tronvillain

Kip:
Yes, the person means "I could have done otherwise at that very moment" but all that means is that they were aware that they had other options available. It does not mean that they think if the tape was wound back they would have actually chosen one of those other options, nor does it mean they think it would be better if that were the case. That is the myth of free will that philosophers have given humanity.

It should be obvious how "free will" (non-determinism) diminishes moral responsibility. If there is no causal explanation for why Mr. Smith killed Mrs. Smith, then it is just bad luck - it could have happened to anybody. Of course, the simple fact is that causal explanations do exist, and so we punish Mr. Smith to prevent him and others from commiting further murders, and perhaps simply for emotional satisfaction. As for your second complaint, asking whether I "ought" to blame someone for committing murder is like asking whether I "ought" to like pumpkin pie. All that matters is what is, because morality is simply a human convention - the universe neither knows nor cares.

Those robots are not morally responsible, but then they do now choose between killing a human child or seeking food - the choice is made for them by the state of the sky. We generally only hold humans morally responsible because we are human and understand human motivation and decision making. If a human chooses between killing a child and having lunch, we hold him "morally responsible" because he was aware that he had the option. We condemn him for being the sort of person who was determined to choose murder over lunch, because frankly, we frown on murder.

Steven Carr

No, the meaning people use everyday to assign moral responsibility is 'conceivably have done otherwise'.

They conceive what a morally good person would have done and compare that action with the action that they are judging.

Steven Carr

Suppose I have been given a post-hypnotic suggestion to kill my mother and sister.

Suppose I have also been given powerful hallucinatory drugs which drive me into a psychotic frenzy, bent upon killing.

Suppose my mother and sister are threatening my life with a knife and an iron bar.

I then shoot my mother and stab my sister with a gun and knife that I have.

Should I be held morally responsible for these actions?

Presumably you would say 'Yes'.

I could have done something else.

Instead of shooting my mother and stabbing my sister, I could have stabbed my mother and shot my sister. That is certainly 'could have done something else.'

So by your critiera, I am guilty of murder.

Do you think your criterion of 'could have done something else' to assign responsibility even makes sense?

Suppose I plant a time-bomb outside my mother's house, set to go off at 12.00. It is remote controlled and I can easily defuse it just by pressing a switch on the remote control in my car.

I make no effort whatever to press the switch, preferring to spend my time drinking in a bar, planning how to spend the money I get in my mother's will. The bomb goes off and kills my mother. Am I morally responsible?

By your criterion, clearly not. Unknown to me someone was watching me all the time and planned to shoot me the moment I left the bar and tried to go to the car.

As I could not possibly have pressed that switch to defuse the bomb, I am clearly not morally responsible for the death of my mother.

Theli

hehehe... I see abit of a pitfall when it comes to the philosophy forum.
You enter the forum full of ideas and questions, spend some time on a few threads, and then leave the forum thinking - "I was never at the philosophy forum."


"Determinism?
I might aswell step in front of a train. I mean, I don't have free will so I cannot change what will happen"

Kip

Tronvillain:

I have failed to find an answer (although your post implies one) to the one question that needs to be answered if this conversation is to resolve anything:

What is sufficient for moral responsibility?

You already claimed that these are necessary:

1. determinism
2. choice

That statement suggests that is necessary too:

3. an understanding of human motivation and decision making

Are these the only conditions sufficient for moral responsibility or do you require others? My question to you is "why is the third distinction relevant?" It seems to me that you are simply adding irrelevant distinctions to separate behavior you claim requires moral responsibility from other behavior.

Furthermore, I question this entire investigation into "what people mean everyday" to establish moral responsibility. Who cares how most people assign blame? Most people believe in God! Your authority, the masses, is questionable at best. To establish moral responsibility, you must appeal to something other than human convention. You disagree:

What definition of moral responsibility are you using? The words "morality" and "ought" are inseparable. Philosophers have even suggested that the scope of moral philosophy is defined by the word "ought". To maintain the existence of moral responsibility but deny the importance of "ought" is to patently contradict yourself.

This argument from human convention is beside the point but I will attempt to demonstrate that your position is false anyway. The reason I am convinced that people do not mean "free" in the weak sense you assert is because I have often discussed the determinism controversy and asked Christians (and non-Christians) that specific question "if you could turn the tape back could you have done otherwise that you did?" These people are loathe to admit that they could not do so.

Please note that I do not ask if they, as you write, "would" have done otherwise (that is not necessary for metaphysical free will), but only that they "could" have. If you were to ask the average person whether or not he or she "has the power" choose a different option at the same point in time, if that situation would "turned back" and met again, most people would be extremely reluctant to deny that power. Why? Simply because most people do not believe they are robots! You and me are in the minority! You cannot apply your compatiblist definitions to the majority who disagree with you.

[ August 21, 2002: Message edited by: Kip ]</p>

Kip

Steven Carr:

That is a naked assertion for which you provide no argument. I deny that people imply only this weaker claim and instead assert that people imply the stronger claim that people mean "possibly have done otherwise".

