Norge

Charlie,

Your last comment is unwarranted. I do most certainly wish you a wonderful day. And why wouldn't I? You may be an atheist, but that doesn't mean I can't treat you cordially. And indeed should do. I'm not sure what kind of a world you live in, your friends, family etc, but I hope it is accepted practice to treat people with respect.

I notice you become quite animated and speak to me somewhat rudely at times. I can let this pass because this is a discussion board; I would stop you if you spoke to me the way you write. There's something about writing that produces bad manners in people and to be honest, I don't think it's any more acceptable in printed form than if we were speaking. But no matter, let me simply reply briefly to your long reply.

It seems to boil down to two simple objections. I base my morality on God and state that he is perfect, but you have two objections at this point:

1) You characterize God as a torturer himself and unworthy of the claim to perfection. You are deeply angry at God and you yourself write that you don't understand the concept of holiness and sinfulness. This line of discussion is then closed, I think. The claim that God is perfect and his nature is the standard by which we measure human actions is not going to go anywhere when you claim ignorance of what holiness and sinfulness means.

2) The second is most definitely the Euryphthro dilemma - but with a twist. First, you state that even if God were perfect, why should that compel me, a human, to act in the manner of God. You use the example of Ralph. Well, I answered that good itself is expressed in God's nature. It is not independent of God, it is described by who God is, and He is necessarily good.

However, your inevitable response will be "well, so what if he is good, why should that compel me to be good?" and the answer is because he commands it. Now, your response will inevitably be "but why should I obey a being who commands me to do things? Sounds like Might-makes-right." Well, the answer there is that while he commands you, he gives you free will to obey. He created you a free being, who can obey or disobey. You have clearly, as I have, chosen to disobey (though with differing responses to our disobedience) and you suffer the consequences of your disobedience. As I do when I disobey. Creatures that freely obey him are pleasing to him.

Quick comment on the "might-makes-right" objection. I think there's something to this, on the basis of it sounding arbitrary as to why we should obey him simply because he tells us to. The problem is that the objection doesn't account for the difference between God and man. It most certainly would be arbitrary if we were being commanded by another man, but we're not. We're commanded by our creator and that makes all the difference. Not only that but he is necessarily good. That is why the moral imperative is to choose good options away from bad ones, determined by what he determines is good and bad, rooted in his character. One of the reasons we object to this is we are immensely prideful. You shake your fists at your creator and demand to know the basis for his commanding you to do anything, but you are not the creator. There is nothing wrong with the argument here. The problem is that you won't accept that his commands should be obeyed. And you don't recognize that they are good. That's sin, by the way.

Onto another point:

When we say, "torture is wrong" we mean that it is objectively wrong, because of the command of God and because of his character, which defines the value of human beings as being of value because he says they are valuable for we are his image bearers.

If you don't like God, or object to him, you are free to do so, but you can't state that the argument is fallacious, because it isn't. It is grounded in God as the ultimate source of meaning. He grounds our value and our moral compulsion. There is nothing illogical about this at all. Indeed, it has been confessed by millions throughout the ages. Even professional atheists know there is nothing wrong with the argument, they simply attack it on the basis of not considering God to be perfect or proposing a system in the absence of God is equally valid.

There is another side to this also. It is that obedience, which is in line with his commands, generally speaking produces a happier life. To please God by living a good life generally produces a happier life. "But why do I need God to lead a moral life. Why can't I just live morally without him." The answer is you can. You don't need God to live a moral life and you will benefit by obeying his commands, because that is how he created the universe, with unalterable moral laws, so that violation of them produces, if not in the short term, in the long term, generally produces unhappiness.

This is not the grounding for morality, however. We're not moral and obey his commands because we want to be happy. We're moral, because we has created a world in which the obeying of commands (moral imperatives) generally produces happiness.

That's it, Charlie. Have a wonderful day . . really.

Alonzo Fyfe

Valmorian:

I have stated that there are two types of "objective" (as in "objective morality").

Objective(1): There is a reason capable of preventing a person from doing a (wrong) action that is independent of any internal (desire-driven) or external (threat-driven) constraints.

Objective(2): We have desire-driven reasons to prevent a person from doing a (wrong) action by causing people generally to have certain internal (desire-driven) or to impose external (threat-driven) constraints.

We both have agreed that objective(1) morality is a fantasy. It's not real and any hope for that type of morality is, well, a waste of effort.

