Plump-DJ

Oh come on man. While we're here we might as well go for it. It's not like it's taking up hours of time or anything. I mean how long did it take you to respond.. a minute or two??

So do accept the idea that time emereged from something else then? I mean did all the matter and energy and the space emerge but maybe time didn't perhaps? I'm really having a hard time constructing anything meaningful out of your statement here as it relates to the penrose-hawking singularity equations. (which tell us that MEST came from 'somefin else' I'm led to believe)

You speak about uncaused again, but i asked you to construct that for me? (Politely ) I'm saying that given the acceptance of BB-C I cannot logicaly construct anything meaningful from that term.

And finally what about the notion of cosmic time? The signle dimension of time in our universe that we experience does not remove the possibility of time existing in some "cosmic" sense. Much like a line on a paper it could go, in both directions for ever.

If you don't want to respond that's fine --- but that means I win.

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>

99Percent

There has to be a point where you stop asking "why?"

The point arrives when you assume existence just is. Time exists and is the basis of existence itself. Why? Because. And thats it or else you go into infinite loop of asking why. Existence exists and is the basis of existence itself. Why? Because. Mathematics and logic exist and is the basis of existence itself, why? Because. Consciousness exists because without it we cannot experience existence. Why? Because. Likewise objective morality is derived from these foundations. Why? Because.

If you want to say "God" is the reason, you are still left with the question: Why did God do it? Where did God come from, who created God, etc.

Plump-DJ

Hello 99.9 Percent.

I'm asking JJL to expand his point on natural properties which house objective moralities. I would like him to tell me (since he offered the possiblity) what sort of natural property could house an objective and binding morality? This is why i see so many atheists reject the existence of objective morelity in the first place. Because even they cannot see "where it might go".

I think that's a fair enough request.

Yes I agree we do have to cease our intellectual questioning at some point. God is supposed to serve a rational and philosophical purpose, to solve something not done so by the mere acceptance of "brute facts". Some agree with that some do not.

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>

jlowder

In response to my claim that moral properties are natural properties, Plump-DJ writes:

Moral ontology is a branch of metaethics; it is concerned with the nature of moral properties (i.e., natural vs. nonnatural vs. supernatural, objective vs. intersubjective vs. subjective, etc.). In contrast, the question, "Which natural properties are identical with moral properties?", is not a question about metaethics. It is instead a question about normative ethics. As John Post notes (and as I quoted over on the C.S. Lewis thread):

Since I am undecided on normative ethics, I don't know the answer to your question. But for examples of how naturalistic philosophers (who do have positions on normative ethics) would respond to your question, see <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0300062125/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">Quentin Smith's book</a> (where he defends perfectionism), <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0521350808/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">David Brink's book</a> (where he defends a form of utilitarianism), or <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0521592658/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">William Rottschaefer's book</a> (where he defends integrationist moral realism).

You are still assuming without argument that if metaphysical naturalism is true, there is no 'ontological room' for objective moral facts. In contrast, I have given arguments for my position. First, I argued that the claim that metaphysical naturalism is incompatible with moral realism is plausible if and only if the DCT is true, but there is no reason to believe the DCT is true. Second, I argued that moral principles are objective in the sense that they are discovered, just as the laws of logic are discovered. I agree that someone has been begging the question, but that person isn't me. ;-)

Which atheists are you referring to? Atheists on the street? Among professional philosophers? Among professional philosophers, I think you would be surprised to learn just how many are moral objectivists, including Quentin Smith, Tara Smith, Rottschaefer, Martin, Post, Bloomfield, Brink, and Fales (that's just off the top of my head).

Jeffery Jay Lowder

kingjames1

Not so fast, Jeff. You are assuming that Moore's intuitionism is logically coherent. If it is logically incoherent, it is not logically compatible with anything! Because Moore's categories of natural/nonnatural properties are unclear, the coherence of his model is unclear. E.g. is the nonnatural category even meaningful?

