XGuilt

This ludicrous question never seems to go away, and undoubtedly because there still exists an incredible number of human beings who cannot apprehend the fact that human morality did not spring from the (tainted) well of religion, which merely appropriated this concept once it realized just how exploited it could truly be (i.e., take all the traits of human 'nature', name them as "evil", and then cash in on the guilt).

As an atheist (more accurately: secularist), I do not accept or recognize religion's ownership of human moral concepts, and I never have; in fact, I consider all religions' fabricated assertions of 'moral' concepts to be as utterly vacuous as the dogma that underlies them. Theirs is the entirely subjective (and, therefore, ulterior-motived) approach, and they all would - and hopefully will someday - cease to exist the moment the majority of humanity rids themselves of their own subjective, self-imposed primitive religious ignorance.

Rational people (most atheists) does not 'need' any concept of "something higher" to validate their own existence or to give meaning to it. The notion of a 'higher power' is just that: a notion, of the most vacuous and mindless kind.

The statement you want to refute is nonsensical, as I'm sure you already realize is why it must remain unanswerable. The 'worth' of bacteria adds nothing to the discussion of 'human morality', and only those who live their lives as 'relativists' could pose such an inane question. Relativists are those whose only concept and source of self-identity (their "I") in life is as a reflection of other people. They are the ones who like to commonly assert another inane statement: that "man would not have need of 'morality' on a desert island." Well, the rational fact is that THAT is precisely where he would need it most. Why? Because 'morality' is that which is conducive to human life and self-preservation, it reflects a series of choices man must make in order to survive - which presupposes standards of value to make such choices, which presupposes a human mind capable of identifying what IS of value to him... starting with his very life. Religion does not recognize human (mortal) life as having value; it asserts that humankind's value exists only beyond the grave, in some supernatural dimension, and that humanity in its entirely is depraved, unworthy and evil - and that it must spend its entire mortal existence trying to atone for a guilt (which has already been predetermined by religion as an exercise in futility) that became his simply for being born. There can be NOTHING more IMmoral to the human consciousness than any entity which condemns human life as value-less and then proceeds to exploit the resulting guilt and fear throughout the entire human experience, and as bait gives its victims an empty promise of some ethereal 'afterlife' in exchange. How incredibly clever of religion to have conceived such a sting operation - and how incredibly ignorant of humankind to have permitted it this long. It is the worst, most contemptible fraud humankind ever perpetrated - on itself. And the most effective vehicle to keep this fraud ongoing has been the one concept that crosses all socio-economic and philosophical lines: the abject need of a code of morality for humanity to survive. Religion identified this very HUMAN need centuries ago, and the first man to acknowledge its 'ownership' of the keys to HUMANITY'S moral need sold out the rest of humanity in the process. So it is not on a desert island that man has no need of 'morality', but only after he is dead. Religion knows this and always has, so it makes hay while the sun shines - literally, because religion actually DOES place a very high value on human life while it exists... only it's NOT the value most people allow themselves to believe. Instead, religion views human lives as 'fodder' that only has value so long as they 'nourish' the needs of those in charge... during their own lifespan.

To me, 'religious morality' is the most blatant contradiction in terms ever conceived and that ever will be conceived in the entire human experience.

Plump-DJ

JJL..

Righteo then. So if i say "There is No God" and someone asks "How do you know that?" this is all going to depend on what i mean by God. If God is not contradictory (let's say he's an invisble pink unicorn who lives in my backyard) how would I know he did not exist? Simply because I find no evidence is not evidence of his non-existence. So on what other basis shall I make the knowledge claim, he does not exist as an absolute statement? If he is not contradictory then that is not a logical statement.

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>

Plump-DJ

Hello Vork.

Is that statement true or false? Is this how reality is --- or not?

PlumpDJ

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>

Plump-DJ

Well I really do beg to differ here. I accept that my belief about the existence of the sun has no bearing on the objective truth of it's existence. I can believe it does not exist, if i wish to. My question concerns the idea that from a metaphysical naturalists perspective I cannot see *where* to ground an *ontologicaly meaningful (it's got ontological ooomph) and binding* ethic (I can see where the Sun might go however). In otherwords If morality in some objective sense is apart from the origins of our beliefs about it (like the Sun) where then does it lie? It certainly does not have platonic or "Godly" existence in your view, so where else is there to put a *ontologicaly binding* ethic?

Well my point was based on the view that from a non-theistic perspective you have no where to place your "objective morality" in any ontologicaly meaningful or binding sense therefore this is the only option. In otherwords there is no justification for removing the origin of our beleifs about 'moral things' from the 'moral things' as they are in themselves given there is no suitable place to put the 'moral things' outside of our collective heads.

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>

kingjames1

Jeff -- it seems we are misunderstanding each other - this, unfortunately, is to be expected in such discussions.

