Freethought & Rationalism Archive

RogerLeeCooke · 08-14-2002, 05:32 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Mike:
Roger,

All I was saying is that what at first seems supernatural is often later discovered to be natural. eg. flight, magnetism, electricity. And that since the alleged witnesses were appealing to natural sensory experience the discussion about natural vs. supernatural might not be relevant. But a simple attempt at replication might. Thus what currently appears supernatural eg. resurrection, parting of the red sea, converting water into wine might at some point be found to have technological possibility. Scientists are already experimenting with similar possibilities eg. cloning.

I don't know anything about christian science, and have no argument about the possibility of hallucination and deception. But since when was science fear driven? If you can't hang with the test, don't, but don't complain either. If you don't know, all you can do is guess. There may very well have been hallucinations, but we don't know for sure. Are you confident in your ability to tell the difference between the real and the imagined in your own experience? If not, then how can you even know that your everyday "natural" experiences are not in fact your imagination?

Mike,

As I recently asked someone else on this board, is there *nothing* you dismiss as not worthy of serious consideration? Do you feel that you should keep an open mind about all those people who think they were abducted by aliens? After all, you haven't (I suppose) been abducted by aliens yourself, so why conclude that these people are either faking it or self-deluded?

I have no hesitation in saying that a serious consideration of that possibility isn't worth a minute of my time, and it isn't going to get a minute of my time. If I'm wrong, I'll humbly apologize later, but time has wings, and the number of hypotheses one can seriously investigate is limited.

Mike · 08-14-2002, 05:58 PM

Roger,

Seriously investigate? Maybe not. Keep an open mind, certainly. Many apparently impossible things have become possible in recent years. I try not to draw conclusions about things I know nothing about. If you know nothing about God and don't wish to, fine, but don't pretend you know what he is or is not if you haven't made the effort.

Right now alien abductions don't concern me, but whether I have 72 years of life or infinity may be worth consideration since the meaning of life itself hangs in the balance.

08-14-2002, 07:12 PM

Hey Cosym,

Quote:

1. G -> []G (if god exists, then god necessarily exists, or "God must exist necessarily IF He even exists at all.")

2. (G -> []G) -> (<>G -> G) (plugging G into the valid modal form of (p -> []p) -> (<>p -> p) (i.e., that necessary existence of any p implies actual existence of p))

3.<>G -> G (if it is possible that god exists, then god exists)- found by using inference 1 with inference 2 in a modus ponens

4. G (modus ponens, using the axiom and inference

This formulation above is invalid. It is, however, very easy to make it work. I�ll add a premise:

1b. <>G (It is possible that a necessary God exists)

Voila!

Now Cosym, I admit that I�m a bit of a moron when it comes to logic. I get all confused with these symbols and letters and stuff. Let�s simplify the argument a tiny bit, just so I can talk about it without getting tied in knots! It will be logically identical, just kind of simplistic-sounding. Same argument.

Since premise 3 is a combination of 1 and 2, all that is left is to combine 1b with 3. We�ll call this combined premise A. (Uh oh, I hear Kugo�s words rumbling in the distance!)

A: G
Therefore
4. G

Be careful with technical terminology Cosym! Your crucial mistake in this formulation of the ontological argument is to confuse modal necessity, (which in this case has been shown to be question-begging!) with colloquial necessity. You and I both admit that necessary elves are possible, but we would both point out that modally necessary elves are not modally possible.

This flaw is common to all ontological arguments. The question-begging is introduced in a novel way in the modal argument but, sure as possibly necessary elves, it does indeed beg the question.

Regards,
Synaesthesia

Kuglo · 08-14-2002, 07:54 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Cosym:
[QB]---If A then A, therefore A.---

Where does the proof ever say that?

Your "argument" for the existence of god asserts that the property of existence is part of god's inherent definition. This means that if there is a god, then god must exist. Or in other words, "If god exists, then god exists." A->A You further "deduce" from this that god exists, A. So your argument boils down to, "If god exists then he exists, therefore he exists." A small child could recognize the nonsense of this argument.

Quote:

I certainly don't agree with the conclusion of the proof anymore than you do, but at least I don't make such gross misrepresentations of it when I criticize it.