To support my claim I do provide an argument. People do not [edited] believe they are robots. You cannot apply your weak compatibilist definitions to the majority of people. Compatibilism is a minority opinion. If you asked the average person whether or not:

1. you are mechanical
2. you are robotic
3. your actions are determined by physics

The person would answer emphatically "NO!". If you do not believe me, ask people. I have asked many people. These people all refuse to allow the admissions that compatibilists grant to determinism.

You seem to be arguing my opponents' position rather than my own. I deny that you "could have stabbed my mother and shot my sister". The laws of physics determined your actions and no other action was possible (although others are certainly conceivable). You could not have done otherwise and therefore are not guilty of murder.


I wholeheartedly agree. The course of events were determined by the laws of physics and there was only one possible sequence of events. Because there was no other possible choice, there is no moral responsibility.



[ August 21, 2002: Message edited by: Kip ]

[ August 21, 2002: Message edited by: Kip ]

[ August 22, 2002: Message edited by: Kip ]</p>

Kent Stevens

The most technically correct way of looking at things is that there is no "choice". The weather has no choice as does other natural systems. If we have perfect foresight we see that a murderer "must" kill the person they do.

We still attribute death to a murderer as opposed to other causes. Murderers are still morally responsible as they are people and we hold people morally responsible for their actions. The possibility of punishment deters crime because people are influenced by this threat. If a someone kills somebody else we would predict that they could harm someone else as well. By prediction it makes sense to imprision such a person to prevent further predicted crime.

sweep

suppose we are morally responsible if we know the difference between right and wrong- (ie. we know that our actions will be injurious to ourself or others. In other words we have an awareness of consequences. If for example i were to download a porn clip from the internet and the consequence of that action was the death of a person then i would not be M.R. As far as i know if this were true, i 'would' be a "homicidal maniac!" and possibly attributed as one since the consequences were so severe.

If we were all playing quake three for real, then killing someone wouldn't matter. Whoops! i just fragged jimmy & kimberly. you big whoopsie, dethWOLFsnarfle3X0! all those involved are consenting, unless we were in ancient rome, at the theatre of war.

it could be argued that responsibility is diminished if we don't care. This implies that our value system regards an objective or goal as taking priority over the wellbeing of the person and other sentient beings whether they are directly or indirectly influenced as a result of those actions.

A great many people would steal for heroin, as those people have created an extra need. If this is so, we can say those people are driven by neccesity, as our body is animal, after all. What do we do with animals! We abuse them, lock them up! Control nature, yes, why not? Isn't this the 'heart' of the issue, control- who controls who, and is it 'right' to do so?

People do control emotions sometimes. We are autonomous, unless provoked.

By saying that one is immoral only has implications as far as social order is concerned. Policing for all- (this isn't the wild west.) Exemption from violence and pain, I think- well, where i live it is. (I keep typing love by accident??)

(I commanded this to my dog moments ago- it seemed relevant: [B]benji [*WOOFS*- berf!], come here! don't get so excited![/I] - but, no, i mustn't stifle too much of the time)

[ August 21, 2002: Message edited by: sweet as a nut ]</p>

Gurdur

Reeeeeaally ?
*raise eyebrows*
According to just whom ?

Ah, human behaviour and that ol' self-consciousness/free-will conundrum resolved by a simple recourse to an analogy drawn from the weather.
Why do I remain unconvinced ?

Perhaps the weather ?

This is wrong on several counts.
Under most present legal systems, extreme youth and insanity are grounds not to hold someone morally responsible for their actions --- and there's also "diminished responsibility", a mitigating ground to take into consideration when sentencing.
Furthermore, if you want to adhere so faithfully to the extreme determinist position, there's no point or need to hold people morally accountable for crimes; for example, you can simply "medicalize" crime instead.
Bring on the "Twinkie Defence" !

Wrong. Several studies seem to show that it is the (self-estimated) possibility of detection and apprehension that deters crimes, not more severe punishments per se.
Furthermore, crime incidence is often related to the socio-economic history.
Wrong.
Many, if not the majority, of murders in say present-day Great Britain are committed by the nearest-and-theoretically-dearest of the victim; IOW, people often murder the one-and-only person they simply cannot bear to live with one day longer. They do not usually go on to commit other murders.

Regards,
The Free-Willed-And-Morally-Responsible Gurdur
____________

But edited because Gurdur is also the Non-Determinist-Spelling Gurdur

[ August 21, 2002: Message edited by: Gurdur ]</p>

Steven Carr

No, it is the position of people who deny determinism that , instead of shooting my mother and stabbing my sister, I could have stabbed my mother and shot my sister.

As this is 'could have possibly done something else', by *your* criteria I would have been guilty of murder, yet most people would say I was acting in self-defence, and therefore not guilty.

In short, your criteria are *not* what people use to assign moral responsibility.