John Page

Owleye:

OK.
OK.
I'm a little taken aback by your response. I'm assuming that you think consciousness exists, because you have stated this is where your philosophical interest lies. This would seem to indicate that (as an empirical realist) you think there is some evidence that consciousness is a "real" phenomenon. Are you saying there is empirical evidence for consciousness but it cannot be related to space/time?
Experiential and scientific evidence. I dream about a house. I wake up and there is no house. The house existed only in my dream of which the remnants were in my conscious mind. Ergo the house (imaginary object) was a product of my brain activity. For a scientific example, I'm sure that the FBI's experimental data on LSD would show that altered brain states created imaginary objects in the mind.

Final point here, you talk about what the brain "finds in the world". If you follow cognitive theory I think there is ample evidence that the brain receives information through the senses and does not directly know the things in the world. This again points to (conscious)perception of an object resulting from data in the brain. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between objects who's existence can be traced back to the reality external to the mind/brain and those whose origin is from internal recollection or synthesis alone.
Within the brain.
I mentioned flash cards in relation to the issue of whether concepts were "locationless". My position was that I had no evidence that concepts were locationless. I guess what I'm saying is that flash cards can be used to measure what a child has learned and not learned, thereby indicating that concepts are acquired by individuals mind/brain. I do not think flash cards exclude a bunch of other theories - I offered them as an example of evidence not inconsistent with my theory that concepts are physically located in the brain.
Not strictly. Strict behaviorism implies that we are merely passive learners. Strict behaviorism also implies that learning is directly connected to action. In reality, we are clearly become selective about the learning we undertake and can become inquisitive for its own sake. So, I am not a strict behaviorist and do not believe a simple cognition - response cycle. I am a behaviorist in the sense that behavior is caused by things and do not believe in free will.
Assumption in the sense of supposition seems perfect to me - could you be more specific about why think I've mis-used the term?
Agreed. Please see the diagram on page 19 of the document I sent you and the summary explanation of the cognition process on page 13. Do I know how the brain works, no, but it is a physicalization theory that also explains how certain paradoxes occur in the mind. The specific worked example is in reference to how Russell's Antinomy occurs in the mental world but not the "real" world.
Supposed by whom (reference please)? First, the laws of physics as used to describe subatomic behavior assume (or presuppose) that experimental data can be interpreted in this way. Second, I believe that all electrons in physical theory are separate "things" in spacetime and therefore non-identical.
Well, if they're identical, how could you tell them apart?
My proposition is that there is an axiom for A'ness and an axiom for logical equivalence. The literal symbols "A = A" are apprehended by the senses, recognized by the mind, put in context with information about this thread and known interpretations of logical propositions and their rules. The proposition can then be apprehended as a tautology in the context of propositional logic because it passes the test for logical equivalence.
Test against whatever the standard is.
The processes associated with a different math system, a number of which have been created by humankind.
I'm not sure I get your point. Human minds can fail as well as an electronic calculator. I said the apparent timeless quality of math was an illusion, not math itself.

I don't follow your logic for "this" not being a physical process.
I believe that the mathematical certainty is a consequence of the process of mind. Turn off the calculator (extinguish the mind) and you eliminate the math. Again please see the worked example in the paper I sent (page 13 and the diagram on page 19) for the cognition of a set of three somethings. I hoping you will see that using an (almost?) identical process to compare the cognition of three and four an axiom for, say n=n+1 can be implemented. Recurse that and you arrive at the notion of infinity (Aleph 0), feed Aleph 0 into the concept of n=n+1 you end up with Aleph 1 etc. (If I've remembered the Cantor designations accurately). In summary, mathematical certainty and logical certainty are a result of repeatable mind/brain operations.
Do you hold Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem to be real (as opposed to true in the context of Peano arithmetic)? What enables you to say this?
So you agree Goedel's theorem is not actually timeless, merely accepted in a timeless sense?
OK, I was just trying to get some clarity to go back to what appeared to be contradictions in what you had said. No matter.
I think it a disservice to philosophy to blindly accept the answers of others. I have studied (perhaps not as extensively as you) the thoughts and conclusions of others and am dissatsified with the inconsistencies I find. Each idea must, IMO, be reexamined to discover how that idea can be coherently related to other ideas. I'm trying to pick up the bones of philosophy, not pick them over. If my attitude seems arrogant or ignorant to you its not intended to be, my nature is that of an independent and free thinker. You might also consider that American English is not my native tongue and meanings of words can be slippery.
Right out the box, no, I haven't.
It is different than the physical object because the physical object is not in your head. You must therefore be consciously perceiving a representation of that object. I think I said this before but perhaps it will make more sense to you now it is clear that there is a cognitive process that takes place between sensory detection and conscious perception.

Cheers, John

John Page

Hi owleye:
This gets back to some of the issues we bandied about in the previous thread. Neuronal activity is generally accepted to by the physiological behavior that relates the inputs and outputs. However, this only captures the "electrical discharge" aspect. I believe that the brain semi-permanently wires itself through dendrite and axon migration so that the spatial orientation of these "cell ends" hard wires acquired concepts and their relations with other concepts.

This theory would be consistent with observations as to learning rates and that during human growth there is much pruning back of connections within the brain. Perhaps what we are seeing in this phenomenon is the brain and its plasticity forming circuitry that "corresponds" to experienced reality.

Back to hard wiring. Assuming I am correct in placing much emphasis on the dendrite/axon migration, the number of potential brain states expands enormously - I think by factorial (#dendrites + # axons). Encoding "reality" in this way should be very efficient since little or no energy is required to "maintain" this spatially retained memory.

I hope this is interesting to you, I know it doesn't fully answer your question but its getting late! I'm not sure how you came to believe I think we'll see brain patterns that show the 'a' - I did post the opposite and observed that there had been no observations of "pictorial" representations within the brain. I do, however, believe we will be able to understand how the brain encodes the 'a'.
Well, it may not be a literal copy but an equivalent.
I agree consciousness is a complex thing. I agree neural network theory is more relevant to the mysteries of consciousness than pillow theory. I think it is very dangerous to assume that the current understand of neural networks accurately copies the mechnism of the brain. Where are the emotions? Where are the modulated electrical fields?

In response to the first person experience issue (which I am assuming is the main philosophical problem presented by consciousness you refer to), what I am proposing is that we will not know with any reasonable certainty that the "consciousness" problem has been cracked until we can create conditions that allow us to create first person experiences in a controlled and repeatable manner. How can we objectively or philosophically prove we've solved the problem? I think its a mixture of the above and some form of mind probe that allows us to experience first the effects of messing with brain circuitry.

