Alonzo Fyfe

A semantic issue. Intrinsic value means that all of the properties relevant to whether something has value are internal to that being evaluated. It depends on no external source or relationship. Extrinsic value holds that something external to that being evaluated is relevant to its having value.

The instant you add the words "to him," you state that this value depends on your standing in a particular relationship to the life being evaluated before it has value -- the relevant relationship being that the life in question is your own. However, by saying that this relationship is an essential component to the value of the life, by definition you can no longer claim that the value is intrinsic, because intrinsic value is value independent of such relationships.

To talk about "intrinsic value . . . to him" is a bit like talking about square circles or bright darkness.



It is true that being alive is required in order to act, just as the presence of oxygen is required for a fuel. But to say that X is causally necessary for Y is still consistent with saying that the value of X is dependent on the value for Y. In such a case, X's value is not "intrinsic" (depending solely upon the properties of X), it is "extrinsic" (depending at least partially on the properties of Y).

If X is life, and Y is what the person values, then the value of X is extrinsic.

The Objectivist argument, "The value of life is universally extrinsic, therefore the value of life is intrinsic," simply makes no sense.


So?

Without having money it is impossible to buy anything. This does not make the value of money somehow intrinsic. Money is still a tool that has value because of what we can use it for, not something that has value IN ITSELF - independent of what we can use it for.

If you take away all of the things that one can spend money on, then the money itself becomes worthless. If you take away all of the things that one can do with one's life, the life itself has no value. This is part of what it means to say that value is extrinsic (depending on other things) rather than intrinsic (independent of other things).

Elsewhere, you write that the value of these "other things" -- the things that we spend our life on -- is subjective. If the value of A depends on the value of B, and the value of B is subjective, then, ultimately, the value of A is subjective-dependent.

dk

I just thought I offer some formal definitions of “intrinsic”

• . intrinsic
  Function: adjective : Etymology: Middle French intrinsèque internal, from Late Latin intrinsecus, from Latin, adverb, inwardly; akin to Latin intra within -- more at INTRA- : Date: 1642
  1 a : belonging to the essential nature or constitution of a thing <the intrinsic worth of a gem> <the intrinsic brightness of a star> b : being or relating to a semiconductor in which the concentration of charge carriers is characteristic of the material itself instead of the content of any impurities it contains
  2 a : originating or due to causes within a body, organ, or part <an intrinsic metabolic disease> b : originating and included wholly within an organ or part <intrinsic muscles> -- compare EXTRINSIC 1b ----- Merriam-Webster © Dictionary
• good-in-itself
  A good-in-itself is otherwise referred to as an intrinsic good. Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics made use of the idea, in attempting to define the good for man. He distinguished between things pursued for their own sake (such as health) and things pursued for the sake of their consequences (such as money). He concluded that there was a number of different things that were goods-in-themselves. To his list of health, sight, and intelligence, we might now add such values as the continuing existence of diverse species of animals. ----- The Oxford Companion to Philosophy , © Oxford University Press 1995

I would also add that forces due to gravity, conductance, capacitance and impedance demonstrate intrinsic properties do relate to external things. You guys have hit on something fundamental to identity.

DRFseven

Yes.

I'm talking about what occurs, not what I might perceive would serve what I would call justice. The moral system we have has evolved as a way of maintaining stability while at the same time allowing for continuous adjustment of behaviors to fit circumstances. This is what has come to be. Justification for behaviors is a human notion that we have constructed as an integral part of our behavioral system that includes morality. This justifies a slap, this justifies a raise in pay, this justifies a war - an everchanging scenario of change and adjustment as things seem to work and not work for various purposes.

Alonzo Fyfe

Unfortunately, Aristotle presumed that there was only one way for something to be good for its own sake, and that is for it to have intrinsic value. So, Aristotle used the terms interchangably.

However, there is another sense in which something can be valued "for its own sake" or "as an end in itself" (which I will discuss in my Ethics Without God series) that is totally incompatible with what people usually think of when they use the term "intrinsic value."

This ambiguity leads to confusion and a great deal of wasted bandwitch as different people using the same terms with different meanings wrongly think that they are talking about the same thing.

The AntiChris

Alonzo Fyfe

I hope you'll bear with me - I'm learning!

Can you explain what you mean by this?

