God Fearing Atheist

Whenever we interact with beings who can offer us harm/benifit.

And no, we should not give the ancestors of native peoples our land (if you do not wish to). Why should we? How am *I* responsible for what someone elses great-great-great grandfather did?

Is this really the case?

As far as it goes, predation is sub-optimal; it imposes costs and forgoes benifits by both parties, *nessecarly*.

Cain

QUOTE]Lets take an example. There is island populated by two men, Smith and Jones. Each own 1/4 of the island. Smith, one day, decides he would like more land for whatever reason (lets say hes a big fan of golf, and would love 18 holes of his own). So,he wonders off into the wilderness, fences another 1/4, and constructs his course. Is Jones, by virtue of Smith fencing off a piece of land, worse off than he was prior? Is his antecedent condition worsened in the slightest? Was the status quo ante better for him than his current position? I think the answer is clearly in the negative. Suppose instead that Smith had wondered into the middle of a bustling city. Are we to say that these people, presumably there for years, are making him worse off?[ [/QUOTE]

First, a book recommendation! The strongest argument against private ownership in land comes from an usual source -- Herbert Spencer. See the original edition of _Social Statics_ or republished excerpts in _Political Thought_ edited by Michael Rosen and Jonathon Wolff <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0192892789/qid=1014408739/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/103-6395005-3773441" target="_blank">http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0192892789/qid=1014408739/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/103-6395005-3773441</a>

I think your argument faulty assumes partial private property (ie Jones owns a fourth, Smith owns a fourth). Instead, we can imagine a better, possibly historically accurate example. Suppose Maria and Ahmed support themselves from land they own in common. Each has their own private home, but they grow crops, graze cattle, or whatever, on a stretch of communially owned property.

Maria, always the entrepenur, can, according to you, unilaterially seize the property. What about Ahmed's livelihood? She offers to pay him a wage for working on her land. Through the specialization of labor, they can together produce more wealth, and Ahmed's will be left off slightly better than he first began.

Or, suppose man and wife find themselves marooned on a desert island. They live on this island for quite some time, over 20 years, and have raised a son. Once their son turns 18 they say, "Okay, Charlie, time you find your own way." Charlie has no property. No means to support himself. Aha! the parents offer him a job. He can trade his labor for survival. Anyone else unfortunate to wash upon the same island will be forced to sell her labor, too.

Private Property makes little sense and, surprisingly, there are few justifications in the literature (and none convincing). Robert Nozick (RIP) subjects the "Lockean Proviso" to devestating criticism in _AS&U_, but suddenly dismisses the critique without further comment.

Your position, I think, also fails to consider future generations. Maybe seizing a piece of property for the moment makes no one worse off, but in the long run there could be disastrous consequences. We're not exactly "owners" of land, but stewards.

Lastly, I am not sure the extent to which you will defend private property. Is it an ultimate right as some Libertarians claim?

I'm in general agreement with Prodhoun- [private] Property is Theft.

God Fearing Atheist

It does no such thing. My argument is one *for* property rights...it does assume them.

I fail to see how any of this damages my argument.

We must not be reading the same AS&U! Nozick subjects Locke's labor theory of acquisition to many criticisms which he does not care to attack (rightfully so, i think), but the proviso, on the other hand....

I not "failing" to consider future generations....i did not consider them on purpose, as we have no moral duties towards them.

All rights are ultimate rights, including the (negative) right to property.

As Dr. Retard reminded us, theft presupposes a system of private property.

Cain

&lt;&lt;It does no such thing. My argument is one *for* property rights...it does assume them.&gt;&gt;

You should not assume what you are attempting to prove.

Re: I fail to see how this damages my argument...

You are a little vague. If you agree to the consequences as I laid them out, then I fail to see how this cannot damage your argument! The problem, unfortunately, runs deeper than simply property rights. Property rights, I think, are a consequence of our disagreement over the meaning of liberty.

Since to our knowledge future generations will arise, we most certainly do have obligations towards them. You seem to be under the impression that those currently on this small planet are the rightful "owners."

