tronvillain

Plump-DJ:
Well, if a sofa were to pop into existence next to me without cause, I think it would be perfectly accurate to say that it came from nothing. Of course, you could always say that the potential for a sofa was there, inherent in the laws of physics. This would present a problem for creation ex nihilo using your definition of "nothing" but one could decide to define it as "the absence of everything but the potential for anything."

Indeed, something could come into existence without cause at any moment; however, as far as we can tell this does not occur. We beleive that things which exist have a reason for their existence because we observe the complete absence of things without a reason for their existence.

I am afraid this is not the slippery slope you make it out to be. Yes, the universe could have popped into existence from nothing five minutes ago, but the hypothesis is completely without support and so we ignore it. If we did observe things spontaneously popping into existence, it might make rational inquiry somewhat more difficult and less certain, but it would be no means make it impossible. As it is, we do not observe things spontaneously popping into existence, so worrying about it is pointless.

We accept the principle because it appears to always be true - it is essentially a hypothesis that is well supported by the evidence. Still, we must acknowledge that there may not be a reason for some things, but that need not prevent us from looking. You can never say for certain "No, this doesn't need a reason and came from absolutely nothing; however, this did come from something else and does need a reason."

Again, this is not the slippery slope you make it out to be. To acknowledge that the principle of sufficient reason may not always hold is not to say that it never holds. The hypothesis that our experiences are without cause but merely appear to caused could be true, but the hypothesis that they actually are caused is simpler.

Not so good I'm afraid, since it does not undermine rational thought itself. If we were to discover tommorow that paper clips spontaneously pop into existence in desk drawers, would all knowledge claims be undermined? No.

Something not having a reason for its existence simply does not preclude someone having rational thoughts about it. Going back to the sofa which could pop into existence next to me: I could think about its shape, its texture, its colour, and so on.

Well, since you failed to show any such thing above, I see no reason to give any credit to the assertion now.

Well, to say that something came from nothing is merely to say that there was nothing (say, a total absence of any of the properties of a sofa) and now there is something (say, a sofa).

Still, it remains a possible way around the Kalam argument. Oh, you may assert that there is some "higher" sense in which there could be said to be something "before" the Big Bang, but why should anyone accept your assertion?

Plump-DJ

I think you could rationaly say "it came from something of which we have no conception." If you claim it came from non-existence as an absence of everything including potentialty that would be absurd. If you claimed it came from sometihng you define as the potential for everything which you label nothing I would charge you with equivocation over the word nothing. I mean you can define it how you like of course, but there are accepted definitions for words and with those definitions come concepts. If nothing has the potential for everything then i say it's not nothing.

You're saying it's possible for something to come from complete non-exstience and there is nothing inherently irational about that and when asked what reason do we have for thinking that "things aren't coming into existence from non-existence all the time" or "that our experiences themselvess aren't simply being generated by nothing" (ergo we have no knowledge) you mention experience and simplicity. Firstly we cannot refer to our experience of things without begging that question. Secondly you say it's simpler to think otherwise and I argued below that it's not in fact simpler to think that at all.

On what grounds do you say it's simpler. What could be more simpler then the idea that everything came from the presence of the potential for everything. (which btw is the first time i've ever seen anyone even hint at the idea that this is what "nothing" is) That's a far simpler hypothesis. In fact it does away with the need for a cause altogether. Occam's Razor just has everything coming into being from this "nothing" of yours. Of course we have no knowledge of anything but let's not worry about that.

Certainly Yes.. But if paper clips did pop into existence, on what grounds would you claim they came from complete nothingness? Because you simply could not see or observe where it came from is no reason and *hence* the problem of line drawing here. And i also note with interest the importance of the use of the word nothing in this whole discussion. By my definition (the accepted definition i believe) you would be engaging in absurd-speak if you tell me that this sofa came from nothing.

1) I think this discussion highlights quite nicely that this is not a matter of 'experience' or empiricism. (at least to me) No amount of experience could confirm or deny creation from absolute nothingness. It's a matter of epistemology in my view. And Again, how do we know it came from nothing? Because we simply did not see the cause is no answer and that is what we're reduced to saying.

2) It's a matter of epistemology and definitions. By my definition any such talk is absurd, by yours anything can come from noithng. However i would argue that the presence of a potential of infinity as we might call it is hardly nothing. I mean we could simply do away with the word nothing and say "infinite potentiality" and instead of saying the sofa popped into existence from nothing I would say it popped into existence from "infinite potentiality"! And people would look at me strangley and go "you talkin silly talk foo" once they see what metaphysical baggage i'm hiding behind the word. I mean infinite potetnaity or the 64 hypo-dimensions of SOD - what's the difference.

