Marz Blak

First, to call one behavior "good" and another "bad" does of couse imply some standard, but it by no means implies that said standard must be immaterial or intrinsic in nature. It seems, rather, that you are asserting that any such standard, being pragmatically or otherwise derived, must somehow be less compelling, less universally prescriptive, etc. That is to say that, without referring to some intrinsic moral standard, we, as individuals, groups, or as a whole (that being the whole of humanity) lack authority to compel behavior towards conformance to whatever standard at which we arrive. Is this a correct re-statement of your view?

If so, then, I might point out that, as a practical matter, all moral codes in effect are necessarily enforced by communities, without exception; and so your assertion of an intrinsic morality (well, actually, I would call it an imposed third-party subjective morality, but that's another issue) might make you feel more justified in holding your views as worthy to be imposed on those who might not necessarily agree with them, but...so what? Even assuming that there is indeed some valid intrinsic morality to be put forward, why should we believe in yours, or anyone else's (that is, I am not singling yours out )? Even assuming that there is a supernatural Deity who has a set of prescriptive rules for us to follow, how do we judge among the many such claims put forward by various people or groups purporting to know His will? Kind of puts us back in the same position--that is, necessarily relying on our own rational understanding of what is best--doesn't it?

Secondly, regarding the law of non-contradiction: what advantage does the presupposition of "an immaterial, supernatural Being" have over other presuppositions which might serve just as well (as far as I can see)--e.g., some form or transcendalism not involving a personal Deity (there are, I believe, strains of pantheism which do this), or even some (that dreaded word) sollipsist formulation? It seems to me that the problems one might put forward with either of these approaches (e.g., question-begging, non-falsifiability) would be equally the case with yours.

[edited for proper UBB code, structure, typos, grammar, and punctuation]

[ September 23, 2002: Message edited by: Marz Blak ]</p>

galiel

Why do you bother with these people who presume to tell you what you and "all of us" think? Not only will he insist that there is a God because he believes it, he will also insist that "there are no atheists in foxholes" because he believes it, and will sinply not accept your own description of what you personally think and feel.

Typical irrational fundamentalism. It is really not worth wasting your time on someone who challenges the foundation of logic as a common discussion ground, because he has no stake in discussion, no stake in advancing human knowledge, only in domination and suppression. You are falling into the favorite trap of the religious authoritarians. 'Tis a woeful waste of electrons.

AtlanticCitySlave

"Why do you bother with these people who presume to tell you what you and "all of us" think? Not only will he insist that there is a God because he believes it, he will also insist that "there are no atheists in foxholes" because he believes it, and will sinply not accept your own description of what you personally think and feel."

-Not sure if you caught this one, but you did the exact same thing you said he would do, i.e. you presumed what he would think or say.

sotzo

First, to call one behavior "good" and another "bad" does of couse imply some standard,

Cool. We agree on that. If only the FDA could agree with us to such an extent regarding what should be in an IDE application!

but it by no means implies that said standard must be immaterial or intrinsic in nature.

How can a standard be material? As for intrinsic, I'm not sure what you mean there. (Actually, it looks like you further explain below, so I'll keep reading!)

It seems, rather, that you are asserting that any such standard, being pragmatically or otherwise derived, must somehow be less compelling, less universally prescriptive, etc. That is to say that, without referring to some intrinsic moral standard, we, as individuals, groups, or as a whole (that being the whole of humanity) lack authority to compel behavior in conformance to whatever standard at which we arrive. Is this a correct re-statement of your view?

(By the way, I see what you mean by "intrinsic" now. Thanks.) Not exactly. While I do subscribe to natural law (ie, for instance, that the unjust killing of a human being is objectively wrong), I have no problem with some forms of ethics being arrived at pragmatically.

However, my view, to answer your question, is that materialism cannot account for the evaluation of a moral action under any standard in order to decide "rightness" or "wrongness" of said action.

Review Vork's 2 previous posts. He frames morality in terms of evolutionary psychology. Evolution (in the context of materialism), at base, is impersonal, thoughtless mechanics. Yes, it involves more complex mechanical reactions as time goes on, but by definition of materialism it cannot ever be more than mechanics.

