Ut

I suspect it is his post titled "Part I" higher up on this page.

Blixy Sticks

Vorkosigan,

That was an extremely intelligent and well-researched commentary. Thank you for providing the sources. I am looking into them as we speak. I have to admit, I am intrigued by Saburo Ienaga. He appears to be an interesting character. I admire his tenacious stance against the government officials that attempted to censor his account of history.

Thank you for calling me son, as well. It's nice to feel young again.

Vorkosigan

Phaedrus -- found part I. Will do.

Vorkosigan

Vorkosigan

Phaedrus: The whole issue boils down to the question that ?Did they consider all means (peaceful and military) before dropping the bombs? Can we say with certainty this was done?
Vork: Yes.
Phaedrus: List them out with references

Phaedrus, all means were considered. They boiled down to:

1) blockade and bombardment -- the Navy's position that B&B were enough. The Strategic Air Arm thought conventional Bombing would be enough.

2) Invasion. The Army position. Resolved in the April 1 meeting, planning for it began two days later. A shame, because if we had simply thrown our troops onto Kyushu right away after Okinawa, they would have found no Japanese troops ready for them.

3) Drop it someplace else, like abandoned land. Rejected because (1) there were only three bombs (2) the Japanese would probably not pay any attention (3) What if they shot down the plane and captured the bomb, or the test failed? This position was supported by many scientists, however.

4) Bomb a city. This position was supported by many scientists. Both sides petitioned the Administration.

5) Do not use it at all. Rejected as immoral, to have a possible war-winning weapon and not use it would have been grossly immoral.

In fairness, one suggestion that might have had merit was dropping the bomb on an already burned out city, such as the suburbs of Tokyo. The problem was that the Bomb had to be dropped on a militarily useful site, like Hiroshima, in case it failed to end the war. Additionally, what if they missed and hit the Emperor? The war might never had ended.

Vork: The sole objective was to limit US casualties. Despite postwar US propaganda, nobody appears to have considered the civilian death toll from the conituation of the war by other means until after the war.

Phaedrus ?Didn’t the rationale of using the bombs was as you had mentioned earlier? To end the war, scare the shit out of the Soviets, annihilate valuable military targets, and test them on a city Now its become only one objective?

I respectfully beg your pardon. I only meant that as opposed to consideration of Japanese casualties, not the overall rationale for the bomb. I have never read a conversation where any high-ranking individual gave as the motive of dropping the bomb explicit recognition of a reduction in the overall level of Japanese deaths due to war.

V: You¡¦re trying so hard, Phaedrus, and not saying anything. The tunnel system was there so that the war could be continued, as were the aircraft, and the suicide militias, and other things.

P: Which part of my statement didn’t you comprehend? Now lets see…if there is a country which is being invaded, realizes its beaten and wants to end the war in a peaceful manner but is “suspicious or unsure ?of the opposition’s intentions, what will they do? They will try to bolster their defenses to the best they can. Isnt that obvious? Or you think all countries will give up their sovereignty in face of certain defeat?

Phaedrus, the reason they built all that last-ditch stuff was because they wanted to continue the war. The whole goal was death-worship -- to let the nation "blossom like the flowers of death" or "the hundred million die as one." The Japanese leaders saw no reason the nation should not perish in a gigantic spasm of fighting ("One Hundred Million Die Together" is the section title of the last part of Toland). Rational war fighters don't engage in banzai charges, and don't form suicide squads, and don't organize suicide militias composed of the young and the female. They don't fight when out of food, weapons and raw material, with all their major cities burned to flinders. They don't seal young men in bunkers so they are forced to die there, nor do they herd their own civilians off cliffs rather than surrender.

So far you have not exampled even a single instance of any peace initiative coming from the government of Japan. You keep ignoring that simple fact that would blow my case out of the water.

V: Which public statement? Be aware that by Potsdam we knew Japan had no intention of surrendering and no surrender plan¡K

P: Err?the one that was to be issued for the bombing. And given that Truman got the news of the successful testing at trinity, wouldn’t it be plausible (or the fact) that the language of the final draft of Potsdam declaration, in particular the language of paragraph 12? And why weren’t soviets part of the signatories and why couldn’t the allies CLEARLY indicate the soviets were going to declare war against Japan?

Phaedrus, the Japanese government had been told and told again by its representatives in Moscow and its diplomatic analysts that the Russians were not interested in the peace proposals. Remember that cable I referenced? From Sato, the man in Moscow:

• ...A PEACE TREATY BY NEGOTIATION IS SOMETHING WHICH CANNOT WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION

In April Togo told the assembled government that the Russia trip was a fantasy and would never work, and the Japanese needed to negotiate directly with the US. Now, if its own experts were telling them again and again in plain language that Russia was not buying, what did they need an announcement about Russia entering the war for? Further, the Russians closed all their organizations in Japan and sent everyone home at the end of July! Japanese intelligence reported massing in Siberia. As far back as April the Japanese had been told that the Soviets would not renew their Nuetrality Pact with Japan. How much more warning do you need!???

In any case, it is not incumbent on Moscow to make announcements of its intentions (and why should it be believed anyway?)

Finally, why should Moscow warn anybody, and get even more Russian soldiers killed attacking a prepared enemy instead of a suprised one? Your ethical stance is unacceptable.

Also, the language of paragraph 12 was prepared prior to the news about the Trinity Test, on July 2. Trinity news reached Truman at Potsdam on the 16th. So Truman's knowledge of the Bomb did not really influence the Potsdam Declaration's text.

Vork: This is what we call a lie, Phaedrus. The Japanese did not use the Swedes, the Swedish initiative was started in Sweden and killed by the Japanese. The Soviet initiative was to get an alliance in return for territory which Stalin was going to take anyway in support of a cease-fire. This is propaganda. Tell me, do you know what terms Konoye was carrying to the Soviets?

P: Sigh again, the same author whom you so eagerly quoted now is lying since it is not in sync with the propaganda you believe in? Konoye?read the telegrams

I read the cables. They are instanced on page 915 and 916 of Toland, where this initiative through Sweden is discussed in detail. The move was initiated by Bernadotte, not the military attache Onodera. See Toland (p915). The Japanese government shut down this negotiation in a cable cited in Toland (p.916):

"JAPAN'S POLICY IS TO FIGHT TO THE END, BUT WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT SOMONE IS CONDUCTING A PEACE MOVE IN NORTHERN EUROPE. YOU ARE TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER AND REPORT YOUR FINDINGS."

This was triggered by the Swedish Foreign Minister's complaint that the diplomatic plan bypassed regular channels. The putz protested to the Japanese Ambassador in Stockholm, which resulted in the cable killing the move. The Japanese routinely killed all peace moves.

Note this line:

• JAPAN'S POLICY IS TO FIGHT TO THE END

Now tell me: Is that a clear declaration of policy?

V: know quite well what his conclusions are. Unfortunately, they are not supported. He is speculating based on a study conducted in 1946. Ironically, fighting would continue on Okinawa past the end of the war, with small unit actions going on until 1947. That should put the conclusions into perspective.

P: Umm?all those studies are WRONG, especially even the author is wrong since it doesn’t fit your belief system?

Phaed:
FACT: The study was done in 1946. it claimed that the Japanese would have surrendered without the bomb, in the fall, maybe. Its conclusions are put into perspective by:
FACT: 1947, fighting in Okinawa
FACT: 1950: Japanese soldiers living in caves on Iwo Jima for five years without sun or fresh food, living off stuff stolen at night from US military camps.

Now, the Study wants to claim that the Japanese government would have surrendered without the Bomb (when?). But the government surrendering, and fighting ending, are two different things. Resistance continued sporadically for quite some time afterwards. In 1946, how could the authors have known what would be happening in 1947 and later? Further, did they include the fact that at least two officers considered erecting independent states in China and the Philippines to continue the war? That as late as August 18, three days after surrender, the military was still arguing the point with the Emperor? That is why the studies conclusions cannot be trusted. Not because "they don't fit my belief system." But because, like all governmental studies, they are slanted toward particular conclusions and use evidence in biased ways.