3) When asked how you know (or what reason i should say) to think your experience's aren't simply being genereated by nothing, along with sofa's and the universe (since you allow for that possiblity) you simply say that it's simpler to think that our experiences are generated by something rather then absolute nothingness. Of course i don't think you actually showed that to be the case. In fact if our experiences are generated by nothing, then there is no need for a reason or cause or explanation at all and Occam's Razor looks like he has their names on it (along with Knowledge as well). How cool is that?

My job isn't even to prove or show that such a situation is even remotely likely. All i have to do is show the error in your objection by raising another possiblity. So no you can't "semantic-ise" you're way out of the beginning of a universe by claiming we can speak of no before, therefore it didn't begin. (And if this is not the goal of such an objection -- to avoid a beginning why even bother?)
Forgetting to mention of course that you've simply tied the notion before to our own dimension of time. And quite frankly i'm amazed that anyone would accept anything as anything given our situation. Why would i simply assume that there is no higher level of time or some such thing especialy if 1) i have reason to think that our dimension of time emerged from the BB a) that other universes may exist and 3) My own limited experience of time in this universe.

If you lived in the multiverse or in another universe for example you could possibly see our universe begin. So there is no problem of conception here and thus you're objection boils down to semantics and the inaccuracies of the language we often use. And in that case I am allowed speak of a before.

Infinity Lover

Posted by Hans
"Xeno's Paradox deals with an object traveling a finite distance. I'm not sure it's the same thing as discounting the possibilty of an infinite regression of events."
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Has any of you checked out the "Infinity anxiety; the irrational attachment to beginning" thread.
I placed an additional post explaining 'the principle of absolute infinity' Infinity working inwards and outwards. It sounds to me like the concept of infinite regression boils down to trying to apply inwards infinity to what really is outwards infinity.
Xeno's paradox is easely solved by abandoning the foolish notion that mathmatical perfection applies to reality.
(In reality it's impossible to actually reach a point, but approximating it or passing it by is quite doable.)

What we call the universe is simply there, constantly expanding because it can't stand still, or go inwards (that would give infinity a limit; a breach of logic science engaged in when creating the Big Bang theory... gee let's reverse the process )
It's the way everything our infinite existence consists of is subject to limitations (a size and a lifespan, after which there's an transformation of mass and energy), and by comparing one movement to another, that we get a frame of refference we call time.

Infinity Lover

Now that I think about it...

...aren't theories supposed to be based on possibilities?

The expansion is a fact, it's hypothetical reverse a breach of logic, again reversed into an alledged beginning (infinity has this funny habit of being boundless, it doesn't stop being infinite within or outside contemplative borders, and the point where everything comes together definately constitutes as a limit)

Where does that leave a theory based on an impossibility?

How can anyone make a serious assumption, based on a reversal that can only exist in our immagination? We might as well throw our hands in the air and succumb to calling religion a genuine science.

Ron Singh

Because God is not subject to infinite regression; due to his timeless nature. Time is not a function of God; but a function of the universe. Infinite regression does not push God aside via Ockham's razor; but infinite regression alludes God.

Horia Plugaru

This is my reply to Bill in response to what he wrote in the feedback section on the 23 of August, 2002, 11:29AM.

I am sorry if you didn't understand this simple fact, Bill, but as I clearly and explicitly said in my response, I was reffering to what you wrote me AT THE FEEDBACK SECTION. Since you did not provide any bibliography and/or links at this section following your post, I naturally thought that you considered what you wrote to be a sufficient criticism of Sadowsky's argument. I pointed out in my response that in fact what you said was incomplete and unconvincing.
In your second reply, you make use of arguments that were not even mentioned--let alone presented in detail--in the first one. Therefore, you admit that what you said the first time was not enough. This was exactly my point. You only confirmed it. So it is not me who misunderstood your arguments, but rather it is you who did not understand what the target of my critique was.

Now lets evaluate your two arguments presented in this last reply.
Your first one is this: So are we now to belive that within a limited amount of time--one minute, for example- we have an actual infinity of intervening moments, in other words, an infinite amount of time?! How can this be? Isn't this incoherent? Do we also have an endless regress of causes taking place during each minute? If yes, can you give at least a single example of such a regress?
Surely a serious argumentation is needed in support of your remarkable claims. Unfortunately, you do not provide such an argumentation.
Moreover, as you say, "it can just as easily be argued that it is impossible for any finite individual to traverse an infinite number of moments". So why should we not conclude from this that in fact we do not traverse such an infinity? If one can make a serious case--as even you admit--that it is impossible for me to traverse an infinity of moments, and if it is clear that I traverse a minute, doesn't it follow that a minute is not "composed" of an infinite number of moments?
In order to argue that it is, you should show that the aformentioned case fails. However you do not show this and it must be said that it will not be an easy task at all since, as even you admit, the case is indeed plausible.