Your objections all fall into the following model:

"Your defense of Objective(2) morality fails because it does not fulfill the criteria for a defense of Objective(1) morality."

Though we both agree that Objective(1) criteria is a joke, you constantly bring up failure to fulfill Objective(1) criteria as a legitimate criticism. It is a bit of a contradiction, don't you think?




There is no "inherent badness" of the desire to rape. The badness comes from the thwarting of desire -- like all other badness. Namely, the desires of the victim, of potential victims, and those who care for them. Including (I assume) you.


This is going to sound glib, so I will say I am sorry in advance. Its purpose is to make a point.

Since you are not me, probably not a victim or a potential victim, and only a very small portion of the group of people who care about any of the above, please stand by and I will tell you when YOUR perspective is important.


See. You are looking for some type of reason that will move an agent independent of his internal and external constraints. That is, objective(1) morality. There isn't one.

Objective(2) morality is entirely concerned with preventing wrong actions -- by creating the internal and external constraints that will inhibit a person from performing wrong actions. And by identifying wrong actions as those actions that we (all of us -- not just you, not just me, but all of us) have reasons.

Well, I would say "false" rather than "meaningless" (indeed, I have given its 'meaning' above.) But that is beside the point. We are agreed that objective(1) morality isn't worth our time.



Propositions identifying the value of internal and external constraints relative to all of the desires that exist are objectively true.

They may not reflect objective(1) type intrinsic value. But nothing does.



I agree, none of this has anything to do with whether rape is objectively(1) wrong. But, then, I'm not talking about objectively(1) wrong.


So. This is just one person. Even though the rapist may not have a reason to institute internal inhibitions against rape (while, actually, he does, because such an internal inhibition will aid him in avoiding the wrath of the external inhibitions the rest of us have reasons to impose), the rapist is just one person among many. It is still the case that the bulk of the reasons in favor of such an inhibition significantly outweighs the bulk of the reasons against.


This type of objection returns to the objective(1) sense of objectivity, which you assert is nonsense and I assert is false. Whether nonsense or false, it is absurd to keep returning to this criteria of objectivity.


No. The strenth of the desire is as relevant as the numerical count of the desire.


By "all people must agree with it" I take you to be referring to some type of "reason" that can compel action independent of the internal and external constraints under which a person may be opeating.

This type of reason -- objective(1) reason -- is a fantasy and failure to fulfill a fantasy criteria is not a significant objection.


This is yet one more example of an objection that presumes the legitimacy of searching for objective(1) type reasons, when we agree that objective(1) type reasons are a joke.

The AntiChris

I assume this is the basis of your theory.

It's not clear to me precisely what you mean when you say your theory is "objective".

It's quite clear that, given access to the sum of all human desires, your theory would provide an objective answer but are you saying that it yields the objective moral truth?

If the latter, on what "objective" grounds do you justify your theory? In other words, why is it objectively true that only your 'desire calculation' can provide objective moral truth?

If you're merely saying that your theory yields an objective answer, so what?

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

Before I can tell you whether this theory provides the answer as opposed to an answer, I need to know what the question is.

If a question has multiple meanings, then it is impossible to provide the answer to the question. For example, if you were to ask me, "Is Jim gay?" I could take it to mean "Is Jim happy?" or "Is Jim a homosexual?" I cannot say that "Jim is happy" is the answer to the question until I know which question you are asking.

I have previously argued that there are two different definitions of objective -- an intrinsic value sense and a belief-independent sense. I can already say that this is not even an answer (let alone the answer) to the question to the question of objective (intrinsic-value sense) moral truth. The answer to a question about objective (intrinsic-value sense) moral value is, instead, "There is no such thing; it is a fantasy creation."

So, once you specify and remove all ambiguities about what the question is, I will tell you if this is the answer.

[I have met some people who say that this is a dodge. But, it is a fact in every field of study -- from physics to logic to math to ethics -- that ambiguous questions yield multiple answers. Pointing out this fact is no more a dodge here, than it would be in physics or logic or math.]

The AntiChris

Do you claim that your theory yields answers which are in some sense objectively 'correct' and that "some-things-considered" theories yield objectively 'false' answers?

I'm not sure this is any better, but I'm certain you know what I'm getting at.

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

"Some-things-considered" answers are the answers to "some-things-considered" questions, and "all-thing-considered" answers are the answer to "all-things-considered" questions.