And still, so far you have not exampled even a single instance of any peace initiative coming from the government of Japan that was ignored by the US.

BTW, claiming something "doesn't fit my belief system" is not an argument. If you have some different idea about this study, please assemble an argument with facts and evidence.

V: look at the DATE! July, 8, 1945. A month before the invasion. Also, these guys had no idea about the Bomb. Also, the Japanese did not surrender when the Soviets entered.

P: Err?so what if it is a month before the invasion? Does that make it irrelevant? It clearly states what exactly are the concerns of the Japanese and regarding the soviets, read the statement carefully An entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat. Maybe instead of trying to test the bomb on a second city, one could have waited for a week or so to see whether the surrender will happen after the Soviets entered…instead of killing more civilians? How would the knowledge of the bomb change any of those observations? Trying to wiggle out?

Phaed, once again, speculation is defeated by facts. You want to claim that the Soviet entry into the war would have convinced the Japanese to surrender, and this was known in July. Horseshit. The fact is that the Soviets entered the war, and two A-bombs were dropped, and the government did not surrender. This is a basic historical fact. Quit accusing me of trying to wiggle. You don't even know enough about this topic to detect a wiggle!

Historical fact number 2 (see The Last Great Victory or Miracle of Deliverance.) Hirohito, referencing the A-bomb, told Togo on Aug 7, the day before the Soviet invasion, that he wanted to end the war and to convene the Supreme Council to do so. It did not meet until the 9th. Thus, Hirohito had already decided to end the war prior to Soviet invasion, on the 7th. So, your case is completely and utterly demolished by history.

FACT 1: The government meeting on the 9th, after Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Russian invasion, refused to end the war (twice actually, both the Supreme War Council and the Cabinet voted against ending the war). So Russian entry did not convince Japanese to end war.
FACT 2: Hirohito had already made up mind by evening of Aug 7. This is testified to by his meeting with Togo. Togo himself had wanted a meeting the previous day (he knew the Russian initiative was hopeless).

P: And there is also the secret War Department Study (April 1946), details of which are given in the Alperovitz response at h-diplo:
an internal 1946 War Department study discovered a few years ago asked what would have happened had there been no atomic bomb. It concluded that:
The Japanese leaders had decided to surrender and were merely looking for sufficient pretext to convince the die-hard Army Group that Japan had lost the war and must capitulate to the Allies.

Here is political naivete. First, "Japanese leaders" include the military. So this should be rewritten to reflect truth: "Some Japanese leaders wanted to surrender, most others wanted to continue the war." Also, another point that needs to made is that all wanted conditional surrender, though they all had different conditions. Finally, it should be noted that at any time, the Cabinet could have resigned and brought down the government. Do you why it didn't do that? Because most leaders were in favor of the war (the peace crowd was very small; Alperovitz makes them seem like a majority hung by a minority. The reality is the opposite) and a new government would have been even more belligerent. One of the most important things you have to realize is that the vast majority of Japanese officials were in favor of continuing the war, and the Suzuki government, for having three officials of the Big Six openly in favor of surrender was quite unusual. So the peace group had to walk softly because they were a tiny and weak minority which could have the rug yanked out from under them at any moment. It is fortunate that the Emperor changed his mind after the A-Bomb and decided to end the war.

In fact, the announcement of surrender caused the government to fall, and the Emperor was forced to appoint a member of the royal family to the Prime Ministership to prevent further disasters.

P: This official document judged that Russia's early August entry into the war

. . . would almost certainly have furnished this pretext, and would have been sufficient to convince all responsible leaders that surrender was unavoidable.

Question: if that is true, then why didn't they surrender when Russia entered the war? I mean, duh!

If the Russian surrender was so decisive, why was the military still rejecting the terms of the surrender on Aug 12, four days after Russian entry? Why did the government still fail to accept the Allied terms which guaranteed that the government of Japan would be up to the Japanese? The fact is that even Suzuki publicly refrained from supporting an end to the war on Aug 12! So the big bad Russian invasion turned out to have no effect at all on the Supreme Council's voting pattern and on the Cabinet's position.

In fact, the Russian invasion was so decisive that army officers crowded into General Anami's office to demand that he continue the war. More than a thousand officers committed suicide the day Japan surrendered. Probably they were shocked by Russian entry......

P: The study concluded that well before the bombings even an initial November 1945 landing on the island of Kyushu was only a "remote" possibility--and that the full invasion of Japan in the spring of 1946 would not have occurred. (This study, by the way, reached these conclusions without assessing the additional effect a clarification of the Emperor's position would have had.)

No kidding? "Only a remote possibility." So the transfer of troops from Europe to Asia, the requisition of landing craft, the repositioning of aircraft and ships, the expenditures, planning, and re-organizations -- all this for a "remote possibility?" Don't think so. I suspect Alperovitz has slanted what the study said. You notice his piece -- I assume you got one of his propaganda trash pieces like this one doesn't tell you anything about the study, so you can't find it and see the text for yourself.

Fortunately, this study is discussed in Skates. The study said that if Japan did not surrender after Russian entry, the war would have ended by Feb 15, 1946. Six more months of killing, for we know that they did not surrender after Russian entry (the government twice voted to continue the war). So, the study is nowhere near as conclusory as Alperovitz makes it out.

The whole thing is stupid, Phaedrus. All the Japanese had to do to surrender was GET ON THE HORN AND ANNOUNCE SURRENDER! That's all. You can't "try to surrender." Not for six months! The reason they couldn't surrender is because only a small minority of government officials, the jushin, and the nobility wanted to surrender. This minority DID NOT include the Emperor, who was the only one who could make the decision anyway.

Vidn't say the Survey was doctored. I said they spun the conclusions to play up their role. You didn't even know about the Survey until you read it on a website that selectively quoted it, so don't spout this nonsense at me. The fact is there is no justification in the Survey for its conclusion. It is there simply to get funding in the postwar environment. BTW, I suggest you read Skates on the Survey¡¦s conclusions.

P: And you knew about it before since you say so right? Wonder why you never mentioned it? What would be justification for you? The fact is that they were the one’s who interviewed the survivors and came to the conclusions. If the survey was a tool of the Air Force, then hope you have read the Europe survey? In case you haven’t, let me tell you that the report describes the inefficiency and inaccuracy of strategic bombing during world war. Skates dismissed the conclusions of the survey as WRONG? I don’t think he says that.

LOL. Skates is quite clear. On page 48-51 he explains why the Strategic Bombing Survey cooked the Survey to make it seem the Air Forces could have won the war alone, and on page 251 he again says: "The [i]Strategic Bombing Survey[i], written ostensibly to evaluate the effectiveness of strategic bombing, also pressed the air force's claim to credit for winning the war against Japan....in fact, the commissioners were chosen and the study was sponsored from within the AAF."

And yes, the Survey was a tool of the Air Force, and I have read the European survey. They couldn't really cook the European side, because everybody knew that Hitler's factories had been producing right up to the end. It was easier on Japan, because so little information was available, and the strategic air war was so much more successful there.

P: Read and understand what I posted completely before opening that thing. I am posting a telegram which gives what the Japanese thought of the zacharias broadcasts, how the hell they were to know what is official and what is not?

Zacharias was well-known to the Japanese. See, prior to the war, he was one of the few US officers who could speak Japanese, and visited Japan many times. Many Japanese military figures had met him, including Prime Minister Suzuki, and Admiral Yonai. This is the sort of background information that would be useful for you to know. That is why I have begged you to read up on the war. Alperovitz is a propaganda writer, not a scholar. Please read someone more objective.

