Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Adrian Selby · 08-06-2003, 12:03 PM

Quote:

AN ELECTRON IS NOT A SENSATION BUT THE CAUSE OF ONE.

What makes you say this? Why can't the undergoing of processes in the brain, be the undergoing of 'mentallings' i.e. why can't our experiences be what it is like to be undergoing brain processes?

VivaHedone · 08-08-2003, 10:33 AM

Quote:

What makes you say this? Why can't the undergoing of processes in the brain, be the undergoing of 'mentallings' i.e. why can't our experiences be what it is like to be undergoing brain processes?

An electron is a negatively charged particle of matter. It is not a sensation. Yes, electrons/chemicals moving through neural pathways induce sensation, but they cannot be said to be sensations. Even if our sensations are the feeling of electrons moving through the brain, then there is a clear difference between the electrons themselves and the feeling of those electrons, just as there is a difference between chocolate and the taste of chocolate.

Adrian Selby · 08-09-2003, 01:55 AM

Quote:

but they cannot be said to be sensations.

i still don't get why they can't be the same. what can a sensation be if not the experience arising out of being a complex functioning brain?

VivaHedone · 08-09-2003, 10:27 AM

Quote:

i still don't get why they can't be the same. what can a sensation be if not the experience arising out of being a complex functioning brain?

A sensation is an 'experience arising out of being a complex functioning brain'. An electron is a negatively charged particle of matter. Spot the difference.

Adrian Selby · 08-09-2003, 01:56 PM

You obviously seem to think that the two are rigid designators for 'things' and that there is no way they can be expressions that derive from an epistemological state of affairs that suggests they can indeed be 'things' but have subsequently, through the research, been able to be thought about as in fact rigidly designating a single thing, i.e. a newer epistemological state advanced by observation of the complexity of the brain.

I'm asking why it is you think they have to be different, i.e. why the difference you espouse, being one of perspective somehow engenders a material difference. Is it perhaps because you're working with a model that suggests a relationship of distinct things, if so, what forms the basis for the model?

Also, I'm not comparing a single electron to an experience, that's stupid, I assume you weren't either.

------------
the incorrigible analytics' club

VivaHedone · 08-11-2003, 10:46 AM

Quote:

You obviously seem to think that the two are rigid designators for 'things' and that there is no way they can be expressions that derive from an epistemological state of affairs that suggests they can indeed be 'things' but have subsequently, through the research, been able to be thought about as in fact rigidly designating a single thing, i.e. a newer epistemological state advanced by observation of the complexity of the brain.

Are you John Prescott? Or is it all the sangria that makes this totally incomprehensable to me? Either way, clarification in thicko-language would come in handy. Congratulations for getting that all into one sentence, though.

For me, it is a quite simple case of cause and effect. Cause = electrons/chemicals flowing through neural passages. Effect = subjective exprerience/sensations. How can the two be the same thing?

Adrian Selby · 08-11-2003, 11:58 AM

Well, the point I was trying to make, by all my questions, was related to this comment.

Depending on our assumptions, we find different things possible.
To a Cartesian Dualist, it is possible to conceive of there being a mind in its own realm and linked to a brain in the physical realm. If you work on the assumption that the mind is the brain, it is not possible to conceive this.

I'm asking you for the basis by which you conceive that there is a distinction. You appear to be highlighting a 'common sense' view, that we have neurons on the one hand and experience or sensations on the other. Do you agree that the key to this difference lies in the perspective we have on the event. A sensation seems to be what one calls something that happens to oneself. We do not see or observe sensations in others, only physical events. The difference, at least, appears to be one of access to the state that is defined as a sensation and a physical event.

------------
the incorrigible analytics' club
In my view the difference is only one of perspective on a given state, and that state is objectively described as a brain state. This is only possible to conceive of as a perspicuous description of what's going on because of advances in our observations and theories regarding the brain. 500 years ago, the brain would no doubt, indeed even now perhaps, be thought of as little more than some crude porridge that shares the same kind of space 'behind our eyes' as our minds do. That view has changed, and only in epistemologically more recent states have different views on what is conceivable come to make sense.

So, the question must be, to what extent are either of our views perspicuous regarding the supposed distinction, or origin of the events we call 'mind events' and 'brain events'.