Therefore on the basis of such evolutionary psychology, whether one has an instrinsic or pragmatic standard, one cannot call the actions of the 9/11 terrorist "evil", but can only say that those were the actions due to the mechanics of the terrorists' brain chemistry.

The reason I think a transcendent standard exists is that materialists cannot bring themselves to just say, "9/11 was simply the result of an evolutionary psychology from which the terrorists could not escape since they are machines being acted upon by evolution." Rather, as Vork has clamied, their actions were "evil".

Now, I'm not doubting the fact that materialist's can hold to materialism in theory, but say 9/11 was evil. Vork has done that in his posts so I would be crazy to claim such a thing!!! Rather, what I am claiming is that the materialist has to supress the natural law he knows to be true (the natural law that permits him to call 9/11 evil) while arguing against that very standard (natural law) in order to preserve his materialism. The mechanics of materialism cannot explain the existence of such a standard since brute mechanics doesn't explain anything......it simply is.

If so, then, I might point out that, as a practical matter, all moral codes in effect are necessarily enforced by communities, without exception

I agree that they are enforced by communities, but that is not in question here. What is in question is this - under materialism, can you (in your community) condemn the actions of the 9/11 terrorist (which were reinforced in his community)??

The obvious question is, whose community is right? The answer to that question can only be answered by a standard outside of both communitites and I ask you to provide a rationale for how materialism can provide such an answer.

and so your assertion of an intrinsic morality (well, actually, I would call it an imposed third-party subjective morality, but that's another issue)

But "imposed" implies that it is not rightfully a part of the options and that implication presupposes a standard by which to evaluate my subjective morality - we end up back where we started.

might make you feel more justified in holding your views as worthy to be imposed on those who might not necessarily agree with them

This is missing the point and, I would contend, a red herring. I have not "imposed" anything , but am merely tying to compare the epistemological grounds for morality, logic within materialistic and supernaturalistic worldviews. We can discuss function of ethics if you'd like but that would be another issue.

, but...so what? Even assuming that there is indeed some valid intrinsic morality to be put forward, why should we believe in yours, or anyone else's (that is, I am not singling yours out )?

Perfect question. Note that the question asks for an evaluation of moral systems, which can only be answered by a standard outside competing systems. Otherwise, the only justification for holding one over the other is, "because I hold to that system", which begs the question (and actually is the only justification materialism can provide).

So, with that in mind, my answer is that there are certain moral values that we instrinsically know to be correct (ie, rape is wrong, unjust killing is wrong, torture of an innocent child is wrong). We know these to be correct in spite of the strict logical possibility that they are incorrect. Hence, a regime such as Naziism can be condemned for its actions, not because we hold a different system, but because the actions of Naziism correspond with our sense of natural law. Of course, not all morality is instrinsic and I've admitted as such. My point is that even on these basic moral issues, materialism cannot account for selecting a "right" over a "wrong".

Even assuming that there is a supernatural Deity who has a set of presriptive rules for us to follow, how do we judge among the many such claims put forward by various people or groups purporting to know His will?

At this point in the discussion, we are now discussing various problems that arise from an assumption of God's existence. This is a different problem than materialism's which cannot even differentiate between the "good" or "evil" of different systems. At the very least, God would provide an objective basis for moral values and logic. Before proceeding, can we agree that superanturalism provides a better option?

Kind of puts us back in the same position--that is, necessarily relying on our own rational understanding of what is best--doesn't it?

Only if the God that exists is that of the Deists who does not intervene in the affairs of men including their interpretation of his Word. But again, we have now jumped into the theist camp so I want to make sure that we've made some progress here. Can I assume that you believe theism to at least be a better option than materialism in sorting out the existence of logic/morality, since materialism doesn't supply the equipment to answer your questions now posed?

Secondly, regarding the law of non-contradiction: what advantage does the presupposition of "an immaterial, supernatural Being" have over other presuppositions which might serve just as well (as far as I can see)--e.g., some form or transcendalism not involving a personal Deity (there are, I believe, strains of pantheism which do this)

No, because an impersonal transcendental gets us only abstract concepts that are eternal. And from where does an impersonal abstract concept get its being?(I say eternal because concepts such as the law of noncon are not dependent on the finite. If abstract concepts are dependent on the finite then abstract concepts began and were previously nonexistent. But it is not concievable that the law of noncon could be nonexistent. Hence, abstract concepts (ie, law of noncon) is eternal.)