Suppose -- for example -- an agressive race of aliens from a planet 200 light years away wants to destroy the inhabitants of earth (to take our property). Though agressive, they are not entirely immoral. They know there's at least one species on earth that possess the power to reason and make moral decisions. So, seeing as how they have (moral) obligations to *this* (the current) race of humans, a neutron-missle is launched at the speed of light that will destroy all living creatures. Assume the aliens live only approximately 70 earth years. According to your argument, this action cannot be considered immoral. Humans today are doing the moral equivalent.

Your ideological bent is becoming more clear... Though I disagree with whole "negative-rights-only" crowd, your application in this casse is probably mistaken. The more land you possess, the more I am displaced. Land is finite. What you "own" directly impacts what I may "own"

&lt;&lt;I'm in general agreement with Prodhoun- [private] Property is Theft.&gt;&gt;

No it doesn't. It presupposes an "owner," caretaker, or steward. If the earth is owned in common (as John Locke once claimed), then shielding off a parcel of land and prohibiting others from entering is, by definition, theft. But, again, this assumes communal ownership. Unilaterially seizing land amounts to an initiation of force.

Dr. Retard

I think it should be agreed that if there were a system of a worldwide communal ownership of all natural resources, then private-property-acquisition could be justifiably called theft. But note that, even then, the charge of theft presupposes a pre-existing property claim -- namely, that worldwide communal ownership claim. Sure, it doesn't presuppose private property, but the slogan is "property is theft", it isn't "private property is theft". Not that this has any great implications. I just like giving that slogan a beating.

Now the main question: why should we accept that the default setting for ownership rights is "worldwide communal ownership"? Why not accept that the default setting is "nobody owns anything"?

John Locke did indeed claim that we begin with common ownership. But he gave an argument for that claim:

"[R]evelation...gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cvx. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given it to mankind in common." (section 25 of the Second Treatise; emphasis original)

Maybe you and I don't think of much of this argument, but at least it's given. Is there any secular reason for holding that all men share rights to the earth in common, by default? I can't think of one.

Here's a weird consequence of this common ownership view: let's say you want to pick an apple to eat it. Since the apple is owned in common, you have a moral obligation to get the consent of every other inhabitant of earth before you pick it. (Locke gives this counter-example in section 28). But why should we think that everyone else has such extensive claims on our behavior, especially by default!

Moreover, if the earth were indeed held in common by default, then presumably there would be some natural rule for determining who gets to do what. For, with private property, since a single will is in control, it's easy to verify what is and is not proper -- ask the person; in contrast, with common property, there are a variety of possible arrangements for sharing ownership. Which one is the default one? It seems odd to think that there is some social choice rule that binds us from the outset.

Now here's an intuitive argument for the other view -- the view that the default setting is devoid of ownership. Liberalism holds and it seems intuitive that any behavior is innocent until proven guilty -- the fact that someone wants to do something is prima facie reason for respecting that wish. If, by default, no one owns anything, then no one's behavior is restricted by ownership (at least initially). In constrast, if everyone owns everything, then everyone's behavior is restricted from the outset; restrictions would be justified by default.

But, intuitively, it seems that it's whoever proposes restrictions that must bear the burden of proof, not whoever proposes the absence of restrictions. Think about it: "'We ought to ban nose-picking.' 'Why should we do that?' 'I don't have to support the ban of nose-picking. You have to tell us why we shouldn't ban nose-picking.'" It seems weird that restrictions on behavior stand in need of no justification -- true by default.

There is another argument against property-acquisition, one that doesn't presuppose default common ownership: property-acquisition harms everyone else by depriving them of opportunities, and so is prima facie unjust. (This is similar to what Spencer argues in Social Statics). I would rebut this by analogy. Is it prima facie unjust to enter into a monogamous relationship? After all, this deprives everyone else of a potential mate. (The truly goofy consequence would be that polyamorous folks are more unjust than the rest of us). Or is it prima facie unjust to occupy some portion of space-time, thereby depriving everyone else of the opportunity to occupy that portion of space-time? (The truly goofy consequence would be that really fat people or really old people are more unjust than the rest of us).

