Luiseach

Golly, Hugo, I never would have guessed you had a liking for the socratic method... ;-)

Yes...that's a good way of putting it. By viewing critique as a negative approach in the first place, we set ourselves up for the problem/solution dichotomy, which is yet another characteristic of logocentric thinking.

Which brings us back to the question of mind, thought and language, yes?

Now that you've brought up Wittgenstein, it's made me think of this: I wonder if, as Chomsky argues, the human mind really does contain the basic organisational patterns/predispositions necessary for language acquisition...could these innate foundations, if they exist, help explain the stubborn either/or mentality that deconstruction shows up? Are our brains hard-wired in this way? What are your thoughts on this?

King's Indian

Hello Luiseach (and also to Hugo and Amos),

Pardon me for the interruption, but I have been following this thread with great interest (probably the thread that made me come out of my shell and register), and hope you don't find me rude to attempt the question quoted above.
In my understanding, if deconstruction has shown up gaps (or aporias, if you prefer) in Western thought (narrowly, the binary oppositon exemplified by speech/writing), it has done so with a view to showing how that same tradition got there first. That is to say, the method of analysis that has been rather loosely summarized as deconstruction (necessarily, in my view, in the attempt to escape a too-easy conceptualization) has been at once radical and traditional.
Two brief examples:
Derrida's demonstration (in Plato's Pharmacy) of how Plato (in the Phaedrus) puts his argument of the debased, secondary nature of writing to speech under tension by recourse to metaphor (speech as the "writing of the soul") and by his use of profoundly ambiguous concepts (Pharmakon:- poison/cure). One of Derrida's lesser aims is to counter the opinion of critics of Plato who thought that the ambiguities of Phaedrus was due to either a) that it was composed by a young tyro, finding his metaphysical feet, or b) it was the work of a man in his dotage.
Closer to our own time (and coming from a different angle), his descriptions (in Signature Event Context) of J.L. Austin's exclusions ("infelicities") of his model of language (Subtle and adaptable as it is) as being general preconditions of that same model (which Derrida places under the rubric of iterability).
All this by way of showing (I hope) that if there are "innate foundations" of language, they cannot be fundamental as such; perhaps, even, the more stubbornly they direct our thinking, the more they are bound to undercut themselves.
Perhaps there's something I missed; if so, I would be happy for your guidance.
And once again, apologies for the presumption.

John Page

Greetings, welcome!

Could you please expand on "fundamentals as such" so I can understand how they might differ from the "innate foundations of language".

Cheers, John

King's Indian

Hello to you too, John. Pleased to make your acquaintance.

I'll try. (As a matter of fact, what I originally wrote was trimmed down by half as much again for reasons of concision. I may have got rid of the point along with the clutter. Heigh-ho)

To Paraphrase:

Luiseach said: If (as Chomsky argues), the mental capacity for language is innate, could that be an explanatory mechanism for the binary oppositions (Orig. "stubborn either-or mentality") that Derrida, as part of his critique of Western Philosophy "shows up"?
I pipe up: Even if it is (and it's an interesting question in itself), the mental linguistic structure that prejudices binaries would also account for the critique of deconstruction itself. The two examples (very barely, I admit) hopefully showing a strategy of deconstruction as not merely attacking Western Philosophy from without.
To address your point directly: when I say that the "innate foundations" cannot be fundamental as such, I mean that the foundations (=a priori mental linguistic structures), in prejudicing binaries as a way of categorization, are not so fundamental that they don't contain their own counter-argument. My way of showing this was to sketch how Metaphysics, (in Derrida's argument) from a certain (conditional) inauguration by Plato, to its more recent manifestation in Austin's work, was (in a phrase worn down to cliche) always already undoing itself. Deconstruction avant la lettre, to pile on the cliches. (Piling on- 10 yard Penalty!)
A more common-sense approach: if binaries(as favoured by Western philosophy) were an a priori feature of our brains, how could we even begin to formulate a critique of them? Here's one way: the critique was always there with them.
In this response, I'm worried that I've failed to grasp your point. Apologies; I'm knackered (I run on GMT), but I wanted to at least try to post something before bed. If you have any follow-ups, I'll bring more coherence to them tomorrow.
PS Derrida says that the trace (being that which disrupts binaries) is anterior to logic, reason etc. I'll dig out some quotes and/or (Bloody hell, even I'm at it now) links.
PPS On the question of Binaries in mental structures: I think Bickerton mentions these in Language & Species. Again, I'll look for more.
Take Care,
KI

John Page

KI:

Thanks, I think I'm getting it partly.

