Norge

But this is hopeless, Dee, isn't it? What you're saying is that the difference is not anything inherent in the judgments themselves but in us as we acquire these different beliefs/judgments. In other words, if it feels different to me, then it's different . . .to me. But that doesn't answer the question, does it? Is there anything inherently incorrect in the statement itself:

Torture preference is the same as ice-cream preference.

Try to X out the person making the statement and look at it objectively. Now if you're having trouble with the idea of objective truth, then we need to discuss that for a while. If you're going with pure subjectivity coupled with genetic/environmental determinism, then you have a whole host of problems. Here are a few:

1) Since I'm determined, do I have free will?
2) If I don't, then on what grounds would you persuade a person not to follow his conditioned beliefs to act in one way (immoral) rather than another, given that you already believe his conditioned response is coming anyway?
3) Are torturers responsible for their acts if they don't have free will?
4) Finally, what philosophical grounds would you have for arguing that we should act virtuously rather than selfishly?

And this, especially given that on the atheistic view, is the only life I have and now that I am conscious of this, there is no reason possibly to live self-sacrificially that is inherently better than acting selfishly, since there really is no "better" anyway, except for what I happen to say is "better" for me.

Atheism simply cannot stand the burden of these challenges. It is a belief system groaning under insuperable challenges that come from both intuition and logical reasoning, such that the answers given by all atheistic contributors end up either internally illogical (see Alonzo with his "desires theory") or so strongly counterintuitive that bells should be going off that something is wrong with the answers being given.

One final point. What I read here from atheists is primarily explanations of what morality is. (That I don't agree with, by the way.) I have not yet read anything that even begins to answer the question of why we should act morally. Dee, you have still to answer that particular question. Explaining what doesn't move us closer to the "why." Perhaps you have some comment on that.

Alonzo Fyfe

Norge:

You are playing word games.

In paragraph 4 you state "You are right, that previous sentence looked (as if) the reason is validated by its effectiveness. I didn't mean that and corrected it later."

Yet, in Paragraph 1, you still base your objection on the charge that I "can provide not one good reason to convince a person performing such an act to stop." That is to say, you are still basing your criticism on the inability to provide a reason that is validated by its effectiveness.

Please, be consistent.

Elsewhere, you state that "I strongly suspect that when a person says there is no reason s/he can give for the wrongness of torture, that person is not telling the truth. I am not impugning your truthfulness, I am simply asking you to consider how it is you have reached a point where you cannot state that you know that torture is wrong."

However, I can give a reason for the wrongness of torture -- the pain and suffering of the person being tortured. However, the person who is doing the torturing can still look at this reason to call the torture wrong, shrug it off and say "I do not care."

If you are not, in fact, looking for a reason that is "validated by its effectiveness," then I have the reason you are looking for. Instead, I suspect that you will argue that I have not provided the reason that you are looking for, because I have not provided a reason that is validated by its effectiveness.

What you are asking for is like asking for a round square, and I do not consider it a valid criticism that I have no round square to show you.


"That is why atheists don't really live consistent with their beliefs, because they generally try to live moral lives in the absence of admitting that objective morality exists..."

I will not speak for atheists generally, but as for the existence of "objective morality," this is another area where objections and criticism is often grounded on equivocation and a misuse of language (word games).

There are two possible definitions of "objective morality." One definition holds that moral properties are properties intrinsic to certain states of affairs, that there are "goodons" and "badons" that are a part of the very structure of things that are good and bad. This view should be rejected -- no such property exists.

But there is another sense of "objective morality." This one holds that moral propositions, "X is good", "Y is bad", are capable of being objectively true or false. This type of objective morality can be demonstrated.

I admit, even many atheists get these mixed up, and assert that the sound objections that can be raised against "objective morality(1)" implies that no defense can be made of "objective morality(2)". But it does not follow.


"...morality doesn't really have to do with fulfilling desires. Self-sacrifice is an example of this. We don't sacrifice to fulfill our desires at all."

Every human action has to do with fulfilling our desires. But, here, you confuse self-regarding desires with other-regarding desires. Some of the desires we strive to fulfill are other-regarding, they are desires that other people get what they want (or avoid what they want to avoid).

So, "self-sacrifice" (the fulfillment of other-regarding desires) is not an objection.



