MadMordigan

But where's the evidence for the claim that they're ACTUALLY conscious?

I'll provide it as soon as you provide evidence for the claim YOU are actually concious.

Vogelfrei

On a practical level, if you think you're conscious, simply observe that we've got similar physiology; if you're a materialist, you think your physiology is responsible for your consciousness, so it's not much of a leap to think that my physiology creates a consciousness for me.

On an absolute level, it's always good to keep in mind that most of what we take for granted is actually uncertain. That's called "intellectual honesty". The question, then, is of the sort of deviations from absolute certainty you're willing to accept in demarcating the boundaries of what we commonly refer to as "knowing". Practically, much of this is pre-determined, rather than a conscious (heh) choice, since if we deviate too much, we run into statements we should support which we are unwilling to (like "people in dreams are conscious"), and vice-versa.

elwoodblues

Again, I invite you to tell us what makes the human brain conscious and willful. You seem all fired up about this physical construct being irreproducible in a machine, so you must have some idea of how the human brain is conscious. Is it something to do with the brain as a whole? Or the parts of the brain? Is it a matter of configuration, or is it an actual property of bits of the brain?

Before answering those questions, you can't call it impossible. Our current understanding says very, very little about how consciousness actually WORKS. We're slowly breaking down the black box of the brain, but we're not at that point yet. We're certainly not at the point of ruling out machine reproduction of conscious phenomena.

Kent Stevens

I do not claim that a normal program or a thermostat has consciousness. But these devices do have a sense of awareness. Consciousness is a vague word which I tend to avoid using if possible. Self-awareness is a better defined property than consciousness is.

A normal program or a thermostat is not self-aware, but you could create a program that logically deduces that it exists. A photo is not a clone of a person. But if the information that corresponds to a person was feed into a sophisticated computer setup, this person could be much better modeled than just with a photo. The essence of a person is their mind and not how they appear in a photo anyway.

The exact boundary where systems start to choose or sense is inexact. For even a bacteria seems to choose between alternatives. Even a bacteria seems to sense it's surroundings in a simple way.

[ October 04, 2002: Message edited by: Kent Stevens ]</p>

Vogelfrei

I don't know what aspect(s) of the brain make(s) consciousness. Neither do you. Indeed, that's my ENTIRE POINT.

Exhaustive list of things I know for sure are conscious:

Me

That's it. I'm willing to believe that other humans are conscious, on this account, because I've got a brain, and they do, too, and I think my brain is responsible for my consciousness. No machine can have a brain of the type humans have (else it wouldn't be a machine), and so I find no basis for believing that a machine either could or couldn't have consciousness; there's simply no way to figure the matter out. I agree that it seems logically possible for a machine to be conscious, but many things are logically possible that are contingently impossible (e.g. nonexistence of matter).

No. Because I have no idea what's necessary for consciousness, and because some possibilities are inherently unreproducible, I have every reason to believe that a machine might never be conscious. I also have every reason to believe that a machine might be conscious. It's simply unknown.

If you review what I've said, you'll find that I've claimed only complete agonisticism in the matter.

What sort of thing could be necessary for consciousness, but impossible to reproduce in a machine? Well, since we know absolutely nothing about what's necessary for consciousness, it could be anything at all. Maybe neurons with animal-type organization and biochemistry are required. But if you've got neurons with animal-type organization and biochemistry, you've got an animal brain of some sort, rather than a machine. If you think this is an implausible possibility, then you've been reading too much sci-fi and your head is in the clouds (or in the gas nebulae of outer space, as it were ). There's no evidence for or against that proposition, and so no way to judge whether it's implausible.

I neither rule it out, nor accept it. Rather, I claim that knowing either way is impossible (assuming that consciousness is epiphenomenal). You're arguing against a strawman.

If you want to argue against the impossibility of knowing, tell me what sort of experiment would say anything, either way, about what the necessary and sufficient causes of consciousness are (again assuming epiphenomenalism). Note that by consciousness, I of course mean actually being conscious, rather than just behaving like it.

I claim that consciousness isn't amenable to scientific inquiry -- at least not by any method that's conceivable to humans at this point. And I like to think that I'm open-minded...

Vogelfrei

All you know is that they have it metaphorically (this is the way in which a thermometer "chooses"). But metaphorical awareness has nothing to do with mind. I don't see that anyone can know whether they have real awareness.

I define consciousness as mental experience of any sort. This definition isn't too vague, and I hope you find it acceptable.

Consciousness is a superset of self-awareness, since consciousness can exist without the conception of a self, whereas the reverse isn't true. It's a better term for that reason, and also because, once you've got consciousness, self-awareness seems to be a matter of refining a system; it's instantiating jump from non-consciousness to consciousness that's problematic.

None of this stuff necessarily has anything to do with minds or consciousness. Computer simulations qua simulations are just processors of meaningless data. Whether a mind is involved, or not, cannot be decided by the bare fact that a program that seems to reproduce intelligent behavior exists. Complex computer programs may yield consciousness, but not, fundamentally, because they're complex programs -- the reason would be elsewhere.

Only metaphorically, just like elementary particles "choose" to act in certain ways...

Laurentius

No matter what one believes consciousness is
no one has ever identified it anywhere else but wihtin living things
which are known to develop systems that process information
for their own interest.

Consciousness does that... consciously .

Consciousness is an information processing system capable of observing and analyzing itself during the process.

Experiments have been performed on apes to determine the degree of their consciousness.

Consciousness is an observable biological fact. Anyone claiming it is more than that should feel responsible to provide some sound arguments, besides simply asking "why not?" ...

AVE

[ October 05, 2002: Message edited by: Laurentius ]</p>

Kent Stevens

This is more clearly defined. But do computers then have consciousness as they have representations of reality? These representations are like mental experiences.

Words like choice and sense can allow for the artificial distinctions between systems. In one way all systems can be seen to choose as the select an outcome from a range of possibilities. In another way all systems appear to sense in that they react to external circumstances. This is not to say that we should throw out words such as choice and sense. But instead it is preferable to realise that they can create an artificial distinction between systems. All systems are physical systems and all systems can be described using the physical stance.

Amen-Moses

Strangely some seem to be making a distinction between "living things" and "merely machines" but living things are machines, biological machines granted but still machines.

If we were to construct a biological computer what is stopping such a beast from becoming conscious?

Amen-Moses

Vogelfrei

Kent Stevens:

Doesn't anyone READ what I write?

Amen-moses:

I thought it was obvious that my usage of the word "machine" was shorthand for "non-standard non-biological machine". As for what's stopping a biological machine from being conscious, well: potentially anything, depending on how exactly it's constituted!

I'm done with this topic unless someone wants to go over new ground. I don't care to repeat myself anymore.