Now, as for they knowing he was speaking for the US government, Zacharias had been speaking on the radio in that capacity for some time...as Toland says on page 951: "As an 'official spokesman' Zacharias had for some time been assuring the Japanese by radio that unconditional surrender was largely a military term and did not mean the end of Japan's way of life." Craig gives his story in The Fall of Japan on p. 37-40. Zacharias established his bona fides by mentioning the all the people he knew in Japan (where he had been visiting for 20 years). Beginning broadcasting on May 8, he recieved coded confirmation that the Japanese had heard and were considering the following day. On the 27 May he got a formal response, with the phrase Zacharias-kun (friend) included at the end. The Japanese knew full well who he was and why he was talking.

I wish you would read some of the books I've mentioned...And still, so far you have not exampled even a single instance of any peace initiative coming from the government of Japan.

P:And once they knew they gave their response in the context of the Atlantic charter, which means that they RESPONDED to the broadcasts. And their concern was clear in the telegram where it said His(Zac) word, however, that Japan shall receive the benefit of the Atlantic Charter is in contradiction to the attitude taken by England and the United States when they rejected German participation under the said Charter prior to her surrend

Phaed, there were only TWO responses. Despite repeated broadcasts, all through June and into July, nothing. Twice, on 27 May, and again on 24 July, he got responses. After that, and through it, only silence. Sydney Mashbir, another well-connected American officer, also tried, and got nothing. Planted editorials in the Washington Post by Zacharias (actually, by his assistant Ladislas Farago) saying that the Japanese need only ask for details -- picked up by Kase in Switzerland and forwarded to Japan, also got no response.

So, the Japanese were aware of who he was, what he was saying, and what he meant. Period. The Japanese just didn't respond.

P: Sigh read the response ?.and btw they were communicating and hoping that others would also know their stance. And it clearly states in the telegram As for Japan, it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter. The difficult point is the attitude of the enemy, who continues to insist on the formality of unconditional surrender

Phaed: I have explained at length about this. Here it is again:

Remember, Sato is in Moscow and has only the vaguest idea of what is going on in Tokyo. He has no idea if anyone is listening to him or not, which accounts for the increasing desperation in his cables as he requests clarifications for surrender plans that do not exist. As he himself said in a decrypted message: "My first responsibility is to prevent the harboring of illusions which are at variance with the reality." He knew that the war was futile -- "How much reserve strength does Japan have for continuing the war?" he asked in another cable. But because he was in Moscow, not Tokyo, he had no clue as to the actual control by the military.

• As for Japan, it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter. The difficult point is the attitude of the enemy, who continues to insist on the formality of unconditional surrender

No. The problem was the attitude of the Japanese, who were using unconditional surrender as an excuse. You will note that the cable above was sent on July 25. The context is completely missing, as it usually is in such propaganda presentations. This was an instruction from Togo to Sato, who is not discussing realities but instead is telling Sato what attitude he is to take with the Russians. Togo added at the end of this cable specifically that this was not a 'peace feeler' (exact words) but "obedience to Imperial command." In other words -- and I can't emphasize this enough -- this is an out-of-context quote that actually demonstrates that Japan's stance on unconditional surrender was a negotiating tactic designed to give the military cover to continue the war.

So quit telling me to "read the cables" which you yourself have yanked out of context and obviously do not have a clue about. Go read someone who is a serious scholar and not a propaganda artist! Togo is instructing Sato how to go about negotiating, how to act. This is "not a peace feeler" as TOGO HIMSELF said.

V: Again, what peace feelers. Can you detail them? Names, dates, and places?

P: Umm didn’t you read the link where the same zacharias who was famous for his broadcasts comments upon the situation? ?a href="http://sandysq.gcinet.net/uss_salt_lake_city_ca25/zach12.htm" target="_blank">How We Bungled the Japanese Surrender?

I am aware of Zacharias complaints. I am also aware of his far-right political views. Does he bring any concrete examples of brushed off peace feelers? Can you? So far I am repeating myself again and again, while you dodge and evade the simple thing that would destroy my case: the government initiated peace feeler.

Zacharias wrote:

• Forrestal then called Potsdam and requested Presidential approval (after the fact) for our "deliberate indiscretion." Finally he dropped everything in Washington and flew to Potsdam himself. Our nerves were on edge as we waited word from Potsdam. Then came the Associated Press flash saying the President would stand by my reference to the Atlantic Charter. But though we gained a victory, it was soon to be canceled out by the Potsdam Declaration and the way it was handled. Instead of being a diplomatic instrument, transmitted through regular diplomatic channels and giving the Japanese a chance to answer, it was put on the radio as a propaganda instrument pure and simple. The whole maneuver, in fact, completely disregarded all essential psychological factors dealing with Japan. It was drafted in the presence of the Russians as they stood poised to enter the Far Eastern war, convinced that Japan could not accept it in the time limit set. It was offered in the shadow of the A-bomb—ready to be released over a city whose population had not been forewarned as other cities to be bombed by the Air Force had been forewarned before. The Potsdam Declaration, in short, wrecked everything we had been working for to prevent further bloodshed and insure our postwar strategic position.

Zacharias hoped to win the war by psychological maneuvering. What a joke! And many errors -- for example, Hiroshima WAS warned, by leaflets dropped three days before. "convinced that Japan could not accept it in the time limit set" but the Potsdam Declaration contained no time limit. In this breathless farrago of accusations there is no mention of a peace feeler rejected by the US. Zacharias simply complains that the war could have been won by psychological warfare alone. Bully for him. He's the only one that thinks so.

P: If they were being read, then still they decided to BOMB, then either they misinterpreted the whole thing or were being stubborn.

No Phaed, Washington was reading the cables and knew full well that there was no surrender plan. That's why they went ahead and Bombed Japan. Just bring me the surrender plan or the peace feelers. Remember the cable to Sweden:

• JAPAN'S POLICY IS TO FIGHT TO THE END

P: As I said in the old thread? was a bomb dropped and people died and the japanese surrendered. Thats a fact, why was the bomb dropped on civilians, why couldnt the bomb be dropped elsewhere to demonstrate its power (whether or not it would have served the purpose is another debate altogether)

Because, the bomb had to satisfy several missions. First, it had to end the war, but failing that, it had to have some positive military effect. What if you expend a bomb on a desolate site, and the Japanese do not surrender?? Congrats, you've just wasted an expensive and powerful weapon. The rational thing to do is to try to address the several missions at once, even though they conflict. Consequently, the site chosen had to be a military one. Remember, Marshall and other Army planners thought, from informal planning conversations, that they would have 9 bombs ready for the Kyushu invasion in November. Marshall believed that there was some chance that the Bomb would not end the war, and wanted backup.

,P: should one have used the "bomb" in the first place, was the "bomb" dropped to give USSR a signal, how different was the surrender deal given to japan ultimately and how different was it from the deal they were asking from before the bomb was dropped, did the leaders even understand how powerful the bomb was and devastation it could cause, were the estimation of military casualties inaccurate...etc ....there are zillion questions like that for which one cant paint an answer in black & white.

True, one can avoid black and white answers if one is paid enough to smear them into gray. Your question "how different was the surrender deal given to japan ultimately and how different was it from the deal they were asking from before the bomb was dropped" is absurd because they were not asking for a surrender deal prior to the dropping of the bomb. They wanted the USSR to help them negotiate a cease-fire while giving the Bear territorial concessions.

P: No one is applauding what the Japanese did or the Germans did in world war II, the things which we are discussing here was the BOMBING justified morally or otherwise.

Yes, morally, militarily, ethically, you name it. It was the right decision, an evil one, but to avert even greater evils. Subsequent events have demonstrated the rightness of that decision.

All the Americans do was to indicate publicly or through the right channels, that the emperor could stay.

