Primal

Amos:
You cannot have it both ways amos, either you are saying that evil and suffering do not exist (and denying an obvious fact via Liebniz style) or you are saying that it is necessary to promote what is good, (and ignoring God's power and motives). In any case, you must choose one or the other.

Vanderzyden

Thomas,

OK, before I can begin I must comment on the title of this thread, "To disprove God is easy".

Now, I do notice that this title is written by a creature who had no choice in the place or time of his birth, nor will be able to prevent his eventual death. How is it, then, that he finds himself justified in declaring the ease in disproving anything, much less the existence of his Creator?

There, I feel better.


It would seem that Aleytheia has gone a long way in addressing your "challenge", although I think that you overlook essential aspects of the replies. As I have indicated in a previous engagement with you, your entire contention hinges on a misunderstanding or a misapplication of human freedom, or what is commonly know as free-will.

First, allow me to make a clarification by stating the definitions you are apparently using:

strongly omnipotent = having the ability to do anything conceivable
weakly omnipotent = the ability to do any logically possible action

I do not agree with these definitions. They are themselves illogical. Substitute the words "all powerful" and the result is absurd: strongly all-powerful? weakly all-powerful? Surely you'll agree that this is nonsense. Something is either all-powerful (i.e. the most powerful), or not. Aleytheia made this point quite well:

The authority that the creator has over every created thing necessarily entails having more power than everything except himself. God is all-powerful. There is nothing more powerful than he. In fact, his power is far in excess of the next most powerful thing in his creation. Let me be so bold to say that God has limitations. However, only he knows these limitations. From the perspective of anything that he creates, his power may appear limitless. However, we may "safely" recognize some aspects of the quality of this power. We may do so by examining your definitions:

strongly omnipotent = having the ability to do anything conceivable

No being has the ability to do anything that is conceivable. Whether we consider God or humans, we must take pains to understand the characteristics of the the being in question. No being can do that which is contrary to its nature. There are at least two ways to view this:

1. Divine essence: God, who is the Supreme Good, may conceive the potential evil propensity of free agents other than himself, but he cannot conceive of himself doing anything that is not good. Notice, for example, that destruction of his very own creation, for example, would not, in and of itself, be non-good. Such an act would be good if it served his good purposes (although it may not seem "good" to those who reject or deny him).

2. Physical limitations: While humans are capable of conceiving evil, they are incapable of, say, self-invoking unassisted levitation.

weakly omnipotent = the ability to do any logically possible action

i think this definition fails on the term "logical". For example, is it logical that the son of God would come down from heaven? Is it logical that God would not immediately annilihate any creature that rejected him? No, I do not think that logic applies to these considerations. However, if it were possible to apply logic to everything that God does, then we must then consider his characteristics (#1 above).

Now, let's take this assertion of yours:

This is surely false.

First, it does not follow that because a being is all-powerful, that he would necessarily cause his creatures to do anything. In fact, if God is not the God we meet in the Bible, then he may be indifferent to human affairs. He may be, as some say, a grand watchmaker.

Second, this statement is a contradiction. No agent can cause an agent to freely choose anything. In order to choose, and for that choice to be free, it must not be caused by an external agent. The agent making the choice must be the cause. If God were to create beings, but these beings would not have the option of not accepting him, then these beings would not be free agents. Trust necessarily requires a free agency. The ability to trust means that the agent may consider the trustworthiness of another being. The ability to consider and come to a conclusion requires the ability to make decisions, that is, to CHOOSE.

Here's something else you wrote:

To reiterate, no being can FORCE another being to FREELY do anything. If I make my own choices, that means that no one forces me to do anything.

By creating free agents, God makes creatures who are capable of expressing genuine LOVE towards him.
In creating humans, he makes them perfect. He gives them the ability to love, but this ability is not possible without the attendant ability to CHOOSE. To love something is to choose to do so. Love is not "programmable"--it must be freely done. We may love, or not love. This is a choice. Of course, a choice necessarily entails alternatives. This is what is meant by free-will. Our freedom to choose includes not only love, but applies generally to the human experience. In fact, we may decide to do what is good, or what is evil. Some even choose to deny or reject God.

