Amos

Sorry Bumble Bee, I should have left it and I tried to correct your post in a gentle form with a question.

You wrote:
God knows he's alone because he is the concept of existence.

I wrote:

Is it not the case that God is the essence of existence after which ideas are conceived to gain ascent in existence?

The difference is that the concept has been conceived while the essence must exist prior to conception.

It is really very simple. God 'is' (as in I AM), and you must conceive the existence of God. For this you must percieve the essence of existence.

A concept is the product of a rout between 2 stands wherein one is negative and the other is positive. In this case, you (positive) must first perceive the essence of a thing (negative) and with this essence you can conceive the idea of God in existence. You may also call it the "suchness" of the thing perceived and understanding is the conception.

Kenny

Thomas,

With respect to the question as to how God would know that He is God, I don’t see that it necessarily follows that God must first know that He is omniscient to know that He is God. On a monotheistic conception of God, it is impossible for there to be more than one God-like individual in any particular possible world. In this respect, God is like the Highlander – there can be only one . Presumably a complete and sound ontological argument would predict this result. If such is the case, it is quite plausible that, in addition to it being impossible that more than one being have all the properties which constitute God’s essence, there are certain subset of properties with respect to God’s essence which characterize God uniquely so that only God could posses them in any particular possible world. It is difficult to see, for example, how two omnipotent beings could occupy the same possible world. Perhaps there is an entire set of such unique-to-God-in-all-possible-worlds properties (from now on referred to as UG properties). Presumably a sound OA would predict what all these UG properties are, and if there is at least one property in this set which does not require God to know that He is omniscient to know that He possesses it, then God has a means of identifying Himself as the being described in the OA that is independent of Him being able to know that He is omniscient, which in turn, via the OA, provides God with a proof that He is omniscient.

Of course, I’m not saying that this is the way it actually works. I don’t know. I suspect God may have options in this respect which are unknown and perhaps even inconceivable to us. But, I think this scenario is sufficiently plausible to effectively counter the charge that there it is logically impossible for God to know that He is omniscient.

As far as my view of knowledge is concerned, I have affinities towards Plantinga’s proper functionalist account which states (approximately) that a belief is warranted for a being if it is formed via the proper functioning of that being’s cognitive faculties which are part of a well designed plan [and ‘design plan’ here need not initially be taken in a theistic sense but might be taken in the sense of when biologists speak in teleological terms about the “purposes” or “adaptive advantages” of various biological systems -- though Plantinga does argue elsewhere that naturalism can’t account for the normative element required, with respect to our cognitive faculties, for the production of knowledge] aimed at the production of true beliefs in the type of environment they were designed to function. With respect to God, it is somewhat awkward to speak of His cognitive faculties being part of a “design plan,” but “well design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs” translates into a being having a certain set of cognitive faculties which have a high objective probability of producing true beliefs in a particular type of cognitive environment. With respect to God, His cognitive faculties have an objective probability of 1 with respect to the production of true beliefs in His cognitive environment.

But, I see this as a long and complex digression. I am willing to accept your definition of knowledge for the sake of argument because I don’t believe God has any problem meeting it.

God Bless,
Kenny

P.S. Bill, your post will have to wait but I will try to get to it soon.

[ November 03, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

Amos

Well isn't that interesting because I hold that just the opposite is true.

Bill Snedden

We've already covered this territory. These are fine as axioms for us. However, they don't address at all the question of how god has knowledge of his "aloneness." God may believe himself to be alone, he may sense no thing other than himself, but how does he know that he is, in fact, the only "thing" in existence? All of your points, above, lead to a conclusion that god simply accepts his "aloneness" axiomatically. Well, how does he justify accepting that axiom?

For example, I can justify an axiomatic acceptance of my own existence because an assertion of my non-existence would be self-contradictory. I cannot, however, justify an axiomatic acceptance of the non-existence of other persons (or their existence for that matter), because doing so encumbers no contradiction.

I don't "impose" any requirements; that is the essence of what it means to be "self-aware" or conscious. To be conscious is to be conscious of something. In order to be self-aware, a consciousness must be able to distinguish between itself and its environment. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is (IMO) an impossibility; a logical contradiction akin to square circles and married bachelors.

Your analogy is flawed. Alone in a room, I am still aware of the room. Alone on the earth, I am still aware of it. Blinded, deafened, deprived of taste, touch, and smell, I will still be aware of their previous existence. My self-awareness is, at any of these points, already in existence.