However, if you want to argue that metaphysical naturalism is logically compatible with ethical realism, fine. I suppose you could always appeal to a modified neoplatonism, for example. However, such solutions always involve a dichotomy: whether natural/supernatural or natural/nonnatural, Idea/form, etc. And these fundamental dichotomies, from a naturalist perspective, seem to create more problems than they solve. Where did nonnatural properties come from - what exactly are their properties? What is their relationship to the natural? If you're a platonist, is there really an Idea behind every form? Even the ideal cow pattie? Does anyone besides mathematicians believe this?

The point of concern for me is your apparent ethical naturalism -- you seem to eschew these trans-natural categories and assert that ethics is grounded in the natural...I'm curious as to how you do that.


Fine - but, again, do you really believe in such a quasi-'Platonic' realm? Or are you a materialist (which seems more irreligious, if you catch my drift, then believing in mystical, sprit-like realms of eternal ideas)? You seem unwilling to show your cards on this. BTW, I understand that you have your hands full in your discussion w/the plump DJ, but you have seemed to ignore my questions regarding your position on how goodness can be reduced to natural properties (i.e. ethical naturalism). The above qualifications of metaphysical naturalism regarding the lack of causal properties of abstract objects only seems to highlight the age-old problem: how can such abstract objects then cause or move us to behave ethically in the first place? Here we go again with the Cartesian dualism (how does the immaterial mind influence the material body): How do nonnatural objects interact with natural objects, or how do we natural objects have 'access' to abstract objects? Plato, here we come!

You also seem quite distressed that I would ask you to demonstrate the falsehood of Moore's naturalistic fallacy. Why? This is actually Hume's fallacy - the fact/value dichotomy or the problem of "ought"/"is," and has been acknowledged as a serious problem for philosophers ever since Hume.

But, to get the ball rolling, in case you're interested in pursuing this question: a natural state of affairs can never ground an 'ought'. Just think about it...whatever state of affairs you say grounds an 'ought' (e.g. greatest good for the greatest number), one can always ask, "is that good?" or "ought we to pursue such a state of affairs?" What is your final, ethical "brute fact," on which your ethics hangs?

Hume asked how does an "is" render an "ought"? And this seems to me to be a fairly serious question. What is your answer, Jeff? Do you have one? Hume concludes that the rules of morality are "not conclusions of our reason." This approach is further developed and finely tuned by the utilitarians and, later by Moore, et al. But how do you answer Hume?

Surely you have an opinion, Jeff -- give me something.

J.

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: kingjames1 ]</p>

kingjames1

Reply to kctan

the answer to the first question is "no", and the second yes. Love for my wife will always be demonstrable, as will generosity. However, such internal dispositions are moral and/or immoral. See the Sermon on the Mount. And yes, God both expects and creates 'clean' hearts w/in his creatures.

I'm not sure what exactly you mean by "not justify their bad behaviours onto your holy words of god?" If you are asking whether I can establish a basis of ethical behavior apart from my belief in God, the anwer is No -- I hold that ethics is grounded in the Holy God of the Old and New Testaments. I do not believe that one can ground ethics apart from this God.



Well, therein lies the problem for you. There is no ground for 'noble love' -- it is entirely subjective: "whatever it is that they feel is right." Thankfully, some feel (for apparently no good reason if there is no God) that such love 'ought' to be pursued. Others, perhaps more consistently with their atheism, acknowledge that there is no 'ought' at all (its all subjective opinion) and don't.

J.

kctan

Originally posted by kingjames1:
Herein lies all your problem as you don't have a basis to justify all those actions or behaviours consisdered to be immoral nowadays which are not covered by your so call holy bible.

So what you do if in such cases ? Pick & choose as you like ?

What's the difference between your morality & mine now ?

Not only for me but for most theists as well even though they like to justify their actions with the help of their holy bible but when it comes to practice, most seems to fall right back to a subjective stance.

Look at the noble love of mother teresa - what a great example of theistic 'noble love' for the poverty & sick, so 'noble' that she won't use a single cent donated to help these people but keep them in their poverty & sickness.