Inevitably, this discussion digresses toward the problem of evil. Let me respond briefly to this statement of yours:

This is yet another non-sequitur. First, not all suffering has a moral benefit. Second, it does not follow because some suffering has no apparent purpose, God necessarily does not exist. You fail to consider that suffering is a collective consequence in which the entire human race participates, on the part of the original rejection of God by the first humans. It is certainly possible that God has withdrawn because humans decided they could do without him. There is no such thing as "natural evil". Also, you are forgetting that some humans suffer because of other humans, who are themselves corrupt. This does not mean that God does not exist. Furthermore, as Aleytheia indicates, suffering is not intrinsically evil. Pain hurts, yes. Does that make it evil? No. You have already admitted that much suffering is for good.

You asked for a definition. I will succintly state the definition given by Aleytheia:

Omnipotence = All-powerful; having more power than anything else. Necessarily, this is supernatural power.

Summary

-- The existence of freely choosing creatures does not preclude the existence of all-powerful just, loving God.
-- The existence of evil does not mean that God does not exist.
-- There is absolutely no contradiction in this statement: An all-powerful God may create free-agents who may reject him.
-- In order to make a genuine choice, it must be free. To have freedom of will is to be free of force.
-- Suffering is not intrinsically evil.
-- It is not the case that, if a just, loving God exists, suffering would not exist. Or, conversely, it is not necessarily true that because suffering exists, God cannot exist.
-- If God is all-powerful, it is not necessarily true that he would prevent suffering.

Vanderzyden

[ October 05, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]</p>

Amos

All of our sense perceptions are illusions because they are perceived only and have no real existence. God is creator of things and not of illusions. The illusions are ours for our benefit and are needed to distinguish between good and evil so we can procreate God in our image for the next generation (I told you above that through our ego awareness we keep God abreast of current affairs and so we do Gods dirty work with our senses and only that which is real is tied down into our soul to possibly change the template for the next generation).

Sorry I for being late.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"I do not agree with these definitions. They are themselves illogical. Substitute the words "all powerful" and the result is absurd: strongly all-powerful? weakly all-powerful? Surely you'll agree that this is nonsense. Something is either all-powerful (i.e. the most powerful), or not."

Well, you can certainly disagree with these definitions, but they are very commonly accepted in the literature. It matters not, however; I still suspect whatever definition you're using will be vulnerable.

"No being can do that which is contrary to its nature. There are at least two ways to view this:

"1. Divine essence: God, who is the Supreme Good, may conceive the potential evil propensity of free agents other than himself, but he cannot conceive of himself doing anything that is not good. Notice, for example, that destruction of his very own creation, for example, would not, in and of itself, be non-good. Such an act would be good if it served his good purposes (although it may not seem 'good' to those who reject or deny him)."

Omnipotence is about the ability to do things, not the ability to conceive of things. Although "to conceive of oneself doing something not-good" is a logically possible action, so we've already got one logically possible action God can't perform. I'll keep reading.

"2. Physical limitations: While humans are capable of conceiving evil, they are incapable of, say, self-invoking unassisted levitation."

This is a physical limitation rather than a logical limitation. You say God can't do anything contrary to His nature. Do you mean logically contrary (it is a contradiction to make the claim) or simply physically contrary (according to the laws of nature, no God can do that)?

"weakly omnipotent = the ability to do any logically possible action

"i think this definition fails on the term 'logical'. For example, is it logical that the son of God would come down from heaven? Is it logical that God would not immediately annilihate any creature that rejected him? No, I do not think that logic applies to these considerations." (Emphasis original throughout.)

When philosophers say "logically possible," they mean something very specific. If an action a is logically possible, that means it does not express a contradictiont to perform it. So "to draw a square circle" is logically impossible, but "to draw a circle with a diameter of one light-year" might just be physically or technologically impossible. See the difference? "To come down from Heaven" is logically possible, but "to leave Heaven but remain in Heaven" is not.

"First, it does not follow that because a being is all-powerful, that he would necessarily cause his creatures to do anything. In fact, if God is not the God we meet in the Bible, then he may be indifferent to human affairs. He may be, as some say, a grand watchmaker."

I said nothing about what God would do, just what God could do.

"Second, this statement is a contradiction. No agent can cause an agent to freely choose anything. In order to choose, and for that choice to be free, it must not be caused by an external agent."