It doesn't seem that we can accept the principle that whenever we deprive someone of an opportunity to do something (because, thanks to us, if they tried to do it, they'd be hurting us and so violating some norm), then we are thereby behaving in a prima facie unjust fashion. But that implausible principle seems to be what grounds these arguments against property-acquistion.

[edited for UBB]

[ February 22, 2002: Message edited by: Dr. Retard ]</p>

God Fearing Atheist

Thankfully, I did not. Perhaps you should reread my original post.

Lets say Smith and Jones, prior to private ownership, "jointly own" undeveloped resources. Communal ownership or not, it doesnt affect my argument insofar as the proviso is not violated. This is true of acquisition generally.

This is old news. I responded to this two, maybe three times already in this very thread.

God Fearing Atheist

I still love Narveson's example.

Two western explorers set out from their isolated homes in California in search of new lands. They travel far and wide, and eventually, one finds himself in the middle of bustling 19th century Manhattan. Are we to say that the acquisition of these New Yorkers are "harming" our would-be adventurers?

Cain

Prodhoun makes quite clear (to a mind numbing degree) he meant "private property is theft." Critiques which ignore this obvious point are either the result of poor scholarship or outright deception (See N. Branden "The fallacy of the Stolen Concept" as an example).

The "community" can influence your decisions to the degree you impact the community. As an analogy, consider the socks I choose to wear in public. This has little or no effect on the lives of others, so they have very little say. Instead suppose I consider to stroll down the same street strapped in dynamite. This most certainly affects the public in a very real and immediate way, so they can impose regulations. If I chose to wear the same explosive suit in the middle of the desert, then, again, the public would have few, if any, reasons to regulate my conduct.

Considering the interests of all invovled, picking an apple from a tree (under ordinary circumstances) cannot compare to seizing a vast stretch of land.

Specific social institutions are one thing, general ethical principles, quite another. Right now we are currently trying to determine what is moral.

You are absolutely correct by saying whoever proposes a regulatory body or instution, bears the burden of proof. However, it's my position that private property is inheriently authoritarian, and ultimately subverts the interests of others. Your position also follows from an ahistorical atomism: you're picking an apple from a tree. Individuals do not suddenly find themselves near apple trees picking fruit. We're born into a society and surrounded by other individuals. If you choose to hike off into the wilderness, and horde all the apples around, then more power to you. If you choose to leave near a pond, far removed from society, then so be it. But if that society expands and eventually needs those apple trees or that land, then their interests count, and should be considered.

Here you're likening self-ownership to ownership over the external world. They're quite different.

I think we're working from the same ethical premise. Even you concede that someone cannot just take a piece of land because she so chooses. The act must not worsen the condition of others. That is, we're recognizing other free willing individual who have interests, to whom we owe moral obligations. Your failure is accounting for the long run.

Suppose 20 people find themselves stranded on a desert island (desert islands always make economics much simpler). Are you arguing that anyone can seize anything (maybe all the coconut trees and the good land), while others (the losers) are left with nothing? How exactly does the island become private ownership?

Do I urinate on the trees that I want own? Do I grab all the coconuts I can hold and hide off in a cave?

Or is the island defacto owned by everyone living on it. Does this communal ownership extend to people half-way across the globe because the world is held in common? No. Humans half-way across the globe do not encounter the same circumstances or needs as the castaways.

"Needs" and "interests" in this case (and most cases) are not far removed.

Again, consider interests equally. My interest to my one and only versus others' interest to occupy the same space-time I am enjoying for the moment.

ELECTROGOD

Let's get back to the simple question of the acquisition of private property.
Does the daily acquisition of food count as the acquisition of private property? How does that affect the views of this concept? If it does not count then what IS the acquisition of food? If it does count then what are our "rights" concerning it? Is that sort of acquisition a natural function of survival that needs no defense or does it have some sort of limit that may serve to define the entire concept?