As I have aptly demonstrated here, my assessment of the "proof" is accurate. I know this apart from my own understanding, because in my logic class we went over Descartes Ontological Argument for the Existence of God, which is precisely the same argument just worded very slightly differently. We discussed why this argument is begging the question. A->A is the most fundamental and obvious example of begging the question.

Quote:

---The crux of your fallacy is step 2.---

Please: report this fallacy to a logic journal immediately, because this inference is used all the time! It's known as Bouer's Theorem, and you can find a more formal proof of by studying K logic, which is hardly a device of theology (it was developed by materialists, in fact, and is commonly used in several sciences).

Google turns up no results for "Bouer's Theorem", and "Bauer's Theorem" (which was the only close match I could find) has to do with polynomial summations. Granted, Bouer's Theorem might be a legitimate part of logic; but your interpretation of it is clearly false, and I'll prove this with a quick repitition of a previous example.
I define F as "A perfect friend, who has the necessary quality of bringing me fresh hot pizza for lunch every day." If F exists, then I will receive this free lunch every day (and be quite happy at that!). However, I don't, because F does not exist. This is identical to the logic employed in this "proof" of god; God is substituted for F (the perfect friend), and "exists" is substituted for "brings me hot pizzas for lunch every day".
As long as we observe that various hypothetical beings obviously do not exist, then your interpretation of "Bouer's Theorem" is false.

Quote:

---Necessary existence is part of your definition of god---

Indeed, as some characteristic is part of any definition. But nowhere in the proof is there a step G[]->G There isn't even an inference of G[]!

The proof starts with G[] and arrives at G with no other logical support for this conclusion. That's equivalent to G[]->G for all intents and purposes.
And G[] is indeed inferred. G->G[] is stated and the conclusion of the "proof" is G. There G and G->G[], together, are the same as stating G[].

Quote:

In case you don't know, - & g t ; means that statements are connected with "if... then"

I've always seen it written as ->, but if you like "minus-ampersand-g-t-semicolon", more power to you.

Quote:

Thus, G->G[] means "IF G exists, THEN G exists necessarily" There is no conclusion of existence or even of necessary existence in this statement.

I never said that there was. But in the "proof" there is a conclusion of G.

Quote:

---Yet I hear no screaming banshee, because none exists.---

There's no reason to believe that the banshee exists, since there is no proof of its existence. This a proof of existence: so where do you think it goes wrong?

There's no reason to believe that a _god_ exists, since there is no proof (or even evidence) of it's existence. It goes wrong in precisely the same way as the banshee example.

Quote:

You are again being very sloppy with your criticisms. NOWHERE in the proof does it say that god exists simply because god is defined as having necessary existence. Follow the logic again: where is this illegitimate step you claim that the proof takes?

The _only_ thing that the "proof" says is that god exists because existence is a necessary property of god.

Quote:

---And your god can have the property of necessary existence, but it doesn't make a difference unless god exists to begin with.---

I agree... but the existence of G is what the proof then goes about _demonstrating_.

No it dosen't. It doesn't demonstrate anything but a very deep misunderstanding of basic logic.

Quote:

You are also incorrect by calling it "my god." I don't have a god. Surely someone can raise an arguement (in response to someone's query about necessary existence) and discuss it rationally regardless of their belief or non-belief.

Yes I was hasty and must have thought I was replying to the original author. Sorry.

Cosym · 08-14-2002, 08:24 PM

---This formulation above is invalid. It is, however, very easy to make it work. I�ll add a premise:---

I already added that premise. The person who quoted me was the one who cut out my original statement of the premise, but if you were reading carefully, you would noted that even in the quoted portion, I referenced the "axiom."
The proof also requires a definition, which I also included.

---1b. <>G (It is possible that a necessary God exists)---

Doesn't this suggest to you the need for the that missing definition?

<>G doesn't mean what you just said it means.

---Since premise 3 is a combination of 1 and 2, all that is left is to combine 1b with 3.---

No, inference 4 is a combination of the axiom and inference 3.

---We�ll call this combined premise A.---

What? It isn't a premise: it's an inference (in this case, our conclusion). How can you get that wrong and still make any sense?
It follows from the axiom and inference. Yes, the conclusion of the inference is G.

---A: G Therefore 4. G---

What? There is no G... therefore G. G is drawn from modus ponens of the axiom and inference 3.

If you are going to criticize the argument, at least get the argument right.