"As hard as you try, you always end up using words like "best" and "right"...."

I consider this criticism to be on the same level as the person who says to the chemist, "As hard as you try, you always end up using words like "atom" and "electron."" It is what the theory is about, of course I am going to use those words. To say that I can't use these words is to say that I can't answer questions about chemistry by using the terms of chemistry. It is another arbitrary and absurd limitation.

The test is not whether I use moral terms in discussing moral theory. An objection must be grounded on evidence that I have used the terms in a way that lack internal or external consistency. In just the same way, one cannot object to a chemist's theory on the grounds that he has used words like "atom" and "electron", but on evidence that he has used them in a way that lacks internal or external consistency.


"What is 'best interests all things considered?' What does that mean?"

It means, take all of the desires that exists (regardless of who has them). Weigh each desire according to their strength. Desires that are fulfilled weight positively, desires that are thwarted weigh negatively, and look for the highest number.


"Best for whom? Certainly not the German soldiers ken to turture."

Best for all. If we take the "ken to torture" and evaluate it on the criteria listed above, it is easy to see that this "ken" has a great deal that can be said against it -- a great deal that weighs negatively. So, the "ken to torture" does not come out very well in the final analysis. It is bad. Evil.


"Pure utilitarianism is ultimately arbitrary because it is not possible to find agreement on what the 'best for all' really is without using categories which themselves are arbitrary and simply reflective of the values of those who propose the solution in the first place."

If your premise was true, your criticism would be sound. "finding agreement" is not the criteria to use here. Ultimately, I think that utilitarians do a far better job of "finding agreement" than those who base their ethics on religion (who, similarly, propose answers that are purely arbitrary and reflective of the answers they want to find as opposed to what is written).

The criteria, as it is in all cases, is its ability to explain and predict observable phenomena. If the explanation of observable phenomena requires a hypothesis of intrinsic value, then the utilitarian will have no more problem postulating such an entity than they do postulating gravity or quarks.

I hold that no such entity is necessary to explain observable phenomena. For all propositions that contain a value component, that value can be accounted for as a relationship between a desire and a state of affairs. Nothing else is necessary.

(The standard objection at this point is to assume that this relationship must be between the desires of the agent or assessor and a state of affairs, but values terms are not so limited. It is just as reasonable for me to talk about relationships between your desires and states of affairs as it is for me to talk about relationships between my desires and states of affairs. And it is just as reasonable to talk about relationships between states of affairs and all desires that exist -- as reasonable as it is to talk about a "center of mass".)

Desires are easily accounted for within evolution.


"Further, matter in motion has no use for such categories, particularly when this is the only life we will ever have."

It does have a use for these categories -- in the same way that a computer has a use for these categories. It is used for decision-making. It is used when looking at a number of different options and selecting option 129. To do this, a decision maker must assign a value to all of the options and a way of weighing them against the other. None of this is inconsistent with determinism -- as I said, computer programs use this method of decision making as a matter of course.


"You're right, there is nothing an atheist can say to convince a person not to act immorally."

And here, one again, you return to talking about reasons that are to be validated or invalidated by their effectiveness. If a person is faced with no internal or external constraints on torture, then that person will torture, and there is nothing ANYBODY can say (theist or atheist) to stop him that is true. That is a reality we all must live in.

But, this does not mean that I can do nothing to CAUSE a person to act morally. I have already explained the process. Raise the person in a manner where he acquires good desires (those desires that are compatible with the fulfillment of the desires of others). And, where that fails, place the person in a society where he is as likely as possible to face punishment as if he does not at least ACT like somebody with good desires.

Norge

It seems we got sidetracked with discussions of the "effectiveness" of an argument to persuade, instead of the real discussion, which is to do with the philosophical grounding for the validity of the argument. I'm sorry we have miscommunicated on that. Hopefully, we can put that aside.

As for your response. I fear we're grinding to a halt. You still haven't given a coherent basis for morality based on desires. This is still hopelessly confused. You write:

What does this mean? And how can this possibly explain morality? It is just nonsensical. I'm sorry, but it is and self-evidently so. (By the way, it certainly isn't a determinist viewpoint, which has no concept of "should" at all.) What is "fulfilled positively" supposed to mean? Positively according to whom? Who decides? If morality is simply fulfilling the sum total of all your "positive desires," you still haven't given any reasons why I should act morally. And I'm not talking about effectiveness here. I'm talking about philosophically convincing and grounded reasons for why I should act morally. All you have done is try to explain it, which you still haven't done.