First, naturalism states (according to both what you quoted and to what I have read elsewhere) that the natural universe is a closed system - i.e. there is no supernatural element in or without it, or anything beyond 'the closed box' of the universe. This is all I meant in my quote.
This typically entails materialism - although I acknowledge that many have held to a tertium quid "non-natural" category (e.g. some naturalists persist in the mind/brain dualism, holding mind as somehow above the physiological processes of the brain - though many of them do hold that 'mind' is nevertheless natural (e.g. a basic force in the universe, like gravity), or at least dependent on the natural properties). However, as in Moore's case, I find this category to be problematic and unclear (to say the least). Taking Moore's example, at one point Moore says that these "nonnatural properties" "depend on" natural properties, thus compromising the purity of his conception. What does this mean? Moore never clarifies. Moreoever, Moore is never clear in what he meant by "natural" in the first place. Third, Moore's only ground for the distinction between "natural" and "nonnatural" was intuition; but the distinction is supposed to be the ground for the appeal to intuition!

Ultimately, Moore's otherwise strange appeal to the nonnatural (what the hell is it?) is rooted in his understanding of the "naturalistic fallacy," as Moore has labeled it. Rightly, I believe, Moore acknowledges that goodness cannot be defined in terms of natural properties (i.e. states of affairs within the natural universe). So Moore makes recourse to these simple, unanalyzable, undefiniable "nonnatural properties." But this is surely then an appeal to the mysterious - a 'brute mysticism'.

Secondly, you stated that "you assume without argument that if a metaphysical naturalist is a moral realist, they must also be an ethical nonnaturalist and subscribe to G.E. Moore's intuitionism."
I never said anything of the sort - I certainly do not hold this. I was merely stating that his position as someone advocating a 'nonnatural' category, which you were the first to mention as an example, has many problems with it, as can be seen in the evaluations of many philosophy texts books.

Thirdly, you write "What you are completely neglecting here is ethical naturalism. To write, "The arguments against atheist, naturalistic ethical realism are hackneyed and do not require rehash," is question-begging. I, for one, believe that your arguments against ethical naturalism do require a "rehash." So please rehash them."

For future reference, please state your understanding of ethical naturalism. As for a rehash, here gos: If Moore's naturalistic fallacy holds true, and we assume naturalism and materialism (i.e. there are no non-natural categories that cannot be reduced to natural properties), then there can be no objective basis for ethics. We must agree with logical positivists that indeed ethics is merely trumpted-up language about 'feelings'. When someone says, "Murder is wrong!" all this can really mean is, "I really don't like murder." But all agree, this is not ethics proper.

If we assumed a nonnatural property, we must be clearer than Moore was in what that is, and how we have access to it (intuitionism is riddled with difficulties in this arena).

If you reject the naturalistic fallacy (rooted in Hume's arguments about 'oughts' and mere facts), then one must demonstrate this.

Fourthly, you felt that I misrepresented you in saying that you granted the possibility that ethics is social convention (though I was assuming it was purely hypothetical). I stated this on the basis your comment: "Talon originally defined morality as "a set of rules or conduct that is considered 'good.'" I pointed out how even if moral rules are nothing but constructs of the human mind, it is still the case that moral rules exist now, since human minds exist now."

I was merely disagreeing with this argument, though I never assumed you actually agreed with the premise. It does damage to the language of "rules" and "good", as I was attempting to point out in my previous post.

Finally, to get to your question about DCT. I hold that goodness is perspectivally understood: theologically (goodness is a divine attribute), morally or behaviorally (God acts good in consistency with his good nature), and existentially (God's goodness is His will and desire).
In terms of what is morally obligatory (that seems to me to be redundant), I hold a perspectival approach: 1) Norm - God has revealed normative standards (which are not completley unambiguous or simple, but nevertheless comprehensible and applicable), 2) Situation - the individual situation must be considered before we can understand and therefore properly apply norms, 3) the existential - we must consider not only our situation and the norms, but ourselves, where we are, who we are, etc. All this to say in the face of traditional DCT, what is morally obligatory CANNOT be reduced to a proposition commanded by God without doing violence to the entirety of God's revelation.

J.

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: kingjames1 ]</p>

kingjames1

I almost forgot this part...

Jeff, may I suggest that you do take some of these arguments seriously - at least read Putnam and Rorty if you can get a chance...these are not idiots spewing nonsense. Putnam is a very respected philosopher at Harvard, and is considered one of the most important thinkers in America today. And I'm sure you have heard about Rorty...

Secondly, I thought I had responded to your criticism already. Because I reject the either/or dichotomy of your reduction inherent in the popular understanding of DCT (namely, ethics as reduced entirely to theology proper), it is not clear how this argument applies to my position.