They DID. REPEATEDLY! REPEATEDLY! REPEATEDLY! REPEATEDLY! Jesus H. Christ, Phaedrus, how many times do I have to say it! Please see the official broadcasts of Zacharias. Here it is again for the umpteenth time:

• Now, as for they knowing he was speaking for the US government, Zacharias had been speaking on the radio in that capacity for some time...as Toland says on page 951: "As an 'official spokesman' Zacharias had for some time been assuring the Japanese by radio that unconditional surrender was largely a military term and did not mean the end of Japan's way of life."

Zacharias letter in the Washington Post was forwarded to the Japanese government by the Japanese Ambassador in Switzerland. It said that all the Japanese had to do was ask about terms, and the US was willing to talk. The US negotiated with everyone, and repeatedly asked the Japanese what terms they wanted. The US offered to fly Japanese officials to Europe to negotiate. NONE OF THIS WAS ACCEPTED!!!!!!!

You could also see the Jacobsson Affair of July 10, when the Americans assured the Swedish intermediary of two local military officials that they well understood the position of the Imperial Family. The Japanese also knew that the Americans had taken pains never to bomb the Emperor. In short, it was all there, and the Japanese, as Zacharias told them, could formally ask for terms any time.

Phaed, the fact is that it was the Japanese who prolonged the war. I know that you will never accept these facts, so I offer them only for interested third parties following this debate. Blaming the US for prolonging the war is exactly the same move as Hitler blaming Poland for his invasion of it: it's the Big Lie.

P: As the cables and other articles point out, They wanted to surrender as indicated in the telegrams, but they wanted to get more clarification on how they and the country is going to treated?

OK. Fine. Point me to the exact cable where the Japanese said they needed terms clarified. And show me where they said this to the US directly. I've already PROVED beyond the shadow of a doubt the willingness of the US to talk.

The ball is in your court. Bring me the peace feeler. The next post had better include a detailed discussion of the Japanese peace feelers ignored by the US, with cites from relevant books.

Vorkosigan

phaedrus

Vork

Bear with me for the delay.....will converse with you next week, tied up until then....

jp

phaedrus

apologies vork....tied up...talk to you next week....jp

Vorkosigan

I just received Richard Frank's []iDownfall[/i], absolutely the last word on the ABomb. I suggest, Phaed, that you get it. Frank demonstrates how the anti-Bomb crowd has cleverly selected and edited Japanese magic intercepts to make it look as though they wanted to end the war. He also points out:

*....the Vatican peace initiative was begun -- need I even say it? -- by the Vatican and -- need I even say it? -- terminated by the Japanese.

*....the 1946 survey report that lowballed casualty figures is a six page analysis hastily done, with many errors and misunderstandings of the situation on Kyushu, and half devoted to the effects of the typhoon of October 1945. In short, it is worthless.

*....the real figures for troops on Kyushu. I suspected Skates had cooked his numbers; since he gave no authoritative figure, just the Ultra estimate of 545,000. And I was right. The real figure is 900,000. Against such a force, we could expect casualties of anywhere from 35% to 100% of the Japanese figure, with 1/4 of those dead. Note that the figure counts only battle deaths, and not disease and psych casualties, which nearly doubled the figure for Okinawa.

*....again, as I have maintained, Frank finds the actual cites for the difference between what was said during the war by the Japanese, and after the war by them. It is very, very clear that the Japanese were never going to surrender.

I think you should go out and read this book.

Vorkosigan

phaedrus

Got some breathing space...will post the response in couple of days....

phaedrus

sorry...had to get bk to some things ...talk to u soon in a week or so

jp

phaedrus

Apologies for the really long delay. Here goes, didnt really do a copy check so, pardon moi......

all means were considered.

You mentioned around 5 options…..all military, were there any deliberate peaceful alternatives that were considered ?

3) Drop it someplace else, like abandoned land. Rejected because (1) there were only three bombs (2) the Japanese would probably not pay any attention (3) What if they shot down the plane and captured the bomb, or the test failed? This position was supported by many scientists, however.

4) Bomb a city. This position was supported by many scientists. Both sides petitioned the Administration.

Umm, which scientists are you talking about? This was one petition that was submitted by the Scientists at the Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory
…http://nuclearfiles.org/redocuments/...-petition.html

And what about the Franck Committee report?

5) Do not use it at all. Rejected as immoral, to have a possible war-winning weapon and not use it would have been grossly immoral.

Any recording of such meeting where it was declared immoral?

I respectfully beg your pardon. I only meant that as opposed to consideration of Japanese casualties, not the overall rationale for the bomb. I have never read a conversation where any high-ranking individual gave as the motive of dropping the bomb explicit recognition of a reduction in the overall level of Japanese deaths due to war.

Don’t understand, you say sole objective was to limit US casualties and then also say rationale was To end the war, scare the shit out of the Soviets, annihilate valuable military targets, and test them on a city

Phaedrus, the reason they built all that last-ditch stuff was because they wanted to continue the war. The whole goal was death-worship -- to let the nation "blossom like the flowers of death" or "the hundred million die as one." The Japanese leaders saw no reason the nation should not perish in a gigantic spasm of fighting ("One Hundred Million Die Together" is the section title of the last part of Toland). Rational war fighters don't engage in banzai charges, and don't form suicide squads, and don't organize suicide militias composed of the young and the female. They don't fight when out of food, weapons and raw material, with all their major cities burned to flinders. They don't seal young men in bunkers so they are forced to die there, nor do they herd their own civilians off cliffs rather than surrender.

Umm…guess you mean the military leadership right? Rational war fighters don’t form suicide squads…..if one takes the example of the Palestine chaps or for that matter al queda souls, they do so coz they are out gunned. So why not just nuke the hell out of these chaps also???? Now that you are so derisive of what the Japanese did, what do you think of what the soviets did when the nazis were outside stalingard? They were non-rational fighters? What you think is rational and what is not, could depend on how you have been brought up too, some cultures have a different definition of what “patriotism” means. You don’t just paint a whole culture “evil or non-rational” coz they employ different types of self-defense. Maybe the Japanese weren’t as materialistic in those days as they are now.

So far you have not exampled even a single instance of any peace initiative coming from the government of Japan. You keep ignoring that simple fact that would blow my case out of the water.

You don’t define the parameters of the debate my friend and btw it is very easy for me to ask you to give a single instance of any peace initiative coming from the US government through proper channels offered to the Japanese government. The simple fact is that those were trying times and both governments were under pressure not to appear as if losing face or being too lenient.

Phaedrus, the Japanese government had been told and told again by its representatives in Moscow and its diplomatic analysts that the Russians were not interested in the peace proposals. Remember that cable I referenced? From Sato, the man in Moscow:
...A PEACE TREATY BY NEGOTIATION IS SOMETHING WHICH CANNOT WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION

In April Togo told the assembled government that the Russia trip was a fantasy and would never work, and the Japanese needed to negotiate directly with the US. Now, if its own experts were telling them again and again in plain language that Russia was not buying, what did they need an announcement about Russia entering the war for? Further, the Russians closed all their organizations in Japan and sent everyone home at the end of July! Japanese intelligence reported massing in Siberia. As far back as April the Japanese had been told that the Soviets would not renew their Nuetrality Pact with Japan. How much more warning do you need!???

; ) Do I have to answer that? Here is a nation that is getting kicked from all corners and sees some hope on the Russian front….and btw that cable which you had quoted….togo replied to sato saying this…which would given an indication of what the Japanese were trying to do through Russians…..

In any case, it is not incumbent on Moscow to make announcements of its intentions (and why should it be believed anyway?)

Finally, why should Moscow warn anybody, and get even more Russian soldiers killed attacking a prepared enemy instead of a suprised one? Your ethical stance is unacceptable.

What ethical stance? We are talking here about the possibility of a nation pinning on hopes from Soviet and if they had known that there is no hope on that front, they could have folded?