---Your crucial mistake in this formulation of the ontological argument is to confuse modal necessity, (which in this case has been shown to be question-begging!) with colloquial necessity. You and I both admit that necessary elves are possible, but we would both point out that modally necessary elves are not modally possible.---

I think it's a little strange that you, an avowed neonate when it comes to logic, are suggesting that this proof, which has been discussed for decades by some of the finest minds in the Western world, has a flaw which you are the first to discover. And unfortunately, you have not found a legitimate flaw: modal necessity is not question begging.

Again: show me where the arguement begs the question!

---You and I both admit that necessary elves are possible, but we would both point out that modally necessary elves are not modally possible.---

Please explain what you mean in plain english again. I don't think you have understood what the proof is doing. It is not stating that just because someone claims that some being is necessary, it exists. You need to at least take it more seriously than that.

08-14-2002, 09:01 PM

Cosym,

Quote:

And unfortunately, you have not found a legitimate flaw: modal necessity is not question begging.

Although I am the neonate, it appears that it is you who have not done your homework. Nobody claims that modal necessity is question-begging because question-begging is not a formal fallacy.

To beg the question is to assume the very thing that you�re trying to prove. Look it up for yourself. Most references will explicitly note, and I ask you to pay close attention: question begging is still begging the question if the assumption is broken up over several premises.

So to say

1. Chickens are invisible space monsters.
2. Chickens are well known to exist.
Therefore
3. Invisible space monsters exist.

Is not ANY better than:

1. Invisible space monsters exist, thus
2. Invisible space monsters exist.

Quote:

I think it's a little strange that you, an avowed neonate when it comes to logic, are suggesting that this proof, which has been discussed for decades by some of the finest minds in the Western world, has a flaw which you are the first to discover.

Ad hominem? tsk tsk tsk. If you are more experienced than I am in logic, I fully expect you to see past that sort of thing.

That�s the really fantastic thing about logic. It doesn�t matter how smart anyone is. When you beg questions, anyone can call you on it. Of course, that�s also the damned thing about logic. Simple errors like question-begging can be disguised as sophisticated reasoning.

That being said, it should be noted that this flaw is really quite obvious. I am very far from the first one to point it out.

Quote:

What? There is no G... therefore G. G is drawn from modus ponens of the axiom and inference 3.

If you are going to criticize the argument, at least get the argument right.

Just in case you missed it, question-begging is not made a mite less egregious if we use several steps to execute our nefarious informal fallacy. It�s simply more obvious when I simplify it.

1. <>G --> G
2. <>G
therefore
3. G

GIven the formulation of possibility in modal logic, to assume the possibility of a necessary being is question begging within that system. In systems where it does not beg the question we don�t get G as a conclusion.

Many ontological arguments involve upwards of seven or eight steps. With each step, more people get confused. Is the argument any more cogent for the confusion it engenders?

Quote:

Please explain what you mean in plain english again. I don't think you have understood what the proof is doing. It is not stating that just because someone claims that some being is necessary, it exists. You need to at least take it more seriously than that.

That is absolutely all that it is doing. It is logically identical to any claim of the modal possibility of a necessary being.

1. <>Jerry Springer is necessarily President of the US.
2. <>Jerry Springer is necessarily President of the US. --(By the rules of modal logic)--> Jerry Springer is necessarily President of the US.
Hence by the perfectly valid form of inference modus pollens.
3. Jerry Springer is necessarily President of the US.

The essence of the Ontological argument is begging the question, and convolution is it�s modus operandi.

Regards,
Synaesthesia

[ August 14, 2002: Message edited by: Synaesthesia ]

Cosym · 08-14-2002, 09:09 PM

---Your "argument" for the existence of god asserts that the property of existence is part of god's inherent definition.---

No. Where? Which aspect simply defines god as actually existing? This would, in the symbols, simply be G. Where do you find G in the proof, save in the conclusion?

---This means that if there is a god, then god must exist. Or in other words, "If god exists, then god exists." A->A You further "deduce" from this that god exists, A. So your argument boils down to, "If god exists then he exists, therefore he exists." A small child could recognize the nonsense of this argument.---

A small child could realize that your arguement bears no relation to this one. You may be used to dealing with ontological arguements this way, but this particular proof is NOT guilty of that particular flaw. There is no statement of "if god exists then god exists" and the proof does not use that formulation.