As you know from my previous post, I do hold to a certain loose understanding of DCT - perhaps most importantly, I affirm that goodness is indeed a divine attribute (and hence both transcendent and personal). And of course I am assuming this in these discussions, just as you are assuming your naturalism. But this does not negate that ethics is also immanent, to be discerned in the natural and human/social domain, etc. Afterall, it is my belief that this good God created a good world, with good people (and it was such without taint, prior to the Fall). Hence, my rejection of the dichotomy above (i.e. all moral properties are either supernatural or (non)natural properties). [To be honest, I have suspicion that the whole natural/supernatural dichotomy itself is artificial and must breakdown at certain points.]

Also, I am claiming that ethics is NOT justifiable on the basis of natural or nonnatural properties ALONE, such that without God, ethics as we know it is destroyed. You have not refuted this point. You are presupposing in this argument that ethics CAN be understood in terms of natural and/or nonnatural properties. But you have not demonstrated this.

So the question I am asking you is, how do you defend ethical realism without a transcendent, personal basis? You only mentioned that numerous atheists have attempted to do this. I and many others find them (at least those that I have read) to be lacking. As you can see, we are both making assertions back and forth - you assert that such and such has made a coherent case, I assert that he/she has not. My question is how do YOU defend this? Pick a position, and let's discuss that.

J.

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: kingjames1 ]</p>

jlowder

This is a silly reply. No one defines God as an invisible pink unicorn. Is your point that your conception of God makes God completely undetectable to humans? If so, I can still think of at least a couple of wayrs in which your non-detectable God might be falsified. First, assuming your concept of God entails that God is a disembodied mind, then your concept of God is still vulnerable to the <a href="http://www.infidels.org/infidels/newsletter/1999/march.html#Naturalism" target="_blank">argument from physical minds</a>. Second, if your concept of God entails that God created the physical universe with time, then God does not exist since time itself must be uncaused.

By the way, we are now completely off-topic for a discussion board titled, "Moral Foundations & Principles." A discussion about whether it is even possible to disprove God belongs over on the "Existence of God" board.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

jlowder

Plump-DJ,

I had written:

You replied:

And again:

Two points here:

1. This does not vindicate Ruse's argument. As we've seen, Ruse's argument is fallacious since it commits the genetic fallacy.

2. Instead of vindicating Ruse's argument, you are advancing a different argument for the same conclusion. You are overlooking the obvious, though, by not considering the possibility that moral properties are ontologically grounded in natural properties. Hence, you have not yet provided even a prime facie case against naturalistic metaethics.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

kingjames1

Jeff, just a fun fact, according to Stephen Hawking time was in fact 'created' - actually the result of a quantum fluctation within space when the universe had Planck dimensions.

Also, all of these arguments presuppose that man's rationality is not only fully functional, but the gate through which all that is acknowledged as truth must pass. What about the Christian presupposition that the Fall has distorted human knowledge - the so-called noetic effects of sin?

But you're right, this is off topic.

J.

jlowder

As Draper's definition of naturalism points out, metaphysical naturalism holds that the universe is a closed system <strong>in the sense that nothing that is a part or product of it can affect it.</strong> The bolded part of that definition is crucial, since it leaves it a possibility that abstract objects (not to be confused with Moore's nonnatural properties) might exist. Since abstract objects have no causal properties, abstract objects are compatible with metaphysical naturalism.

You've stated your conclusion. However, I do not find an argument for that conclusion anywhere in your post.

Fair enough. And I probably agree with you about many of the criticisms of Moore's position. However, my point remains that Moore's ethical intuitionism alone proves that moral realism is logically compatible with atheism or metaphysical naturalism. It never ceases to amaze me how theists, when responding to atheological arguments from evil, will make a distinction between logical arguments from evil and evidential arguments from evil, yet theists fail to make such distinctions when advancing their own arguments. I'm simply applying the same distinction to moral arguments for God's existence. What we might call the "logical ontological moral argument" is bankrupt. If you want to formulate an "evidential ontological moral argument," go right ahead.

Louis Pojman, in Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, defines ethical naturalism as "The theory that ethical terms are defined through factual terms, in that ethical terms refer to natural properties." Elsewhere, Pojman writes, ethical naturalism "is the theory that value statements can be defined in terms of factual statements."

That's a pretty big "if," especially in light of the critiques of Moore's "fallacy" has received by Smith, Brink, and others. How about a defense of Moore's naturalistic fallacy?

Talk about the fallacy of shifting the burden-of-proof! You have appealed to Moore's so-called "fallacy," now you need to defend the claim that naturalism in ethics really is a fallacy. To assume without argument that ethical naturalism commits a fallacy is to beg the question.

The words "even if" signify the fact that I was merely stipulating Talon's definition of "morality", for the sake of discussion, in order to make a point. I have never actually defined "morality" in the way Talon does.

If such a semantical thesis about morality were true, then morality would require God. But I see no reason to believe that that semantical thesis is true.

Jeffery Jay Lowder