Also, the language of paragraph 12 was prepared prior to the news about the Trinity Test, on July 2. Trinity news reached Truman at Potsdam on the 16th. So Truman's knowledge of the Bomb did not really influence the Potsdam Declaration's text.

Umm…nope…take a look at stimson’s memo on July 2 with the draft for the proclamation by the heads of state (http://nuclearfiles.org/redocuments/...son-draft.html)……..and compare that with the final declaration on july26 (http://nuclearfiles.org/redocuments/...6-potsdam.html)

So it is very much possible the successful testing of the bomb did change the text to a more belligerent tone.

I read the cables. They are instanced on page 915 and 916 of Toland, where this initiative through Sweden is discussed in detail. The move was initiated by Bernadotte, not the military attache Onodera. See Toland (p915). The Japanese government shut down this negotiation in a cable cited in Toland (p.916):

"JAPAN'S POLICY IS TO FIGHT TO THE END, BUT WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT SOMONE IS CONDUCTING A PEACE MOVE IN NORTHERN EUROPE. YOU ARE TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER AND REPORT YOUR FINDINGS."

This was triggered by the Swedish Foreign Minister's complaint that the diplomatic plan bypassed regular channels. The putz protested to the Japanese Ambassador in Stockholm, which resulted in the cable killing the move. The Japanese routinely killed all peace moves.

Note this line:
JAPAN'S POLICY IS TO FIGHT TO THE END

Now tell me: Is that a clear declaration of policy?


Err…how does this indicate that Japanese routinely killed ALL peaceful moves. The above cable doesn’t even conclusively point out a killing of a particular peace imitative. The “end” could mean many things, end of war, cessation of hostilities due to peaceful negotiations.

FACT: The study was done in 1946. it claimed that the Japanese would have surrendered without the bomb, in the fall, maybe. Its conclusions are put into perspective by:
FACT: 1947, fighting in Okinawa
FACT: 1950: Japanese soldiers living in caves on Iwo Jima for five years without sun or fresh food, living off stuff stolen at night from US military camps.

: ) Great, how many units were involved in the fight at Okinawa? And how many soldiers were holed up in the caves at Iwo Jima? Both these events which you are talking about….happened after US was occupying these places since 1945? Now how do these events blow apart the survey?

Now, the Study wants to claim that the Japanese government would have surrendered without the Bomb (when?). But the government surrendering, and fighting ending, are two different things. Resistance continued sporadically for quite some time afterwards. In 1946, how could the authors have known what would be happening in 1947 and later? Further, did they include the fact that at least two officers considered erecting independent states in China and the Philippines to continue the war? That as late as August 18, three days after surrender, the military was still arguing the point with the Emperor? That is why the studies conclusions cannot be trusted. Not because "they don't fit my belief system." But because, like all governmental studies, they are slanted toward particular conclusions and use evidence in biased ways.

Don’t see how the things that you brought up dilute the study except your generic statement “like all governmental studies, they are slanted toward particular conclusions and use evidence in biased ways” which is an argument that could be used against all governments. Going by that logic, one could always say the US government’s decision to nuke japan was slanted and the evidence presented was biased. If the study was biased or doctored to meet the Air Force’s objectives, why did they have to talk about the peace group in japan?

BTW, claiming something "doesn't fit my belief system" is not an argument. If you have some different idea about this study, please assemble an argument with facts and evidence.

Have already told what I thought about the study and you opposed it, but haven’t seen any argument based on facts and evidence so far, except quoting skates selectively.

once again, speculation is defeated by facts. You want to claim that the Soviet entry into the war would have convinced the Japanese to surrender, and this was known in July. Horseshit. The fact is that the Soviets entered the war, and two A-bombs were dropped, and the government did not surrender. This is a basic historical fact. Quit accusing me of trying to wiggle. You don't even know enough about this topic to detect a wiggle!

Umm the tone again, whether one knows enough about a topic is something I dont think you can claim to be in a position to gauge. What sort of argument is that?? How does one use logic to talk about historical events and decisions? We are not talking about post-fact events here, we are talking about what the US leaders had in front of them before coming to the decision to nuke japan, and this particular study doesn’t exactly make a case for nuking japan.

Historical fact number 2 (see The Last Great Victory or Miracle of Deliverance.) Hirohito, referencing the A-bomb, told Togo on Aug 7, the day before the Soviet invasion, that he wanted to end the war and to convene the Supreme Council to do so. It did not meet until the 9th. Thus, Hirohito had already decided to end the war prior to Soviet invasion, on the 7th. So, your case is completely and utterly demolished by history

Umm, cant you see your predicament….i am talking about why the US couldn’t have waited for a week (atleast ) before dropping the bomb and seen the impact of the entry of soviets on Japanese. And again the second bomb and it is not as if the surrender was delayed by month inspite of the entry of the soviets and the bomb, its called around a WEEK. !!! And what exactly is my case? I gave you a study that was convinced that soviet entry into war would “would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat”. They don’t make such decisions overnight as you have already mentioned and demonstrated. As you yourself have already said, the military still wanted to fight and it had to take the emperor’s final word to end the war, why couldn’t have he done on 7th itself if he was fully convinced? Utterly demolished I believe, like adjectives a lot?

Here is political naivete. First, "Japanese leaders" include the military. So this should be rewritten to reflect truth: "Some Japanese leaders wanted to surrender, most others wanted to continue the war." Also, another point that needs to made is that all wanted conditional surrender, though they all had different conditions. Finally, it should be noted that at any time, the Cabinet could have resigned and brought down the government. Do you why it didn't do that? Because most leaders were in favor of the war (the peace crowd was very small; Alperovitz makes them seem like a majority hung by a minority. The reality is the opposite) and a new government would have been even more belligerent. One of the most important things you have to realize is that the vast majority of Japanese officials were in favor of continuing the war, and the Suzuki government, for having three officials of the Big Six openly in favor of surrender was quite unusual. So the peace group had to walk softly because they were a tiny and weak minority which could have the rug yanked out from under them at any moment. It is fortunate that the Emperor changed his mind after the A-Bomb and decided to end the war.

In fact, the announcement of surrender caused the government to fall, and the Emperor was forced to appoint a member of the royal family to the Prime Ministership to prevent further disasters.

Vork, semantics apart, that’s what the line from the quote implies too The Japanese leaders had decided to surrender and were merely looking for sufficient pretext to convince the die-hard Army Group that Japan had lost the war and must capitulate to the Allies And regarding the peace crowd, its not just Aleperovitz, even the survey talks about the peace initiatives.

Question: if that is true, then why didn't they surrender when Russia entered the war? I mean, duh!

that is pretty naïve, to expect a nation to surrender as soon as one of the hopes they had is quashed. Wouldn’t it be plausible to expect lot of confusion over the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and hence the delay in surrender, since they didn’t have all the facts in front of them?

If the Russian surrender was so decisive, why was the military still rejecting the terms of the surrender on Aug 12, four days after Russian entry? Why did the government still fail to accept the Allied terms which guaranteed that the government of Japan would be up to the Japanese? The fact is that even Suzuki publicly refrained from supporting an end to the war on Aug 12! So the big bad Russian invasion turned out to have no effect at all on the Supreme Council's voting pattern and on the Cabinet's position.

Maybe it had an effect on the Emperor’s decision? And again I don’t know why you take a span of 5 days and talk of it as if it is a LONG period to dismiss the entry of soviets. And what allied terms are you talking about?

In fact, the Russian invasion was so decisive that army officers crowded into General Anami's office to demand that he continue the war. More than a thousand officers committed suicide the day Japan surrendered. Probably they were shocked by Russian entry......

You mean to indicate or imply that because of the soviet entry into the war, all these army officers wanted to continue war? And regarding suicide, do we have to go into this? Cultural gaps ?