Of course, whether this can be done remains to be seen.
I don't subscribe to tokenism. Its not needed in my theory since the instance of the thing in the brain state is what it is. Concepts IMO are mental. I'm supposing each concept has an axiomatic form which is used to test whether mental things fit the concept - see section 2.4 of my paper.
I think its important in any debate about idealism if one can prove how shared experiences actually occur.
A theory of meaning is not needed with my system of representation - the meaning comes from context and we perceive things as having meaning because our natural tendiency to anthropomorphism (useful for Turing tests!)
But it might matter. An accurate picture of reality and ability to "share" that reality intersubjectively may be very beneficial in the survival sense, for example.
We can disagree, I think the description is pretty decent definition, IMO the latter does not need to uniquely identify the object.
The first-person subjective experience difficulty that is obstructing our communication in the first place?
In the blindsight thread there was an experiement that referenced simultaneous conscious and non-conscius perception. Do you think the link irrelevant to the puzzle of conscious perception?
I will certainly try.

Sorry if some of the posts are not clear - it got wiped out twice so I started getting hasty.

Cheers, John

excreationist

owleye:
The topic of consciousness becomes quite a headache when the posts become large... so I'm limiting the subject matter. I'm retiring from the moon/reality discussion. I said much earlier in this thread that it should be in a separate thread since it adds a whole new tangent to this.

As far as materialistic explanations for consciousness that may involve diagrams go, there are books and things on this that go into a lot of detail. Even a prescribed university textbook, Elaine N. Marieb's "Human Anatomy and Physiology" has a lot about this - it has diagrams and many interesting articles about different aspects of the conscious experience. It has a couple relevant chapters on brain functions which I hope to read thoroughly sometime.

So anyway, all I have is a very generalized basic framework. I don't want to be too dogmatic about every detail since I haven't learnt that much about the brain.

I'd recommend that textbook - there are probably other good ones too... it has a few relevant chapters that are filled with many colourful diagrams, photos, charts, etc.

About the voice in people's heads - apparently Julian Jaynes' "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" is a good book about this. At <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0618057072/qid=1027059718/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/102-4118811-6628105" target="_blank">amazon</a> there are some sample pages.

I'd take that to mean "what does consciousness *do* or involve?" Well I wrote about that in the <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=56&t=000268" target="_blank">Humans vs. Nonconscious Machines thread</a> - and also in this thread at least once. Basically consciousness is a form of awareness where the aware thing has progressed through most or all of <a href="http://chiron.valdosta.edu/whuitt/col/cogsys/piaget.html" target="_blank">Piaget's Stages of Cognitive Development</a>.
And in the bigger picture, this allows people to do things like invent agriculture, build cities, make scientific discoveries, etc - and slaughter and/or integrate the hunter-gatherers who haven't got to that level of development. So basically it is just a way of having an advantage of others. I don't think there is any other purpose for the existence of consciousness. e.g. I don't think God created consciousness for a specific purpose/function (since I'm an atheist)

....
I stated those figures based on what I'd read, not my own thoughts.

e.g.
from a <a href="http://www.pslgroup.com/dg/1db736.htm" target="_blank">Ritalin link</a>:
I thought if you combined a reaction testing program with one where you made a binary decision, it would add about 200 ms to your reaction time. Or maybe 300 ms... depending on the individual involved.
<a href="http://members.ozemail.com.au/~wenke/brainscience/reactiontime.htm" target="_blank">Here</a> is a javascript reaction testing applet I made. I get times of about 200 ms, with the minimum being about 180 ms. I'm slowly working on a Java applet that will involve a binary decision - you'd use a two-button mouse in it - the keyboard seems to slow down my results.

I think the reason it can take 0.5 seconds to recognize some things is because the objects are complex. In the <a href="http://nivea.psycho.univ-paris5.fr/ASSChtml/ASSC.html" target="_blank">change blindness</a> link it has pictures which show the paths an eye can take to view a scene... it has to move around to see - it can't just see the scene at once. In the <a href="http://www2b.abc.net.au/aftershock/posts/topic12497.shtm" target="_blank">New Scientist blind to change</a> article they also talked about this...
"When gazing at a painting or photograph your impression that you are seeing the whole thing in sharp detail is false, say British researchers. In fact, the only part of it that you see at high resolution at any given moment is an area about the size of your thumbnail held at arm's length.

It is by moving the eye around, and with it that area of high resolution, that you gradually take in the whole image, says David Wooding from the University of Derby."

I highly recommend that article... it talks about many of the qualia type things you were asking me about.

So anyway, detecting a screen flash is fast because your eyes don't have to move around to see it... but for more complex recognition, your eyes have to move around a lot. I'll probably read more of that textbook and finish my Java program to see how long it takes for me to make decisions of increasing complexity... then I'll reply to more of what you've written. I guess it takes time to be conscious, in a detached way, of what you've seen... that's because you've got to stand back and think about what you're seeing... but I think to just see it and react (especially to simple things like flashes of colour) takes much less time. There are two kinds of awareness really - the "doing" type of awareness... and the detached analytical type (which I call consciousness)... and you can also analyse the detached analytical type and so on... think about yourself thinking about yourself thinking about yourself. Due to our limitations we can't conceive of that in explicit detail to a very high degree) - well at least I can't. That's the reason I think why I struggle with this complex topic - because of my limited "working memory"... to cope I've tried to simplify and organize things.

owleye

I'm a little taken aback by your response. I'm assuming that you think consciousness exists, because you have stated this is where your philosophical interest lies. This would seem to indicate that (as an empirical realist) you think there is some evidence that consciousness is a "real" phenomenon. Are you saying there is empirical evidence for consciousness but it cannot be related to space/time?"

It would be a task of mine to put consciousness within the context of empirical realism. In doing so, I wouldn't think of consciousness as an object of experience, the way real objects are considered. Rather I'd say such an existence was necessary in order to have experience in the first place.

"Experiential and scientific evidence. I dream about a house. I wake up and there is no house. The house existed only in my dream of which the remnants were in my conscious mind."

The above is a description of mental activity, not brain activity. In any case, nothing in the above discusses the comparison you allege is always occurring in everyday experiences. Moreover, the house of the dream represents the content of a conscious experience that occurred in dreaming. The same house in ordinary experience is also the content of a conscious experience. This is not different in kind than comparing two objects of experience. Thus, you have not produced the activity associated with comparing objects of experience with some brain state.

"For a scientific example, I'm sure that the FBI's experimental data on LSD would show that altered brain states created imaginary objects in the mind."

This does not help you. You claim that the brain contains some sort of comparable entity that can be used to compare with what is observed. I'm asking you a question not about comparing two objects of experience (of two different experiences), but of a single experience in which you are comparing something internal with the object as presented in order to determine that it is what it is. What makes you think the internal brain activity corresponding to a house is comparable to the house being observed, as an object of perception.

"Final point here, you talk about what the brain "finds in the world". If you follow cognitive theory I think there is ample evidence that the brain receives information through the senses and does not directly know the things in the world."

It is not my contention that the brain knows anything at all. In the theory of yours that we have been discussing does the brain know anything?

"This again points to (conscious)perception of an object resulting from data in the brain."