---As I have aptly demonstrated here, my assessment of the "proof" is accurate.---

You have demonstrated no such thing. There simply is no place where the proof draws G reflexively from G.

---I know this apart from my own understanding, because in my logic class we went over Descartes Ontological Argument for the Existence of God, which is precisely the same argument just worded very slightly differently.---

Sigh. This is NOT the same arguement as Descartes. Even materialists take this proof far more seriously than they do Descartes's ontological arguement. In fact, the only real discussion philosophy is over the _soundness_ of the proof, not the validity of the logic, which you are attacking.

---I define F as "A perfect friend, who has the necessary quality of bringing me fresh hot pizza for lunch every day." If F exists, then I will receive this free lunch every day (and be quite happy at that!). However, I don't, because F does not exist.---

Hello? The proof is NOT DONE YET. By inference 2, it has not established, nor does it claim to have established, G. You are being dishonest in implying that it does, or has even yet considered whether it does. What it has done is draw an inference about what would be true if another condition, yet unstated, were true.
All it says is that that if a proposition p is implied to be necessary, then the proposition's truth is implied by virtue of its possibility.
If you disagree with this formulation, please explain how. But don't make the false claim that it is simply a statement of G.

---As long as we observe that various hypothetical beings obviously do not exist, then your interpretation of "Bouer's Theorem" is false.---

No... because the theorem's implication is not drawm from existence, but from _possible_ existence. You are simply ignoring what the proof actually says in lieu of your canned critique of a different arguement.

---The proof starts with G[] and arrives at G with no other logical support for this conclusion.---

At this point, I don't feel unjustified in calling you a liar. The proof does NOT start with G[]! It begins with G->G[], which is a _definition_, not a statement about existence.

---That's equivalent to G[]->G for all intents and purposes.---

How so?

---And G[] is indeed inferred. G->G[] is stated and the conclusion of the "proof" is G. There G and G->G[], together, are the same as stating G[].---

No, it is not. You can't make a coherent arguement simply by gathering together some related symbols and claiming they represent the proof. You can't collapse a logical arguement into just a definition and the conclusion. The proof could go nowhere without the axiom, and that you have utterly ignored the role of the axiom in your criticism is proof positive that you have not seriously considered what this arguement is saying.
In fact, without the axiom, we could not even invoke Bouer's Theorem in the first place!

If G[] were anywhere stated as a premise, it would need to be justified BY a proof, and G->G[] is not it. It doesn't do it!
Now, do you disagree with G->G[]? Is the greatest possible existence impossible, in your mind?

---I've always seen it written as ->, but if you like "minus-ampersand-g-t-semicolon", more power to you.---

I wrote ->, and -> still appears in my browser everywhere but, suspiciously, your quotation of me.

---But in the "proof" there is a conclusion of G.--

So? What the heck is the point of the argument if not to conclude G? Are you maintaining that all arguements that conclude G are invalid because you took a philosophy class once, and don't like it? Some help you're gonna be in a debate against theists...

---There's no reason to believe that a _god_ exists, since there is no proof (or even evidence) of it's existence.---

Um... this IS a proof. You presenting this statement "there is no proof" as an arguement against the validity of the proof is incoherent.

Ontology demonstrates things straight from logical inference: if you really maintain that logical arguements are invalid whenever and just because you don't like their conclusions, fine. But no one is going to respect you very much for that position.

---The _only_ thing that the "proof" says is that god exists because existence is a necessary property of god.---

You are, simply put, wrong. Again: point out where in the proof it concludes god exists because existence is a property of god. What it says is IF god exists, then god exists necessarily (in every possible world). An IF statement is not the same thing as defining something into existence.

Again, you cannot possibly speak honestly about this proof without appreciating the key role played by <>G, without addressing modal logic itself, and by claiming that the whole arguement can be summed up with G[]->G. That you, in your supposed refutation, have not even addressed the concept of possibility is the most incredible thing to me about this whole mess.

08-14-2002, 09:48 PM

Cosym,

Quote:

No... because the theorem's implication is not drawm from existence, but from _possible_ existence.

Modally possible existence, not just possible existence.

