Freethought & Rationalism Archive

jlowder · 08-13-2002, 12:34 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Vorkosigan:
Jeff,

I'm not clear on what you mean by "true" in the context of moral claims. It seems to me that the moral realist can be a relativist, but that is not what I think of when I think of moral realism. For example, the MC "It is bad to set babies on fire" might be true in Cincinnati, but not in Cleveland. Does the "true" here mean "somewhere at some time" or "true everywhere on earth at all times." Leaving aside the question of whether such an MC would be normative, does simply refer to "having objective and verifiable existence somewhere at some time?"

Vorkosigan

Your question is a straightforward and deserves an answer. Unfortunately, I'm writing this message from work without the benefit of my books and reference material, so I am going to go from memory. I think moral philosopher Geoffrey Sayre-McCord would stipulate that moral subjectivism is not normally considered a type of moral realism. However, Sayre-McCord explained at some length how he wanted a definition of moral realism that was consistent with how realism is defined in other non-moral branches of philosophy. That is what his definition of moral realism accomplishes.

FWIW, you have not completely accurately quoted MC. MC (moral claim), as I stated it, is the claim, "You should not set babies on fire for fun." You ask, what does it mean to say that a moral claim like MC is "true"? Again, going from memory, I think Sayre-McCord's answer would be that it depends on which type of moral realist you ask; all that matters (from the perspective of moral realism in general) is that some moral claims are literally true. A moral subjectivist would say that MC is true just in case he or she (the speaker) believe it is true, or just in case an entire society or community believed it to be true. A moral intersubjectivist would say that MC is true just in case it was in accord with, say, natural human desires (e.g., Larry Arnhart's ethical theory in DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT). I'm not sure, in Sayre-McCord's definitional scheme, how to characterize how an objectivist would define "moral truth." Some objectivists are nonnaturalists like G.E. Moore and so I presume they would say that MC is true just in case the appropriate nonnatural moral properties supervened on the relevant natural properties. Other objectivists, including atheist philosophers Quentin Smith and Michael Martin, are ethical naturalists and so would have a somewhat different condition that would have to obtain in order for MC to be true.

I hope this helps. This is the best I can do without my reference books!

Jeff

tronvillain · 08-17-2002, 08:06 PM

jlowder:

Quote:

So let me attempt to put this in plain English. A moral realist believes that some actions are, quite literally, wrong. (For example, a moral realist might believe setting newborn babies on fire is really wrong.) The objectivist goes a step further than the realist. The objectivist says that not only are some things really morally wrong (e.g., burning newborns), but that the reason such things are morally wrong has nothing to do with the opinions of individuals, cultures, societies, etc.

As far as I can tell, only an objectivist really believes that some actions are, quite literally, wrong. After all, both subjectivists and intersubjectivists acknowledge that while a given action may be "wrong" from one perspective, it could be "right" from another. Their moral statements are a matter of taste, comparable to "This casserole is delicious." This would seem to make moral realism relatively synonymous with moral objectivism after all.

Oh, and Larry (SingleDad) had a few things to say:

If we are going to argue for moral objectivism, we must, as Jeffery Lowder correctly notes, establish that some moral claims are "true" or "false". Naturally, we must establish a rigorous definition of "truth".

If we use Tarski's correspondence theory of truth, then a true statement is one that accurately corresponds to the real world; it is false if it corresponds to a contradiction of the real world. Under this defintion, moral objectivism trivially entails moral realism.

Of course, there are meta-truths. For instance it is true that "2+2=4" is a theorem of ordinary arithmetic. In this sense, moral objectivism is true given an objective standard. It is objectively true that "thou shalt not kill" is moral according to the christian bible. However, this is a trivial form of objectivism, since the objective truth of the christian bible as a moral standard is not established.

It should be noted that I was not arguing against the existence of the presumption of objectivity (which need merely be asserted to exist), merely whether such presumption entailed the actual objectivity of moral standards.

jlowder · 08-18-2002, 08:41 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by tronvillain:
As far as I can tell, only an objectivist really believes that some actions are, quite literally, wrong. After all, both subjectivists and intersubjectivists acknowledge that while a given action may be "wrong" from one perspective, it could be "right" from another. Their moral statements are a matter of taste, comparable to "This casserole is delicious." This would seem to make moral realism relatively synonymous with moral objectivism after all.