So as you can see, your first argument is not very convincing--although it is original, I must admit.

What about your second argument?

First of all, I do not agree that we have three options. Depending on how you interpret it, your third option can be reduced to one of the first two. For example, if X is the theist God in your 3, then we have the following two options: (a) there was an infinite regress of thoughts in God's mind stretching all the way back in time and which eventually ended with with the conclusion that its preferable to create the world. Therefore, God created the world setting in motion the chain of causality in the world. Here we have an endless chain of causality (the infinite regress of God's thoughts which is continued by the chain of causality within the created world). (a) is your first option.
The second option is (b): the intension (or the thought) to create the world popped into existence in God's mind uncaused. (b) is your 2.
Therefore, your 3 can be reduced to your 1 or to your 2. As I say in my reply to Professor Carrier, where, this uncaused cause can emerge from complete nothingness or can exist eternally out of necessity ( or "because it is necessary").
Now you affirm that:

I. One cannot argue against my 1 because he will be forced to postulate an entity that exists eternally and in this case he contradicts himself.

II. My 2 is "ludicrous" (meaning presumably that it clearly is impossible or, at least, very, very improbable). So our only serious option is 1.

Both I. and II. are problematic.

Problems with I.

Notice that Sadowsky is not saying that an eternal entity cannot exist. All he says is that an endless regress of causes in which "nothing (incuding causes) can exist without a cause" cannot exist. So it is not enough to simply show that the proponent of 1 is forced to rely on the existence of an eternal entity. You must also show that this entity includes or gives rise to an endless regress of causes. It is not at all necessary to postulate such a regress if we postulate an eternal entity. For example, Plato's Form of Beautiful is eternal but it is hard to see how does it include an endless regress of causes or how does it create one.
So we must ask: can one reject 1 without relying on the existence of an eternal entity which includes or gives rise to an endless regress of causes? It seems to me that the answer is "Yes". One solution is given by Professor Nicholas Rescher in his article Optimalism and Axiological Metaphysics, Review of Metaphysics, June 2000, v53 i4 p807. It is obviuos that I cannot present Rescher's whole argumentation here. But I will present some of his points very briefly. His Rescher goes on to show "why should it be that reality rational" and "How Value Can Have Explanatory Efficacy"-section IV.

So it appears that an impersonal, eternal, uncaused and necessary value can create the world without including in itself an endless regress of causes and without giving rise to one such regress. It does not include an endless regress of causes in itself because it doesn't require an endless chain of thoughts as the theist God does. It is eternal because it is necessary. It does not give rise to an endless regress of causes because it starts the chain of causality within the world so this chain cannot be endless: it has a beginning.

So in order to defend I., you must show that at least Rescher's solution fails (there may be other solutions as well). Needless to say, you do not even begin to show this.
So your I. is unconvincing.

Problems with II.

Is it true that my 2 is impossible or very, very improbable? First of all, an uncaused cause need not emerge from "complete nothingness" because it may very well be necessary.
But even if it is not necessary, is it true that it cannot emerge from nothingness, that the principle ex nihilo nihilo fit is correct?
Apparently not. Professor Morriston in his Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause? argues at length against this principle-sections I.D; I.E; I.F.
John Mackie in his classic The Miracle of Theism, although admits that ex nihilo nihil fit receives empirical confirmation, also writes on page 89 Also Dr. Martin in his book Atheism:A Philosophical Justification offers an argument which can be used against your II -page 100. The same Dr. Martin, in his debate with Dr. Fernandes -in his opening statement- says that You must show that all this arguments presented against the principle ex nihilo nihil fit fail. But you do not show this. As usual, you simply assert it.

But even if all I said against your second argument fails, this still doesn't mean that you rebutted Sadowsky's argument. You just presented an argument against my 2. But Sadowsky also presented an argument against 1. So the "score" is equal: Sadowsky -one point vs Bill -one point. If you want to rebut Sadowsky's point you will also have to directly attack his argument presented in my feedback--showing, for example, that the proposition "nothing (including causes) can exist without a cause" is not problematic.
Again, you fail to do this.

