice is a contradiction.


Thomas Ash...

I don't see how a plant or a vegetable makes any logic choices. However this is pretty fussy. Some plants, like vines does 'seek' objects to climb.
About the computer, it does not simply follow a script. It has no "knowledge" of future events, so it's future actions is not inherit in it's design. It simply follows if-&gt;then routines, very much like we do. The only difference, I guess is that the computer only has one option, wich nullifies it's choice.

If lacking knowledge of ones future actions would require some sort of awareness, then yes. However there's probably more to it.
I was thinking of this the other day. If someone would know my future actions, that would not change my awareness. But if I were to learn them, there would be nothing I could do to prevent them, right?
Then, what happened to me? The only answer I could imagine would be that I would cease to be aware. If I was aware, I could avoid the action.


Kharakov...

That depends on your knowledge and intelligence. If you was unaware that you need money or just didn't understand, you would have more options to choose from.
Both knowledge and intelligence generally limits the amount of bad options. So, the free'er the choice is the more flawed it gets, at the "deep end of logic". The perfect choice would then only have two options.

I might be way out of line, if so start your flaming.

[ December 03, 2002: Message edited by: Theli ]</p>

tronvillain

K:
An alarm clock is not aware of anything. It does not realize that it could go off at seven if its settings were different. It does not even realize that it goes off at six.

K

tronvillian:

It's true that an alarm clock is not aware of its environment, but does self-awareness create free will even though the self-aware human's actions are just as mechanically determined as the alarm clock's? How does awareness create free will?