, or even some (that dreaded word) sollipsist formulation?

Can you suggest such a formulation?

It seems to me that the problems one might put forward with either of these approaches (e.g., question-begging, non-falsifiability) would be equally the case with yours.

Ultimate questions about the ultimate reference point for any worldview will, in the nature of the case, lead to question-begging and non-falsifiability since the reference point defines what is true and what is false.

In the case of pantheism and materialism, it is an impersonal reference point; in the case of Christian theism a personal reference point. I don't see how we can escape brute mechanics with the former, whereas assumption of the latter makes room for both mind and matter without compromising either.

cheers,

jkb

Marz Blak

sotzo: First, to call one behavior "good" and another "bad" does of couse imply some standard,
Cool. We agree on that. If only the FDA could agree with us to such an extent regarding what should be in an IDE application!

Marz: ...but it by no means implies that said standard must be immaterial or intrinsic in nature.

sotzo: How can a standard be material? As for intrinsic, I'm not sure what you mean there. (Actually, it looks like you further explain below, so I'll keep reading

Marz: It seems, rather, that you are asserting that any such standard, being pragmatically or otherwise derived, must somehow be less compelling, less universally prescriptive, etc. That is to say that, without referring to some intrinsic moral standard, we, as individuals, groups, or as a whole (that being the whole of humanity) lack authority to compel behavior in conformance to whatever standard at which we arrive. Is this a correct re-statement of your view?

sotzo: (By the way, I see what you mean by "intrinsic" now. Thanks.) Not exactly. While I do subscribe to natural law (ie, for instance, that the unjust killing of a human being is objectively wrong), I have no problem with some forms of ethics being arrived at pragmatically.

However, my view, to answer your question, is that materialism cannot account for the evaluation of a moral action under any standard in order to decide "rightness" or "wrongness" of said action.

Review Vork's 2 previous posts. He frames morality in terms of evolutionary psychology. Evolution (in the context of materialism), at base, is impersonal, thoughtless mechanics. Yes, it involves more complex mechanical reactions as time goes on, but by definition of materialism it cannot ever be more than mechanics.

Therefore on the basis of such evolutionary psychology, whether one has an instrinsic or pragmatic standard, one cannot call the actions of the 9/11 terrorist "evil", but can only say that those were the actions due to the mechanics of the terrorists' brain chemistry.

The reason I think a transcendent standard exists is that materialists cannot bring themselves to just say, "9/11 was simply the result of an evolutionary psychology from which the terrorists could not escape since they are machines being acted upon by evolution." Rather, as Vork has clamied, their actions were "evil".

Marz: Here is one certainly one place where you and I part company.

Firstly, as I noted in a prior post (to paraphrase), I certainly would hold that to see the events of 09/11 from a neurobiological point of view would be a valid way of looking at the matter.

As to judging the rightness or wrongness of it, I certainly feel it was wrong, but I do not claim, nor would I under any circumstances, that this feeling of "wrongness" was anything other than subjective. No matter the scale, and no matter how many people agreed with me.

A bit of a digression here. I happen to feel that so-called 'objective' moralities are objective only if one takes certain underlying presuppositions as axiomatic. Such presuppositions as that 'human life is good,' 'unnecessary suffering is bad,' etc. (I would go further with this, but I am sure you see my point.) I would argue that even though I agree with such sentiments personally, they are not axiomatic--they are in and of themselves subjective value judgments, which we as humans mostly (that is, unless he happens to be psychologically aberrant) are unable to avoid making by virtue of being human ourselves.

I realize that this is an entirely different discussion, and won't pursue it here, but I did feel it necessary to inject it at this point, at least, so that you could perhaps begin to see how I arrive at moral imperatives that are largely similar to yours, I suspect, but from an entirely different philosophical underpinning--and with no notion of objectivity involved.

sotzo: Now, I'm not doubting the fact that materialist's can hold to materialism in theory, but say 9/11 was evil. Vork has done that in his posts so I would be crazy to claim such a thing!!! Rather, what I am claiming is that the materialist has to supress the natural law he knows to be true (the natural law that permits him to call 9/11 evil) while arguing against that very standard (natural law) in order to preserve his materialism. The mechanics of materialism cannot explain the existence of such a standard since brute mechanics doesn't explain anything......it simply is.

