Alonzo Fyfe

It is true that we ought to have a preference to telling the truth over lying. This is consistent with saying that lying is always wrong; lying is something which a good person always has a desire not to do.

But, it is not the only desire a good person has. Such a person should have an even stronger desire to save the innocent. And, when a lie will enable one to give somebody something that he or she cares about, improve their life at a cost to nobody, then compassion for the person lied to may outwiegh the aversion to lie. Thus, the "little white lie."

When we ask, "is lying wrong", we are asking an ambiguous question; are we asking about specific instances or lying in general.

Lying in general is always wrong. This says simply that everybody should have an aversion to lying; we are all better off if people generally prefer to tell the truth over lying.

Lying in specific must be measured against the other concerns that we ought to have, including the saving of innocent lives, and compassion for the feelings of our friends.

Another way to look at the NAZI/Jew example (and similar cases of lying) -- if it is permissible to kill a person in self-defense, or in the defense of an innocent life, then it is certainly permissible to lie in self-defense (or in the defense of an innocent life). If you are willing to kill the intruder who comes into your house with the intention of slaughtering members of your family -- or even guests you are entertaining, it is certainly permissible to lie to them.

And what about the Great Santa Clause Lie? Is this the sign of a moral monster?

fatherphil

in my right/wrong-black/white world lying is always wrong yet sometimes it's expedient and even the most appropriate thing to do if that makes any sense to you all. in other words, just cause i choose to lie (and i have on more than one occasion) it still is not right.

beth

I agree with this to some extent, but I do believe that there are times when lying is moral or justified if the truth would endanger oneself or another.

fatherphil

this brings to mind the drug arguement. is using heroin right or wrong? well its wrong. but if you have a gunshot wound, which is also wrong, a shot of morphine seems like a pretty good idea. given the screwed up situations we find ourselves in, sometimes we are called on to do the "wrong" thing that if all things were right we would never have to do.
i may use situational ethics but i really avoid redefining things to suit my purposes. thats why i can go to war and still define war as wrong.

The AntiChris

This looks dangerously close to an appeal to the intrinsic wrong of lying.

I can't see that lying (simply in the sense of not telling the 'truth') is wrong or immoral in itself. Why else is it so trivially easy to think of situations where deceit is quite clearly the 'right' option?

Chris

Jamie_L

All other things being equal, lying to someone thwarts their desire to know the truth. In general, people should not want to lie, because this ensures that people are able to hear the truth when they want to. Lying is wrong because, in general, people don't want to be lied to.

It's easy to come up with situations where it's moral to lie because people have many other desires which can easily be more important than truth.

Jamie

The AntiChris

Which just demonstrates that it's not the act that's immoral but the intention behing the act combined with the consequences of the act that give rise to moral issues.

Not telling the truth, in itself, has no moral value.

Chris

Jamie_L

There is always a consequence to not telling the truth, unless no one is listening when you speak the falsehood. Thus, there is always morality attached to it. As you say, however, the consequences can vary with the situation.

Jamie

Alonzo Fyfe

Nope. The value of a preference for telling the truth is due to the fact that the preference generally fulfills other desires more than it thwarts other desires.

No intrinsic merit is involved.

Yet, I do agree that the wrongness of lying is weak (that is, the strength of the aversion to lying that one ought to have is weak), yet, the charge of lying is considered to be prima facie valid --suggesting that some level of aversion on the part of moral agents is expected.

Alonzo Fyfe

Perhaps, but your phrase here allows for multiple interpretations, and some of them are not exactly right.

A person who tells the truth for bad motives under bad intentions still need not be doing anything wrong. For example, I may hate my brother and want nothing more to ruin his life. I know that he is involved in an illegal business practice. I tell the truth -- not with the intention of enforcing the law (I could not care less about that), but with the intention of hurting my brother. Yet, reporting my brother is not wrong.

The reason it is not wrong is because the intentions evidenced by the act are not wrong. I have done exactly the same thing that a person with good intentions would have done, even though my intentions were not good. Because a person with good intentions would have done the same thing, the intentions evidenced by my action are good, and the act is considered right.

It is quite possible that the phrase I use, "intentions evidenced by an act" is what you mean by "intentions combined with consequences of an act." The consequences are what determines the intentions evidenced by the act. In this case, we are in agreement. The confusion is that the actual consequences behind the act play no role whatsoever.