Remember, we're talking about a strongly omnipotent being here. You've already agreed with me that such a being is impossible.

"First, not all suffering has a moral benefit. Second, it does not follow because some suffering has no apparent purpose, God necessarily does not exist. You fail to consider that suffering is a collective consequence in which the entire human race participates, on the part of the original rejection of God by the first humans."

If not all suffering has a moral benefit, God is allowing useless suffering to exist, which is inconsistent with His perfectly moral nature. You say "apparent" in the second point -- if you still believe all suffering has an actual purpose, you're stuck with the argument you're trying to answer in the first point. If you don't, then God is back to allowing useless suffering. Do you or do you not accept the proposition, "It is morally better to prevent useless suffering than to allow it"?

If we suffer because of a moral choice Adam and Eve made, then we're still suffering needlessly. God could forgive us. Either that, or God must serve the causes of justice and justice precludes such an action -- but in this case, again, we're back to the proposition that all suffering is justified. Further, we've added another logically possible action to the list of actions God can't perform: "to forgive humanity."

"Omnipotence = All-powerful; having more power than anything else. Necessarily, this is supernatural power."

This doesn't really tell us anything. Almost every philosopher of religion will say omnipotence has to do with ability, not simply the lack of competition in power. If there were a being that could do one more logically possible action than God, God wouldn't be omnipotent. Similar, if God didn't exist, the next being down in the ladder of power would somehow being omnipotent. Finally, that definition tells us nothing about what God can do, because differing "amounts" of power is obscure. Does a being who can do every action of type 1 but only some actions of type 2 have more power than a being who can only do some type 2 actions but every type 1 action? What if I have the ability to imitate any animal sound perfectly, for example -- do I have more power than a being who can't imitate any animal sounds, but can build a perfect doghouse every time? I think we need a better scope for our omnipotence, because omnipotence simply relative to other beings doesn't seem to work.

Philosoft

Vander, the only thing I got out of your post is that the ways we've been trying to define "omnipotent" are wrong but there is a definition of "omnipotent" that corresponds to God's power. Would you kindly tell us what that definition is, rather than what it is not?

Vanderzyden

Thomas,

Thanks for replying. Here's round 2...

It is irrelevant to this particular discussion whether these defintions are common in "the literature". Also, I am indicating more than a disagreement--it is a declaration of nonsense. While you are busy imagining that I will be unable to address your concerns, you overlook my insistence on the insensibility of these definitions:

Perhaps you could assist me by explaining why these terms should make sense. Incidentally, I could only find one instance of these definitions when searching with Google.

Perhaps inadvertently, you are misquoting me. My claim, which has biblical support, is that God "cannot conceive of himself doing anything that is not good". So, I am not in agreement with you, as you imply later in your post.

Another difficulty with your contention is that you equate the ability to perform any logical possibility with power. A being need not possess the ability to do all-things-logical to be all-powerful. There is a large difference. The Creator, who is responsible for the existence of everything else, necessarily has far more power than any created thing. The creatures cannot possibly measure such power.

Thank you for the education, Thomas, but I understand logical possibilities. Allow me to suggest that you consider a third example: "The unicorn jumped the fence" is a logically possible statement. However, unicorns don't exist. Similarly, while God may have capacity to do some things that are logically possible, he is incapable of doing them because there is nothing in his character that would permit him to do them.

Also to "to draw a circle with a diameter of one light-year" is very likely a completely useless act. Again, when we consider the power of God up against this analogy, we see that there are many things that God might do that he has no purpose in doing--these things might even be consistent with his character.

I realize it's off-topic, but who says that the Father left heaven? His son came to earth. This misunderstanding perhaps provides us with some insight into your extent of the research on this question. I wonder, have you read the Bible thoroughly? If not, then perhaps that is why you are greatly concerned with a precise, fully-understandable, legalistic definition for omnipotence.

Indeed you have said much in thread about what God could do, but I will leave that alone for the moment. Again, I want to emphasize that you cannot inextricably equate logical possibility with power. What God can do, as the Supreme Good, must be consistent with all of his characteristics. It seems that you agree here. What I don't understand is this: If you agree that what God does must be consistent with his character, then why do you separately consider the concept of logical possibility? Well, in fact, you can't. It is logically possible that I could demonstrate my meager power by cheating on my wife. Of course, I realize that there are many consequences that will result, so I do not do what I am capable of doing. Allow me to present an argument:

Premise 1: God has many capabilities.