No kidding? "Only a remote possibility." So the transfer of troops from Europe to Asia, the requisition of landing craft, the repositioning of aircraft and ships, the expenditures, planning, and re-organizations -- all this for a "remote possibility?" Don't think so. I suspect Alperovitz has slanted what the study said. You notice his piece -- I assume you got one of his propaganda trash pieces like this one doesn't tell you anything about the study, so you can't find it and see the text for yourself.

Come on, no one has challenged this particular evidence by alperovitz and anyhow it was Bernstein who uncovered this study in 1986. And what do you mean propaganda trash pieces? If the same thing is said in H-Diplo would you believe it? Then all you have to do is to the link I provided. And don’t know how you are reading the text, but from my reading of the quote, it comes across as that the study concluded about the impact of soviet entry on Japanese position, which would have rendered the invasion as a remote possibility.
Again, one can just say whatever you read is propaganda very easily….don’t indulge in generalizations without evidence.

Fortunately, this study is discussed in Skates. The study said that if Japan did not surrender after Russian entry, the war would have ended by Feb 15, 1946. Six more months of killing, for we know that they did not surrender after Russian entry (the government twice voted to continue the war). So, the study is nowhere near as conclusory as Alperovitz makes it out.

Are you telling me that the war department study of 1946 was discussed in skates book ?????????????? When you said above that one cant see the text or find the study?? Again which study said about the war ending on feb 15, 1946?

Skates is quite clear. On page 48-51 he explains why the Strategic Bombing Survey cooked the Survey to make it seem the Air Forces could have won the war alone, and on page 251 he again says: "The Strategic Bombing Survey[i], written ostensibly to evaluate the effectiveness of strategic bombing, also pressed the air force's claim to credit for winning the war against Japan....in fact, the commissioners were chosen and the study was sponsored from within the AAF."

Err. If it’s a Strategic Bombing Survey the air force has to appoint the commissioners and pay for the study right? Who will do it, the NAVY?? ; ) And as I asked, does Skates clearly say that the survey was WRONG?

And yes, the Survey was a tool of the Air Force, and I have read the European survey. They couldn't really cook the European side, because everybody knew that Hitler's factories had been producing right up to the end. It was easier on Japan, because so little information was available, and the strategic air war was so much more successful there.

What do you mean? The strategic air war was successful in Japan compared to Germany and hence, what they said in both surveys is essentially true?

Zacharias was well-known to the Japanese. See, prior to the war, he was one of the few US officers who could speak Japanese, and visited Japan many times. Many Japanese military figures had met him, including Prime Minister Suzuki, and Admiral Yonai. This is the sort of background information that would be useful for you to know. That is why I have begged you to read up on the war. Alperovitz is a propaganda writer, not a scholar. Please read someone more objective.

Please don’t try to indulge in what I know and what I don’t know, you are not an authority.

Now, as for they knowing he was speaking for the US government, Zacharias had been speaking on the radio in that capacity for some time...as Toland says on page 951: "As an 'official spokesman' Zacharias had for some time been assuring the Japanese by radio that unconditional surrender was largely a military term and did not mean the end of Japan's way of life." Craig gives his story in [i]The Fall of Japan on p. 37-40. Zacharias established his bona fides by mentioning the all the people he knew in Japan (where he had been visiting for 20 years). Beginning broadcasting on May 8, he recieved coded confirmation that the Japanese had heard and were considering the following day. On the 27 May he got a formal response, with the phrase Zacharias-kun (friend) included at the end. The Japanese knew full well who he was and why he was talking.

Why are you telling me what I know and when I have also given you links to articles written by Zach himself on the subject and also the cable examples/text in which Japanese mentioned the broadcasts and their concerns over atlantic charter…etc?

there were only TWO responses. Despite repeated broadcasts, all through June and into July, nothing. Twice, on 27 May, and again on 24 July, he got responses. After that, and through it, only silence. Sydney Mashbir, another well-connected American officer, also tried, and got nothing. Planted editorials in the Washington Post by Zacharias (actually, by his assistant Ladislas Farago) saying that the Japanese need only ask for details -- picked up by Kase in Switzerland and forwarded to Japan, also got no response.

So, the Japanese were aware of who he was, what he was saying, and what he meant. Period. The Japanese just didn't respond

Umm just read above about the telegrams….

The problem was the attitude of the Japanese, who were using unconditional surrender as an excuse. You will note that the cable above was sent on July 25. The context is completely missing, as it usually is in such propaganda presentations. This was an instruction from Togo to Sato, who is not discussing realities but instead is telling Sato what attitude he is to take with the Russians. Togo added at the end of this cable specifically that this was not a 'peace feeler' (exact words) but "obedience to Imperial command." In other words -- and I can't emphasize this enough -- this is an out-of-context quote that actually demonstrates that Japan's stance on unconditional surrender was a negotiating tactic designed to give the military cover to continue the war.

What is the context? Its the context of a message being sent when they knew it was being read by people concerned. I still don’t understand how you continue to mis-read the text….the actual content is On the other hand, since it is possible that the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States may exercise caution and suspect our dispatch of a special envoy may be a peace plot, we have repeatedly advised that what is described above is not a mere "peace feeler" but is in obedience to the Imperial command. It should very clear to anybody who reads this text that togo is saying that in case the allies think that this is some sort of peace plot or is a mere feeler, confirm that this is in obedience to the imperial command, that means it has the sanction of the emperor or imperial order.

So quit telling me to "read the cables" which you yourself have yanked out of context and obviously do not have a clue about. Go read someone who is a serious scholar and not a propaganda artist! Togo is instructing Sato how to go about negotiating, how to act. This is "not a peace feeler" as TOGO HIMSELF said.

Again that tone !!! So all you have to do is get some classes in comprehension and how to read English. Read the cables carefully.

I am aware of Zacharias complaints. I am also aware of his far-right political views. Does he bring any concrete examples of brushed off peace feelers? Can you?

Again the usual happens, the same Zach and his broadcasts which you so often mentioned and liked, are now suddenly wrong since he has different views on the subject?

Zacharias hoped to win the war by psychological maneuvering. What a joke!

Oh, the same Zach who knew how Japanese operate, is now a joker? He was trying to make things right given the limitations he had and the Japanese had responded and as he says, the declaration had sabotaged the whole effort. WRITE ABOUT LEAFLETS

Washington was reading the cables and knew full well that there was no surrender plan. That's why they went ahead and Bombed Japan. Just bring me the surrender plan or the peace feelers. Remember the cable to Sweden:
JAPAN'S POLICY IS TO FIGHT TO THE END

: ) Remember the cables between Russia and japan and “AS FOR JAPAN, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT WE SHOULD LIKE TO COMMUNICATE TO THE OTHER PARTY THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS THAT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO A PEACE BASED ON THE ATLANTIC CHARTER. THE DIFFICULT POINT IS THE ATTITUDE OF THE ENEMY, WHO CONTINUES TO INSIST ON THE FORMALITY OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN REMAIN INSISTENT ON FORMALITY, THERE IS NO SOLUTION TO THIS SITUATION OTHER THAN FOR US TO HOLD OUT UNTIL COMPLETE COLLAPSE BECAUSE OF THIS ONE POINT ALONE.”


Because, the bomb had to satisfy several missions. First, it had to end the war, but failing that, it had to have some positive military effect. What if you expend a bomb on a desolate site, and the Japanese do not surrender?? Congrats, you've just wasted an expensive and powerful weapon

Congrats on a nice logic of killing innocents, when you have “three” bombs like you said above, one bomb is ok naa? And btw why was the first bomb not the type that was successfully tested ?