Remember, I asked you to answer ( and I will continue to ask) why two men shouldn't rape a woman during warfare. All you said was and I quote:

(Edited "ken" to "keen"). Now, again I ask you. Negative according to whom? Don't forget that you are grounding morality in desires. Some men have a desire to rape and you wish for all desires to be fulfilled, right? First, this is obviously not possible where different desires are mutually opposite. Woman: no to rape. Men: yes to rape. Second, your value judgement of "positive" is grounded where exactly? In what you happen to believe and state today? You know where this is headed of course. You are going to end up with morality looking like your own personal value judgements. How objective is that?

In addition, don't forget, if I'm an atheist, this is the only life I have. Why should I act in any but my own self-interest?

One final thing I'd like to ask you: Given that on the atheist view humans are no different from other animals, we're merely more advanced, why is it that morality doesn't apply to animals and how are we to evaluate the treatment of other animals? Why is a flea less important than a horse? No, not in terms of its usefulness or beauty, but its ontological significance. Ie, is a horse of more value ontologically than a flea? Is a human of more value than a monkey? In fact, are humans of any value independent of being valued by others?

I believe, but you'll have to enlighten me, that the atheist view is that we are of no value at all. We're simply organisms with no objective value at all, except that which we give to each other. So, if a person is not valued, then they're objectively valueless. I wonder if you could give this some consideration based on Romanian orphanages with abandoned children. Thanks.

One final point: What I find so interesting is that you are aware of objective morality, the existence of "good" and "bad" and realising that they exist, but then your explanation is simply incoherent. It can only be driven by a devotion to atheism. You know, when the tool you're using doesn't work, you need a new one. Atheism won't explain morality, I'm afraid. You need a new tool, Alonzo. If objective good and bad exist, they must be accounted for and you're looking in the wrong place.

dk

Hi Alonzo, now I have a thoughtful reply, making a relevant response difficult.
Originally posted by dk:
A moral theory has got to focus on the “act of judgment” that orders the external reality.
Alonzo Fyfe: Define "act of judgment". Is this some sort of decision to assign value X to Y? If it is, then I do not think that there is no such "act" to focus on.
dk:
An act of judgement associates the “whatness” of a thing with appearances to generate a conscious thought. The content of a judgment is the thought that conjoins understanding with the appearances of a thing. The morality of an act is the judgment that commits a person to some practical course of action within the context of law (moral principles). When I pull the trigger of a gun in cold blood I can’t know for certain the outcome, but once I’ve pulled the trigger I’m committed to murder. On the other hand if I perceive a deadly threat from an enemy, and to save my life, or the life of another, and pull the trigger of a gun my commitment was to defend, not murder. The two acts appear virtually the same, but to understand what a person intends requires a moral judgment in the context of law.

Alonzo Fyfe:
We have desires. Those desires have objects. The objects of those desires have value (which turns out to be nothing more than saying that they are objects of desire).
If a person assigns value independent of desire to any object, then that person is simply making things up, like assigning beliefs to a baseball or intention to the chair that one stubbs one's toe on.
dk:
The value of a chair no matter how desirable doesn’t commit me to any course of action, therefore the value of the chair lacks moral context, until I commit myself to a course of action. I may desire a chair enough to murder, lie, cheat and steal to obtain it. I might say, “Oh, I’d die for that chair”, or, “I’d kill for that chair” but without commitment its not a moral matter. Commitment requires an act of judgment to some course of action. If a bright 2 year old boy steals a toy from his 1 year old sister, if immediately confronted, “Did you take that from your sister”, the 2 year old will shake his head no, and might immediately offer to surrender the property. The two year old has no sense of commitment, and acted without judgment to take the toy. There’s no lie, no theft, no commitment because the toddler acted on impulse absent an “act of judgment”. Later, if the two year old takes his little sisters toy and hides when approached, then he’s made a committed to have it, and because he’s made a moral judgment has become culpable for both the lie and the theft.