Since her death, we are indeed lucky to still have around one whole order of sisters carrying on her noble work in her loving tradition.

Not to mention the countless number of pastors & ministers out there who nobly loved their young choir or altar boys.

kingjames1

Response to kctan

Whoa - were you shat on by someone in a church?

Look, the question of biblical ethics involves the issues of hermeneutics - interpreting a text w/in its original literary and historical context, and applying it to the reader's present situation.

There is no issue today that Scripture, given the hermeneutical process of going from original meaning (through grammatico-historical exegesis) to contemporary application (for a model of such a process, see Gadamer's "fusion of horizons") does not address...whether theists obey Scripture or not is another question.

Now, as you noted, many contemporary issues are not directly addressed by the Scriptures, e.g. the particular questions of euthanasia or cloning. Nevertheless, Christians understand that the principles for dealing with such questions are addressed: e.g. "Thou shalt not murder," "Love thy neighbor as thyself". The meaning of these commands cannot be abstracted from their historical, literary context, but rather are given their meaning within the narratives in which they are found. Hence, it is apparent in the Pentatuech that not murdering entails more than simply avoiding killing - it requires the protection and even nurturing of life. To prove this, I can only appeal to the narratives of the Pentateuch, as well as moral reasoning directed by tutelage of the entire witness of Scripture. This seems to be Jesus' own approach to the commandments in his sermon on the mount ("you have heard it said, 'thou shalt not murder'...but I say to you anyone who hates his brother will be subject to judgment").

To return to our example, in such 'medical ethics' cases, Christians are then commanded to do all they can to protect and nurture life - not simply 'not murder'. On this same principle, Christians are called to make life better for people (not simply 'don't not protect their life') - this may entail pulling the plug on someone who is kept alive solely by medical machinary...etc.

This means that the norms of Scripture are not always immediately obvious as to how they are to be understood or applied in the contemporary context. This requires careful considerations of the original meaning, as well as the contemporary issues (i.e. the particularities of the situation, as well as existential consideration of the individual person making the decisions).

Because Christians have a book does not mean that they have all the answers. It doesn't function like some VCR manual. Consider that many of the moral principles are 'embedded' not in the casuistry of Leviticus or Deuteronomy, but in historical narratives! The bible then cannot be reduced to a moral handbook...

Nevertheless, God has given His people direction, whether through moral principles or examples in narrative, or rules in the law, or the ethical implications of the gospel (e.g. Galatians 2:14), or through the guidance of the Holy Spirit in tandem with His Word, to discern what is right and good.

Anyway, I hope that clarifies things.

J.

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: kingjames1 ]</p>

jlowder

In response to the fact that Moore's ethical intuitionism alone proves that metaphysical naturalism is logically compatible with moral realism, Kingjames1 writes:

I think it is obvious that Moore's nonnatural category is at least meaningful. There sure seem to be a lot of people who think they know exactly what G.E. Moore meant by nonnatural propeties, and I take that alone to be prima facie evidence for the meaningfulness of those properties. My own view is that Moore's nonnatural properties are meaningful, coherent, but false.

Is this even a sincere objection, or are you just arguing this point for argument's sake? I consider myself fairly well read in moral philosophby, and I'm not aware of a single moral philosopher who disputes the mere meaningfulness of ethical nonnaturalism. Indeed, IIRC, Christian philosopher J.P. Moreland holds not only that ethical nonnaturalism is meaningful, but true!

LOL. As I've said, I'm not an ethical nonnaturalist. But ethical nonnaturalism alone proves the logical compatibility of moral realism with metaphysical naturalism. In this sense, my point is analogous to Plantinga's familiar defense against the argument from evil, that even natural evils are logically compatible with God's existence since it is logically possible that natural evils could be the result of free choices by demons. Just as Plantinga doesn't actually believe that is the case and instead merely uses that example to prove the logical compatibility of theism and natural evil, I don't actually believe moral properties are nonnatural and only mention Moore's theory to prove the logical compatibility of metaphysical naturalism and moral realism.