1. Foundations (of language) include the language capability of the mind/brain.
2. The linguist intuits the structure of language, which is processed by the mind/brain, but this is different than the foundation of language (see 1. above). Rather, the "structure of language" is the relations between the words themselves.
3. Binaries. When a word is defined as meaning something, we have a way of describing that meaning using other words, e.g. definitions in a dictionary. This is not (always) the actual meaning. For example, "A smilie means this picture to the right of the words, ", which means the actual smilie to the right of the words. (Note: If you don't see the smilie then my intention has not been conveyed and our realities do not have referential integrity. If we were doing this face to face it would be easier). Conclusion: resolution of some binaries requires reference to an experienced *reality* and, I argue, language without (what is meant by the word) reality is meaningless.
4. Fundamental. If I understand you correctly, you are disgreeing with a deconstructionist premise that language is reality. In this case, I concur and observe that while the only reality we can talk about is framed by language this is pretty much consistent with the definition of language anyway, so no big deal.

Comments invitied!

Cheers, John

Amos

The Significance of Stephen's Vision.

The five chapters of the novel "to live, to err, to fall, to triumph, and to re-create life out of life" are true reflections of Stephen's life (New York Penguin, p.172). "To recreate life out of life" signifies a new beginning, and judging by the power of the authors writing combined with the narrative technique in chapter five it may be postulated that these changes are a direct result of Stephen's vision at the end of chapter four. This would mean that the visions, dreams, and hypnogogic experiences of the first four chapters are foreshadows of this vision of which its significance is manifest in chapter five. If the vision experienced by Stephen at the end of chapter four was indeed "an envoy from the fair courts of life, to throw open before in an instant of ecstasy the gates of all the ways of error and glory" (172) it was a beatific vision. Since such a vision is all that is required for Catholics to go to heaven (132), Stephen Dedalus was on his way to heaven. Chapter five would then be a description of his life lived with a new outlook on life as Stephen had been reborn into a new world of wisdom and beauty from where he looks back on his life to write the first four chapters.

The "girl that stood before him in midstream, alone and still" (171) is Stephen's image of the virgin Mary who looked much like the "faded blue shrine of the Blessed Virgin" described on page 162, except that this image was strange and beautiful . . . touched with the wonder of mortal beauty" as if he himself had created her. "The emerald trail of seaweed [that] had fashioned itself as a sign upon the flesh" is his image of the serpent that was defeated by this virgin Mary who now stood before him "stirring the water [s] with her foot hither and thither" to signify the upcoming epiphany event. The "water" is symbolic for the celestial sea (the subconscious mind) from where this vision issued forth. Mary is the "Tower of Ivory" inasmuch as she is the second Eve who in chapter one was the first Eve represented by Eileen who was a "protestant" (35) and thus not suitable for marriage to Stephen. Stephen's self-righteous vision of Catholicism (his old Tower of Ivory) was defeated in his "valley of Jehosephat" described on page 113 (eg."Time is, time was but time shall be no more"). This defeat was foreshadowed in chapter three and lived by Stephen in chapter four after he had left religion. Since Stephen had created his own Eve and since Mary is the second Eve, Stephen created his own Mary, which is why she had a mortal beauty about her. Her "mortal beauty" signifies a certain amount of earthliness that she had retained from the first Eve who was clever and cunning; much like Stephen who was a "schemer" and wished he had a "little mirror to see" if it showed (53). Often, Stephen used to "hide out of the way" to escape punishment (54) and thus is why I suggest that he made her with his own hands.

(Side note: The Virgin Mary always appears to the visionary in their own image of strength and beauty; she is what is written between Alpha and Omega; color your own world equals color your own heaven if you get to heaven in time; Rev.14:13c).

The beatific vision of Stephen ended his advent period and entered him upon the purgation period that was foreshadowed on page 117 with his vision of the rain that lasted "forty days and forty nights." To emphasize the significance of this vision, and to indicate the complete reversal of his perception of life, Stephen was joyfully "crying to greet the advent of the life that had cried to him" (172). Now, he felt himself suspended between heaven and earth--and thus out of the valley of Jehosepath: "above him the vast indifferent dome and the calm process of heavenly bodies [the future]; and the earth beneath him [his past], the earth that had born him, had taken him to his breast." (172).

"His mind" (176) wavered often between the spectral words of pastoral care and the dainty songs of revelations that illuminated his escape from the darkness of his lurking place. On towards the future he was led:
From the chapter it is clear that this vision had an effect on him. He had lost his sense of time, was often late for class, and became antisocial and much more philosophic. His refusal to take the eucharist is a clear sign that he had left his religion if only because it had served its purpose. For Stephen, religion is a means to the end and not a "lying-in hospital" (248) to be endured for life. For Stephen to be religious now would limit his freedom and with it the beauty of heaven. He was "free, soulfree and fancyfree" (248). As such, was Stephen "the body of Christ" and "did not believe in it nor disbelieve" (239) because to believe is to have doubt and to know is to be beyond believe and doubt. Stephen's answer to Cranly was based on the literary tradition of Port Royal Logic now arresting the "idols of the marketplace" (188).