I have no objection to this. The brain somehow produces (conscious) perception. How it does this (and why, for that matter) is the 64 dollar question.

"It is therefore necessary to distinguish between objects who's existence can be traced back to the reality external to the mind/brain and those whose origin is from internal recollection or synthesis alone."

This could say no more than there are objects of inner experience as well as objects of outer experience. If so, I'd consider it acceptable (though the idea of "mind/brain" would have to be elaborated in great detail before I'd allow it to pass muster).

On my question about "Where is the concept then that is being represented within a brain state?"

You responded with: "Within the brain."

I must conclude then, that in your theory there is a brain state that represents a concept and brain state that is the concept. If this is the case, I don't see the need for the representation of the concept at all? What function is served by having both of these in the brain?

"I mentioned flash cards in relation to the issue of whether concepts were "locationless". My position was that I had no evidence that concepts were locationless. I guess what I'm saying is that flash cards can be used to measure what a child has learned and not learned, thereby indicating that concepts are acquired by individuals mind/brain."

I would agree that concepts are acquired by individuals. However, this doesn't tell me where they are located. Your theory is that they are located in the brain (or what you refer to as the "mind/brain" a theory you have not explained, nor provided a rationale). The basic problem with locating concepts in the brain is that it is difficult to understand how they could be made public. (Your theory of common physiology and reality is insufficient.)

"I do not think flash cards exclude a bunch of other theories - I offered them as an example of evidence not inconsistent with my theory that concepts are physically located in the brain."

I wouldn't be able to count it as evidence one way or another. Not being inconsistent is not a good criteria for support. If it were, one could argue that scientific results not being inconsistent with the view that God created the universe supports the view that God created the universe.

"Agreed. Please see the diagram on page 19 of the document I sent you and the summary explanation of the cognition process on page 13."

I tossed the document.

"Do I know how the brain works, no, but it is a physicalization theory that also explains how certain paradoxes occur in the mind. The specific worked example is in reference to how Russell's Antinomy occurs in the mental world but not the "real" world."

How the hell does this relate to the (formal) truths of mathematics and logic? What is it that you think mathematicians do?

"Supposed by whom (reference please)? First, the laws of physics as used to describe subatomic behavior assume (or presuppose) that experimental data can be interpreted in this way. Second, I believe that all electrons in physical theory are separate "things" in spacetime and therefore non-identical."

This implies, I think, that you believe objects have spatial and temporal properties. That is, an object's spatial-temporal coordinates are an essential part of its identity. This means that it is wrong to think that objects move in spacetime. An cannot move in spacetime since moving implies changing the spacetime coordinate (assuming spacetime remains unchanged while an object moves through it, which according to GRT is false, but insofar as the modification of spacetime does not precisely correspond to the movement of the object, this is a sufficiently good approximation for the above argument). If an object in spacetime changed its coordinate it would not, by your account, be the same object. True?

"Well, if they're identical, how could you tell them apart?"

There is a distinction between being indistinguishable and being identical. Identical objects are presumably indistinguishable.

"My proposition is that there is an axiom for A'ness and an axiom for logical equivalence. The literal symbols "A = A" are apprehended by the senses, recognized by the mind, put in context with information about this thread and known interpretations of logical propositions and their rules. The proposition can then be apprehended as a tautology in the context of propositional logic because it passes the test for logical equivalence."

This begs a question about how the brain holds axioms. More importantly, though, it should give you a big headache with respect to your principal of identity. The literal symbols within "A = A", according to your theory, has it that the first A cannot be identical to the second one (since they are in two different locations). How does '=' make them identical? (I think eventually this will be a big problem for your idea that concepts are physically located.)

"Test against whatever the standard is."

How can there be a standard for proof? There is only common physiology and reality in your theory. Standards are not usually thought of in either of these terms. In Plato's theory, for example, standards exist in an ideal sense only.

"The processes associated with a different math system, a number of which have been created by humankind."

If it is new math system, it would not make the old math system produce wrong answers. Answers within a given mathematical system have a formal truth that is eternal. To claim some true statement in math (e.g., 2+2=4) will be false in the future is to change the meaning of one or more of the symbols in the mathematical statement. If you change the meaning of the terms of the statement (or the context in which the statement has meaning), this does not make the statement wrong. You've created an entirely different statement.

"I'm not sure I get your point. Human minds can fail as well as an electronic calculator. I said the apparent timeless quality of math was an illusion, not math itself."

The assumption behind there being an error in the first place requires some standard by which there is a right answer and from which all other answers are wrong. Your theory fails to tell us how a calculation could be right or wrong.

"I believe that the mathematical certainty is a consequence of the process of mind. Turn off the calculator (extinguish the mind) and you eliminate the math. Again please see the worked example in the paper I sent (page 13 and the diagram on page 19) for the cognition of a set of three somethings. I hoping you will see that using an (almost?) identical process to compare the cognition of three and four an axiom for, say n=n+1 can be implemented."

Using your notion of identity (distinguishing spatio-temporal differences), no two processes could ever be identical. Each summation of four and three would always produce a different answer. Notwithstanding this, the notion that there is no answer to a summation until the calculation occurs fails to capture the notion that if a calculation of the sum of identical values ever deviated from the number that was intended to be the answer, we could not understand how it could be wrong. After all, in your theory, it could represent a change in math system and become a new standard.

"Recurse that and you arrive at the notion of infinity (Aleph 0), feed Aleph 0 into the concept of n=n+1 you end up with Aleph 1 etc. (If I've remembered the Cantor designations accurately). In summary, mathematical certainty and logical certainty are a result of repeatable mind/brain operations."

Repeatability then becomes the standard. However, since no physical process is ever completely repeatable, no physical process could become the standard, unless standards themselves change in accordance with changes in the physical processes, something like changing what constitutes a unit of time based on a physical process. But this doesn't characterize the way mathematical results are achieved. Just because the physical process that performs the calculation wanes over time, doesn't make it the case that its erroneous results would be considered correct on the basis that the standards of correctness would have changed.

"So you agree Goedel's theorem is not actually timeless, merely accepted in a timeless sense?"

Huh? Godel's proof of this theorem was a logical/mathematical achievement. The achievement was historical. it was an accomplishment that occurred in time. The proof of the theorem means, for those who accept it, that what it states is always the case, prior to its proof, when it was proved, and forever in the future. Indeed, it is really inappropriate to place it in a temporal context at all. Moreover, it seems inappropriate to put it into any context, spatio-temporal, political, socio-economic, scientific, religious, or what have you.

"I think it a disservice to philosophy to blindly accept the answers of others."

No one is asking you to. Indeed, you needn't accept them with full sight. You should at least know what it is that has been accomplished (or at least some of what has been accomplished) whether or not you agree with it.


"It is different than the physical object because the physical object is not in your head."

This is the problem. Here is the way Kant puts it.