Marz: I certainly would agree with you that 9/11 was evil, if anything can be said to be; but I am not sure that evil means the same thing to me it does to you. Nor do I mean this is purely a matter of semantics. You seem to believe that evil is just, well, evil. To me, evil means something that is, to a certain (great) extent, antithetical to or at odds with my (personal, subjective) morality. And for the record, I will also say, without softening my condemnation of the hijackers one bit, I can at least envision scenarios in which what they did might have been justifiable, in my view. This is, in fact, one piece of evidence leading me away from believing that morality might be objective.

Marz: if so, then, I might point out that, as a practical matter, all moral codes in effect are necessarily enforced by communities, without exception

sotzo: I agree that they are enforced by communities, but that is not in question here. What is in question is this - under materialism, can you (in your community) condemn the actions of the 9/11 terrorist (which were reinforced in his community)??

Marz: Yes, I could. But the basis of my condemnation would be my understanding and argumentation I might put forward rationally, from the position of promulgating a certain sort of world order which I could in turn argue would be best for all. Appeals to mystery do not come into it.

In fact, this is what I believe we do all the time, is the practical way that moralities have been and continue to be developed among human communities. A lot of the argumentation is subtext, is implicit, but it's there.

sotzo: The obvious question is, whose community is right? The answer to that question can only be answered by a standard outside of both communitites and I ask you to provide a rationale for how materialism can provide such an answer.

Marz: I disagree again. The answers to such questions as whose community is right in such situations as this are, as a practical matter, always arrived at intersubjectively, by negotiation and/or by force. We don't always know the "ultimate" answers until after-the-fact, as it were, because, as a practical matter, we arrive at them interactively, not by following some unalterable set of first principles down to their logical conclusions. These things are constantly evolving.

Were it as you say, I would suppose that our positions as a society would not have altered so drastically over our history, on such matters as slavery, women's suffrage/women's rights, child labor, the death penalty, etc. The basic ethical elements of these issue have not changed in all that time, after all. So what has? People's undrestandings, people's intersubjective feelings, I would posit.


Marz: and so your assertion of an intrinsic morality (well, actually, I would call it an imposed third-party subjective morality, but that's another issue)...

sotzo: But "imposed" implies that it is not rightfully a part of the options and that implication presupposes a standard by which to evaluate my subjective morality - we end up back where we started.

Marz: I don't want to quibble here. I meant by "imposed" only that it was something promulgated by your presupposed Being, but I see where you might have a problem with this, given your argument...OK, let's stick with 'intrinsic' for the sake of the argument.

Marz: ...might make you feel more justified in holding your views as worthy to be imposed on those who might not necessarily agree with them...

sotzo: This is missing the point and, I would contend, a red herring. I have not "imposed" anything , but am merely tying to compare the epistemological grounds for morality, logic within materialistic and supernaturalistic worldviews. We can discuss function of ethics if you'd like but that would be another issue.

Marz: See above. Sure, some other time....

Marz:..., but...so what? Even assuming that there is indeed some valid intrinsic morality to be put forward, why should we believe in yours, or anyone else's (that is, I am not singling yours out )?...

sotzo: Perfect question. Note that the question asks for an evaluation of moral systems, which can only be answered by a standard outside competing systems. Otherwise, the only justification for holding one over the other is, "because I hold to that system", which begs the question (and actually is the only justification materialism can provide).

Marz: Uh, no. Again. Sigh.

You again seem to be saying that if we cannot appeal to some external standard, then there is no way to judge between two systems. Human beings in fact make these sorts of judgements all the time, both collectively and individuallty. How? We look at the two systems, we assess their implications, we put those implications up against some ideal or paradigm we have, and we say, this one is better because it is likely to lead to results more in accordance with the paradigm.

No one I know of holds to a system because it is the system they hold to (except, perhaps, moral absolutists of various stripes ). Usually, if one asks or otherwise investigates, he can find some practical reasoning behind such choices.