I've addressed this over in the <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000333" target="_blank">C.S. Lewis thread</a>, but for convenience I will repeat what I wrote there. As nontheist John Post writes in his <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0801419689/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">textbook on metaphysics</a>,

And elsewhere, Post writes:

How are moral properties determined by natural properties? John Post explains the concept of determination as follows: "When we say one thing determines another, we mean that given the way the first is, there is one and only one way the second can be." Post says that the following principle is true:

Thus, moral properties supervene on natural properties in the sense that nothing can differ in its moral properties without differing also in its natural properties. That is what Post means when he says that moral properties are determined by natural fact.

==============

In response to the fact that abstract objects are logically compatible with metaphysical naturalism, you write:

As I've said, I don't subscribe to Moore's ethical nonnaturalism. I'm not a materialist. I (tentatively) think there are such things as abstract objects, but I'm not really interested in defending that view here since it really has nothing to do with my moral realism. (The answers to your questions about abstract objects may be found in Smith's book, if you're interested.) I only mentioned abstract objects because I disagreed with the definition of metaphysical naturalism you offered earlier.

This sounds like Moore's old 'open question' argument. In reply, I'm going to paraphrase something Pojman has written on the subject. Let N be the natural property that ethical naturalists identify as good. Moore asks naturalists, "X has N, but is it good?" Any self-reflective naturalist will answer, "Yes." When Moore argues that this substitution leads to a tautology ("X is good, but is it good?"), the naturalist can point out that this difference in meaning doesn't affect the essential referent. Consider the following examples:

D. 1. This is Venus, but is it the Morning Star?

by Moorean substituion,

D. 2. This is Venus, but is it Venus?

or

E. 1. This is the 42nd President of the United States, but is it Bill Clinton?

E. 2. This is Clinton, but is it Clinton?

In both cases, the answer to both questions is "yes," even though the statements 1 and 2 in each case may not mean the same thing.

I like John Post's answer that 'ought' is determined by 'is.'

Jeffery Jay Lowder

Plump-DJ

JJL. So... in otherwords "It's not that simple". You can't just sorta go "Well here you go, morality lies in natural property X and Y."

I'm not assuming that. I'm aware that it *may* go somewhere but i've been asking you to give me some idea's of where it might go since this is what i've really been after from the beginning. (Now that i think about it. ) In the absence of a plausable scenario on the table then i do beleive i'm making a fair point here.

I do agree that moral's are discoverd, in fact I was having a discussion recently with Shandon Guthrie about his debate with The Infidel Guy and he said exactly the same thing. He said morals were demonstrably objective, but the Infidel guy and a couple of his callers rejected that I believe. (More of them non-objective morality village athiest types i suppose.. )

And if i may my point about "begged questions" was in respone to this..

If can only 'be' or be discovered if it has somewhere to go. And i assumed that this is the proposition you were defending hence the charge of 'begged question.'. If naturalisim has the ontological space to put this where then shall it go? Surely you must have some preferences? A summary perhaps would be nice. And I now think I understand why Plato had his theory of the forms. He saw no ontological room for things like objective morality in a naturalistic reality.

I would probably be referring to non-philosopher atheists types. (straight of the cotten-picken street yuck yuck) I assumed that so many rejected it for the same reason I did, because they cannot see where it might go. Hence morailty is subjective, it's evovled, it's not 'out there' or it's an illusion.

I'd like to add something else which has been going thru my head while we've been discussing this. What exactly is a natural property? If you equated Naturalism with Materialism then I could probably see where you were coming from. But i'm guessing (given that you're one of the smarty-panths atheist types ) you would not equate Naturalism with so limited a definition. In fact in my view this point threatens to destroy all meaning to this whole discussion. If Naturalism can house abstract entities like logic, maths and an ontologicaly binding objective morality without any real hassles then it's starting to smell very much like "Supernaturalism" or "Platonism" to me.

[ October 27, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>