Longbow

It sure can. It is just like the idea of Euclidean Geometry. It is just an idea. The possibility of having the idea is what makes it "exist". And in this day and age we don't even think that the universe is Euclidean. And yet the ideas are just as hypothetically possible. It certainly isn't like Euclidean Geometry is false. It just isn't universally applicable.

If there were no beings, no one would think about anything to ever even have ideas. And, in any case, morality, being a subject necessarily entailing beings, certainly wouldn't matter if there were ideas. But even under these circumstances, the possibility of a being thinking about a certain aspect of the nature of how other beings interact is still conceivable. That is, the idea is still possible so that morality would still "exist" just as Euclidean Geometry would even if we lived in a world without such thing as "space".

It is hard to imagine all of this and to imagine someone conceiving of things that are completely outside of their experience. But is, in principle, possible. And that is what is meant by "morals exist" by proponents of moral objectivism like myself. I claim they definitely do not exist as physical objects. But, moral philosophy is definitely about a subject matter that is both objective and inescapable if one is going to consider certain questions (informally referred to as "moral dilemmas").

K

Longbow:

Actually I (and I think others here) am dispensing with moral evaluations. I believe the morality we discuss is simply a way to model the behavior we are driven to engage in. There are no "right" and "wrong" actions. There are only actions. Those actions may tend to help or hinder individuals, groups, or society as a whole, but that says absolutely nothing about the "should" aspect of the behavior.

I would contend that the only objective evaluation of the actions would be whether or not those actions tended to preserver the actors so that the actions would continue to be performed.

Longbow

Well, I think you are perhaps trying to. But, the reason you are having such difficulty is because you cannot make a whole lot of statements you would tend to want to without implicitly accepting moral objectivism. Or another way of putting this whole thing is to say that moral philosophy really does have a lot of content. You are trying to avoid it and replace it as much as you can with science, but it doesn't work. If you dispense with moral evaluations, then you cannot make them at all -- not even suggestively and implicitly by making various scientific observations and speculations.

K

Longbow:

I don't believe I'm having a difficult time at all. I don't know what statements you think I tend to want to make, but none of the statements I actually do want to make require an objective morality.

Moral philosophy may have a lot of content. Religion also has a lot of content. This certainly doesn't force me to accept any particular aspect of either one.

How can you say that I must make moral evaluations in order to make scientific observations and speculations? Unless you have some unusual definition for moral evaluations, that statement is ridicoulous. I can certainly make observations without saying that it is objectively "good" or "bad" to do so.

Primal

But if morals can even theoretically be reduced to such traits then the other viewpoints become superflous.

An example: We assume animals evolve, why? Because we know they can and have evolved in many observed cases. When we then look at a new fossil, we don't every time guess between creation and evolution, that'd be inefficient. We realize, that there are known mechanisms that explain what we are seeing, and that it makes sense to generalize from known mechanisms instead of positing new ones.

Same with morality, we know humans have evolved behavioral traits that we call "moral behavior" why then posit things like the utility principle or categorical imperative? There's no reason to as morality can merely be reduced to known behaviors and mechanisms.

Well if you can't reduce morality to anything material then positing a nether realm is exactly what is being done if you still wish to maintain morality exists objectively, either that or making an arbitrary standard. I am a moral objectivist too btw.

Yes I know, "divine command ethics" are some of the weakest positions in ethical philosophy.

I see your point and agree. I'd even be hesitent to call divine command theorists "realists" or "objectivists" because they are merely positing third person subjectivism in regards to morals. i.e. instead of society just arbitrarily making moral rules....god is.


quote:

I think so, as it says we "choose" or "invent" our moral systems. That a person has to "create" his or her own morals, this assumes much of our behavior is self-determined instead of inherited.

Yes, but I see this association as questionable.


Yes and that makes it arbitrary as its claims are rarely backed by evidence or reasoning, they are usually just assumed at face value. Also they don't say morals are arbitrary but often times that they are equal and "constructed" instead of inherited, and also that they are "not legitimate" or "shouldn't be enforced"...which simply does not follow. They also seem to posit that morals just randomly apear and serve no other function, hence no basis for judging moral systems or practices.

I know, though I can say likewise subjectivism really gets reduced to relativism. The two are very interchangeable.


Yes and tha's what makes them arbitrary. They are just "agreed" on for no real reason other then conviction. This ignores the fact then that conviction would be the source of morality, not the named principle like CI.

Well if they aren't naturalistic, then they posit a nether world, arbitrarily invented and very,very superfluous.

Yes it is because in the end he just leaves things adrift. Kant in no way ever links CI to any epistemic foundations, he more or less just says "act in such a way that you will wish all others to act in your place" and presupposes underlying moral factors without explicitky saying so. One can then just will every one to be greedy or take the phrase "in one's own place" to the extreme, saying you are a special case as other will never be perfectly in your own place (with your genes, history etc.)


Yes, in the end Kant apeals to teleological mechanisms but never admits to this.


I've read some of Kant and do find contradictions. For example Kant believes that two wrongs don't make a right, and retaliation is hence evil. But Kant agrees with the death penalty, as "government" retaliation, but then that's not absolutist morality Kant is saying "ok for them but not ok for us". Also Kant is allowing for retaliation, as government murder is wrong, so why government killing in response to murder? Kant is in essence then saying that he allows for retaliation when before he said retaliation was merely a second wrong and hence immoral.

I think he does, deontological means apart from material in many ways.