A more relevant question might be, "what if you were born into the world blind, deaf, mute and with a peculiar neurological disorder that rendored all of your sensory organs incapable of transmitting information to your brain. Don't you think that you'd still be aware of your existence; that you'd still become 'conscious?'" My answer: No.

No problem. Unfortunately, you seem to feel that

(f) God knows that he is omniscient

follows from a-e, but it simply doesn't. It causes no necessary contradiction to suggest that God is the only thing in existence, but doesn't know that he's the only thing in existence, even granting that he has perfect knowledge of himself. He looks around, doesn't see anything but himself and thinks, "oh, it must be just me." But how does he justify this recognition to himself?

Remember, we're not discussing whether or not God knows all truths, we're discussing whether or not God knows that he knows all truths.

I do hope that you've got something better than Craig's exhumation of that tired old argument...

Well, I certainly do think that Dr. Plantinga is just as susceptible as the rest of us to allowing our emotions to occasionally cloud our reason (cf, Naturalism Defeated? from Warrant and Proper Function), but I wasn't at all referring to you with that comment. I was referring to Amos' consistent use of metaphor and what I would call "emotionally evocative" language to describe his experience of "God".

Regards,

Bill Snedden

[ November 03, 2002: Message edited by: Bill Snedden ]</p>

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Kenny:

"Presumably a sound OA would predict what all these UG properties are, and if there is at least one property in this set which does not require God to know that He is omniscient to know that He possesses it, then God has a means of identifying Himself as the being described in the OA that is independent of Him being able to know that He is omniscient, which in turn, via the OA, provides God with a proof that He is omniscient."

It would seem God would have to discover that at least one property, other than omniscience, is only possessible by an omniscient being. I don't see how the OA could ever confirm this to God. The OA, if sound, could confirm the existence of a being with properties p, q, r, and s, but I don't think it could show that a being with properties p, q, and r, must have s.

Bumble Bee Tuna

Maybe that clarified?

You respond that "God IS". The line of question simply continues- How does God know that "God IS" (Or whatever else you want to use to explain things)? The point is that to explain one aspect you need to pick something to be axiomatic, but God cannot do so. He has to KNOW, not assume.

John, this pretty much works the same for you. Your defense is just that "God is alone". But how does God know that?

-B

Amos

Don't laugh Bumble Bee but my objection was to make room for the Immaculate Conception.

God does not need to know that he is and does not need to tell us anything or he would be telling the whole world how great he is and who would be going to hell if you don't believe him. None of that is true but since I am not really part of this argument I will leave at this.

Apart from this would I add that this does not deny the reality of God's omniscience but the difference is that he does not need to tell us this. There is a declining chain of command and this goes from God to Lord God to like god and the Holy Spirit is the mediator between Lord God and like god . . . until etc.

Kenny

I disagree. As I noted, on a monotheistic conception, it is not contingently true that there is only one God-like being, it is necessarily true. This means that there must be something about God’s essence which precludes the possibility of there being more than one God-like being in any particular possible world. So, if p,q,r, and s are taken as the properties which constitute God’s essence, then it must be impossible, at least, for more than one being to manifest the property pqrs in any particular possible world. Thus, the set of UG properties, in the sense I defined above, must contain at least one member, namely pqrs. But, I don’t see why it couldn’t be the case that in addition to it being impossible for more than one being to possess the property pqrs, it is also impossible to for more than one being to possess at least one of the sub-properties formed out of pqrs. Say, for instance, that it also is logically impossible for more than one being to possess the property r (which in turn would entail that it is impossible for more than one being to possess the property pqrs). In that case, if the ontological argument entails that there is exactly one being in all possible worlds that possesses the property pqrs, it also entails that any being possessing the property r is also the being that possesses pqrs and therefore any being which possesses r also possesses the properties p,q, and s.

God Bless,
Kenny

[ November 04, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

Vanderzyden

Bill,

I realize that the creature cannot possibly fathom the depths of the Creator's experience. However, it has been reasonably argued (elsewhere) that there is no actual infinite (e.g. no actual temporal infinite regress; God is not infinite, since he knows his "dimensions"), and there must be an immovable person from whom all else originates. Making these assumptions, we may go further to discuss the likelihood that God may possess all knowledge with certainty.