True, one can avoid black and white answers if one is paid enough to smear them into gray. Your question "how different was the surrender deal given to japan ultimately and how different was it from the deal they were asking from before the bomb was dropped" is absurd because they were not asking for a surrender deal prior to the dropping of the bomb. They wanted the USSR to help them negotiate a cease-fire while giving the Bear territorial concessions.

As I said earlier if you read the cables it is clear that they were trying to do more than that and how they required clarification on the emperor.

Yes, morally, militarily, ethically, you name it. It was the right decision, an evil one, but to avert even greater evils. Subsequent events have demonstrated the rightness of that decision.

Which events are you talking about?

They DID. REPEATEDLY! REPEATEDLY! REPEATEDLY! REPEATEDLY! Jesus H. Christ, Phaedrus, how many times do I have to say it! Please see the official broadcasts of Zacharias. Here it is again for the umpteenth time:

Thou shalt not take the Lord's name in vain Please go back and READ Zach’s article and what he thought of Potsdam and his efforts.

Zacharias letter in the Washington Post was forwarded to the Japanese government by the Japanese Ambassador in Switzerland. It said that all the Japanese had to do was ask about terms, and the US was willing to talk. The US negotiated with everyone, and repeatedly asked the Japanese what terms they wanted. The US offered to fly Japanese officials to Europe to negotiate. NONE OF THIS WAS ACCEPTED!!!!!!!

Oh, you mean to say that the US government through proper channels approached the Japanese government and asked them about the terms and assured them that the emperor will be retained???? Please provide evidence.

You could also see the Jacobsson Affair of July 10, when the Americans assured the Swedish intermediary of two local military officials that they well understood the position of the Imperial Family. The Japanese also knew that the Americans had taken pains never to bomb the Emperor. In short, it was all there, and the Japanese, as Zacharias told them, could formally ask for terms any time

They did respond as you had acknowledged with regard to the Atlantic charter and US should have responded to that instead of Potsdam. Why couldn’t the US convey the terms formally through proper channels?

Phaed, the fact is that it was the Japanese who prolonged the war. I know that you will never accept these facts, so I offer them only for interested third parties following this debate. Blaming the US for prolonging the war is exactly the same move as Hitler blaming Poland for his invasion of it: it's the Big Lie.

yes that’s the whole point isn’t it, to debate and discuss the grey areas that were never probed. Who was blaming the US for “prolonging” the war, isn’t one of the pro-bomb claims that the bomb brought the war to and end.

OK. Fine. Point me to the exact cable where the Japanese said they needed terms clarified. And show me where they said this to the US directly. I've already PROVED beyond the shadow of a doubt the willingness of the US to talk.

Read above with regard to the exact cable when they expressed their concerns and with regard to the willingness of US to talk to Japan directly, all I have is your words, provide the evidence.



Part II

Zacharias you don't understand at all

Look above

The text is in the prior post in this thread.
Supporting Sato's contention that Potsdam was the only avenue to peace, and that the Zacharias gloss on its terms was a crucial "divergence" from the utter surrender forced upon Germany, Minister Kase cabled Togo from Bern that he saw real guarantees offered. The "Imperial House" was unmentioned, and thus sanctioned by implication. Further, "a Japanese domain is recognized in which Japanese sovereignty holds sway." ("It seems to me" Kase added in a parenthesis, "that this proclamation provides a basis on which we can carry on our national structure which the Japanese race is now protecting with its life's blood.") As Sato did, Kase also observed that unconditional surrender applied only to the military and not to the government or the people, and he pleaded that it should be understood that the careful language of Potsdam appeared "to have occasioned a great deal of thought" on the part of the signatory governments ¡V "They seem to have taken pains to save face for us on various other points." And he pointed out in particular the promise that the Japanese people would "be given the opportunity to lead a peaceful and productive life."


Reference: which day, intercept number..e.tc?? And the above text which is not just the text of a particular cable also talks about sato observing that that unconditional surrender applied only to the military. Which cable is the above analysis talking about?

Sato said, and I quote (again):
"If our country truly desires to terminate the war, we have no alternative but to accept unconditional surrender or something very close to it


Sato knew quite well what Potsdam meant. That's from Toland, not Weintraub, BTW. Craig notes that on July 20 he sent a note saying he recommended ¡§Japan¡¦s surrender on any terms

That would amount to selective reading….later sato clarifies The so-called unconditional surrender or peace obtained by something close to unconditional surrender referred to in my telegram No. 1392 and other which I sent from time to time, omits the problem of protecting the fundamental character of our nation. It goes without saying that even in conducting negotiations with the Soviets on the subject of your telegram, the absolute desire on the part of 70 million citizens as regards our form of government should be forcefully stressed. Therefore I have already added a statement in the latter portion of my telegram, believing that there should be no fear of misunderstanding arising therefrom on this matter; I mention this only in order to make sure.

There were many meetings and cables -- Kase was in Switzerland, for one thing.

Second, these are not Weintraub's but mine. I have supplied you with quotes from all the relevant members of the "peace faction." Kase, Suzuki, Sato and Togo all clearly understood that "unconditional surrender" was conditional and certainly did after Potsdam. The military knew this -- it had phrases that indicated that Potsdam was conditional removed in the version it circulated to the public. In other words, the claim that the Japanese balked at unconditional surrender is a lie. The Japanese used the phrase as an excuse to avoid surrendering and continue the war.

If one reads the telegrams, it doesn’t come across as if they were “certain” of what unconditional meant and they also mentioned the broadcasts and Atlantic charter and their willingness…but Potsdam happened

Because Sato was trying to convince his government that the Russia route was a dead end! Remember, Sato is in Moscow, not Tokyo. He is a junior diplomat recieving instructions and conveying information back. He's not in the policymaking apparatus.

Err, the particular cable was sent by Togo.

No. The problem was the attitude of the Japanese, who were using unconditional surrender as an excuse. You will note that the cable above was sent on July 25. The context is completely missing, as it usually is in such propaganda presentations. This was an instruction from Togo to Sato, who is not discussing realities but instead is telling Sato what attitude he is to take with the Russians. Togo added at the end of this cable specifically that this was not a 'peace feeler' (exact words) but "obedience to Imperial command." In other words -- and I can't emphasize this enough -- this is an out-of-context quote that actually demonstrates that Japan's stance on unconditional surrender was a negotiating tactic designed to give the military cover to continue the war.

I seriously don’t understand how you are able to read the mentioned cable in a totally different light. As explained above
“What is the context? Its the context of a message being sent when they knew it was being read by people concerned. I still don’t understand how you continue to mis-read the text….the actual content is On the other hand, since it is possible that the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States may exercise caution and suspect our dispatch of a special envoy may be a peace plot, we have repeatedly advised that what is described above is not a mere "peace feeler" but is in obedience to the Imperial command.

It should very clear to anybody who reads this text that togo is saying that in case the allies think that this is some sort of peace plot or is a mere feeler, confirm that this is in obedience to the imperial command, that means it has the sanction of the emperor or imperial order. “

We in the US already knew this because the Russians had already informed us that they were just stringing the Japanese along and had no intention of ending the war. We knew it was futile because the Russians had told us. So there's no excuse for listening to people who claim that somehow this was a peace initiative we had ignored or discredited so we could drop the Bomb. The whole Russian exercise was a fantasy designed to prevent the Emperor from facing up to the fact that the war was lost and it would have to give up all the territory it had taken since 1895.

How does this exactly make a point, “we knew Japanese were trying for peace through Russians, but since Russians said they don’t give a hoot, we and the Russians were laughing away to glory about the Japanese peace overtures” instead of providing a saving face and going the peace way”

Washington was reading all the cable traffic between Kase and Tokyo! Every last word was on Truman's desk within 24-48 hours. It knew perfectly well what Tokyo was saying to Kase and vice versa!