Best Regards,
Horia Plugaru

P.S.: I hope, Bill, that for the truth's sake you will post this response also in the feedback section or, at least, provide a link to my response.

tronvillain

Plump-DJ:
I am not entirely clear what your position on the word "nothing" is. To clarify it, let us simply assume that a sofa suddenly pops into existence without cause and ask the question "Would it be accurate to say the sofa came from nothing?" Personally, I think it would be, since I see no reason to include "lack of potential" in the definition since it makes the word essentially useless. Anyway, it would be rational of me to say "it appeared to come from nothing" or "there was no apparent reason for its sudden existence."

We cannot be completely certainn that things are not coming into existence from complete non-existence all the time, but the simple fact is that they do not appear to be doing so. What more do you want? As for the possibility that our experiences are simply being generated from nothingness rather than being generated by an external reality, while it is a possibility it has less explanatory power. Compare the response of the two hypotheses to the question "Why do our experiences give the impression that there is an external reality?": 1) They just do. 2) There really is an external reality. Again, what more do you want?

*sigh* It is no more favoured by Occam's Razor than is the hypothesis "God did it." See my comparison of the two hypotheses above.

Do you realize that everything you just said amounts to nothing more than whining about the impossibility of proving a negative? While we could never assign probability one to the hypothesis that there is no explanation for the sofa's existence other than its inherent possibility, the continued absence of any alternative explanation would lend it support. Oh, perhaps not enough support to totally abandon the search for an alternative explanation (I can think of a few actually), but enough to keep the possibility in mind.

No, while no amount of empericism could conclusively prove the hypothesis, it would be easily disproved by the discovery of another explanation. Since the inability to conclusively prove a hypothesis is not a problem for science, I fail to see what you are whining about.

See my earlier effort to clarify your definition of the word "nothing." As far as I can tell, there is nothing irrational about something coming into existence from nothing, at least as the word is often used. What is next to this chair I am sitting in? Nothing. Well, there is air and space, but there is no sofa. Does the potential for a sofa exist next to me? Yes. A sofa could easily be occupying that space instead of the air that is now occupying it, and while the traditional way of getting a sofa into that space would be to go get one and move it, there is no apparent logical obstacle to one simply appearing without explanation.

See my earlier comments... again.

You are merely raising an alternative possibility, which means that the possibility I suggest is a way around the Kalam argument: If there was no before the Big Bang, then the universe did not come into existence at the Big Bang. No one is claiming that this is definitely the case, but the mere possibility
reduces the conclusion of the Kalam argument to "Therefore, the Universe may have a cause of its existence."

I see no reason to assume (or think likely) the existence of a meta-universe or a meta-time given the total lack of evidence for their existence, though they are certainly possibilities.

Bill

Horia Plugaru:

The Feedback section is not a place for conducting formal debates. If that is what you had in mind, we have a forum set aside for that sort of thing.

I'm real busy right now, trying to move the main infidels web server to be colocated on the same machine we are on right here. This is taking up a heck of a lot of my time, and I have many other things to do today "in real life" which prevent me from even reading what you've posted, above. I will get back to you as soon as I am able.

== Bill

Horia Plugaru

Rectification

I should have said: Rescher goes on to show "why should it be that reality is rational"...

Instead of I.D. I should have said I.B.

The correct quote from the Martin - Fernandes debate is
Yes, but you also posted your responses at this forum. Besides, I also gave you my responses at this forum.


No problemo. Take your time.

Regards,
Horia.

Richard Carrier

I don't have time to read all that has gone on here. I am forced to reply in isolation to the one post that addressed me. I apologize.

Horia, just FYI: I am not a professor. I currently hold an M.A. and an M.Phil. but at present no Ph.D. or teaching position (though I am working on a Ph.D. and I have taught).

Everyone else, FYI: its Zeno, not Xeno.

Regarding the <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=1&t=002199&p=" target="_blank">Schick-Sadowski matter</a>, don’t forget that my paragraph began “You are confusing me here.” What follows was my attempt to make sense of what I thought you were saying, which I had a hard time figuring out because of all the overlapping double negatives (hence I concluded with my observation that what you were saying wasn’t clear to me).

You’ve cleared that up now at any rate. Be aware that I never avowed any interest in defending either Schick or Sadowski. I continued in feedback solely with my own thoughts on the issue stated in your topic heading, “Can there be an endless regress of causes?” and not anything about the specific arguments of Schick or Sadowski.