Quote:

A small child could realize that your arguement bears no relation to this one. You may be used to dealing with ontological arguements this way, but this particular proof is NOT guilty of that particular flaw. There is no statement of "if god exists then god exists" and the proof does not use that formulation.

Simply because the premises are not in the form "God exists", doesn�t mean it doesn�t beg the question.

The very fact that a necessary being is asserted to be possible ensures that the conclusion will be that this being (whatever it is, God, pink bunnies, or all possible universes being hard vacuum) is instatiated.

Time for another obligatory parody:

All possible universes are hard vacuum = []V

1. <>[]V
2. If <>[]V then V
Modus pollens
3. V

That�s odd.. I can breath just fine.

How confident am I, therefore, in the idea that this ontological argument can prove God anymore than it proves the innumerable absurdities for which it is valid?

Regards,
Synaesthesia

[ August 14, 2002: Message edited by: Synaesthesia ]

Cosym · 08-14-2002, 10:26 PM

---Ad hominem? tsk tsk tsk. If you are more experienced than I am in logic, I fully expect you to see past that sort of thing.---

This was not ad hominem, but a suggestion that perhaps you would do well to consider the debate over this issue. Even those that strongly oppose this arguement do not think it begs the question, and I think it's worth considering their arguements before jumping to a conclusion that I hold (and have later argued) is false.

---To beg the question is to assume the very thing that you�re trying to prove.---

Yes, I know.

---1. Chickens are invisible space monsters.
2. Chickens are well known to exist.
Therefore
3. Invisible space monsters exist.---

Indeed: this is an example of a perfectly valid arguement (no different in form than: "monkey's are hairy mammals, monkeys exist, hairy mammals exist", except that, unlike the chicken arguement, the first premise of the monkey arguement is true, and so is the conclusion) that is not at all convincing.

But your job in sustaining your accusation, is to show where, in the proof, is found AS A PREMISE, that God exists, even split up. The definition is G->G[]. The axiom is <>G. Those are the only two things which require any a priori assent.

And, unlike your chicken example, <>G cannot by itself be combined with G->G[] to demonstrate G. That it is merely possible that G necessarily exists does not demonstrate either G or G[]. All it could say is that it is possible that G exists, and thus only possible that G is necessary. One could claim the same about anything.
The conclusion can only be reached by working through the inferences.

---It doesn�t matter how smart anyone is. When you beg questions, anyone can call you on it.---

Yes, but not all calls are legitimate simply because they are made. You seem to be making this call reflexively, instead of based on what's there.

---Just in case you missed it, question-begging is not made a mite less egregious if we use several steps to execute our nefarious informal fallacy. It�s simply more obvious when I simplify it.---

But you cannot simplify it to the point of destroying or ignoring the inferences of a proof! You even seem to be confused as to what is a premise and what is an inference. To wit:

---1. <>G --> G
2. <>G
therefore
3. G---

<>G->G is an _inference_ from inferences 1 and 2. Nowhere is <>G->G simply stated alone as being true in all cases. No one is asked to simply agree to it's truth. It is, rather, presented in the proof first as only _conditionaly_ true, and is only held to be true _after_ that specific condition has been fulfilled.

---Given the formulation of possibility in modal logic, to assume the possibility of a necessary being is question begging within that system.--

It isn't assumed: it is an inference! Good grief.

---Given the formulation of possibility in modal logic, to assume the possibility of a necessary being is question begging within that system.---

Are you arguing then that it is not possible that there is a necessary being? (i.e., that it is not possible that beings inhabit the most possible number of worlds?)

---<>Jerry Springer is necessarily President of the US.---

Where in the proof is found something equivalent to <>J[]? That arguement would go nowhere, and it is not the approach of this arguement. How can you possibly critique the arguement without examining the second inference, which is the key to the whole thing?

---1. <>Jerry Springer is necessarily President of the US.
2. <>Jerry Springer is necessarily President of the US. --(By the rules of modal logic)--> Jerry Springer is necessarily President of the US.---

That is not a valid modus ponens, modal or any other form of logic.
<>J[]
<>J[]
-----
does not give you J[] It gives you <>J[] again, which is to say, nothing.

---The essence of the Ontological argument is begging the question, and convolution is it�s modus operandi---

Sounds like you've made up your mind what all ontological arguements must do, by definition.