What I actually think you are "getting at" is for me to provide a proof, not that this is the only legitimate answer, but that there is only one legitimate question.

Of course, I can't do this. There isn't a field of study in existence, no matter how objective, within which there is only one legitimate question. There are always multiple legitimate questions, each with its own legitimate answer.

This is why I wrote earlier (more than once, I think) that if the limited "some-things-considered" subjectiist was to speak consistently I would have no objections against them. "Some-things-considered" answers are legitimate, objective answers to "some-things-considered" questions.

There are objective, legitimate answers to all "some-things-considered" questions just as there is an objective, legitimate answer to "all-things-considered" questions. Different questions yield different answers.

Nobody should be shocked by this.

However, my charge against subjectivists is that they do not speak (or write) consistently. They routinely draw "all things considered" implications from "some things considered" answers. They routinely confuse the question, "What do I care about?" with "What should I care about?" and treat these as if they are the same question. (If they were the same question, then everybody already cares about that which they should care about and the question can be dismissed entirely.)

Plus, they interpret all questions as some-things-considered questions (as questions only about what the agent wants or the assessor wants) when there is no justification for such an interpretation.

At this point, the subjectivist may exclaim, "At last! Subjectivism wins!".

But this answer is applicable to all fields of study. Different questions yield different answers and none of the questions are the question. If this means that subjectivism wins here, then this means that subjectivism wins in all fields of study.

In math, for example, there is one objective answer to the question, "What is the sum of 6 plus 5?" and a different answer to the question "What is the sum of 6 plus 5 plus 2?" But nobody can mount an argument that states that the first question is the right question. And nobody can argue that failure to defend any question as the right question proves that math is subjective.

My guess is that subjectivists are saying something more substantive than "there is no objective right question to ask in this field?"

The AntiChris

Ok.

What question does your theory attempt to answer then?

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

I try to answer the question that most people seem to be asking when they ask about moral value.

To determine what this question is, it is necessary to look at the context of the question, at the types of evidence that those who ask the question see as being relevant, and at the types of implications that they see as being legitimate. The question that they can be taken as asking is the question with the best fit within this overall context.

I will use a modified example discussed earlier, in which a mother catches her son mistreating a cat, and telling the son, "Don't do that, it is wrong!"

We will look at different possibilities for what it means to say "it is wrong?" in order to determine the best fit.

When she says, "It is wrong," is she saying "I do not like mistreating cats?" If she was saying this, then it would be perfectly legitimate for the son to say, "Then don't do it," and continue what he was doing. The son, and the rest of us, know that this is not what the mother is saying. We know that the relevant moral question is not, "what do I like to do?"

Is the mother saying, "You do not like mistreating cats?" If this is what the mother was saying, if she were to discover that her son really does like mistreating cats, she would be forced to say, "Okay, my mistake. Never mind, then." But she would not, in fact, infer this from the discovery that her son likes to mistreat cats. So the moral question is not, "What do you (in this case, the son) like to do?"

Is the mother saying, "I do not want you to mistreat cats?" If this is what the mother was saying, then if the son were to repeat this phrase, and say to his friend, "Mistreating cats is wrong," we would have to understand the son as saying, "My mother does not want me to mistreat cats." At this point, the friend can legitimately respond, "Then don't mistreat cats. That has nothing to do with me." However, in normal moral conversation, when the son repeats what her mother says, it is, in fact, taken to be something that is just as applicable to the friend as it was to the son. Therefore, it makes no sense to understand the mother as saying, "I do not want my son to mistreat cats." The moral question is not, "What do I want my son to do?"

The task is to continue like this until you get to a question that makes the most sense of the context, implications drawn, and evidence accepted for moral statements. Once you have that, you know what the moral question is.

Now, as it turns out, I think that the moral question is, "What has intrinsic value?" However, nothing has intrinsic goodness or badness. It is a fantasy creation. So, ultimately, the answer to the moral question is, "Nothing." Nothing is intrinsically right or wrong.

But, if we strip away the error, we can still search for a real-world question with real answers that most closely matches the question, "What has intrinsic value?"

I argue that the question that comes closest without bringing fantasy creations into the picture is, "What is best, all things considered?" Not, "What is best for me?" Not, "What is best for the agent?" Not "What does the assessor like the most?".