Regarding logical possibility, every proposition about a matter of fact is logically possible if the proposition itself is internally coherent. That is a basic fact of logic. Since “there is an infinite regress of causes” does not state anything self-contradictory, it is by definition internally coherent and therefore logically possible. That is, as I say, so obvious it is hardly worth the trouble of saying. I think someone here--you, Schick or Sadowski--has lost track of what the word “logically” means. Even if “there is an infinite regress of causes” should contradict some other proposition it still remains logically possible, because any such contrary proposition about a matter of fact could be false. Thus, as I said before, it boils down to an empirical question--of physical possibility--not logical possibility.

You say my strategy (of pointing out that infinite regresses are an actual element of several serious contending theories worked out by expert astrophysicists) “could work only if you have EXTREMELY good, convincing empirical facts in support of your position.” That completely confuses the issue. If the issue is logical possibility, no empirical facts are needed at all, since logical possibility is completely separate from the question of truth. Indeed, every false statement is necessarily logically possible--if it weren’t, it would be meaningless, not false. Thus, even if I had overwhelming empirical evidence against infinite regress, that would not entail it was logically impossible.

Finally, Sadowsky does not appear to be making the argument you think. If your characterization is correct (and since you write confusingly, I don’t know if it is), then Sadowsky only discusses what follows from the proposition “if each cause of A were itself in need of a cause" ("then no cause of A could exist and hence A itself could not exist”). That does not cover all cases relevant to your question (whether there can be an infinite regress). For example, what if it is the case that there are things that do not need a cause? We already have evidence supporting such a contention from quantum mechanics. And at any rate it is logically possible there are uncaused events. Could there be an infinite series of those? Sadowsky’s argument does not address that, and therefore even if correct it fails to address the more general question of whether there can be an infinite regress. That’s why I said I didn’t understand what you were getting at.

Regarding what you follow with, if I understand you now, and if it is an accurate paraphrase of Sadowsky’s actual argument, that has already been refuted by calculus (which treats of infinite sequences without any contradiction, and in a manner that produces demonstrable results in countless feats of engineering, even when one of the axes in the formula is time) as well as, more relevantly here, the B-Theory of Time (i.e. Relativistic Determinism), as even William Lane Craig admits (in his contribution to the recent Moreland-edited book critiquing Naturalism). This is, again, why I found your question perplexing, and why I thought your presentation of Sadowsky's argument must have been incomplete or inaccurate.

Just as you can have a universe with an infinite number of galaxies, all lined up next to each other, so you can have a universe with an infinite number of moments in time, all lined up next to each other. Just because there are an infinite number of galaxies, and every galaxy has a galaxy to its left and a galaxy to its right, it doesn’t follow that we can’t be on one of those galaxies. So it is with time. Just because there are an infinite number of moments, it does not follow that an object cannot exist at one of those moments.

A good example would be an oscillating universe: even if the cosmos expanded and collapsed an infinite number of times, it does not follow that it never expanded or collapsed. In fact, asserting that is a logical contradiction, not the other way around: if the cosmos expanded and collapsed an infinite number of times, it follows necessarily that it expanded or collapsed at least once, which is not never. So Sadowsky’s opening premise is highly problematic, not the other way around.

Given a steady state model, like Alfven’s Plasma cosmology, the claim that the universe is comprised of an infinitely large time dimension has no bearing on what is in that dimension: we can look back at an infinite increase in homogenized plasma, and forward to an infinite increase in intergalactic complexity, and no logical contradiction would arise. From a point of view outside time, all moments of time, past and future, exist statically, just as with space. Thus, anything true of space as observed from outside time is also true of time. And when we are talking of all time, not our own finite piece of it, we must step outside of time.

Sadowsky’s error, I now see, is to presume that an infinite series must have a first member, which is begging the very question he is trying to answer. If there was no first member, then it is a priori false that “No permission may be asked for because each asking for permission requires a prior asking for permission.” That statement can only ever be true if there had to be a start to the series. If every “asking of permission” already existed, through all past and future time (as it necessarily does to any observer standing outside the dimension of time), then there is no need for a first asking: an infinite series of askings already exists, just as an infinitely large cosmos already exists (if it does--that’s again another unresolved issue in contemporary cosmology, but it does follow from certain solutions to the equations of the Theory of Relativiy). This is, again, well demonstrated by calculus, which routinely produces and employs infinite series with the integral function, proving they can and do exist.

Now, I suspect he ultimately makes this error by confusing temporal with ontological causation, just as I said in the first place. You don’t seem at all aware of the difference yourself, so I can’t say if pointing that out will help you. The bottom line is that the proposition “there is an infinite regress of causes” logically entails there is no start to the causes, so any argument based on the need for such a start fails, simply on the criterion of relevance. You have presented Sadowsky’s argument as just such a claim, therefore it fails, his claim being irrelevant to the proposition in question.