Cosym · 08-14-2002, 10:47 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Synaesthesia:
Cosym,

Simply because the premises are not in the form "God exists", doesn�t mean it doesn�t beg the question.

If the question is indeed being begged, it must take place in the premises, not the inferences.

Quote:

Originally posted by Synaesthesia:

The very fact that a necessary being is asserted to be possible ensures that the conclusion will be that this being (whatever it is, God, pink bunnies, or all possible universes being hard vacuum) is instatiated.

Not at all. To say that it is possible that a being necessarily exists is to say precisely nothing about actual existence.

Quote:

Originally posted by Synaesthesia:

Time for another obligatory parody:
All possible universes are hard vacuum = []V

1. <>[]V
2. If <>[]V then V
Modus pollens
3. V

That�s odd.. I can breath just fine.

It's rightly called a parody: because it doesn't contain any of the essential elements of the proof we are discussing.

In your parody, "If <>[]V then V" is not deduced as an inference: it is simply stated as premise. It is not even the same form as the original proof (which in the key step, is simply <>G->G)

Yet again, you are entirely ignoring the role of inference 2 in the original proof. Without that inference, you _cannot_ simply say that <>V[]->V (note that the actual proof never states exactly that anyway: it only concludes <>G->G). You certainly cannot state it as a premise, because no one would take it seriously as a premise. Possible existence does not imply actual existence in any sense.

It is ONLY ever useful in the proof if you can first establish V->[]V as a premise (in this case a definition), and then use that in the second inference.
But you can't, because there is no reason anyone would grant V->V[] when V is "the universe is hard vacuum."

Quote:

Originally posted by Synaesthesia:

How confident am I, therefore, in the idea that this ontological argument can prove God anymore than it proves the innumerable absurdities for which it is valid?

I'm afriad it doesn't prove any of those things, since as I demonstrated, you weren't using even remotely the same arguement. Simply being silly doesn't prove your point (and it certianly doesn't prove that the arguement begs the question).

The only way you could possibly make sense of your parody would be if you asserted V->V[] and then followed through the REAL arguement of the same form. But since that definitional premise is itself unjustified, the arguement ceases to be sound anyway, so of course the conclusion would be unjustified.

[ August 15, 2002: Message edited by: Cosym ]

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08-14-2002, 05:58 PM	#72
Mike Regular Member Join Date: Jul 2001 Posts: 100	Roger, Seriously investigate? Maybe not. Keep an open mind, certainly. Many apparently impossible things have become possible in recent years. I try not to draw conclusions about things I know nothing about. If you know nothing about God and don't wish to, fine, but don't pretend you know what he is or is not if you haven't made the effort. Right now alien abductions don't concern me, but whether I have 72 years of life or infinity may be worth consideration since the meaning of life itself hangs in the balance.

08-14-2002, 08:24 PM	#75
Cosym Junior Member Join Date: Aug 2002 Location: New York Posts: 22	---This formulation above is invalid. It is, however, very easy to make it work. I�ll add a premise:--- I already added that premise. The person who quoted me was the one who cut out my original statement of the premise, but if you were reading carefully, you would noted that even in the quoted portion, I referenced the "axiom." The proof also requires a definition, which I also included. ---1b. <>G (It is possible that a necessary God exists)--- Doesn't this suggest to you the need for the that missing definition? <>G doesn't mean what you just said it means. ---Since premise 3 is a combination of 1 and 2, all that is left is to combine 1b with 3.--- No, inference 4 is a combination of the axiom and inference 3. ---We�ll call this combined premise A.--- What? It isn't a premise: it's an inference (in this case, our conclusion). How can you get that wrong and still make any sense? It follows from the axiom and inference. Yes, the conclusion of the inference is G. ---A: G Therefore 4. G--- What? There is no G... therefore G. G is drawn from modus ponens of the axiom and inference 3. If you are going to criticize the argument, at least get the argument right. ---Your crucial mistake in this formulation of the ontological argument is to confuse modal necessity, (which in this case has been shown to be question-begging!) with colloquial necessity. You and I both admit that necessary elves are possible, but we would both point out that modally necessary elves are not modally possible.--- I think it's a little strange that you, an avowed neonate when it comes to logic, are suggesting that this proof, which has been discussed for decades by some of the finest minds in the Western world, has a flaw which you are the first to discover. And unfortunately, you have not found a legitimate flaw: modal necessity is not question begging. Again: show me where the arguement begs the question! ---You and I both admit that necessary elves are possible, but we would both point out that modally necessary elves are not modally possible.--- Please explain what you mean in plain english again. I don't think you have understood what the proof is doing. It is not stating that just because someone claims that some being is necessary, it exists. You need to at least take it more seriously than that.