Mexicola · 08-11-2003, 03:17 PM

Just a question for VivaHedone: why are we supposing that 'subjective experience' has no effects on 'the world'? Surely if I see a lion in front of me, I'll run away. Is this not a physical effect in the world? The same applies for even what we consider the most 'subjective' experiences, such as aesthetic or moral judgments; these too have effects in the world. So exactly which aspect of 'subjective experience' is the one which is 'left over' for your theory after you've dealt with the ones that have effects in the world?
Your theory, in case you don't know, is called 'Epiphenomenalism'. It's been around for quite a while in the philosophy of mind, and is a result of certain Cartesian assumptions concerning consciousness. In the past 30 years this picture has gradually become very unfashionable, largely because better replacements have come along. Try reading Daniel Dennett's accessible Consciousness Explained for a good example of why the Cartesian paradigm is being abandoned. Consciousness (or rather, discussions of it) rely upon what Richard Rorty called the 'Incorrigibility of the Mental'; ie that we tend to take people's word for what they are experiencing. This leads (intuitively, but problematically) to the Cartesian idea that we are presented with a privileged 'sphere' of experience which is entirely private, and this in turn leads to positions like Epiphenomenalism. But it doesn't have to. We can regard this 'sphere' as not some special epistemologically privileged domain, but rather as formed out of our immediate judgments themselves. So, our seeing an apple as red does not mean that there is some inner 'apple' picture 'in' consciousness, but rather just that we have judged that there is a red apple in the world. Rorty's point is that this judgment of the apple is incorrigible, because we don't usually question it, but that this doesn't mean there is some privileged domain on which we make these judgments; it is simply the judgments themselves we don't question.
So... back to the main question. If we get rid of this 'Cartesian Theatre' (as Dennett calls it) of privileged experience, then we can allow that our subjective experience (ie judgments about our environment) do have effects on the world. And then there isn't much of a step to asking 'what exactly is left over once we account for all our effect-causing experiences?'
If you stick with the Cartesian view of consciousness as a privileged subjective domain (in some metaphysical sense) then, yes, Epiphenomenalism is probably the best theory on offer. But that's like saying that we should buy the dodgy produce from this shop simply because we don't want to bother looking at any others...

Albert Cipriani · 08-11-2003, 09:13 PM

Quote:

For me, it is a quite simple case of cause and effect. Cause = electrons/chemicals flowing through neural passages. Effect = subjective exprerience/sensations. How can the two be the same thing?

Cause = a river flowing over jagged rocks.
Effect = smooth rocks.

Conclusion: the river flowing and the rocks getting smoothed are one in the same process, not one in the same thing as you suggest.

Your problem consists in your insistence upon ostricising the electrons that flow from objective experiences from the electrons that flow from subjective judgements about those experiences. It's like you think water can only flow in a river and something else must be doing the smoothing of river rocks.

Why can't objective electrical flows beget subjective electrical flows? Why must subjective judgements be non-material events?

Seems you are insisting upon a real metaphysical distinction between objective and subjective experience. I reject this notion as I reject the notion of a distinction between natural and supernatural phenomina. Such distinctions, like the hours in the day or colors in a rainbow are merely useful but arbitrary conventions, not real metaphysical constraints. -- Sincerely, Albert the Traditional Catholic

Morpheus · 08-12-2003, 01:50 PM

yo mexicola,

Quote:

Consciousness (or rather, discussions of it) rely upon what Richard Rorty called the 'Incorrigibility of the Mental'; ie that we tend to take people's word for what they are experiencing. This leads (intuitively, but problematically) to the Cartesian idea that we are presented with a privileged 'sphere' of experience which is entirely private, and this in turn leads to positions like Epiphenomenalism. But it doesn't have to. We can regard this 'sphere' as not some special epistemologically privileged domain, but rather as formed out of our immediate judgments themselves. So, our seeing an apple as red does not mean that there is some inner 'apple' picture 'in' consciousness, but rather just that we have judged that there is a red apple in the world. Rorty's point is that this judgment of the apple is incorrigible, because we don't usually question it, but that this doesn't mean there is some privileged domain on which we make these judgments; it is simply the judgments themselves we don't question.

i'm not too knowledgeable regarding rorty's position, but i'm not sure i understand how this solves the problem of consciousness.

when it comes to seeing a red apple, there is "something that it is like" for me to see a red apple, and there is "something that it is like" for you to see a red apple. however, only i have access to the "something that it is like" for me to see a red apple; that is to say, no one outside of myself can know what it is like when i see a red apple. this is the purported subjective aspect of consciousness. does this not seem to imply some epistemological distinction between what can be known equally by everyone (e.g., some material/chemical fact about the physical human body) , and the phenomenal aspect that can only be known by he who experiences that specific phenomenon?

i'm not sure how your comments on judgment get around this, but perhaps i'm just not understanding them.

albert cipriani, in your last post you asked

Quote:

Why must subjective judgements be non-material events?

material events are scientifically observable (theoretically, at least). if each person's phenomenal aspect (i.e., his subjectivity) is material, then what differentiates it from other material things such that it cannot be empirically observed as well?

with regard to epiphenomenalism, it seems quite unlikely that the phenomenal realm has no effect on the physical realm, if the two are indeed ontologically distinct. consider the very utterance of the phrase "i am conscious." what causes me to affirm this proposition, if it is not the subjective phenomenality that i experience?

this is one of my favorite topics, despite the fact that i need to read a lot more on the issues before i dare say that i am well-versed.

