Alonzo Fyfe

What you call "conditional morality" is actually more commonly known as a "hypothetical imperative" -- and tends to contain no moral component at all.

That is to say, it applies as much to the person trying to figure out how to perform the perfect murder as to the person trying to save a life. It is a purely means-ends calculation fixed solely on reason and divorced from the value of the end (or the means).

As for your moral axioms (where 100% of the moral content is contained) -- my question would be: How is it determined that a particular axiom is valid and another invalid?

Alonzo Fyfe

I would like to point out that there is an important distinction between the question "Is there a reason for person P to do X?" and "Does P have a reason to do X?"

It very well be the case that there is (exists) a reason for P to do X, only X does not have a reason to do X. The reason that exists is not P's reason.

These additional reasons that exist for P not to do X are the reasons that people other than P have for P not to do X.

Morality, one may argue, concerns not just the reasons that P has, but the reasons that exist, independent of who has them.

[ March 21, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Pomp

Not Prince Hamlet,

The way you've described the relationship between conditions and axioms is pretty much exactly how I view it. Morals, to me, are objectively valid strategies for attaining subjective goals.

Here's a question for you: are prescriptive ("X ought to do Y") statements meaningful at all if they do not reference some value (presumably, some value that X holds), either explicitly or implicitly? In other words, would one of your If-then statements make sense without the "If" clause?

(And I really have trouble with that nickname, since you've shown yourself to be anything but)

Awww...

The name is an old in-joke amongst my circle of friends. Most people here settle on either Pompous or PB, and I'm not adverse to being called Adam.

Pomp

Alonzo Fyfe,

Morality, one may argue, concerns not just the reasons that P has, but the reasons that exist, independent of who has them.

To paraphrase the OP, why should P give a crap about reasons that are not his? One may argue that morality concerns all reasons held by all agents, but such an argument would divorce morality from P's actual situation.

Alonzo Fyfe

If I may: It would make sense, but it would be false -- in the same way that "my car is green" makes sense, but is false.

An "if/then" statement such as this, without the "if" statement, is precisely what Immanual Kant defines as a categorical imperative. For all practical purposes, it states that what follows the "then" phrase has some sort of intrinsic worth which is independent of anything that would go in the "if" phrase.

It makes sense to say that something has intrinsic worth. It just happens to always be false.

Alonzo Fyfe

It depends on your definition of "should".

I am a moral externalist. An externalist holds that it may be morally obligatory for P to do X, but have no reason to do X (because ALL of the reasons for P to do X belong to other people).

There are two definitions of "should". Practical "should" limits the relevant reasons to P's reasons alone. Moral "should" encompases all reasons that exist.

And it may very well be the case that P practical-should has no reason to do what P moral-should.

However, if P has any desire or drive to be a moral person, then this gives P a practical-should reason to do what he moral-should. It is the only way that P can accomplish his aim of being a moral person.

[ March 21, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Not Prince Hamlet

P.B.,

Yes, they would make sense ... to me. Taking the If clause out instantly turns it into subjective morality in my opinion.

"You ought not to beat your child regularly" is a moral statement that I believe in, but is subjective to my belief system.

Jeff

[ March 21, 2002: Message edited by: Not Prince Hamlet ]</p>

Malaclypse the Younger

Alonzo Fyfe

However it is a fact that I will not do X unless I have a reason to do X. By itself, the fact that other people have reasons for me to do X is irrelevant.

However if I value the good opinion of other people (or fear the possibility of their coercion), then that is my own reason to do X, thus contradicting the premise that all reasons to do X are held by other people.

You can convince me in principle that everyone else has a rock-solid rational case that I should do X, but unless you can show me my own reason to do X, I simply won't do it.

Pomp

Alonzo Fyfe,

It makes sense to say that something has intrinsic worth. It just happens to always be false.

We'll disagree here, then. In my view, it makes no sense at all to say that something has intrinsic worth. To say that something has worth begs the question "worth to whom?" Pie isn't intrinsically delicious, it is judged delicious by various tasters. Tasters who do not like pie are not misapprehending its intrinsic deliciousness because there is no such property.

There are two definitions of "should". Practical "should" limits the relevant reasons to P's reasons alone. Moral "should" encompases all reasons that exist.

In what sense does a "moral should," in your view, encompass all reasons that exist? I can think of three possibilities:

1) Any existing reason is sufficient grounds to establish a "moral should," in which case P is saddled with a wide variety of mutually contradictory moral obligations. P should give all his money to A because A has a reason for that action, but P should also give all his money to B because B has a reason for that action, but P should also keep all his money because P himself has a reason for that action.

2) Only reasons held by all agents are considered sufficient to establish a "moral should," in which case "moral shoulds" are irrelevant because P already has a practical reason for any action that he could have a moral reason for performing.

3) Some sort of averaging process is carried out on all existing reasons, so A's desire for P's money cancels out B's desire for P's money and so forth. I'm not sure exactly how this would work, but it seems to be the only option that does not lead to an immediate absurdity or irrelevence.

However, if P has any desire or drive to be a moral person,

Why would P desire this, in your view?

...then this gives P a practical-should reason to do what he moral-should. It is the only way that P can accomplish his aim of being a moral person.

Agreed.

Pomp

Alonzo,

Somehow I missed this when responding to your earlier post:

As for your moral axioms (where 100% of the moral content is contained) -- my question would be: How is it determined that a particular axiom is valid and another invalid?

I know you asked this question of Not Prince Hamlet, not me, but I'd like to give you an answer from my perspective.

What NPH is calling moral axioms are values held by various agents. His statements are of the form "If X values Y then X ought to do Z." To the subjectivist, there is no such thing as an invalid value. We simply take each agent's values (the Y factor in NPH's statements) as given when formulating "should" statements. Such statements only apply to X when X does, indeed, value Y.