08-14-2002, 09:09 PM	#77
Cosym Junior Member Join Date: Aug 2002 Location: New York Posts: 22	---Your "argument" for the existence of god asserts that the property of existence is part of god's inherent definition.--- No. Where? Which aspect simply defines god as actually existing? This would, in the symbols, simply be G. Where do you find G in the proof, save in the conclusion? ---This means that if there is a god, then god must exist. Or in other words, "If god exists, then god exists." A->A You further "deduce" from this that god exists, A. So your argument boils down to, "If god exists then he exists, therefore he exists." A small child could recognize the nonsense of this argument.--- A small child could realize that your arguement bears no relation to this one. You may be used to dealing with ontological arguements this way, but this particular proof is NOT guilty of that particular flaw. There is no statement of "if god exists then god exists" and the proof does not use that formulation. ---As I have aptly demonstrated here, my assessment of the "proof" is accurate.--- You have demonstrated no such thing. There simply is no place where the proof draws G reflexively from G. ---I know this apart from my own understanding, because in my logic class we went over Descartes Ontological Argument for the Existence of God, which is precisely the same argument just worded very slightly differently.--- Sigh. This is NOT the same arguement as Descartes. Even materialists take this proof far more seriously than they do Descartes's ontological arguement. In fact, the only real discussion philosophy is over the _soundness_ of the proof, not the validity of the logic, which you are attacking. ---I define F as "A perfect friend, who has the necessary quality of bringing me fresh hot pizza for lunch every day." If F exists, then I will receive this free lunch every day (and be quite happy at that!). However, I don't, because F does not exist.--- Hello? The proof is NOT DONE YET. By inference 2, it has not established, nor does it claim to have established, G. You are being dishonest in implying that it does, or has even yet considered whether it does. What it has done is draw an inference about what would be true if another condition, yet unstated, were true. All it says is that that if a proposition p is implied to be necessary, then the proposition's truth is implied by virtue of its possibility. If you disagree with this formulation, please explain how. But don't make the false claim that it is simply a statement of G. ---As long as we observe that various hypothetical beings obviously do not exist, then your interpretation of "Bouer's Theorem" is false.--- No... because the theorem's implication is not drawm from existence, but from _possible_ existence. You are simply ignoring what the proof actually says in lieu of your canned critique of a different arguement. ---The proof starts with G[] and arrives at G with no other logical support for this conclusion.--- At this point, I don't feel unjustified in calling you a liar. The proof does NOT start with G[]! It begins with G->G[], which is a _definition_, not a statement about existence. ---That's equivalent to G[]->G for all intents and purposes.--- How so? ---And G[] is indeed inferred. G->G[] is stated and the conclusion of the "proof" is G. There G and G->G[], together, are the same as stating G[].--- No, it is not. You can't make a coherent arguement simply by gathering together some related symbols and claiming they represent the proof. You can't collapse a logical arguement into just a definition and the conclusion. The proof could go nowhere without the axiom, and that you have utterly ignored the role of the axiom in your criticism is proof positive that you have not seriously considered what this arguement is saying. In fact, without the axiom, we could not even invoke Bouer's Theorem in the first place! If G[] were anywhere stated as a premise, it would need to be justified BY a proof, and G->G[] is not it. It doesn't do it! Now, do you disagree with G->G[]? Is the greatest possible existence impossible, in your mind? ---I've always seen it written as ->, but if you like "minus-ampersand-g-t-semicolon", more power to you.--- I wrote ->, and -> still appears in my browser everywhere but, suspiciously, your quotation of me. ---But in the "proof" there is a conclusion of G.-- So? What the heck is the point of the argument if not to conclude G? Are you maintaining that all arguements that conclude G are invalid because you took a philosophy class once, and don't like it? Some help you're gonna be in a debate against theists... ---There's no reason to believe that a _god_ exists, since there is no proof (or even evidence) of it's existence.--- Um... this IS a proof. You presenting this statement "there is no proof" as an arguement against the validity of the proof is incoherent. Ontology demonstrates things straight from logical inference: if you really maintain that logical arguements are invalid whenever and just because you don't like their conclusions, fine. But no one is going to respect you very much for that position. ---The _only_ thing that the "proof" says is that god exists because existence is a necessary property of god.--- You are, simply put, wrong. Again: point out where in the proof it concludes god exists because existence is a property of god. What it says is IF god exists, then god exists necessarily (in every possible world). An IF statement is not the same thing as defining something into existence. Again, you cannot possibly speak honestly about this proof without appreciating the key role played by <>G, without addressing modal logic itself, and by claiming that the whole arguement can be summed up with G[]->G. That you, in your supposed refutation, have not even addressed the concept of possibility is the most incredible thing to me about this whole mess.