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08-09-2003, 01:56 PM	#15
Adrian Selby Senior Member Join Date: Jan 2002 Location: Farnham, UK Posts: 859	You obviously seem to think that the two are rigid designators for 'things' and that there is no way they can be expressions that derive from an epistemological state of affairs that suggests they can indeed be 'things' but have subsequently, through the research, been able to be thought about as in fact rigidly designating a single thing, i.e. a newer epistemological state advanced by observation of the complexity of the brain. I'm asking why it is you think they have to be different, i.e. why the difference you espouse, being one of perspective somehow engenders a material difference. Is it perhaps because you're working with a model that suggests a relationship of distinct things, if so, what forms the basis for the model? Also, I'm not comparing a single electron to an experience, that's stupid, I assume you weren't either. ------------ the incorrigible analytics' club

08-11-2003, 11:58 AM	#17
Adrian Selby Senior Member Join Date: Jan 2002 Location: Farnham, UK Posts: 859	Well, the point I was trying to make, by all my questions, was related to this comment. Depending on our assumptions, we find different things possible. To a Cartesian Dualist, it is possible to conceive of there being a mind in its own realm and linked to a brain in the physical realm. If you work on the assumption that the mind is the brain, it is not possible to conceive this. I'm asking you for the basis by which you conceive that there is a distinction. You appear to be highlighting a 'common sense' view, that we have neurons on the one hand and experience or sensations on the other. Do you agree that the key to this difference lies in the perspective we have on the event. A sensation seems to be what one calls something that happens to oneself. We do not see or observe sensations in others, only physical events. The difference, at least, appears to be one of access to the state that is defined as a sensation and a physical event. ------------ the incorrigible analytics' club In my view the difference is only one of perspective on a given state, and that state is objectively described as a brain state. This is only possible to conceive of as a perspicuous description of what's going on because of advances in our observations and theories regarding the brain. 500 years ago, the brain would no doubt, indeed even now perhaps, be thought of as little more than some crude porridge that shares the same kind of space 'behind our eyes' as our minds do. That view has changed, and only in epistemologically more recent states have different views on what is conceivable come to make sense. So, the question must be, to what extent are either of our views perspicuous regarding the supposed distinction, or origin of the events we call 'mind events' and 'brain events'.

08-11-2003, 03:17 PM	#18
Mexicola Junior Member Join Date: Jul 2003 Location: Stockport, UK Posts: 29	Just a question for VivaHedone: why are we supposing that 'subjective experience' has no effects on 'the world'? Surely if I see a lion in front of me, I'll run away. Is this not a physical effect in the world? The same applies for even what we consider the most 'subjective' experiences, such as aesthetic or moral judgments; these too have effects in the world. So exactly which aspect of 'subjective experience' is the one which is 'left over' for your theory after you've dealt with the ones that have effects in the world? Your theory, in case you don't know, is called 'Epiphenomenalism'. It's been around for quite a while in the philosophy of mind, and is a result of certain Cartesian assumptions concerning consciousness. In the past 30 years this picture has gradually become very unfashionable, largely because better replacements have come along. Try reading Daniel Dennett's accessible Consciousness Explained for a good example of why the Cartesian paradigm is being abandoned. Consciousness (or rather, discussions of it) rely upon what Richard Rorty called the 'Incorrigibility of the Mental'; ie that we tend to take people's word for what they are experiencing. This leads (intuitively, but problematically) to the Cartesian idea that we are presented with a privileged 'sphere' of experience which is entirely private, and this in turn leads to positions like Epiphenomenalism. But it doesn't have to. We can regard this 'sphere' as not some special epistemologically privileged domain, but rather as formed out of our immediate judgments themselves. So, our seeing an apple as red does not mean that there is some inner 'apple' picture 'in' consciousness, but rather just that we have judged that there is a red apple in the world. Rorty's point is that this judgment of the apple is incorrigible, because we don't usually question it, but that this doesn't mean there is some privileged domain on which we make these judgments; it is simply the judgments themselves we don't question. So... back to the main question. If we get rid of this 'Cartesian Theatre' (as Dennett calls it) of privileged experience, then we can allow that our subjective experience (ie judgments about our environment) do have effects on the world. And then there isn't much of a step to asking 'what exactly is left over once we account for all our effect-causing experiences?' If you stick with the Cartesian view of consciousness as a privileged subjective domain (in some metaphysical sense) then, yes, Epiphenomenalism is probably the best theory on offer. But that's like saying that we should buy the dodgy produce from this shop simply because we don't want to bother looking at any others...

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