"We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited in space or time, and therefore all objects of any experience possible to us, are nothing but appearances, that is, mere representations, which in the manner in which they are represented, as extended beings, or as a series of alterations, have no independent existence outside our thoughts. This doctrine I entitle transcendental idealism. The realist in the transcendental meaning of this term, treats these modifications of our sensibility as self-subsistent things, that is, treats mere representations as things in themselves......

"The objects of experience, then, are never given in themselves, but only in experience, and have no existence outside it. That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although not one has ever perceived them, must certainly be admitted. This, however, only means that in the possible advance of experience we may encounter them. For everything is real which stands in connection with a perception in accordance with the laws of empirical advance. They are therefore real if they stand in an empirical connection with my actual consciousness, although they are not for that reason real in themselves, that is, outside this advance of experience."

"This gets back to some of the issues we bandied about in the previous thread. Neuronal activity is generally accepted to by the physiological behavior that relates the inputs and outputs. However, this only captures the "electrical discharge" aspect. I believe that the brain semi-permanently wires itself through dendrite and axon migration so that the spatial orientation of these "cell ends" hard wires acquired concepts and their relations with other concepts."

This may be a description of brain activity. However, it hardly is helpful in identifying concepts. From the above, I have no clue whatsoever, how the concept of 'a' (its type) is stored. Moreover, it is useless in explaining how it is used in recognition of tokens.

"This theory would be consistent with observations as to learning rates and that during human growth there is much pruning back of connections within the brain. Perhaps what we are seeing in this phenomenon is the brain and its plasticity forming circuitry that "corresponds" to experienced reality."

One major difficulty I have with this is that you think wiring is particularly important, when in fact it seems to make more sense to me that concepts would be created within neuronal states themselves, accompanied by the thresholds by which they are activated or inhibited.

"Back to hard wiring. Assuming I am correct in placing much emphasis on the dendrite/axon migration, the number of potential brain states expands enormously - I think by factorial (#dendrites + # axons). Encoding "reality" in this way should be very efficient since little or no energy is required to "maintain" this spatially retained memory."

I have no idea what you are getting at here.

"Well, it may not be a literal copy but an equivalent."

That's the problem. What kind of copy is equivalent to a literal one that is not a literal copy? Surely you don't mean metaphorical (or analogous?), since this begs the question of what counts as a sufficiently analog to call it equivalent. Take the concept of a triangle. What would count as a "copy of the triangle" in the brain?

"I agree consciousness is a complex thing. I agree neural network theory is more relevant to the mysteries of consciousness than pillow theory."

With respect to the latter statement, I ask why is it more relevant? What makes a pillow not a valid physical model of the mind?

"I don't subscribe to tokenism."

That may be the case, but you kept using examples of tokens when you expressed optimism about the ability to capture what the concept of 'a' was in brain activity. That is, because you thought different forms of 'a' are recognizable as 'a', it therefore should be no problem to recognize what it is that is the concept (as if the brain contained a token of that concept).

"Concepts IMO are mental. I'm supposing each concept has an axiomatic form"

Once again, the use of 'axiomatic" here represents a poor usage. I can only assume that your use of the term 'axiom' is different than the dictionary use.

"A theory of meaning is not needed with my system of representation - the meaning comes from context and we perceive things as having meaning because our natural tendiency to anthropomorphism (useful for Turing tests!)"

I have no idea what you are talking about here.

"But it might matter. An accurate picture of reality and ability to "share" that reality intersubjectively may be very beneficial in the survival sense, for example."

Huh? What is the reality of the blue experience? What is it you think is real about that experience? Do you think the object of the experience is really blue? Or the light media the conveys the information about the object is blue? Or do you think that the physical activity of the eye is blue when it perceives blue or that some neuronal activity is blue (as if we could look at such activity and notice its blueness)?

"We can disagree, I think the description is pretty decent definition, IMO the latter does not need to uniquely identify the object."

As I thought. Your strange use of important terms in your paper are going to get you into a great deal of trouble. If you insist on building up a system, you will need to define your terms (or since this term is itself problematic, you will have to tell us what meaning you intend by the words you use) before you begin. That is, you will need a lexicon or glossary of terms so that we can communicate.

"In the blindsight thread there was an experiement that referenced simultaneous conscious and non-conscius perception. Do you think the link irrelevant to the puzzle of conscious perception?"

I find it interesting that consciousness seems to have the effect of providing a unity of experience -- as such, it makes sense that even though there are two eyes, ears, nostrils and so forth, one single consciousness is the result. Also interesting is that in some folks, different personalities can show up in such a way that consciousness seems to be serially changeable. Some of this is certainly debatable. Is it really possible, for example, to feel more than one pain at the same time? One might respond to this by saying yes, but a careful analysis of this might show that consciousness moves from one site to the other not with precision but through the mixing of experiences that arise temporally (i.e., a sharp pain dulls in time while another sharp pain waxes in the stream of consciousness).

owleye

excreationist

owleye:
some comments to your reply to John Page:

...What makes you [John Page] think the internal brain activity corresponding to a house is comparable to the house being observed, as an object of perception.
See this <a href="http://www.discover.com/" target="_blank">Discover magazine</a> article - from <a href="http://208.245.156.153/archive/output.cfm?ID=80" target="_blank">July 1992 - "Dreams of a Rat"</a>
Basically they monitored some neurons in a rats brain while it went through a maze. Whenever it got to a particular area in the maze, a particular neuron would fire a lot. This neuron would be used to by the brain for navigation as a "marker" for where it is. And when it dreamt, the same neuron would fire a lot. "The place-neuron experiment provided the first direct evidence that the brain is reprocessing daytime information during sleep."
There is also a very interesting experiment using <a href="http://www.hhmi.org/senses/b230.html" target="_blank">rhesus monkeys</a>. These monkeys are quite intelligent and I think they would be as "aware" as a baby human.
This suggests that the MT area of those monkeys' brains is similar to that of humans.

<a href="http://www.hhmi.org/senses/b210.html" target="_blank">A related article</a> about the MT (motion) area talks about a woman who doesn't have a working MT area... she can't detect movement...
[qutoe]Compared to the complex ensemble of regions in the visual cortex that are devoted to perceiving color and form, this motion-perception pathway seems relatively streamlined and simple. More than any other part of the cortex, it has yielded to efforts to unveil "the precise relationship between perception and the activity of a sensory neuron somewhere in the brain," says Anthony Movshon, an HHMI investigator at New York University.[/quote]
So basically there seems to be a 1:1 correspondence between information about movement in the MT area of the brain and the perception of that movement. If the MT area is damaged or over-ridden then their perception of motion is changed. Basically those neurons are memories which tell the person what they know... if the MT memories are destroyed, they lose the ability to track movement. If the MT variables are tampered with, it's like changing that person/monkey's thoughts.

"This again points to (conscious)perception of an object resulting from data in the brain."