My question to you is, what is it about moral systems, in your view, which makes them different from any other sort of shared human enterprise?

sotzo: So, with that in mind, my answer is that there are certain moral values that we instrinsically know to be correct (ie, rape is wrong, unjust killing is wrong, torture of an innocent child is wrong). We know these to be correct in spite of the strict logical possibility that they are incorrect. Hence, a regime such as Naziism can be condemned for its actions, not because we hold a different system, but because the actions of Naziism correspond with our sense of natural law. Of course, not all morality is instrinsic and I've admitted as such. My point is that even on these basic moral issues, materialism cannot account for selecting a "right" over a "wrong".

Marz: I am getting tired and I need to go feed the rugrats, so I will only say that it should come as no surprise to you that I reject the entire 'natural law' thing. As to the Nazis, I would hold that, ultimately, they had a set of values which was so diametrically opposed to ours that there was really no way to negotiate a compromise, and so either capitulation or conflict was inevitable. You will note, though, that we (the U.S.) did not enter that conflict at its onset from high moral reasoning, but only after the Axis became more clearly a threat to us. This, I believe, is instructive, and, sadly, perhaps, typical.

Marz: Even assuming that there is a supernatural Deity who has a set of presriptive rules for us to follow, how do we judge among the many such claims put forward by various people or groups purporting to know His will?

At this point in the discussion, we are now discussing various problems that arise from an assumption of God's existence. This is a different problem than materialism's which cannot even differentiate between the "good" or "evil" of different systems.

Marz: I will grant you that materialism cannot account for or differentiate between intrinsic or objective good or evil, but I believe I and others have demostrated how it can account for them as subjective concepts. This is good enough for me. That it is not good enough for you, apparently, is the problem, but it is your problem, not mine.

sotzo: At the very least, God would provide an objective basis for moral values and logic. Before proceeding, can we agree that superanturalism [sic] provides a better option?

Marz: Uh, no. From where I stand, you can't begin to say this until you deal with those "various problems that arise from an assumption of God's existence" you referred to above. If you are going to say my argument has problems which your argument overcomes, you have to show that the way in which it overcomes those problems does not create other problems which are just as bad or worse (which I in fact would hold to be the case).

Marz: Kind of puts us back in the same position--that is, necessarily relying on our own rational understanding of what is best--doesn't it?

Only if the God that exists is that of the Deists who does not intervene in the affairs of men including their interpretation of his Word. But again, we have now jumped into the theist camp so I want to make sure that we've made some progress here. Can I assume that you believe theism to at least be a better option than materialism in sorting out the existence of logic/morality, since materialism doesn't supply the equipment to answer your questions now posed?

Marz: I believe it does (see above); they may not be answers you like, necessarily, but they're good enough for me.

Marz: Secondly, regarding the law of non-contradiction: what advantage does the presupposition of "an immaterial, supernatural Being" have over other presuppositions which might serve just as well (as far as I can see)--e.g., some form or transcendalism not involving a personal Deity (there are, I believe, strains of pantheism which do this)...

sotzo: No, because an impersonal transcendental gets us only abstract concepts that are eternal.

Marz: So why couldn't an objective morality be based on, say, a karmic sort of concept? Completely impersonal, but gets the job done....

sotzo: And from where does an impersonal abstract concept get its being?(I say eternal because concepts such as the law of noncon are not dependent on the finite. If abstract concepts are dependent on the finite then abstract concepts began and were previously nonexistent. But it is not concievable that the law of noncon could be nonexistent. Hence, abstract concepts (ie, law of noncon) is eternal.)

[b]Marz: Maybe the the law of noncon simply is and always has been, well, eternal? In which case it would never have needed to getits being, having always had it?

Marz:...or even some (that dreaded word) sollipsist formulation?

sotzo:Can you suggest such a formulation?

Marz: OK, off the top of my head: I am dreaming all of this, and things are mostly rational because I am essentially a rational being, but not entirely so because, well, neither am I.

It seems to me that the problems one might put forward with either of these approaches (e.g., question-begging, non-falsifiability) would be equally the case with yours.

sotzo: Ultimate questions about the ultimate reference point for any worldview will, in the nature of the case, lead to question-begging and non-falsifiability since the reference point defines what is true and what is false.

In the case of pantheism and materialism, it is an impersonal reference point; in the case of Christian theism a personal reference point. I don't see how we can escape brute mechanics with the former, whereas assumption of the latter makes room for both mind and matter without compromising either.

