Thomas Metcalf

We get to choose what our words mean. So if you say "we don't know what 'omnipotent' means," I say, "of course we do." All you can say is we don't know whether God is omnipotent, and I'm talking about the God we know is omnipotent.

One problem with claiming God is above the laws of logic is that the deductive argument from evil is sound. No theodicy can succeed, because God can violate the laws of logical possibility.

Thomas Metcalf

With the use of "prove," you assume a system of logic. So it's quite possible to prove certain things about you. Most theologians actually believe in a different God than you're claiming to be; they think it is possible to prove things about God.

If you're not limited by logic, however, then why does evil exist?

Automaton

Wrong, if God is omniscient, there is nothing he can possibly learn, so it is logically impossible for him to learn.
I have argued this myself - in some cases (which I refer to as the legitamite paradoxes), the "anything consistent with own nature" definition of omnipotence becomes nothing more than circularity.
But stating "in no possible world does God learn" presupposes that it is logically impossible for God to learn. "In no possible world X" and "X is logically impossible" are totally equivalent.

Automaton

The point is one can't disprove my assertions, as to disprove, requires a system of logic, which I am of course above.
"Most theologians" aren't our friend foursquareman here, though.
Why shouldn't evil exist if I'm not limited by logic? Are you going to claim there's a logical contradiction between my benevolence and evil or something?

Thomas Metcalf

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Either you think it's possible to create a rock God can't lift, or that it's impossible to learn. Or you were wrong when you said "Wrong." I agree that it's logically impossible for God to learn, but you've predicated your actor. I'm saying that "to learn," alone, is logically possible.

It does. Therefore, apologists will say "anything logically possible and consistent with one's nature," which is not circular. "I can't perform X" and "It is logically impossible for me to perform X" are two different states.

The problem with "can do anything logically possible and consistent with one's nature" is that a being who is essentially semipotent (McEar, for example, who can only scratch her ear) would be omnipotent.

Yes, it does, and it is indeed logically impossible for God to learn. I guess I'm not sure what your worry is here.

Thomas Metcalf

Oh, but I can disprove your assertions, in principle. I can't produce absolute knowledge that you are not God, but that's not what "to prove" means.

And there is a logical contradiction between a strongly omnipotent God and the existence of evil. Once again, the god about Whom apologists and atheologians concern themselves is most vulnerable to disproof. The question isn't whether we can have absolute knowledge of God's nonexistence, just whether we can disprove Him.

Automaton

The actor is automatically predicated when we talk of God performing certain actions. It is not logically impossible to create a rock so big that you cannot lift it, either, but when referring to God, it is.
Agreed, but the above is still circular. "I can't perform X because it is logically impossible for me to perform X because I can't perform X." So we have either a circular definition of omnipotence or a definition of omnipotence that means that every degree of potence is "omni".
I was just wondering if you thought there was any actual difference between state-of-affairs omnipotence and standard omnipotence. It appears you now don't?

Automaton

The point of my spiel is to get certain theists to reject their notion that God is "above", or "not limited by", or whatever, logic. Of all the ways one can do this, I find mine is the most direct, and effective.

Thomas Metcalf

Of course it is, but I'm not predicating the actor when I say "to learn." These are actions without predicated actors:
"to learn" "to create a rock God can't lift" "to change" "to change God" "to wear clothes" "to put clothes on God"
The first, third, and fifth are logically possible, and the second, fourth, and sixth are not. None of them predicates an actor.

I do. "to learn" is an action, and "God learns" is a state of affairs. If we define "omnipotence" as "the ability to perform any logically possible action," we get different results than if we define it as "the ability to actualize any logically possible state of affairs," no? With the former, God fails to be omnipotent, and with the latter, God succeeds in being omnipotent. (Well, I don't think He does, but He does for these purposes.)

[ July 31, 2002: Message edited by: Thomas Metcalf ]</p>

Thomas Metcalf

I usually just point out that a strongly omnipotent God could prevent all evil, no matter what, and that we have to assume prohibitively deep skepticism if we think God is above logic.

[ July 31, 2002: Message edited by: Thomas Metcalf ]</p>