I have no objection to this. The brain somehow produces (conscious) perception. How it does this
Earlier I defined what an aware system was... see also the recent consciousness threads in this forum. What the system (the animal, etc) is aware of is just the information it uses (MT information, etc) in order to make decisions, etc. Like that <a href="http://nivea.psycho.univ-paris5.fr/ASSChtml/ASSC.html" target="_blank">change blindness</a> like says, I think "experience is not something we feel but something we do".

(and why, for that matter) is the 64 dollar question.
I talked about this in my previous reply to you... anyway, we just biologically and culturally "evolved" to be intelligent enough to pursue science, conquer hunter-gatherers, etc. The more primitive people were just slaughtered, etc... so we are the only ones left. Our closest relatives that survived are chimps. I think our intelligence is just a result of the struggle for survival... other species didn't need to become more intelligent to survive though. (like bacteria, etc)

"I agree consciousness is a complex thing. I agree neural network theory is more relevant to the mysteries of consciousness than pillow theory."

With respect to the latter statement, I ask why is it more relevant? What makes a pillow not a valid physical model of the mind?
Neuroscientists have discovered first hand a lot about how neurons work... about what inputs they need to "fire", etc. See these <a href="http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/ai/laptop.jsp" target="_blank">New Scientist</a> articles for some examples about what artificial neural nets have been doing. The <a href="http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/ai/gasbrain.jsp" target="_blank">gas on the brain</a> article is particularly good I think. Artificial neural networks can do many things, like learn new patterns, infer and predict, recognize patterns even if the inputs are distorted, etc. Can pillows do this?

...I find it interesting that consciousness seems to have the effect of providing a unity of experience -- as such, it makes sense that even though there are two eyes, ears, nostrils and so forth, one single consciousness is the result.

Well we need to use all the data from those different sources in order to make decisions! e.g. pretend each sense led to a separate mind...
say the body was just walking around and the nose smelt something burning in the kitchen... so the "nose mind" would force the legs to walk to the kitchen, guided only by its nose...! (no sense of touch, sight, etc) It could just move the leg muscles so that the smell gets stronger and stronger. But what if the person had fallen over? The "nose mind" wouldn't know! It would just keep on cycling the legs around trying to find the source of the burning smell. But let's assume that it manages to somehow navigate the body towards the kitchen. The "eyes mind" would be confused because it wouldn't know why the body is moving down the corridor. Along the way it might turn its neck and look into a mirror and see its face. Its hair might be messy but it might just let that go since it might think the body moving down the coridoor is important. Then it might look around some more and see that the body is naked. Well it would be quite important to solve that problem so it would try and go back to its bedroom. The "nose mind" would be cycling the legs and this would create a problem for the "eyes" mind. It might push the body over and crawl along the floor with its arms - while the legs are still cycling. Eventually it would get to the bedroom to try and put on some clothes. Along the way it might get a big splinter in a finger from the big struggle. The "touch mind" would have been feeling a lot of pain during the struggle between the "nose mind" and the "eyes mind" - either it would have made the struggle worse by trying to react to the pain - or it would just ignore the pain. It would probably ignore the splinter since the pain would be fairly minor. Perhaps it would shake its hand. The "eyes mind" might see the hand shaking and be confused. If it looked carefully it would see the splinter. It would have to tell the "touch mind" somehow that it is ok... that the "eyes mind" will get the splinter out.
Then the "ears mind" might hear the doorbell ring - it could be very important. The ears would hear a lot of movement but not know what is going on. It would assume that the doorbell is important so it would try and move the muscles so that the doorbell sound gets louder. It can't feel touch so it wouldn't know where in the house it is or if it is standing upright or if the body is trapped somewhere.
The "stomach mind" might feel a bit upset... but none of the other minds would know... it wouldn't have a clue where the toilet is (or what a toilet is) so all it would be able to do is to try and keep the stomach contents inside its stomach. Along the way the "eyes mind" might see a chocolate drink and have a drink... (though it doesn't have much reason since it can't taste or feel) this would upset the "stomach mind" even more and it would eventually vomit things up a bit.
Now let's say the "eye's mind" is going towards the bedroom to put some clothes on. Along the way it might make the body lose balance (since it doesn't have a sense of balance) and a sharp object might stick into the body's back causing the body to bleed a lot. The "touch mind" would feel pain at first but then the pain would go away. Then the "eyes mind" would continue on its journey to the bedroom. The "ears mind" might hear the answering machine start and hear that its a person it wants to talk to so it would resist against the "eyes mind". The blood might never go into the field of view of the "eyes mind" so it wouldn't know that there was a problem.

Anyway, to make decisions our brain needs to simultaneously take into account many senses - it can't deal with them separately. A harder question is about why blue looks blue, etc.

Is it really possible, for example, to feel more than one pain at the same time? One might respond to this by saying yes, but a careful analysis of this might show that consciousness moves from one site to the other not with precision but through the mixing of experiences that arise temporally (i.e., a sharp pain dulls in time while another sharp pain waxes in the stream of consciousness).
Well I can feel two pains simultaneously if I concentrate... e.g. when I have bad posture (I'm doing this now) - to have a dull pain - and also dig my nails into my skin somewhere, like my forehead.

John Page

You're effectively saying that consciousness is required in order for a conscious experience to take place. This is a tautology of little value.
Mental activity takes place in the brain. I have provided evidence for this (and so has excre - thanks). Where is the contra evidence?
You totally overlook the evidence for how non-conscious experience is absorbed through the senses leading to conscious experience (or conscious perception, if you prefer). The time delay for auditory sensations to conscious perception is between 400 and 500 milliseconds.
I gave the "dreamed house" as an example. I sure you could recollect something similar from your own empirical experiences. Do you not have an imagination?
Yes. Knowledge is acquired information and the brain stores this, hence the brain "knows". It can also lose knowledge and clinical studies of various degenerative brain diseases can show this correlation of memory loss. A classic example is the elderly widow that does not consciously know her husband is dead.
I think that's exactly what it does say.
Agreed. Do have references to theories that seem mor plausible?
I'm talking about a specific brain state being the representation of a concept to us, the observers. As you say, it doesn't need to represent itself - IMO that goes toward infinite regress issues.
Difficulty is generally a problem. My theory of common physiology and reality may be insufficient. Why do you think it is insufficient?
I'll send it again, I can't post diagrams here.
Well, if you'd read the document I think it would be hepful for you to understand how this could be. Are you saying math has no relation at all to reality? Are you saying logic has no application in the real world?

Second, mathematicians study the science of numbers (real and imaginary).
Yes.
Yes again.
Huh? I'm saying that to uniquely identify an object you need time coordinates. Without this information you cannot tell the relation between the first observation of "the object" and what you observe at a second point in time. If you didn't follow this discipline and build up an understanding of how objects move through space over time. Without such understanding you wouldn't be able to "know" that the second observation was of the same object.