So, you're saying that although the objectivist and subjectivist may reach exactly the same moral conclusions, the subjectivist is somehow "not as moral" because of his refusal to use the phrase "objectivel wrong"? I think I must be misunderstanding you.
I have to admit I've not come across these distinctions before. I suspect I endorse "assessor-subjectivism". If I understand these terms correctly, then most of your comments would seem to make some sense if you're addressing "agent-subjectivism".
I'm not sure what you mean by "both opinions have nothing behind it"? Underlying my "point of view" are my personal subjective moral principles and, from my perspective, they're all the reason I need to recommend my opinion "over the view that I reject".
From my subjective perspective they're not and so I don't.

Chris

DRFseven

Complete misinformation. People without moral feelings do not regret their actions because, by definition, they don't feel they have done any wrong. People who have acquired moral feelings, be they subjectivists or objectivists, all learn to think that certain behaviors are wrong and when they behave in these ways have no choice but to feel they are wrong.

For instance, I have the moral feeling that it is wrong to behave inconsiderately, say in traffic. However, there have often been times when I have behaved that way and I always feel a little remorse at my "bad deed." Like everyone else, I try to justify through rationalization ("If they knew how important my deadline was, they'd WANT me to cut them off." ), but still I feel that I have not done right.

People who have committed horrible crimes very often feel they have done wrong and beg for forgiveness. This is a common scene on any type of deathbed, including those cases where the individual is being strapped down and given lethal injection.

Quote:

So, of course subjectivists are just as moral as anyone else. Even more so, since they virtually never do anything wrong (in their own mind). Whereas somebody who holds an objective view holds that their attitudes may be in error -- that wanting to blow up a building full of innocent people and thinking it right is not sufficient for it to actually BE right.

Well, you're just wrong about that. I'm a subjectivist and would have just as strong moral feelings against blowing up buildings as you, our physiological mechanism of moral acquisition being the same.

dk

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe

No, Aristotle defined something intrinsically good as a thing pursued for its own sake “independent of consequences”. For example, “It is the journey not the destination.” speaks of an intrinsic good. If the consequence of “intrinsic good” becomes associated with an “intrinsic value” then the intrinsic value is the product of a judgment based upon, but distinct from the intrinsic good itself.

I know I’m jumping the gun, but I have no idea what anyone thinks unless they tell me and for me to know what most people think about anything requires at least an informal poll. Still, I agree there’s a lot of confusion about “intrinsic good” and “intrinsic value”.

You say Aristotle used the terms “intrinsic good”, and “intrinsic value” interchangeably, do you have a source?

I find this odd because values are derived from non-direction scalars, whereas “intrinsic good” communicates an absolute orientation.

To an objectivist a end-in-itself doesn’t equate to a intrinsic value. I agree, but would qualify that an end-in-itself is a matter of fact irrespective of judgment, whereas the value of a thing is conceived by an act of judgment. Depending upon how “skewed my act of judgment about the thing”, will determine the distance between an “end-in-itself” and the intrinsic value I conceive.

Alonzo Fyfe

Are you truly talking about what DOES occur, or what SHOULD occur?

If it is the former, then there are a lot of people who make moral claims who will say, "This is not what I am doing -- and I don't think this practice you describe is at all legitimate. There is only one moral code, it is constant and unchanging through all time, and it has nothing to do with evolving to fit circumstances."

If, instead, you are talking about what SHOULD occur, then this "should" is in need of justification -- particularly in the light of the same facts of people who are saying, "I do not do things that way and I think it is illegitimate to do so."

Alonzo Fyfe

I hope that this is not what I am saying, because it makes no sense to me, and I at least attempt to avoid saying things that do not make sense.

It makes no sense to me because saying that the subjectivist is "not as moral" in this sense would require an objective morality. And to PRESUME an objective morality when raising an objection against subjectivism would be question-begging. And question-begging objections really do not carry much weight.

What I am saying is that even though subjectivists SAY that, objectively speaking, position A = position B and that a preference for A over B is merely subjective (objectively speaking, a preference for B over A is just as valid), they behave in all ways as if position that they select is BETTER THAN the position they reject.

It is like saying, "Even though A = B, I am going to live my life as if A > B; of course, I have nothing that I can say against anybody who decides to live their life as if B > A."

To which, I respond, why don't live your life as if A = B since this is the fact of the matter. Why must you pick one and live a lie?

Alonzo Fyfe

Who is talking about "people without moral feelings?" I never mentioned them.

I was talking about people who have very definite moral feelings, but they include feelings that there is nothing wrong with certain types of horrendous acts.

I am talking about the inquisitor/torturer, the slave owner, the petty dictator and those who carry out his deeds, the hit-man, the terrorist.

These people do not lack moral feelings. They feel very much that what they are doing is permissible -- they may even say that the feel compelled to these actions by their moral feelings.