Marz: True, but...I guess it all comes down to what makes more sense to one at his deepest levels of thinking. Show me evidence of minds existing separated from 'brute mechanics' and I might come around to thinking of your sort.

[ September 23, 2002: Message edited by: Marz Blak ]

[ September 23, 2002: Message edited by: Marz Blak ]</p>

Marz Blak

sotzo--

Missed the IDE reference. Never worked for a company that was actually doing anything new that didn't have a pretty clear predicate in the field already. So 510(k) are about as far as I've gotten. I've never actually even looked at IDE requirements. Do you have to do a detailed plan for clinical trials as part of the IDE? Do you have to show them your informed consent literature? Tissue or animal trials and outcomes? What do you have to do?

[ September 23, 2002: Message edited by: Marz Blak ]</p>

Vorkosigan

I am claiming:

1. Materialism can give an account for behavior but not an account for the ability to demarcate one behavior "good" and another behavior "bad - it is just behavior and to say more implies an immaterial standard which per the definition of materialism cannot exist. Same thing with the immaterial law of non-contrad.

This is not correct in my view. First, neither materialism nor atheism can give an account of morals. That is to be expected, the latter being merely a single statement of non-belief, the former a position on the nature of reality.

2. Hence, an immaterial, supernatural Being is a better hyopthesis around which to work since, at the very least such an hyopthesis provides the preconditions of intelligble thinking (law of noncon) and morality (calling the events of 9/11 evil instead of just behavior).

This is totally unwarranted. There is no need to refer to a being to explain morality.

I'm claiming that soley material objects merely behave and their actions are neither moral nor immoral so long as materialism is true since "moral" and "immoral" presupposes an immaterial standard.

AFAIK, such standards reside in people's minds, where they are not immaterial, but material collections of chemicals and electricity.

Good, we agree on that. So then it is all just behavior that we do...actions and reactions with no differentiation between a "good" action/reaction or "bad" action/reaction. Otherwise, we would be assuming a standard outside of actions/reactions by which to judge actions/reactions. This supposition cannot be permitted by materialism.

Yes, it can. Materialism is simply the view that everything is material. It makes no comment on morals one way or another. That is where you've gone wrong. Critizing materialism for not having moral standards is like critizing soccer because there are no three-pointers.

You can do that, but in doing so you give up materialism because "right" and "wrong" are not labels that materialism can provide.

Very true, but materialism is not expected to provide such labels. They are evolved, taught, deduced by other means.

You can assert they were wrong, but I have to ask you how you tell one behavior is "right" or "wrong" versus another.

Well, I could give you a detailed account of my moral thinking, but obviously that's not necessary here.

Inevitably, you will refer to some standard outside of the material realm itself.

My standards exist inside of me as chemical and electrical impulses. They are very much material. When I talk about morality, those impulses are converted into material digits or material sound waves, for processing by another material brain. There's nothing in there that's not material. The organization of the sound waves is a pattern in the material world your brain is designed by evolution to process. You've confused "abstraction" with "immaterial."

How do you square this statement with this rhetorical question from above with which you concurred:

"Or that the philosophy of materialism provides no basis for moral belief?"

I do above. Materialism is not about morals, but about the nature of the stuff of reality. Therefore it does not provide an account of moral standards by itself, nor does it preclude the development of such standards.

Are you saying that materialsim does not provide for moral belief yet the materialist can go on making moral judgements?

Yes, because the basis of morality does not lie in materialism per se. Materialism is neutral with regards to morality, with the exception of saying that there are no transcendent moral standards that lie outside of humanity.

Vork: I don't need some kind of transcedent standard to deplore what I see as evil.

Sotz: You say you don't, but you have yet to show how materialism can provide the preconditions of calling something "right" versus "wrong". How is it any more than just behavior as the result of molecules in motion?

There are no "preconditions" for calling things right and wrong. Evolution has given rise to creatures that call things "moral" and develop "moral standards." There's nothing impossible about that in materialism. I am free to call 9/11 wrong and evil. Or good and just, morality being subjective.

So logic is contingent on social function? This would seem to mean that the laws of logic don't exist apart from the need for humans to be social.

Well, they don't exist outside of humans....

I can't see how the laws of logic would change if I were the last man on earth?!?