Mind experiment. Take two rocks that are visually identical. Throw the rocks. How do you know which one is which? Prior observations of rock trajectories which, I contend, are just comparisons of unique observations over time. If you didn't know this I don't see how you could arrive at the notion of a "persistent" rock.
Again, how would you know? Think about how you would prove an object's existence. How do you define an object in your example? A persistent observation?
Agreed, and how can you tell them apart?
Owleye, I think you're getting there. You just managed to distinguish between two instances of an "identical" symbol. Your act of perception would seem to violate the law of identity.

Hence, one cannot take a statement like "A = A" literally, it is a representation that A is deemed equivalent to A. You worked this out by comparing them. QED. Here is the definition of true from the paper you tossed "... true is a word that represents a state that exists when a represented entity is considered equal or equivalent to one or more representational forms". (bottom of page 4)

The only reason you can experience the symbol "A" in the first place is because we can imprint it on a substance that retains the impression over time.

Again, if you read the paper you will discover that I avoid using the same symbol on both sides of a statement in order to avoid the situation that you point out is, otherwise, a headache. Church's theorem is an example where the same symbol is used to represent the same "thing" existing at two points in time, no wonder its problematical!!
There are standards for proof, I never said they'd been proven as foolproof.
So what? The answer is only correct in conext with its own system. Its in no way universla is my point.
The answer to the calculation is only "right" in the context of of the system that it is seen in contect with. Nothing is universally right or wrong. I don't understand why you have an issue with this.
You need to distinguish between identity and assumed identity. There is nothing in what I have said that prevents processes from yielding results that are identical from an informational standpoint. Again, identity is conferred by the mind - if we couldn;t tell the difference between yesterdays paper and todays we'd think they were all identical.
Yep, thats how mistakes get made.
History shows this proces of correcting and improving standards happens. Especially in math and logic.
So what Goedel's theorem? Is it a series of marks on a piece of paper? Is it a series of mathematical operations? Is it a statement about relations between numbers? The truth of Goedels theorem is replicated when it is performed.

I think if we follow your reasoning, if the human race were wiped out tomorrow, Goedel's theorem would be lost forever. Not so, the mathematical truth could be understood elsewhere in the universe.
I would have thought it clear that I'm trying to articulate a worldview that needs no apriori.

More to follow, John

excreationist

John Page:

The time delay for auditory sensations to conscious perception is between 400 and 500 milliseconds.

I suspect that it is quicker than that... I'm planning on modifying a Java applet I found and testing it out... it would use synthesized sounds. I might do a binary decision one too where you have to react as fast as you can, choosing if the sound is high or low. (Basically the two sounds would be able to be distinguished even when only a fraction of it has been heard) If speech is involved it takes a bit longer since some of the word has to be finished in order for you to work out what the word is.

"It is not my contention that the brain knows anything at all. In the theory of yours that we have been discussing does the brain know anything?"
-------------------------------
Yes. Knowledge is acquired information and the brain stores this, hence the brain "knows". It can also lose knowledge and clinical studies of various degenerative brain diseases can show this correlation of memory loss. A classic example is the elderly widow that does not consciously know her husband is dead.

Also look at what I wrote about the MT areas of the brain and experiments with monkeys. The thing is that just because some information is stored somewhere, it doesn't mean that the thing "knows" it... i.e. a set of encyclopedias doesn't really "know" (or "understand") anything. But brains that have accumulated a set of beliefs and respond competently with the world obviously know a lot about the world. And I'm also talking about the brains of lower mammals. "Know" implies certainty and it also implies awareness or consciousness. I am cautious about saying that we can be certain about much... rather, we have beliefs about things.

I think if we follow your [owleye's] reasoning, if the human race were wiped out tomorrow, Goedel's theorem would be lost forever. Not so, the mathematical truth could be understood elsewhere in the universe.

That is assuming sufficient intelligences existed elsewhere in the universe... if humans were the only sufficiently intelligent creatures then I think his theorems would be lost. (But perhaps equivalent patterns would be found later in the future)

owleye

excreationist....

"The place-neuron experiment provided the first direct evidence that the brain is reprocessing daytime information during sleep."

This was not in dispute. The question relates to whether the house as observed is real or whether it is a product of the mind.

"There is also a very interesting experiment using rhesus monkeys. These monkeys are quite intelligent and I think they would be as "aware" as a baby human.

Again. This is not in dispute. When does
"baby human" become consciousness (i.e., self-conscious). I respect that there may be reason to believe that certain non-human primates achieve consciousness. Possibly other creatures do as well. The philosophical problem is determining what consciousness is. Is it physical? If so, you will need to explain it in accordance with physical properties. For example, does it have a size or a mass?

"I talked about this in my previous reply to you... anyway, we just biologically and culturally "evolved" to be intelligent enough to pursue science, conquer hunter-gatherers, etc. The more primitive people were just slaughtered, etc... so we are the only ones left. Our closest relatives that survived are chimps. I think our intelligence is just a result of the struggle for survival... other species didn't need to become more intelligent to survive though. (like bacteria, etc)"

I do not disagree with this. However, it doesn't tell me what it is that we possess. Calling it "being aware" or "being conscious" or being self-conscious, etc., is not enough. You need to explain subjective experience. Obviously if the brain produces conscious experience in us, something about the brain will be responsible for this. Searching the brain, discovering all its secrets, will undoubtedly be a fruitful endeavor over the course of the next 50 to 100 years. No breakthrough on the problem will occur until it can tell me what it produces. All that has been accomplished, it seems to me is to correlate our own experiences (or perhaps certain behavior) with brain states or brain activity. This has been accomplished many times over. We do it when we operate on the brain to remove language difficulties. The world as it appears to us (or to monkeys, if you like), has yet to be determined. The experience of the color blue is not explained by telling me that a certain wave length of light has been sensed by our eyes.

"Neuroscientists have discovered first hand a lot about how neurons work... about what inputs they need to "fire", etc. See these New Scientist articles for some examples about what artificial neural nets have been doing. The gas on the brain article is particularly good I think. Artificial neural networks can do many things, like learn new patterns, infer and predict, recognize patterns even if the inputs are distorted, etc. Can pillows do this?"

I mention pillows only because they (or at least some of them) can form impressions. The composition of the pillows could be said to react in such a way as to remember whose head was on it. I could have selected the immune system. Obviously the brain is more complex. The question is what is different about the brain than any system that can be said to remember and differentially respond to the world it senses in such a way that consciousness is produced. Indeed, what is consciousness?

"Well we need to use all the data from those different sources in order to make decisions! e.g. pretend each sense led to a separate mind...

[snipped irrelevant examples of disunity of consciousness]

Anyway, to make decisions our brain needs to simultaneously take into account many senses - it can't deal with them separately. A harder question is about why blue looks blue, etc."

We may need a brain that serves the purpose of unifying data received from the world. This does not explain why consciousness is needed for that purpose.