Originally posted by dk
You can argue that A) the physical universe is closed, B) mental states produce physical acts, therefore... C) mental states must have a physical basis.
posted by Alonzo Fyfe:
Sounds good to me.
Originally posted by dk:
But, mental states are blue sky without an explanation of the mental properties that have a causal role, and next, you’ve still got to assume the physical universe is closed, and the assumption in itself, being true, becomes un-testable.
It is a bit much to go into here, but the theory of mental states that makes the most sense to me is BDI (belief-desire-intention) functionalism. I have explained many of the relevant components elsewhere in these posts.
Alonzo Fyfe:
My most recent posts in a thread on .Utilitarianism describe this account.
And the assumption that the physical universe is closed is not untestable. All we need is one instance of an observable that cannot be explained in terms of a physical universe, and the hypothesis of a close physical universe immediately becomes falsified. The assumption is not that no non-physical options are possible, but that no non-physical options have been demonstrated yet and this gives us good reason to believe they never will.
dk: I disagree, to some limited degree the proposition of a closed rational universe can be proven false, but it can’t be proven objectively true. Induction and abduction are speculative and impractical, hence subject to change. In theory one can believe the universe is closed, but in fact one cannot know with certainty the universe is closed without leaving the universe, which only proves the universe is open. .

Originally posted by dk:
What we know is that human potential and many possible contingent futures remain unknowable, untreatable and unreliable.
Alonzo Fyfe:
We live in a world of risk and uncertainty. But a great deal of research has been done concerning decision making under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Risk analysis and probability theory are very highly advanced areas of research, and are not especially problematic. These accounts are quite compatible with BDI theory and decision theory.
dk: I buy that, my point is that people understand one another by making commitments in the context of law. When people commit themselves to murder, rape, lies, theft, and power they become immoral and degenerate. Savages are primitive degenerates because they committed themselves to a law that makes understanding, peace, friendship and prosperity incoherent.

Alonzo Fyfe:
It is highly likely that much of this misses the point, because we do seem to be talking two different languages here.
dk:
We are working from a different context, so can’t understand one another. People understand one another by submitting to moral law. Subjective morality promulgates a propositional attitude, that people understanding one another by a concrete measure of altruism, utilitarianism, normalcy, or hedonism. The problem is that nobody can contextually understand what it means to be altruistic, utilitarian, normal, or hedonistic. We seem to agree morality must be objective but part company on what morality means.

DRFseven

What is hopeless? Agreement between us? It IS unlikely, but I wouldn't say hopeless.

Quote:

What you're saying is that the difference is not anything inherent in the judgments themselves but in us as we acquire these different beliefs/judgments. In other words, if it feels different to me, then it's different . . .to me. But that doesn't answer the question, does it? Is there anything inherently incorrect in the statement itself: Torture preference is the same as ice-cream preference.

I don't know why this is so difficult to understand. It's not that the difference is only "to me." It's different to everybody. Everybody has a different mechanism for incorporating moral opinions than they do for food preferences.

Do you feel different about loving your lover than you do about loving chocolate ice-cream? Aren't they both simply preferences? Of course you understand that there IS a difference. Romantic love and love of chocolate are two different mechanisms.

Quote:

1) Since I'm determined, do I have free will?

No.

Quote:

2) If I don't, then on what grounds would you persuade a person not to follow his conditioned beliefs to act in one way (immoral) rather than another, given that you already believe his conditioned response is coming anyway?

We respond to experience by learning. I am an experience from whom this hypothetical person might learn to change his mind, depending upon other experiences. We are vastly capable of change (Changes R Us).

Quote:

3) Are torturers responsible for their acts if they don't have free will?

The don't cause themselves to learn what they learn, but we hold them accountable, anyway. This fact of being held accountable, thus, impacts on the thoughts of that individual, often precipitating a change; sometimes on the individual, sometimes on others.

Quote:

4) Finally, what philosophical grounds would you have for arguing that we should act virtuously rather than selfishly?

I don't think a predominantly selfish society will survive, and I think most of us agree that we would like our society to survive.

Quote:

And this, especially given that on the atheistic view, is the only life I have and now that I am conscious of this, there is no reason possibly to live self-sacrificially that is inherently better than acting selfishly, since there really is no "better" anyway, except for what I happen to say is "better" for me.