Premise 2: God performs actions.

Premise 3: God is the Supreme Good; there is nothing in him that is not good.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion 1: Therefore, God's capabilities are only those which are good and have good purpose.

Conclusion 2: Any of God's actions must be consistent with his supremely good nature.

For God, there are no "logical possibilities". He simply IS. When considering God, logical possibilities are irrelevant. While it is crucial that revelation concerning God be reasonable, it does not matter that his creatures are incapable of fully comprehending his character and his purposes.

No, I think we are discussing omnipotence in general. You have not yet demonstrated the sensibility (or necessity) of the term "strongly all-powerful". More importantly, you miss (or, "glossily gloss" over ) my main point. Let me remind you again of two contradictory statements you have made:

You may recall that I opened my post by saying that your contention hinges on the misunderstanding or misapplication of human freedom. Please address each of these rebuttals:

1. First, it does not follow that because a being is all-powerful, that he would necessarily cause other beings creatures to do anything. In fact, if the all-powerful Creator is not the God we meet in the Bible, then it may be indifferent to human affairs. He may be, as some say, a grand watchmaker.

2. Second, this statement is a contradiction. No agent can cause an agent to freely choose anything. In order to choose, and for that choice to be free, it must not be caused by an external agent. The agent making the choice must be the cause. If God were to create beings, but these beings would not have the option of not accepting him, then these beings would not be free agents. Trust necessarily requires a free agency. The ability to trust means that the agent may consider the trustworthiness of another being. The ability to consider and come to a conclusion requires the ability to make decisions, that is, to CHOOSE. To reiterate, no being can FORCE another being to FREELY do anything. If I make my own choices, that means that no one forces me to do anything.

It does not follow that, because God is all-powerful, that he necessarily would cause his creatures to do anything. As the biblical accounts relate, God may intentionally create other beings that may choose to do evil which, in turn, causes suffering***. Furthermore, God may make provision (beforehand) to reconcile and restore the creation from the anticipated degrading effects of the suffering.

*** Note: It does not follow, either, that God has caused the suffering by causing the existence of the free-will creatures. Nor, does it follow that God should have not created free-will creatures.

I'm not sure. You appear to ascribe immorality to the concept of suffering itself. And yet, you have admitted repeatedly that some suffering is good. This is yet another contradiction. Also, you seem to establish a dichotomy between prevention and permission. You are omitting the consideration that permitting some suffering may prevent much more additional suffering. Furthermore, I would think that the qualifier "useless" is superfluous. Now, if you were to propose, "It is preferable to prevent additional suffering", or "It is preferable to have no suffering", then I would generally agree. However, we cannot isolate the issue of prevention of suffering when we are considering the potential of free agents who may choose between good and evil.

Ah, now you switch to "justification" when considering the utility of suffering--this is an entirely different concept from morality. I'm not sure if you are equivocating on the words "justice" and "justification". To be clear, suffering concerns not only justice, but merit. Let me ask you, can any human declare that they are undeserving of any suffering? On what basis?

No, it does not follow that suffering is useless if God is capable of forgiveness. We may be forgiven, and yet may be permitted to experience suffering so that we will be tested, refined, and observed. Again, suffering is not itself evil.

Indeed, you are correct, God can forgive. And he does. But forgiveness comes with asking--it comes within the context of a relationship. He is the author of justice, and yet may forgive who he wishes to forgive. Of course, he will forgive only those who desire forgiveness.


Now, perhaps you are right, Thomas, my definition isn't comprehensive:

However, we must both realize, Thomas, that we will never arrive at a complete definition. Do you agree? If there are many enormous created things that we cannot describe well, then it is certainly impossible to describe the Creator. What we really should be asking is, "What is the nature of God's power?" But, for convenience, let's stick with the term omnipotence, which I will expand to be:

Omnipotence = All-powerful; having supernatural creative power.

Observe that creative power necessarily entails the ability to create the natural from the non-natural. Consequentially, the ability to create means that the creator "sets the rules" for the creation. God is the standard by which all conscious creation must measure itself. Notice the absence of logical possibility from the definition, which I have shown above to be unnecessary.


