David Gould

originally posted by David Gould:

If [God] knows that rape has a good consequence that outweighs the suffering of the victim in more than half the cases but he does not know which ones, then he is morally obligated to not intervene in any rape.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
posted by tergiversant:

What are the implications for those who believe this and claim that God is worthy of moral emulation?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

If they truly believed that this was the case (that rape led to a positive moral consequence more than half the time) then they would be obligated to themselves not prevent rape.

But the thing is, they cannot know that: only God knows why he is not preventing all rapes. Thus, this is a possibility but as only God knows for sure humans cannot live their lives on such an assumption. Moral choices have to be based on knowledge - if you knew that saving someone from being raped would damn them to hell, you are obligated not to save them. As you do not know that (although it certainly is a possibility) then the moral obligation on you is very different.

As human knowledge is less than divine knowledge by definition, it would seem inevitable that different actions are moral for humans than for God.

tergiversant

In such a scenario, it matters not what we do, everything will work out for the greatest good. People who buy into such poppycock will therefore have no motivation to act morally, and may indeed act immorally with impunity.

Most people (believers and unbelievers alike) believe that our moral choices do matter, and would thus reject such a farfetched theory.

tergiversant

They most certainly can, if they assume that God is worthy of moral emulation. Whatever moral reasons God has for allowing atrocities would apply human moral agents as well, whether known or unknown.

I fail to see why. Whether God prevents some rapes or none, those that follow God's moral example should do just as He does.

Let me put it another way. If a rape is about to happen, either God will stop it or not. If so, then the God-emulating human need not act. If not, then the God-emulating human ought not act. Either way, action is not warranted.

David Gould

I disagree with this.

The human observing the rape in progress may be agent through which God intends to prevent that particular rape.

Or the observer may be there simply to learn a particular moral lesson.

The point is, the human observer does not know, leaving him free to act or not to act based on other moral considerations of which he is aware. (Such as, for example, that rape causes suffering to the victim).

If we allow the idea of free will and humans as free willed moral agents, it follows that humans must be placed in positions where they must make choices of morality and immorality.

If you dissallow free will, then the first option becomes the only one available - no free will and everything that happens is a moral necessity leading to the greatest moral outcome.

To say that this means that humans have no reasons to act morally is exactly equivalent to saying that this means that humans have no reasons not to be morally. Thus it is a meaningless statement.

Humans in a situation where free will does not exist will either act morally or not act morally according to way the world is set up. Thus, those who accept this argument and see that it excuses them from acting morally will have done so because that is what they are required to do. Those who reject the argument as poppycock, likewise. Those who see that the argument gives no reasons to not act morally, likewise.

Let me ask you this question: if I accepted the argument that everything that happens is because it is morally required that it do so, what reason does this give me to not act in the way that I believe is moral (preventing rape, for example)?

Alternatively, if we start with the assumption that God is moral and free will exists, then God in creating free will must have had a moral reason to do so - free will must be morally significant.

Any action that therefore curtails this free will (for example, preventing a rape) must therefore necessarily morally outweigh the moral significance of free will. Likewise, any situation where free will is not curtailed with must be one where the moral benefit of allowing that expression of free will outweighs any moral cost.

But how do we test this? We have no knowledge of the moral value of free will. We cannot weigh it up; we cannot evaluate it in any specific instance. Thus, it is impossible for us to judge whether God is indeed moral or is not moral.

For all we know, free will could have zero moral value. Or it could have an infinite moral value.

Thus, judging God to be immoral based on his lack of intervention in any specific act of rape is impossible for us.

However, judging a human for such a lack of intervention is not impossible for us. As we do not know the moral value of free will, we can only act on the knowledge of the suffering we see in front of us.

Koyaanisqatsi

There is another negation of premise one, but based on the notion of Karma.

The rapist this time around was earlier the rape victim and vice versa, thus Karmic justice is served.

Just thought I'd throw that into the mix.

tergiversant

If the human chooses not to intervene, God has other means available to stop the crime. What then is the point of human intervention? Would God refrain from stopping a rape merely because of an uncooperative would-be hero? Either God intends to prevent the victimization or allow it. If God intends to stop it, human intervention is unnecessary. If not, then human intervention is immoral (assuming God is morally exemplary). There is nothing moral about the exercise of indeterminist free-will (IFW). One may as well flip a coin and act accordingly! Moreover, the idea of IFW has no empirical basis and indeed cannot be proven -- even in principle! Assuming God exists, and is quite the benevolent fellow, this is so. Those who hold such views would therefore appear to have rather little motivation to act morally. How so? If one hopes to morally emulate God, then one should allow all evils which God allows, that is, all of them.