Many (I think most) people think we can agree on goals that we all want, such as survival of the planet, etc. Atheists and theists alike tend to share a hope for a future life for humanity. Yes, you are right; there is no reason we SHOULD survive; however, that is what we want. Being that we mostly agree on that, we now have a basis for saying some behaviors are better.

Quote:

Atheism simply cannot stand the burden of these challenges. It is a belief system groaning under insuperable challenges that come from both intuition and logical reasoning, such that the answers given by all atheistic contributors end up either internally illogical (see Alonzo with his "desires theory") or so strongly counterintuitive that bells should be going off that something is wrong with the answers being given.

Well, I hope I've cleared THAT up.

Quote:

I have not yet read anything that even begins to answer the question of why we should act morally. Dee, you have still to answer that particular question. Explaining what doesn't move us closer to the "why." Perhaps you have some comment on that.

What makes you think there is a "should" involved? I have told you why we DO act morally. Do you have some information that you think reveals why we ought to act morally?

Alonzo Fyfe

This is false. Determinism is quite compatible with a hypothetical "should" (what Immanual Kant called a hypothetical imperative) of the form "if you want X, you should do Y")

What does not exist is the Kantian categorical imperative -- a "should" not grounded on desire -- one that just hangs out there, without a foundation or base.



It means that X has a desire that P, and P is true.


We have already been through this. Remember, the "Who gets to decide that squares have four sides" analogy. It is a malformed question. It is a question that, just by asking, one demonstrates a problematic understanding of language.

As a matter of fact, all human action aims at the fulfillment of desire (given belief). A person that desires that P is motivated to a degree proportional to the strength of the desire to make it the case that P is or remains true. That is just the way people work. You cannot show me an exception. Nobody decides this, just as nobody decided that the speed of light is (just under) 300,000 km/s


Still asking that malformed question. You tell me who gets to decide that squares have four sides, and I will tell you negative according to whom.


Yes. Desires have value according to their capacity to fill other desires. The desire to rape thwarts other desires, so the desire to rape has negative value. It is morally bad. Those with this desire are evil.


This is no different than when we, as an individual, have conflicting desires. We have a desire for chocolate cake. We have a desire not to get fat. They are in conflict. Yet, we are still able to make decisions. It is still possible to evaluate which action is best. The weighing of interpersonal desires is no different than the weighing of intrapersonal desires.

I think I said that already.


It is grounded on the fact that all intentional human action aims at the fulfillment of desire, and nothing else.

I did not choose to make this a fact about human action. It just is. Anybody who argues that people should do something else is talking into the wind. As a matter of fact, they will not, because they cannot.


Another malformed question. The question is not whether you should act to fulfill your desires -- you will do so, just as everybody else does. The question is: what should those desires be?

A monkey's desires are as important as a human's, but a human has more and more complex desires. The death of a human will thwart far more desires than the death of a monkey.

False. Everything has value according to its capacity to fulfill desires. Humans (or, at least, good humans) have an exceptionally high ability to fulfill desires, so humans have high value.


Actually, you come to this theory with a set of incoherent assumptions, and then try to "intepret" the theory to make it consistent with those assumptions. It is little wonder that, to you, it appears incoherent.

Wiploc

crc:
Hi everybody, my handle is wiploc, my real name is Charlie, and I am a male person. I sign with my initials for the sake of brevity.


I'm going to ask you for cogency too, Richard. If you've answered the question of why a theist shouldn't rape or torture, you hid it in a mountain of verbage. I'd like to see your core claim, uncluttered by expostulations about how atheist reasons are irrational emotionalism.


Good. You can give us a theistic justification for morality that does not depend on what is best for us. This eliminates what I call might-makes-right morality. You can't say we should be good in order to avoid god's punishment, and we can't say you should be good because we'll call 911 if you aren't.

(I assume you'll agree that pain-avoidance isn't really a moral (oughty) basis for behavior anyway. Counter-examples abound.)


Thanks. I'm encouraged by your style too. I dare to hope that you will come across with the answer if there is one.



Bingo.



This is not a distinction since atheists don't think we live in the best of all possible worlds either. In fact, come to think of it ...



Unpersuasive. Using your example, let's try to talk someone out of a rape. "Excuse me sir, but that rape is nonstandard." Totally unpersuasive. You can see yourself that if I told you that failure to rape was nonstandard, you would not be persuaded to rape.