They wouldn't! You asked about the origin of logic, not what would happen if you were the last man on earth.

Okay, and going back to the 9/11 example, you would then need to say that the reason for their actions was their social conditioning. How can we hold them accountable under such a view?

If you hold that view -- and I cannot stop you -- then you are correct. But neither of us holds that view.

If morality becomes subject to the mechanics of social conditioning there is no fault to be found, in fact there is no way to fault someone for conforming to the actions caused by their brain. It would be like being upset with a car for going faster when the accelerator was pressed down.

If you hold that view -- and I cannot stop you -- then you are correct. But neither of us holds that view.

And they would need that information for survival correct? They would not need it in order to make "right" versus "wrong" choices for the sake of being moral.

Sotzo, what do you think moral behavior is about? You have a rather simplistic view of evolution. Evolution is about getting one's genes into the next generation -- it is not about survival. We're all gonna die one way or another, the issue is whether we pass on our genes. So yes, morality is extremely useful in that regard. A human who could not behave morally -- an autistic person, a sociopath -- has a much lower chance of having offspring that grow to adulthood and reproduce. Who would make social contracts with such a person? How could it successfully raise kids? How could it compete for status in social groups and assure itself a share of resources? That is why such people remain the outcome of genetic accidents and not the norm.

So, if Osama Bin Laden felt threatened for his survival or even for his group's survival, can we fault him for what happened? If survival is paramount, morality becomes its servant and changes at the whim of the organism trying to survive.

As I said, evolution is not about survival.

This technically means that it is possible that child abuse could be made socially acceptable (and therefore, morally appropriate) if it were found that children were threatening survival.

What we call "child abuse" is socially acceptable in many cultures. In the US you'd be arrested for sucking on a baby's penis, but that is a common practice among several south america peoples, who use it to calm males babies so they can sleep. Is that child abuse or not?

And it appears to be a tip of the iceburg that rests on the razor thin layer of materialism.

In your view. But evolutionary psychology is already running ahead of you.

will be built. I'm asking more generally how materialism provides a framework with which to say "9/11 was evil" rather than "9/11 was socially unacceptable...at least to us". It seems the latter is unavoidable and hence permits the possibility that one residing in Afghanistan is equally correct to say "9/11 was socially acceptable...at least to us".

Materialism provides no moral framework. You'll have to get those from somewhere else. Criticizing materialism for not having morals is like criticizing an aircraft carrier because it can't submerge.

Vorkosigan

Howay the Toon

To try and bring the thread back to the original purposeof how to respond to theists who use the "we all got faith" argument. (Discussions on the justification of logic and morality are all very fine but will probably not get you very far against the theists argument). Here are a couple of suggested responses.

If he is using 'faith' to mean belief without proof and he is including the law of non-contradiction and other axioms of logic in the category of 'without proof' then he is effectively treating faith as a synonym for belief since all of our supposed knowledge is without proof in that sense. But if faith simply means belief then he can no longer use faith as any sort of justification for his belief. You on the other hand have the justification of empirical and scientific evidence for your beliefs. He now has nothing.

Secondly,

Marz Blak

Good point, Howay. We had gotten pretty far away from the OP.

RogerLeeCooke

"Okay, and going back to the 9/11 example, you would then need to say that the reason for their actions was their social conditioning. How can we hold them accountable under such a view?"

Always they keep coming back to this tired old argument, as if they never heard, or just couldn't take in what is said against it.

1. What do you mean, "hold them accountable"? If we can make them pay for what they did, we'll do it. If we can't, we won't. The *fact* that they are products of the society they grew up in has no effect on our response to what they did.

2. What I suspect is, you feel some need to prove that they are "wrong" in some absolute sense, rather than what anyone would naturally and immediately feel, namely that these people did something we absolutely hate, and we mean to make them pay for doing it. THERE IS NO NEED to prove that the universe endorses our point of view instead of theirs. The fact that we want the kind of society we want is sufficient explanation for our retaliation against them.

3. Before you come back at me with the usual, "So whatever we want is right, then?" Let me anticipate: "Yes, but we sometimes want incompatible things and have to pick and choose among the things we want. And the socially-conditioned ideas of right, which are things we very much want, DO restrain us from simply taking blind revenge or mindlessly pursuing the immediate impulse."