Vanderzyden

[ October 06, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]</p>

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"Perhaps you could assist me by explaining why these terms should make sense. Incidentally, I could only find one instance of these definitions when searching with Google."

Well, they make sense because we choose for them to make sense. They're our definitions. Let "strongly omnipotent" be "the ability to perform any syntactically describable action" and let "weakly omnipotent" be "the ability to perform any logically possible action." Easy.

"The creatures cannot possibly measure such power."

Then your position is that we don't know what "omnipotent" means? Later, you say "However, we must both realize, Thomas, that we will never arrive at a complete definition." So is that your position? We don't know what "omnipotent" means?

"Allow me to suggest that you consider a third example: 'The unicorn jumped the fence' is a logically possible statement. However, unicorns don't exist. Similarly, while God may have capacity to do some things that are logically possible, he is incapable of doing them because there is nothing in his character that would permit him to do them."

The statement in question is logically possibly true, yes. You say God is limited by His character. So suppose there is a person, McEar, whose character is such that she can only scratch her ear. Would you say this being is omnipotent? She can do anything consistent with her character, and can't do anything inconsistent with her character.

"Also to 'to draw a circle with a diameter of one light-year' is very likely a completely useless act. Again, when we consider the power of God up against this analogy, we see that there are many things that God might do that he has no purpose in doing--these things might even be consistent with his character."

I agree that there are things God might do that He has no purpose in doing. Omnipotence says nothing nontrivial about purposes.

"1. First, it does not follow that because a being is all-powerful, that he would necessarily cause other beings creatures to do anything. In fact, if the all-powerful Creator is not the God we meet in the Bible, then it may be indifferent to human affairs. He may be, as some say, a grand watchmaker."

I grant this point. Luckily for me, God is also taken to be morally perfect, which does say something about what He would do.

"2. Second, this statement is a contradiction. No agent can cause an agent to freely choose anything."

I grant this point. The point of the original argument was to show that a strongly omnipotent God is inconsistent with the existence of suffering, and with our understanding of analytic propositions.

"No, it does not follow that suffering is useless if God is capable of forgiveness. We may be forgiven, and yet may be permitted to experience suffering so that we will be tested, refined, and observed."

Then this suffering is not useless. We're talking about actually useless suffering here, suffering that is not required for any greater good. If God allows it, God is morally imperfect, and if God doesn't allow it, all the suffering I cause is justified.

"Consequentially, the ability to create means that the creator 'sets the rules' for the creation."

Sets what rules? Again, I find your definition lacking. If God sets all the laws of the universe, God would appear to be weakly omnipotent, because He could create any law that would not produce a contradiction.

Vanderzyden

Actually, they are your definitions. To be persuasive, they must make sense. Agreed? Well, I continue to have difficulty. Upon close inspection of the first definition, I see the new concept of "syntactically describable action". But we encounter a problem with a simple example:

Being A can make a square circle

This action statement is illogical, but syntactically sound. And yet, it is by your own admission, nonsense. A being can't do something that no being can do. However, this does not exclude it from having creative power (which no other being possesses). So, this is a counterexample to your first definition, which defines "all-powerful" to be ""the ability to perform any syntactically describable action".

Now, this action statement is logical:

Being B can make a rock so big he can't lift it.

But it is also nonsense, by your admission. Again, God possesses complete creative and sustaining power over the entire universe, and yet does not fulfill your definition.

Perhaps you have a third definition. Or, maybe you could imagine a being who can perform either of the above counterexamples. It is reasonable to expect that a definition have no demonstrable counterexamples that invalidate it. If this is the case, then the definition must be revised or discarded altogether.

Yes, indeed. I realize that this seems uncomfortable to some people--that is, not being able to define something with high precision. But, of course, there are many things we can't define well. However, we are not prevented from inquiring about the nature and extent of God's power. We will find many answers from what has been revealed.

No, I would not say that such a being is all-powerful. The being you describe is a person, having a mind. Should all of her senses become disabled, she would still possess her mind, and would therefore have many more capabilities than scratching her ear. In consideration of this, I find the analogy itself to be nonsensical. Perhaps you have another.

