Vanderzyden

In general, yes. However, as I have explained previously, these powers would be used in a manner that is consistent with the other characteristics.


John

Vanderzyden

X,

First, I will tell you that I can prove nothing. Perhaps I can persuade. Let's see. Remember, you must take the whole statement, and its context in the argument, into consideration.

This is a conditional statement, comprised of an antecedent and a consequent. If the antecedent is true, then consequent is true:

Let me expand it:

If God has the power to create then he has the power to destroy.

He has both powers, because the total power is over matter and existence. Nothing can be created that isn't comprised of something. God has power over the elements of the "somethingness", whether supernatural or natural. You may remember that I said that God has power over the metaphysics. Well, if we take supernatural creatures into account. We would say that he has power over meta-existence.

Again, I use the term "create" out of convenience. It implies complete power over all other things that exist.

There is a direct analogy in our everyday experience. Tell me, X, what do you know of that can be constructed by men that cannot also be dismantled?


John

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"Hence, there may be possible worlds in which God did not choose to know all things knowable; perhaps in world w, he chose not to know X; in that case, God can learn X, in virtue of His omnipotence (i.e. God can instantiate the state of affairs in which God knows X)." (Italics original.)

But now it looks as if you've abandoned the essential nature of God's omniscience. If God is not omniscient in every possible world, He is not essentially omniscient. Further, we may say that God is indeed unable to learn in the actual world -- if this is so, why can't we say God is not omnipotent in the actual world?

"For instance, suppose you are right and God cannot learn or eat. Then, if God gains the ability to learn and eat, then according to the state-of-affairs model of omnipotence, he is now more powerful than before, because He can now instantiate more states of affairs than before, namely, the SOA in which God learns, and the SOA in which God eats."

It does not seem that a being could be omnipotent if a possible version of it could be more powerful. Why isn't Learning-God more powerful than God? And if Learning-God is indeed more powerful than God, it seems God is not quite maximally powerful.

Xixax

By the definition you give for create, we create nothing.

If you mean craft, then it entirely depends on who you are talking about. I can easily give you an example though, someone who makes tea cannot, unless they have lab equipment and knowledge beyond that required to make tea, separate and undo the process that makes tea. Once it's mixed, they lack the necessary function and knowledge to unmix it.

Regardless of whether or not an example was able to be found, it still does not in any way show that a being with a function of creation would necessarily have a function of destruction as well.

What you seem to say here:

Is that in fact you are saying he has complete power over matter, whether to destroy, create, or modify.

If that is what you wanted to say, it's much easier to just say it than try to present an indefensible position equating creative and destructive powers. They are just subsets of the real power you have assigned to the being, the total power over matter.

Philip Osborne

Due to time constraints, this will likely be my last post for this thread. Thanks for an excellent discussion. I appreciate the tone and erudition of your posts.

But now it looks as if you've abandoned the essential nature of God's omniscience. If God is not omniscient in every possible world, He is not essentially omniscient. Further, we may say that God is indeed unable to learn in the actual world -- if this is so, why can't we say God is not omnipotent in the actual world?

This doesn't seem to be the case if God is essentially able to know all truths. I don't see why theists can't consistently hold that God can and does know all things, rather than holding that God must know all things. I think we can hold God's ability to know all things to be essential, while his actual knowledge of those things to be non-essential. This would be analogous to holding God to be essentially omnipotent; God is capable of instantiating every possible state of affairs, but that doesn't mean necessaril having to instantiate every such SOA at every moment of God's existence. Similarly, GOd isn't forced to know every truth at every moment.

In fact, to hold otherwise may create some modal problems. If God essentially knows everything that He does, then God essentially knows that p is true in world w. But there might be a world w'in which p fails to be true; if God necessarily knows p, then God knows be in w'. If God knows p in w', then p is true in w'. But this contradicts our assumption that p is false in w'. So there seems to be a problem here.

It does not seem that a being could be omnipotent if a possible version of it could be more powerful. Why isn't Learning-God more powerful than God? And if Learning-God is indeed more powerful than God, it seems God is not quite maximally powerful.

If you are wrong that omniscience and the ability to learn are in opposition to each other, there is no inconsistency in holding God to be a being that is both able to learn and omniscient. If you are correct, however, then it seems to me that being omniscient is intuitively a more powerful ability than the ability to learn.

Sincerely,

Philip

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"Thanks for an excellent discussion. I appreciate the tone and erudition of your posts."

Thank you for providing by far the best apologist response to my points, and helping me to figure out exactly what I want to say.

"I think we can hold God's ability to know all things to be essential, while his actual knowledge of those things to be non-essential.[...] Similarly, GOd isn't forced to know every truth at every moment."

This seems a slight departure from the theist position, but I agree that it is consistent. However, if we were simply to say that God could cause Himself to know any particular truth, it doesn't seem necessary to call God "omniscient" at all; to be able to know anything seems to follow from His omnipotence. I might also be content here just to argue that God is not omniscient in the actual world, however, if we take omniscience in the stronger, "knows all" sense.

"If God essentially knows everything that He does, then God essentially knows that p is true in world w. But there might be a world w'in which p fails to be true; if God necessarily knows p, then God knows be in w'. If God knows p in w', then p is true in w'. But this contradicts our assumption that p is false in w'. So there seems to be a problem here."

But God doesn't necessarily know p; He necessarily knows "p in w" or "p" in w. God only knows p in w, and He knows that p would be true in w, if w' is the actual world.

"If you are correct, however, then it seems to me that being omniscient is intuitively a more powerful ability than the ability to learn."

I think this is the best objection to my argument. I would say in response that omniscience, if we go into detail, doesn't seem to grant that much power, intuitively. I think we can say that for any pair of beings when one can learn and one can't, most of the time, the former is more powerful. God's omniscience might only include something trivial such as the number of hairs on my cat's head at t. Learning-God might in fact correctly believe the number of hairs on my cat's head at t, just not have this knowledge be justified.

In any case, we've departed from the states-of-affairs conceptions of omnipotence if mere omniscience counts as power.