Not true! Again, remember the definition of moral realism. Moral realism is the view that two conditions obtain: (1) moral claims are either true or false, and (2) some moral claims are literally true. As Sayre-McCord notes, both subjectivism and intersubjectivism are realist positions:

Quote:

Each of these positions, whether subjectivist, intersubjectivist, or objectivist, is quite clearly a realist position as long as it is combined with the view that some of the relevant truth-conditions are actually satisfied (i.e., that some of the relevant claims are true.)

Remember that Sayre-McCord wanted to find a definition of realism that made sense not only of moral terminology, but of terminology from other disciplines as well. Sayre-McCord then comments on realism in the field of the philosophy of psychology:

Quote:

For instance, a perfectly respectable and unquestionable realist position in the philosophy of psychology is that the truth-conditions for reports of pain make explicit reference to an individual's mental state and that sometimes those truth-conditions are satisfied (i.e., that people do sometimes feel pain). No general account of realism rules out subjectivism, so no account that requires 'independence from the mental,' will be acceptable. As R.B. Perry emphatically points out: 'There is not the slightest ground for imputing to realism the grotesque notion that there are no such things as acts or states of mind, or that such things cannot be known. . . . Because he [the realist] seeks to avoid a philosophical pysho-mania, there is no reason to accuse him of psycho-phobia.'

"In the same way, a perfectly respectable realist position in the philosophy of law is that the truth-conditions for legal assertions make essential reference to conventions and practices of particular societies and that sometimes those conditions are satisfied. Of course, this isn't the only realist position. One who offers objectivist truth-conditions for legal claims (as natural law theorists do) and who thinks the claims are sometimes true will also be a realist about the law. Yet in the case of legal claims, the most plausible account of what we're saying when we claim that some behavior is illegal is that it's forbidden by the laws in force in the relevant society. Anything stronger seems to build into legal claims more than is intended.

These views, in the philosophy of psychology and the philosophy of law, are no less realist than is the view, in the philosophy of science, that the truth-conditions for claims concerning theoretical entities make no reference to people or their practices and conventions and those truth-conditions are sometimes satisfied. Realism is not solely the prerogative of objectivists."

[ August 18, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]

jlowder · 08-18-2002, 09:26 AM

Picking up where I left off in my last post....

Sayre-McCord next discusses how intersubjectivism and even subjectivism can be realist. First, he discusses subjectivism:

Quote:

Importantly, subjectivism about value gives perfect sense to there being a fact of the matter (you might even say 'an objective fact of the matter') about what is good or valuable, and to that fact being reportable any number of people. The (cognitivist) subjectivist's position is not that value judgments are 'true-for-someone' and not literally true. Instead their view is that value judgments are literally true, when true, but only because of the subjective states of someone (e.g., the desires, preferences, and goals of the relevant person).

Sayre-McCord next discusses how intersubjectivism can be realist:

Quote:

There are various ways of altering intersubjectivism so as to get a more plausible account of moral language. One way is to reject the view that moral claims are directly about the conventions of a society and to maintain instead merely that they are the product of convention. With this in mind, one might argue that the correctness of a moral principle (and so the truth of moral claims) depends on its falling within the best coherent justificatory theory available (in principle) for the practices, conventions, and principles we happen to embrace. This view recognizes a standard against which particular practices and actions are to be measured, so it acknowledges the intelligibility of saying that there are immoral conventions and morally unacceptable practices. At the same time, however, it treats this standard as itself reflecting the institutions and practices of the moral community question.