My insistence was the the utility of suffering has no direct relation to forgiveness. If I remember correctly, this was your contention. Nor does it follow that if God allows suffering, he is morally imperfect. This implies that suffering is intrinsically evil, which has not been demonstrated. Please address this rationale (from my last post):

You appear to ascribe immorality to the concept of suffering itself. And yet, you have admitted repeatedly that some suffering is good. This is yet another contradiction. Also, you seem to establish a dichotomy between prevention and permission. You are omitting the consideration that permitting some suffering may prevent much more additional suffering. Furthermore, I would think that the qualifier "useless" is superfluous. Now, if you were to propose, "It is preferable to prevent additional suffering", or "It is preferable to have no suffering", then I would generally agree. However, we cannot isolate the issue of prevention of suffering when we are considering the potential of free agents who may choose between good and evil.

Please demonstrate an example of a "contradictory law". Anyway, my point is that God set the rules by virtue of his status as Creator. Presuming that no other being has creative power, then God is by default all-powerful. He has power over being itself. From nothing, something comes. He has power over life and death. This is, in essence, what it means to be all-powerful.

Vanderzyden

[ October 07, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]</p>

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"Perhaps you have a third definition. Or, maybe you could imagine a being who can perform either of the above counterexamples."

I don't; that's exactly my point in this whole thread. No one has a version of "omnipotent" that is plausible as a definition of "omnipotent" and can apply to God. That is what I believe I have demonstrated.

"Yes, indeed. I realize that this seems uncomfortable to some people--that is, not being able to define something with high precision. But, of course, there are many things we can't define well. However, we are not prevented from inquiring about the nature and extent of God's power. We will find many answers from what has been revealed."

Either we know what "omnipotent" means or we don't. If we don't, we cannot assert God's existence, because we don't know what we're saying. The sentence "An omnipotent being exists" is nonsense. If we do, on the other hand, know what "omnipotent" means, however far we can define it we must examine it for contradictions with itself and with God's character. And you are correct that almost all leading apologists believe we know what "omnipotent" means. If you're talking about a version of God Whose attributes we don't understand, you're probably not talking about the same God as I.

"No, I would not say that such a being is all-powerful. The being you describe is a person, having a mind. Should all of her senses become disabled, she would still possess her mind, and would therefore have many more capabilities than scratching her ear." (Italics original.)

No, I have defined her as only able to scratch her ear. Maybe she's not a person at all. Maybe she has a very severe form of mental retardation. Whatever it is, you're left with the position that a being defined only to be able to scratch her ear is omnipotent. (By your definition of "omnipotent," I think.)

"You appear to ascribe immorality to the concept of suffering itself. And yet, you have admitted repeatedly that some suffering is good."

I have never ascribed immorality to suffering itself. When I say some suffering is good, I mean it advances God's purposes. This line of argument is a dead end for the apologist.

"Furthermore, I would think that the qualifier 'useless' is superfluous."

Suffering e is useless iff e is not logically necessary for a greater good. There, I've defined it. Now I would like to see whether you accept "It is morally better to prevent useless suffering than to allow it."

"Please demonstrate an example of a 'contradictory law'."

A contradictory law would be something like "All squares become square circles for five seconds every day."

"Anyway, my point is that God set the rules by virtue of his status as Creator. Presuming that no other being has creative power, then God is by default all-powerful. He has power over being itself. From nothing, something comes. He has power over life and death. This is, in essence, what it means to be all-powerful."'

So all that's required to be omnipotent is that I can create or destroy whatever I want?

Vanderzyden

But I thought your problem was with the definitions that you had previously encountered, particularly the so-called "strongly omnipotent" and "weakly omnipotent" definitions. Here, we have it from the OP:

I think that have shown in the last post that these putative definitions are nonsensical, and therefore should be discarded. Perhaps you could address the points I made there.

Incidentally, God can "bring about a state of affairs in which a human freely chooses evil." He has done it, since we are here, choosing evil on a daily basis.

I will admit that we may arrive at a loose, uncontradictory definition. However, you seem to insist that you may somehow comprehend the immensity of God. That is impossible for anyone other than himself.

Yes, with the recognition that "create" has specific meaning. Why do you find this insufficient?

Vanderzyden

[ October 08, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]</p>