Since all value is desire-dependent, "Best all things considered" can best be interpreted as "best in relation to all desires."

And since it is not causally possible for an agent to DO something different who does not WANT something different, the question is further refined to "Which desires are the best at fulfilling other desires, regardless of who has them?"

When the mother says that mistreating the cat is wrong, what she is saying is that mistreating the cat is not something that a person with good desires (desires that are compatible with the fullment of all other desires regardless of who has them) would do.

This is the interpretation with the best fit.

With this interpretation, the boy can repeat the mother's claim that "it is wrong" to a friend, without changing the meaning, and without making the claim trivial or inapplicable to the boy. It is still the case that a person with good desires would not do such a thing. It is still the case that a person without good desires is a person who will thwart the desires of others. It is still the case that all of us have reason to work against the creation of fellow citizens whose desires tend more to thwart than to fulfill the desires of others, because we are those others.

The son's willingness to maltreat the cat shows that he does not, in fact, have those desires that are best at fulfilling other desires. So, the mother says that he is a bad person. The mother hopes that her stern words, and perhaps her punishment, will change the child's desires and cause the child to have an aversion to acts that thwart the desires of others.

The main reason why I do not think that limited "some things considered" alternatives have the best fit is because all "some things considered" interpretations treat the welfare of others (those not considered) as contingent. Yet, those people who speak about moral values tend to take the wellbeing of others as "necessary." An "all things considered" interpretation treats the wellbeing of others as necessary. Therefore, "all things considered" (universal-subjectivism) interpretations have a better fit than "some things considered" (limited-subjectivism) interpretations.

The AntiChris

Ok, I'm with you until:
Given your example, I find this an extraordinarily simplistic conclusion. Is it not more likely that the mother has many, complex, reasons for wishing to deter her son from mistreating cats? These reasons will range from personal distaste of animal cruelty through to the shame that her son's socially unacceptable behaviour will bring upon the family. One thing is for sure though - every mother will have a unique set of reasons and rationalisations to support her assertion that "it is wrong!" based on what she, personally, values.

Initially, I was at a loss as why you should come to this odd conclusion until I realised that you're using this to justify your next step:
For the life of me I don't see how this follows from your assumption that the mother is appealing to "intrinsic goodness or badness".

However even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that we can infer from the mother's reaction to her son's behaviour that she is saying something like "it is wrong, all things considered", how do you reach the conclusion that "all things considered" means the same to all mothers in this situation?

The problem I have here is your apparent insistence that all "moral questions" can be distilled down to a distinct and coherent concept of "all things considered" and that a single moral theory can provide the answer.

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

Sure she does, but you are changing the question.

"What is she saying?" and "Why did she say it?" are two entirely different questions. The first asks about the meaning content of a proposition. The second asks about the causal antecedents to speech act.

If you are looking for the causes of a speech act, then yes you will find those causes entirely in the desires and beliefs of the person whose speech act you are interested in.

But this is true not only of the mother telling her son that mistreating the kitten is wrong. It is also true of the geometry teacher saying "The square of the length of the hypotenuse of a right triange is equal to the square of the length of the other two sides." His reasons for saying that are tied to his beliefs and his desires.

In fact, this is true for every speech act ever uttered -- without exception.

But you cannot derive the meaning of a speech act by looking at a person's reason for saying it. If you could, then the meaning of "The square of . . . " would have to have something to do with collecting a paycheck so that one can replace the furnace before winter comes.

I asked you what question you wanted me to answer, and you shot back with "What question are you answering?" I said that I am interested in the meaning of the claim that mistreating the cat is wrong (for example), and now cricitize me for not answering your question about the cause of the mother's speech act.

If you want me to ask a question about the cause of the mother's speech act (or the geometry teachers's), then ask that question and I will tell you. I will almost certainly give an answer that examine's the agent's beliefs and desires. But my answer will have no implications relevant to the meaning of the proposition uttered.


Please note that the very first sentence in my response used the word "most", not "all."

In addition, the assumption that they are saying the same thing can be inferred from their use of language. In our exchange here, I could certainly have a different meaning for the word "most" than you do. But, we cannot communicate unless we have at least some minimum level of assumption that the word "most" does not mean one thing to me and something entirely different to you.

Language requires at least some minimum conformity in the meanings of words. We are not each free to invent our own private language each time we speak. So, the assumption that there is this conformity in meaning is not unreasonable.