I didn't say my analogy is perfect. It is an analog (i.e. similarity) from (i) what is likely to be God's experience to (ii) the human experience, that's all. Despite your harsh objection, the analogy seems to fit our topic quite nicely. In that room, you are still alone. You believe you are alone because you know what it means to be alone. No one else is with you. Having your primary senses intact, you would know if you were not alone. If your senses were inoperable, then you might not know if you are alone, but you will still be aware of yourself and you would know that all of your senses were disabled. You would be alone with your thoughts. You can know nothing more strongly than your own existence, as you imply.

Regardless of whether you are of aware of your previous existence, you only live in the present. You cannot recover the past. At any moment, your consciousness may either terminate or be substantially altered. Therefore, your consciousness is inextricably and completely present. You are only aware in the now. Certainly, we can imagine a state of consciousness that is independent of sensory experience. You can close your eyes, hear nothing, feel nothing, smell nothing, taste nothing, and yet still know your own mind. Therefore, your consciousness is it's own justification. Indeed, your conscious has developed from infancy, but you do not now require external justification to know that you are yourself, and no other. We may map this analogy to God and employ it in demonstrating that God was also alone.

Actually these are axioms for God. The primordial God knows all truths. This includes the truth that existence is contained within himself. I have yet to see your affirmation or denial regarding CERTAINTY. I have mentioned the concept several times, and it would appear that Thomas himself accepts its validity. Please answer:


What precludes God from knowing with certainty?


God DOES NOT BELIEVE; he simply knows. Existence has no external context. He knows, with complete certainty, that no thing--not one single element--exists, other than himself. This knowledge is co-extensive with the knowledge that the concept of being is completely contained within God. There is no "other", for a thing cannot be if it does not, minimally, exist. God subsumes existence. He is meta-existent; that is, he transcends existence. At the "time" before creation, God is existence itself. Again, he does not believe, but rather knows this with certainty.

Bill, you believe that you are Bill. You can demonstrate it to yourself. You know that you are Bill, and not John. However, the disadvantage you have, Bill, is twofold:

(1) You cannot be certain of your knowledge, and
(2) you do not have control over your existence.

Of course you know that existence is not contained within you, since John also exists, and you do not have creative power. Also, you did not choose the time nor the place of your birth, and you cannot prevent your eventual death. Your fleeting existence and inability to be certain means that you are severely limited.

But, and this is a big "but", God knows that he is God. He knows what "God" means, elementally and as a whole. He has certain knowledge of himself. And, one element of himself is existence. He knows that there is no "Other". In the beginning, he knew that "God" meant a being who contains existence in himself. It was impossible for anything else to be, since being was inside God. He "knows he is the only thing in existence", because he transcends existence. Existence is merely one part of his comprehensive knowledge. It is impossible that anything else "exists", since God has not acted to make existence external to himself. He need not "look around", since there cannot possibly be another thing, since a thing requires existence so that it can be. Therefore, God knows that HE IS (alone), with certainty, because being is intrinsic to himself. He "knows that he knows", as you say.

Note: the word "alone" is actually superfluous, because, again, existence is contained within God. There is no other being, such that the absence of which would make God "alone". Indeed, there is no other "place" where such a being might reside so that God would be "alone".

So, again, when we consider that God is (a) eternal, (b) forgets nothing, (c) knows himself, and that (d) he was "alone", we also may conclude that

God is omniscient, knowing all truths, including the truth that he transcends and subsumes existence..


John

Jack the Bodiless

I think there is a rather interesting communication problem here.

Theists such as Vander are discussing the God of the apologists:
When discussing a hypothetical being, the proposer/creator of the hypothetical being may dictate the properties of the being, just as the creators of Superman could write in his power of flight. The God of the apologists has these properties by definition. The God of the Apologists IS responsible for everything, DOES forget nothing, IS eternal, and DOES know himself. Given these premises, Vander's conclusion follows directly.

...Whereas others are discussing the (claimed) God of the Universe, the God who (allegedly) exsits in actuality. No apologist has the authority to simply decree what properties this God actually has.

For instence, maybe the "God of the Universe" didn't create the Universe, but was himself created by an uber-God, complete with false memories of creating the Universe (an obvious parallel with the creationist fossil record) and a false belief in the total power of his omniscience. This scenario cannot apply to the God of the Apologists by definition, but could apply to an ACTUAL God. An actual God, no matter how omniscient he THINKS he is, cannot rule out the possibility that he's been deluded by a greater power.

[ November 05, 2002: Message edited by: Jack the Bodiless ]</p>