Well Kant's theory cannot be reduced to pure logic or reason. It is in the end based on preference.


kant also sees God as necessary for reason. This to me is superlfuous, as is Kant's free will. And certainly the soul. If natural mechanisms can be used to explain morality, positing "deontological" or transcedental ones is just making spurious assumption.


Isn't that the way it is for all ideas? People rarely reason in a vacuum, usually debates are between contenders with opposing viewpoints, like evolution vs. creation. This is because people will often stick with a poor belief system simply because it's the best they have, and this keeps up till something better is developed.

Well I think they just see how superfluous,arbitrary and quasi-religious it is and are turned off by that. They also see that in the end it is reduced to teleological mechanisms.

The Categorical Imperative for example is made to promote the good will as an end, and is based on possible ends of your actions become universal law.

[ October 24, 2002: Message edited by: Primal ]</p>

Kharakov

What are the criteria for an action to be identified as moral?

Helmling

K

Yes, certainly the pair bond behavior was evolved. We see it again and again in mammals. But that behavior is easily adapted to circumstances and various reproductive strategies. Witness the variety of sexual behavior among our close primate relatives—it ranges from rampant promiscuity in chimps to polygamy in gorillas. In humans, we are seeing that infidelity is fairly common. Conventional wisdom has always been that its a male sexual selection strategy to mate with as many females as possible, while only dedicating maximum resources to a single or small number of mates. However, now that we know that Human sperm have evolved defenses against female infidelity, we’re seeing that the female sexual selection strategy is far more complex than we’d given it credit for and that females often sneak in some variety into their own gene dispersion. You sum up the conventional wisdom of female sexual selection strategy, but there’s another page in that story. Turns out, many females look for the best of both worlds. They maintain the protection of their mate, while capitalizing on the opportunity of procuring the genes of another successful male to mix with their own, thus varying the genetic makeup of their own offspring and increasing the odds of persistence of their own genes in future generations.

What I was suggesting, then, was that the strict “morality” of marriage across many cultures was an attempt to compensate for this behavior which, though evolutionarily selected for, was deemed counterproductive for settled societies.

Helmling

from Longbow

[Why do you say this? (that Kant’s imperative is arbitrary) Because you have read Kant's books and don't find his arguments compelling? Or are you just making the assertion that there is no way to justify a moral world view from nonmoral assumptions?]

Both, actually. Though admittedly, my Kant is rusty.

[This latter position is almost surely false, in my opinion. It is certainly not something you can just take for granted.]

I do not. I think it has been you that has been speaking often of the burden of proof. If you are positing some objective foundation for morality, then I think the burden of proof must be on you. I have never heard anything approaching a successful argument for such.

[Or more generally, there is some idea X that we are talking about. X appears in many contexts often combined with the independent ideas of Y or Z. Now everyone is trying to act like a discussion of X is a discussion of Y and Z. It isn't -- it has nothing to do with Y or Z. Without an explicit and particular connection, what people tend to do, what happens in other cultures, what are instinctive behavioral traits that all humans share, and so on are all completely irrelevant to the entire subject of moral philosophy.]

Well, when you rig the game, you’re bound to win. When people talk about morality, they are talking about standards of behavior. It seems like you want to divorce the moral discourse from a discussion of moral behavior. It would seem that your criteria for discussing “moral philosophy” means that any such discussion would be irrelevant.

I guess I’m not sure what question you’re interested in. This is what I thought we were addressing:

Where do human ideas about what is and is not moral come from?

Fred Flintstonensis

RE: the comparison of moral truths to mathematic truths

It is not just like the idea of Euclidean geometry. Math is a fact whether there are sentient beings who understand it or not. 2+2=4 no matter where you go in space or time and no matter who or what is around to understand it. Math is not an idea, it is a fact. It is an absolute.

Morals are not analogous to mathematics in any sense. They are not static, unchanging and eternal, math is. I can't even believe that such an obvious truth has to be stated between intelligent people.

This is clearly a non sequitur and at best is the merest of wishful thinking. C'mon man! The possibility of having the idea is what makes it exist? So then every single conception of every single devil or deity in the entire history of man exists in actuality because the possibility of having the idea makes it so? That is one of the most superlatively absurd statements I have ever come across in a 'philosophical' discussion.

Math does not exist simply because on a speck of dust somewhere in the backwater of the universe there is a species of sentient beings who have thought it into existence. It exists because it just does. If you take two things, any two thing: apples, blacks holes, neutrinos, etc and remove one of them, you will end up with one thing. Why? Because 2-1=1 no matter where you go in space or time.

Morals just simply don't stack up! Comparing morals to math is like comparing an avant-garde jazz composition to a sponge.

As a moral objectivist you are not qualified to respond to the original question of this post anyway (did morals evolve?). The question is meant for people who are already aware of the facts that I have briefly touched upon here. Proponents of hocus-pocus need not apply.

[ October 25, 2002: Message edited by: Fred Flintstonensis ]

[ October 25, 2002: Message edited by: Fred Flintstonensis ]</p>

Fred Flintstonensis

I have ordered the following book from amazon.com:

Evolutionary Origins of Morality : Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives by Leonard D. Katz (Editor)

It seems from doing a bit of internet research on this matter that among non-religious philosophers, the idea that morals evolved is the prevailing idea.

Do not be surprised if I rekindle this debate later after I have finished the book and after I get laid off in a few months (freeing up more time to be on the computer).