"Well I can feel two pains simultaneously if I concentrate... e.g. when I have bad posture (I'm doing this now) - to have a dull pain - and also dig my nails into my skin somewhere, like my forehead."

Maybe. Of course it depends on what you mean by simultaneous. Most theorists today do not have a "knife edge" orientation with respect to what constitutes "now." Instead they use the model that William James gave us, known as the "specious present." James writes that it is rather like a "saddle-back" from which we look in two directions at the same time. In any case, if you wish to explain consciousness you will have to explain your ability to do what you claim it can do.

owleye

owleye

John...

"You're effectively saying that consciousness is required in order for a conscious experience to take place. This is a tautology of little value."

True enough if this is all you got from it.

"Mental activity takes place in the brain. I have provided evidence for this (and so has excre - thanks). Where is the contra evidence?"

This requires you telling me what mental activity is that it can be located anywhere at all? I have yet to see any discussion that informs me about the physical nature of the mind such that it can be located in space and time. All that has been discussed is what is not in dispute -- namely that the brain is involved in producing (conscious) mental activity. What is produced (and why it is produced for that matter) is the subject of my philosophical concern.

"You totally overlook the evidence for how non-conscious experience is absorbed through the senses leading to conscious experience (or conscious perception, if you prefer)."

That conscious experience is produced by the brain is not being disputed. What is consciousness? What is conscious experience (or conscious perception)? These are the questions being asked.

"The time delay for auditory sensations to conscious perception is between 400 and 500 milliseconds."

So?

"I gave the "dreamed house" as an example. I sure you could recollect something similar from your own empirical experiences. Do you not have an imagination?"

I repeat. Dreams are conscious experiences. The comparison you are making is with objects in conscious experience. I am asking you to provide the alleged comparison of ordinary experience with some brain state (not with another experience).

"Yes. Knowledge is acquired information and the brain stores this, hence the brain "knows"."

Why put quotation marks around 'knows'? If it doesn't know something in the same way that our mind knows it, it can't count as knowing. You seem to running away from the problem I'm trying to address.

"It can also lose knowledge and clinical studies of various degenerative brain diseases can show this correlation of memory loss. A classic example is the elderly widow that does not consciously know her husband is dead."

That the brain is involved in producing consciousness is not in dispute. I don't know how many times I can repeat that. The above does not tell me that the brain knows (or doesn't know) anything at all. Rather it is the elderly widow that knows (or didn't know). Of course I recognize you use terms in metaphorical ways. The pillow knows who slept on it because an impression remains on it. This is the only way I could understand your use of knowing.

"I think that's exactly what it does say."

If this is all you mean, then you have not provided an account of the relationship between objects of experience and the subject. You've merely suggested a way of accounting for objects of inner experience from our experience of the outer world. The objects of inner experience are mental objects, produced by our imagination just as objects of outer experience are produced by us, given information received from the outer world. What constitutes the experience produced, whether they be from dreams and the imagination or from the world external to us?

"I'm talking about a specific brain state being the representation of a concept to us, the observers. As you say, it doesn't need to represent itself - IMO that goes toward infinite regress issues."

So the concept that is being represented by a brain state is "in the brain." In what sense do you mean "in". Do you mean physically within the boundaries of the brain -- like we might say a neuron is in the brain? Or do you mean something else?

"Difficulty is generally a problem. My theory of common physiology and reality may be insufficient. Why do you think it is insufficient?"

The concept might exist independently of whether the object is real, such as a mermaid. Secondly, even though we have a common physiology we each have different experiences and different perspectives on the world. The concept of an elephant would be different for different observers. The question is what would make possible having the same concept? Assuming that such a concept is derived from our having a common physiology, what is it about that physiology that makes concepts sharable? If, for example, you and I possess the same concept of 'physiology' (or 'concept' or 'sharing' or any other concept we might share) what is it about our physiology that permits this? What does our common physiology have when it possesses a shared concept?

"I'll send it again, I can't post diagrams here."

I generally consider documents fruitless for philosophical discussion unless I know what all of the symbols mean. If you use standard computer or engineering diagrams, I might be able to discern their meaning. You'll have to tell me though.

"Well, if you'd read the document I think it would be hepful for you to understand how this could be. Are you saying math has no relation at all to reality? Are you saying logic has no application in the real world?"

It may have an application, but its application is not what I'd been referring to. Mathematicians usually spend their time working problems that have nothing to do with reality and it is only much later that someone else finds a use. How do you account for what a mathematician does?

"Second, mathematicians study the science of numbers (real and imaginary)."

The science of numbers is one of the formal sciences that mathematicians are involved in. Since mathematicians are humans, what do you think is their domain? What is a formal science?

"Huh? I'm saying that to uniquely identify an object you need time coordinates. Without this information you cannot tell the relation between the first observation of "the object" and what you observe at a second point in time."

The second object must be different than the first because it has a different time coordinate, according to your theory of identity.

"If you didn't follow this discipline and build up an understanding of how objects move through space over time."

If the object moves through space and over time, the spatial and temporal coordinates are not essential to its identity.

"Without such understanding you wouldn't be able to "know" that the second observation was of the same object."

You would need to assume the object persists through time. Your theory of identity needs a lot of work.

"Mind experiment. Take two rocks that are visually identical. Throw the rocks. How do you know which one is which? Prior observations of rock trajectories which, I contend, are just comparisons of unique observations over time. If you didn't know this I don't see how you could arrive at the notion of a "persistent" rock."

This seems testable. Kant would argue that persistence is a fundamental part of our ability to observe objects in motion and this aspect of observation is a priori. It would be interesting to analyse motion sensors (including that which is part of our own visual system) to see whether there is the presumption of permanence given successive observations built into the apparatus. I.e., permanence isn't learned so much as it is built-in. (I.e., the motion sensor is programmed so that an object exists over time if certain conditions of motion are met in successive sensings.)

"Again, how would you know? Think about how you would prove an object's existence. How do you define an object in your example? A persistent observation?"

The point here is that you specified that an object's location in space and time is an essential part of its identity. If this were true then no object could move because doing so would require changing its spatial and temporal coordinate. You can't maintain both that the object is identified by (among other things) its spatial and temporal location and then turn around and say that it is the same object if it is at a different location. You are confusing what belongs in an essential way to the object and what belongs to the relationship of the object to the observer. Moreover, if objects, in your theory, are permitted to move through space -- i.e., traverse an absolute distance in an absolute amount of time, as a motion of the object (and not of the observer), then it is the motion that is being perceived, which will depend on perception making the assumption of persistence through time.

"(I think eventually this will be a big problem for your idea that concepts are physically located.)"

I have no such idea. I thought when you said that concepts were located in the brain, I assume them to be physically located there. I gather I'm wrong about this.