On April 27 Stephen died to his old self with the words: "Old father old artificer, stand me now and ever in good stead" which means "Father into thy hands I commit my spirit." On that day Stephen ended his purgation period to welcome new life on the first day of May to complete his forty days of lent.

================================================
It's short, Louise, too short but long enough to make my point if it is there. The interesting part here is that Joyce found freedom from religion while remaining true to himself (could still "deflower a virgin") while Eliot sought freedom in religion (would never do that). That is how Joyce became an artist while Eliot remained a poet.

Amos

I don't think there is one! Why do you think I forgot about it? (sorry Louise, I'll take a look). Yes I did write the comparison.

The bit about Cranly is that both were born from "exhaused loins," hence Cranly's "despair of soul" (248) and "heavy burden" (232 top). Cranly was a good man but remained part of the "Church Suffering" while Stephen became part of the "Church Triumphant." Cranlys element of the Church paves the way for salvation in that it provides the stream of consciousness against which salvation is found, and it does this with all earnesty and dedication so salvation may be found. This recognition is a very appropriate end after his vision. It says, "thank you" and is just the right thing to do.

Amos

Hello King's Indian.

I'll leave Deconstruction to those who are familiar with it. I am here for fun and learn enough from just being here reading and writing.

I am a firm believer of "speech as the 'writing of the soul.'" For this to be possible we have to believe in a soul that is incarnate upon us from previous generations from where we "re-collect" our intuit knowledge that was placed there, at least in part, by our ancestors. This includes the structure of language which is mathematical or it could not be an avenue for artistic expression(?).

To me, soul is not a swear word, nor is God, nor evolution. They are concepts that we must try to master.

phaedrus

Warning : The following rambling is under the influence of a hangover after viewing the drubbing of the barmy army.

hugo

Why bring in this "Fish is a social structuralist" critique if you can't back it up?

Got me there...was being lazy when i offered the link....and didnt check the references

As for Olsen, i agree that his argument was simplistic but, to be fair to him, it should be said that i only quoted a few excerpts and he was specifically discussing the role of rhetoric in the justification of belief. To get us back on track, what would would say said role is? Do you think Olsen and Fish over-estimate its importance?

Rhetoric is important in daily life.....but what exactly is rhetoric? Is it this?

Socrates The rhetorician and his rhetoric will have the same relation to all the other arts: there is no need for rhetoric to know the facts at all, for it has hit upon a means of persuasion that enables it to appear, in the eyes of the ignorant, to know more than those who really know.

Gorgias: Well, Socrates, isn’t that a delightfully easy way of doing things: to make oneself a match for the experts in the other arts, though one has learned none of them, only this one?

(Plato, Gorgias, 459)

I'll strengthen my position then. Methinks you overlook the possibility that a solely negative critique may be just what the doctor ordered. By way of example (and only an example), offering alternative theories of truth may be a waste of time and effort if what is really called for is dispensing with the concept altogether.

Don't you accept that knocking a bad idea down constitutes doing something about it?

Lets see. How can your alternative theories of truth be a waste of time when they are built after finding flaws about the current concept? Do you think you migth find "flaws" in your "finding the flaws" about the current concept? Maybe deconstructing deconstruction? No one is saying "finding problems" is wrong, they are saying "you found the problems - now what?". Something those chaps at focusing.org tried to do and that after postmodernism conference. Atleast they tried instead of bemoaning, there is nothing beyond the text. Could we say that it amounts to dilettantism??

I think we're talking past each other half the time. When Putnam said "there is no God's-eye view", i'll bet he could've guessed that people would say "how do you know - do you have a GEV?" and so on. However, i don't have his books here so i can't check

Putnam can say that you are assuming that there used to be a GEV or there could be a GEV.

In any case, you didn't answer me with regard to my argument before: can the impossibility of a GEV be shown without presupposing a GEV? How about taking a crack at it, even if you answer "no"?

See above

Shall we discuss Rorty's shortcomings here, or in the linked thread, or get back to my question about GEVs in general?

Rorty and his problems have been discussed enough and have done it enough. You tell moi

What say you to this, phaedrus?

Will my comments above suffice?

phaedrus

John

Umm....I think what i meant by language was apparent from my posts on the same till date. Not talking about fodor's natural language.

I think Penny is confused - the "functional entwinement" posited is precisely the reason for arguing toward an understanding about which is what way and what way is who.

Why would you say she is confused? Language of thought - has there been a final word on this?