Larry Arnhart's ethical theory, in his excellent book, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0791436942/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">Darwinian Natural Right</a>, is an example of realist intersubjectivism. Arnhart's ethical theory is that the good is the desirable, and there are at least twenty natural desires that are universal to all human societies because they are rooted in human biology. The satisfaction of those desires constitutes a universal standard for judging social practice as either fulfilling or frustrating human nature. Arnhart's theory is intersubjectivist because it entails that ethical goodness varies according to species. As Arnhart writes:

Quote:

The first point--that what is good varies according to the species--should not disturb us unless we believe the objective reality of the human good depends on its being a cosmic good. It is sensible to recognize, as Aristotle does, that the term "good" has as many senses as "healthy"... . Whatever is befitting to something is good for it, and therefore goodness varies according to the nature of each thing. The goodness of life is rendered no less real by being relative to each species: "The good is not the same for all animals, but is different in the case of each." We can see that in those respects as to which we differ from other animals, what is good for us is not good for them. Yet this in no way diminishes the objective reality of the good for us as conforming to our nature.
(Arnhart, pp. 236-237)

Notice that on Arnhart's ethical theory, (1) moral claims are either true or false, and (2) some moral claims are literally true. Thus, Arnhart's ethical theory is an example of realist intersubjectivism. In Arnhart's words:

Quote:

Far from denying that moral judgments are judgments of fact, Hume claims that moral judgments are accurate when they correctly report what our moral sentiments would be in a given set of circumstances. Moral judgments do not have cosmic objectivity in the sense of conforming to structures that exist totally independently of human beings. Yet neither do moral judgments have only emotive subjectivity in the sense of expressing purely personal feelings. Rather, as Nicholas Capaldi (1989) has argued, moral judgments for Hume have intersubjective objectivity in that they are factual judgments about the species-typical pattern of moral sentiments in specified circumstances.

(Arnhart, p. 70)

[ August 18, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]

[ August 18, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]

AtlanticCitySlave · 08-18-2002, 09:30 AM

This has nothing to do with the conversation, but what is your job Jeff (Lowder)? (If you don't mind me asking of course). I saw you in a debate a couple years ago at the University Of Penn, and even then I wondered what you did for a living. Care to share?

tronvillain · 08-18-2002, 09:40 AM

jlowder:

Quote:

Not true! Again, remember the definition of moral realism. Moral realism is the view that two conditions obtain: (1) moral claims are either true or false, and (2) some moral claims are literally true.

Of course, statement such as "You should not burn babies for fun." can be both true and false, unless "You" and "should" are strictly defined.

jlowder · 08-18-2002, 10:08 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by tronvillain:
jlowder:

Of course, statement such as "You should not burn babies for fun." can be both true and false, unless "You" and "should" are strictly defined.

Huh? I'm afraid I don't follow this.

tronvillain · 08-18-2002, 04:32 PM

Well, it is trivially easy to imagine a scenario in which MC is true, and it is almost as easy to imagine a scenario in which MC is false. It is a short leap to imagine both situations occuring simultaneously, in which case "You should not burn babies for fun" will be both true and false. To make it either true or false, you would have to define which situation the statement was being made in.

jlowder · 08-18-2002, 04:51 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by tronvillain:
Well, it is trivially easy to imagine a scenario in which MC is true, and it is almost as easy to imagine a scenario in which MC is false. It is a short leap to imagine both situations occuring simultaneously, in which case "You should not burn babies for fun" will be both true and false. To make it either true or false, you would have to define which situation the statement was being made in.

When would MC be false?

tronvillain · 08-18-2002, 05:37 PM

You are telling me you cannot imagine any situations in which the subjective moral statement MC would be false? Apparently objective morality has really limited your imagination.

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08-18-2002, 09:30 AM	#15
AtlanticCitySlave Banned Join Date: Jun 2002 Location: New Jersey Posts: 251	This has nothing to do with the conversation, but what is your job Jeff (Lowder)? (If you don't mind me asking of course). I saw you in a debate a couple years ago at the University Of Penn, and even then I wondered what you did for a living. Care to share?

08-18-2002, 04:32 PM	#18
tronvillain Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2000 Location: Alberta, Canada Posts: 5,658	Well, it is trivially easy to imagine a scenario in which MC is true, and it is almost as easy to imagine a scenario in which MC is false. It is a short leap to imagine both situations occuring simultaneously, in which case "You should not burn babies for fun" will be both true and false. To make it either true or false, you would have to define which situation the statement was being made in.

08-18-2002, 05:37 PM	#20
tronvillain Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2000 Location: Alberta, Canada Posts: 5,658	You are telling me you cannot imagine any situations in which the subjective moral statement MC would be false? Apparently objective morality has really limited your imagination.

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