"Hence, one cannot take a statement like "A = A" literally, it is a representation that A is deemed equivalent to A. You worked this out by comparing them. QED.":

I have no problem construing this, since all of this is carried out within cognition, as part of my mental capacity. I assumed we use concepts in order to discriminate objects. You expressed the idea that concepts represent comparisons (not comparisons between two objects) but comparisons with something internal -- as if you were speaking about the concept itself. That is, you were saying the concept is used to compare with object it relates to in order to recognize it. I'm asking you to explain this. You keep avoiding this, by showing examples of comparing two different objects.

"Here is the definition of true from the paper you tossed "... true is a word that represents a state that exists when a represented entity is considered equal or equivalent to one or more representational forms."

What is the state that exists that represents the entity which is considered equal or equivalent to 'A' as it is represented in the statement "A = A"? Is this the concept (type) 'A'? Or is it merely the representation of the concept (type) 'A'? In what sense does it make sense to say of the above that a comparison is being made between the state representing the entity and one or more of its representational forms? What sort of comparison is being made here?

"The only reason you can experience the symbol "A" in the first place is because we can imprint it on a substance that retains the impression over time."

I don't think it would be the "only" reason. Don't you think it might be that our mind is constructed in such a way as to recognize the symbol? Secondly, do you think the mind retains an "impression", like an imprint of that which is observed -- something like a camera would or a pillow?

""There are standards for proof, I never said they'd been proven as foolproof."

Nor did I. What is a standard?

"So what? The answer is only correct in conext with its own system. Its in no way universla is my point."

You used it as a counter-example of '2+2 =4' being wrong. Given a particular math system,
'2+2=4' is true, and in that same math system, '2+2=5' is false? This allows you to say that truth is contextual, not universal. However, universality is not ruled out by this. With respect to that math system, its truths will remain true in that universe of discourse. It will be eternally true within that universe.

"The answer to the calculation is only "right" in the context of of the system that it is seen in contect with. Nothing is universally right or wrong. I don't understand why you have an issue with this."

That there are different mathematical domains (universes) doesn't reduce the universality of their application. It just means there are different universes. If you insist on universality with respect to the one universe that exists (i.e., the real universe), then if there is some mathematical representation of that universe, then its truth will be with respect to that universe -- i.e., it will be universally true.

"You need to distinguish between identity and assumed identity. There is nothing in what I have said that prevents processes from yielding results that are identical from an informational standpoint. Again, identity is conferred by the mind - if we couldn;t tell the difference between yesterdays paper and todays we'd think they were all identical."

I'm not sure I can sort this out. What do you mean by information? Is there a difference in your theory between what something means and what information is conveyed?

"Yep, thats how mistakes get made."

Could you characterize what a mistake is so that I can use it for reference?

"History shows this proces of correcting and improving standards happens. Especially in math and logic."

I had given you some credit for your contextualized theory of truth, but now it seems that you think there is something outside of our contexts which allows us to improve our standards. I'd be interested in how you account for improvement of standards? It would seem this requires the existence of a standard from which the improvement in standards could take place. This is very Platonic.


"I think if we follow your reasoning, if the human race were wiped out tomorrow, Goedel's theorem would be lost forever. Not so, the mathematical truth could be understood elsewhere in the universe."

What you claimed as my reasoning was based on my assessment of your reasoning. As such, I think there is an inconsistency in your thoughts. On the one hand you believe that mathematical truths are a human invention, yet on the other hand you believe they were discovered (or are discoverable). I could be wrong here, but this is how I would understand your various points on the subject.

owleye

John Page

Owleye:
Representations are things in themselves, they are used as representations (by us, for example) of other things that are not directly present.

Kant's transcendental idealist is unable to explain how the concept of representations comes about in the first place. If representations do exits there is no need for a transcendental explanation and if representations don't exist then there is no medium for the transmission of information - to which your perception of this message is contrary.
Look at the end of the first sentence "The objects of experience, then, are never given in themselves, but only in experience, and have no existence outside it." It has been proven that conscious mental experiences (can) result from physical experiences. Thus, the objects of experience do result from the action of physical objects and the statement at the end of the sentence is misleading if not downright wrong. There is a connection between physical reality and conscious experience, we don't know how this happens.

If you're going to complain that one can only experience consciousness first hand, go ahead. We know roughly what happens inside the combustion chamber of a car engine but nobody's ever been there.
You'll have to wait for neurological science to advance for a full explanation, if experience is anything to go by, speculation will be required to develop the concepts required to fully interpret and explain brain activity.
Babbage's early machines and even the electric adding machine are good examples of how operations can be facilitated electromechanically. I'm trying to bring your attention to the need to be open minded about the components of a conscious organism - neuronal states should include physical vectors.
See above, I'm trying to expand your awareness of the brain's possible resources.
No copy (literal or otherwise) is identical to the original. An equivalent could be written in a different langauge, for example.

There is not such thing as an identical (perfect) copy, this is usually what is intended by the expression "literal copy", unless you are taking the words literally of course.
Same as anywhere else, you copy the information that represents the entity.
Compare and contrast the behavioral characteristics of the neural network and the pillow.
I used identity, not tokenism. That entity #1 is compared with entity #2 and declared a fit does not create a token. That you think I'm using tokens, this is OK with me, we tokenize in written communication.
Axiomatic = self-evident in the dictionary. Unless a concept can be self evident, i.e. it is the thing you are experiencing, you end up with regress. That's why I don't use or need tokens - consciousness is a first person experience of representations, right?

How, then, do you think my use of the word axiomatic is not self-evident?
Experience is contained with our minds, it doesn't need to mean anything else.

If one was to start building a model of the brain, the components of the model would need to have meaning in the context of actual minds/brains. Again, please read my comments above on the use of the term axiomatic identity as opposed to token.
The reality of the blue experience is explained in the color vision link provided some while back. To all intents and purposes the conscious experience is of a blue object - the color bluse is associated within the mind.

The reality is that (absent perceptive abnormlities such as color blindness) we (all humans) can perceive colors uniformly.
No, we may need a shared lexicon or glossary in order to achieve a truly satisfying intersubjective experience. I'm using dictionary definitions - if you could be specific as to the words or expressions you are having a problem with?
I share your fascination but believe the unity is apparent - evolution has found some way for a Cartesian theater to be erected that gives us a (near) real time representation of reality - the ultimate head-up display. I wonder if a fly receives a unified image through its compound eye or whether the eye nerve tells the brain it has something that might be worth looking at.

I think the unity is apparent and the inner "I" illusory. In conscious experience, the inner "I" cannot be viewing something at a distance otherwise we end up with the same issues as Kant. In this way, conscious experience can never be third hand.

IMO the model we need to consider is how mutiple experiences within the brain are presented for conscious attention such that all those experiences seem converged as a single event. If you haven't looked into the area, you might find it thought provoking to look at some of the experiments on cognition that trace eye movement to eye perception/conscious understanding (reading) - i.e. we don't read line by line, word by word.

Cheers, John