-- tergiversant@OklahomaAtheists.org

<a href="http://www.OklahomaAtheists.org" target="_blank">ATHEISTS of OKLAHOMA</a>

"Atheists are OK."

[ July 09, 2002: Message edited by: tergiversant ]</p>

David Gould

Originally posted by David Gould:
To say that this means that humans have no reasons to act morally is exactly equivalent to saying that this means that humans have no reasons not to be moral. Thus it is a meaningless statement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
my response:

Because there if there is no free will, there is no reason to do anything - the things that are ordained to occur will occur.

It seems to me that you are objecting to this simply because you do not like the implications, rather than because you have any logical reason to do so.

It is like a scientist objecting to the universe being a certain way by saying 'If the universe were like that, we couldn't do the sums!'

Your argument boils down to: 'If we had no free will, no-one would have a reason to act morally.' Even if that statement were true (and it can't be as it makes no sense), that is not a logical argument against there being not free will. it is merely a wish - you want there to be reasons to act morally and complain that you cannot see any in my scenario. Tough cookies, pal.

And as to why your objection makes no sense whatsoever anyway: THERE IS NO FREE WILL IN THIS SCENARIO!

Think about it.

People would not have 'reasons' to act morally or not act morally - they would act morally or not act morally according to the dictates of God's plan.

Thus, those whom God wanted to believe it and thus convince themselves that they need not act morally would believe it. Those that God did not want to beleive it and still have a reason to act morally would not believe it. Obviously, if the scenario is the correct one you are one of the people that God has made to not believe it.

Remember: there is no free will in this scenario. people have no choice as to whether they accept this as being the truth or not.

I think the atheological argument from rape fails on this point alone.


With regard to a situation in which we had free will, think about this scenario:

I walk round a corner and see a man in a suit pointing a gun at another man lying on the ground. I see that he is about to pull the trigger. I push his arm so that he misses the man lying on the ground - my moral code says that it is wrong to murder people.

And then a bomb detonates in the basement of a skyscraper and 1,000 people die.

The reason? The guy on the ground was trying to trigger a bomb. The guy with the gun was shooting him to stop it.

Have I acted morally or immorally?

It is clear that I acted morally.

With more information, I would have acted completely differently, and yet still have acted morally.

This is what I mean about information being important. God has by definition more information than we do. Therefore, actions which he performs may be moral for him and yet immoral for us. And vice versa.

Either God is totally moral or he is not.

If he is moral, then the creation and allowance of free will must for him must have a positive moral consequence.

We have no way of determining in what direction that moral consequence lies - is it a positive moral consequence for us to save the woman from rape or is it a negative one?

God intervening to prevent a woman being raped may automatically cause a negative moral consequence. (Like a bomb going off that he knows about). It would be an immoral act for God to prevent a rape with his knowledge.

But it is not immoral for us to prevent the rape with our limited knowledge. In fact, with our limited knowledge it is immoral for us to nto intervene in the rape.

The bad things that ensue are not moral things that can be laid at our door or God's. (If we assume free will must be allowed).

The immoral thing was done by the person who set the bomb, not by the person that was trying to shoot him with knowledge of that event and not by the person that was trying to prevent the shooting without knowledge of the bomb.

Knowledge is the most important factor in moral situations.

And either you accept that we have free will or you accept that we do not.

If we have free will then we must act morally on the knowledge we have. God must act morally on the knowledge he has, and that includes permitting free will (remember, free will is a given in this scenario - as soon as free will is removed, you are in the no free will scenario).

Thus, God and humans can both act perfectly morally and yet be doing completely different things.

tergiversant

Objecting to what? An undefined and unsubstantiated notion of “free-will?” Unless you can explain what exactly free-will is and why it outweighs our moral obligation to prevent rape, then any free-will defense is dead in the water.

Certainly not. I made no mention of “free-will” in my argument. I doubt that the notion has been coherently defined.

You have yet to explain what the claim “free-will exists” entails. Action without coercion, perhaps?



I doubt that there is any free-will at all, in the sense that you are using the term.

I do.

Which premise is falsified by your “no free-will” scenario?

If we knew that the man in your hypothetical scenario had good moral reasons for shooting the other man, then it would be moral for us to refrain from intervention on those grounds alone. Similarly, if God has some good moral reasons for allowing rape, then it would be moral for us to refrain from intervention.

Such as?

If we know that God has good moral reason for nonintervention, then we should act accordingly. Do you claim to know this?

I accept that we oftentimes act without being coerced to do so. Perhaps you mean something else?