Still doesn’t answer the question And again I would like links for your interpretations that “Washington [k]new perfectly well that Kase was acting on his own, and against Tokyo's wishes?” Now you say there is a cable which is the source for this exact statement. How can a cable that magic intercepted have these words????? ?Washington [k]new perfectly well that Kase was acting on his own, and against Tokyo's wishes ?That is an interpretation and not the cable message itself, which is what I am asking you to provide

Which cable had the exact words “Washington [k]new…..et al”?


Did Donovan meet Kase? You are confused. Donovan did not meet Kase at this time. Donovan reported that Kase extended a peace feeler because he met with Fujimura. Offhand, I can¡¦t recall any meeting between Kase and Donovan at this time on this topic. Can you tell me when this meeting took place?

Wrong interpretation. You stated that Kase's peace urgings never reached the Americans and records indicate that donovan reported to Truman about kase’s overtures, as you mentioned.

the quote (leahy’s) you offered has no context supplied. Where was it from? When was it written? To whom was it addressed? Why was it written? What context is around it? You know, it is out of context

The diary and why is it out of context, when it refers to matter that is being discussed?

Truman didn¡¦t do it because he felt it was the best way to force the Japanese to surrender.

We will never know will we?

Skates, whom you tried to club me over the head with, has a detailed discussion of just how and why the Air Force spun its Strategic Bombing Survey conclusions (the effort to gain credit for ending the war actually began in 1944 even before it was over!) When you locate Skates The Invasion of Japan look on pages 48-51.

As mentioned earlier, does he claim or offer proof that the study was “doctored” on purpose or whether it was “wrong” based on some particular evidence? If not, its merely a view

US approaches to Japan were Zacharias broadcasts, as well as our enthusiastic response to early overtures. For example, after Fujimura¡¦s initial meeting with Dulles, the US offered to fly out ranking Japanese officials to Europe under US protection to negotiate. Does that sound like rejection to you? Unfortunately, while a number of Japanese wanted to go, the military turned the idea down, and all understood that any Japanese who went would be killed.

Zacharias already discussed, where he himself shows how it was not official but was declared official and how Potsdam undid whatever progress was achieved.

As indicated in this paper clip dulles had informed about the same at Potsdam….
With regard to the helicopter story, some evidence please for that and Japanese rejection of the same.

can I ask why you want links and references to basic history? References to these events are numerous. See Weintraub¡¦s The Last Great Victory, Craig¡¦s The Fall of Japan, Toland¡¦s Rise and Fall Vol 2, Miracle of Deliverance, and numerous other works. But since the perfidious US horribly denied the peace-loving Japanese many attempts to make peace, it should be a simple matter for you to find the Japanese ¡Vgovernment initiated peace plan that the US rejected so it could nuke Japan. Just bring it on

All books that belong to your camp. Provide me links or exact references.

Zacharias is confused about the end of the war peace feelers. I read the article. It doesn¡¦t contain a single concrete correct fact, just a lot of invective. No Japanese-government initiated peace feeler was ever cut off by the US. Zacharias, like many after the war, confused a large number of individually-initiated peace feelers with some kind of government program. I have challenged you a couple of times to find me the peace feeler from the Japanese government. There was none, and all ¡§peace feelers¡¨ were individual in nature, not sanctioned by Tokyo, and ultimately rejected by the Japanese, where it was settled policy on the part of the Emperor, the Supreme War Council and the Diet to continue the war.

The same zacharias who did the broadcasts is now confused? Why is there lot of invective, coz he thinks US did the wrong thing?

Toland, Rise and Fall, p915:
Widar Bagge, the Swedish Minister to Japan, was approached by Mamoru Shigemitsu. Foreign minister in the Koiso cabinet, with a suggestion that Sweden intercede on Japan¡¦s behalf with the United States. It came to nothing because of opposition from Shigemitsu¡¦s successor, Shigenori Togo, who was convinced that a much more influential go-between than Sweden could be found.

Satisfied? Don¡¦t you own any of the basic works?

; ) Evidence is not what is in a book, evidence is that for the above narrative, what are the documents and evidence on which toland has based this observation on. It does make sense however that USSR is much better go-between than Sweden.

Like I said, Zacharias was not in a position to know what really happened. And the Potsdam declaration clearly called for only the surrender of ONLY the Army, a fact you have resolutely ignored.

It did? Then wonder why the Japanese were sending out cables seeking clarification. And Zacharias who through his broadcasts offered atlantic charter didn’t know what was happening?????

the rationale for dropping the bomb was for ending the war. That¡¦s what all its supporters intended it to do. But that does not mean that it could not have other effects, nor does it mean that planners could ignore the possibility of failure.

Umm then rationale and objectives can be different? You mean by objectives happy fallouts?

Nagasaki was necessary to show that we had a number of the weapons and would use them. As it was, it was rendered a tragedy by a combination of bad weather and the Japanese military and US weapons deployment procedures.

And peace loving US could not just wait for few more days to see what would Japanese government would have done once they assessed the complete damage of Hiroshima? Do you think their communication facilities were all honky dory?

I¡¦ve read this before. Alperovitz is a propagandist, not a serious scholar.

And you are basing this observation on ?? Why not refute his claims/observations objectively?

The US was not ¡§calling the shots.¡¨ I think you need to read up on the Occupation as well.

Then who was calling the shots? Maritans?

the Japanese government, the world¡¦s second richest, operates a propaganda machine that is extremely effective. One of the things it does is attempt to get the US blamed for the nuking of Japan by trying to get the Left to believe that the US deliberately put off the Japanese surrender so it could bomb Japan.

And how come USA the world’s richest economy never had a propaganda campaign countering that? Coz they felt guilty or they thought Japanese propaganda served their purpose?

phaed : Why didn’t other historians respond to it and have a public debate?

vork : Duh. They did

Again, when and where and what was the conclusions of the debate?

The letter states Hiroshima was not a military target, when it most certainly was. Therefore it is a lie. Nagasaki was an industrial city, and therefore a military target. End of discussion

Why and how, any documentation that says it is a military target? Well then all cities could be military targets, just coz they happen to be cities and they have industries like all cities do.

No, they knew it was a military target. They didn¡¦t need to specify. Many of the committee members were conversant with Japanese geography. Did you note the detailed discussion of the geographical features of Hiroshima?

That is precisely the sort of justification bush and his cronies can give after going to war with iraq, we knew iraq had WMD. Knowing the geography seems to indicate their reasons for imparting maximum damage and not wipe out military installations

you concede that it has been crafted. Here is the simple fact: 720,000 leaflets were dropped two days prior on Hiroshima warning that the city would be obliterated. In a country where most cities had been obliterated, don¡¦t you think that maybe somebody should have paid attention (in fact about 120,000 had already been evacuated)?.

I conceded? If you go through the text, it will become apparent that the historians in the letter were implying that the original text was “carefully crafter” to imply that the leaflets were dropped on Hiroshima prior to the attack.

Where were these leaflets dropped and the documentation of this drop? There has been no evidence in this regard.

There is only reference to the two leaflets that were dropped on August 6
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistle...small/mb09.htm

See Bruce Lee¡¦s [I]Marching Orders. How many times do I have to provide this reference? Is there no library system near you?

Err…in a discussion you don’t ask others to go read, its just one cable….why don’t you provide the contents? What is easier? You who have the book right next to you or have “read” it, providing me with the contents of one cable, right? Maybe the records of “Magic Diplomatic Summaries” would be more helpful and revealing.

You¡¦ve confused ¡§occupation¡¨ with ¡§ruling¡¨. The Americans did not rule Japan. Don¡¦t you know? The Americans did not really de-Nazify Japan like we did Germany. We kept the Facists in power there, starting with Emperor, and ran the show through them. They fed us lies, and controlled us very nicely. The arrangement suited everybody fine.

Read carefully my friend, “effectively ruling”. Americans must be REALLY DUMB to be led by facists and their lies then, and now after SO MANY YEARS.

jp