08-14-2002, 10:26 PM	#79
Cosym Junior Member Join Date: Aug 2002 Location: New York Posts: 22	---Ad hominem? tsk tsk tsk. If you are more experienced than I am in logic, I fully expect you to see past that sort of thing.--- This was not ad hominem, but a suggestion that perhaps you would do well to consider the debate over this issue. Even those that strongly oppose this arguement do not think it begs the question, and I think it's worth considering their arguements before jumping to a conclusion that I hold (and have later argued) is false. ---To beg the question is to assume the very thing that you�re trying to prove.--- Yes, I know. ---1. Chickens are invisible space monsters. 2. Chickens are well known to exist. Therefore 3. Invisible space monsters exist.--- Indeed: this is an example of a perfectly valid arguement (no different in form than: "monkey's are hairy mammals, monkeys exist, hairy mammals exist", except that, unlike the chicken arguement, the first premise of the monkey arguement is true, and so is the conclusion) that is not at all convincing. But your job in sustaining your accusation, is to show where, in the proof, is found AS A PREMISE, that God exists, even split up. The definition is G->G[]. The axiom is <>G. Those are the only two things which require any a priori assent. And, unlike your chicken example, <>G cannot by itself be combined with G->G[] to demonstrate G. That it is merely possible that G necessarily exists does not demonstrate either G or G[]. All it could say is that it is possible that G exists, and thus only possible that G is necessary. One could claim the same about anything. The conclusion can only be reached by working through the inferences. ---It doesn�t matter how smart anyone is. When you beg questions, anyone can call you on it.--- Yes, but not all calls are legitimate simply because they are made. You seem to be making this call reflexively, instead of based on what's there. ---Just in case you missed it, question-begging is not made a mite less egregious if we use several steps to execute our nefarious informal fallacy. It�s simply more obvious when I simplify it.--- But you cannot simplify it to the point of destroying or ignoring the inferences of a proof! You even seem to be confused as to what is a premise and what is an inference. To wit: ---1. <>G --> G 2. <>G therefore 3. G--- <>G->G is an _inference_ from inferences 1 and 2. Nowhere is <>G->G simply stated alone as being true in all cases. No one is asked to simply agree to it's truth. It is, rather, presented in the proof first as only _conditionaly_ true, and is only held to be true _after_ that specific condition has been fulfilled. ---Given the formulation of possibility in modal logic, to assume the possibility of a necessary being is question begging within that system.-- It isn't assumed: it is an inference! Good grief. ---Given the formulation of possibility in modal logic, to assume the possibility of a necessary being is question begging within that system.--- Are you arguing then that it is not possible that there is a necessary being? (i.e., that it is not possible that beings inhabit the most possible number of worlds?) ---<>Jerry Springer is necessarily President of the US.--- Where in the proof is found something equivalent to <>J[]? That arguement would go nowhere, and it is not the approach of this arguement. How can you possibly critique the arguement without examining the second inference, which is the key to the whole thing? ---1. <>Jerry Springer is necessarily President of the US. 2. <>Jerry Springer is necessarily President of the US. --(By the rules of modal logic)--> Jerry Springer is necessarily President of the US.--- That is not a valid modus ponens, modal or any other form of logic. <>J[] <>J[] ----- does not give you J[] It gives you <>J[] again, which is to say, nothing. ---The essence of the Ontological argument is begging the question, and convolution is it�s modus operandi--- Sounds like you've made up your mind what all ontological arguements must do, by definition.

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