So far, you have not provided what you asked of us, a logical reason that we ought to behave in a given manner. Even if your standard existed, you have not said why we ought to comply.


Good. We are after the justification of your "should." Have you got one?



Still waiting for the relevance of these arguments. A created organism should be moral because why?



And the theist is going to offer something more, yes?



Please, Richard. We agree on the question, and you are the one claiming to have an answer.



Great. Let's have it.



Unpersuasive. Again, I'll use your rape example.

If I say, "I'm sorry, you should stop raping that woman because the standard of behavior is external to yourself," I will not have given a logically persuasive reason.

Or we can use this comparison: If there were an external justification for rape, and an internal reason for nonrape, is there any logical reason that we should follow the external standard and rape rather than the internal standard and not rape? You offer no logical reason to believe that an external standard is oughtier than an internal standard.

If it was the "god himself" part you were relying on rather than the "external standard" part, you are still hiding the ball. As an atheist I could say, "My morals are based on Ralph himself." If I've picked my Ralph wisely (for instance, my Ralph has never turned anyone into a pillar of salt) why isn't that better than relying on the morality of a known-to-be-genocidal invisible eccentric?

In any case, we can apply the test again: If god says rape, and Ralph says don't rape, why should we do what god says? Why should we ever do what god says?


Hey, Kettle, this pot says you're black. Let's get back to your claim: How do you justify morality?


Go sell that to the choir. You will never sell it people who know better.


If you were going to argue that Jehovah was a better standard of morality than Ralph, on the grounds that Jehovah is nicer or better than Ralph, then it would become relevant to point out that, judged by his actions (as described by Christians) Jehovah is a nasty bad person. If you make that argument, it is proper that you get that response.


Yup. God isn't pretty.


And you are going to say why?



a.) At this point, it becomes appropriate to point out that if the Christians are right, god has done a lot of terrible things. Logic inevitably would have us conclude that doing many terrible things is incompatible with perfection. (Don't say I'm raising my fist in anger at god. I don't believe in god. I am just pointing out, as a logical response to your point, that it is the people who do believe in god who make him out to be the sort of rat bastard that is incompatible with the idea of a standard of goodness.)

b.) Also, you are two-stepping, trying to slip back and forth between two incompatible positions. Before, you were saying god is the standard of goodness. Now you are saying there is some independent standard that god measures up to. Pick one position and stick with it.


You are going to need better than that. You need a reason --- a logical reason --- that we ought to obey any external rule. You don't have that. And what you do have justifies obeying Satan quite as well as it justifies obeying Jehovah.


Why do we need something external to ground morality?


This is hardly a reason to obey the standard.


I'm letting this go by, but don't think it slipped by.


None of that follows. But don't come back arguing that it does follow. That would be nothing but more distraction. Your job is to explain why, if there is an external standard, we should obey it. You chide us endlessly for not having such an explanation for our morals. We'll show you ours if you'll show us yours.


So you think you are going to live longer than I think I am going to live. Big deal. How is that relevant? And remember not to try the might-makes-right move, because you have rejected that already.


I'm glad you brought that up, because William Lane Craig's line about how he doesn't see any reason not to rape and murder other than that it is contrary to god's will reminds me of nothing so much as Nazi death camp guards saying, "I was just following orders." If you really didn't have a personal morality, why would you care what god's orders were?


You aren't going to tell me the Nazi soldiers at the death camps weren't mostly Christians? Surely not.



What sort of consequences are you talking about? If I think rape is bad because the victim doesn't like it, and you think it is bad because an invisible eccentric doesn't like it, I don't see how your system has a better ought than mine. You've already ruled out punishment as a consequence that should be considered as a basis for morality. I, an atheist, claim that the suffering of the rape victim is enough to justify a moral ought; and you can't use that as justification because your essential point is that you have a different (and better) justification for morality than we do.


That's my point.


Took the words out of my mouth.


Is it yours? Or have you really got something from us?



Well said. Got an answer for us?


And you are assuming some sort of standard that you have implicitly claimed to be defensible under the atheist view. Can you deliver on that?


Bingo.



Exactly.



"The reason is external," is supposed to be better?


This is important too: If you say you have a good reason, but you refuse to say what it is, not only is it reasonable for us to doubt you, but you should seriously consider your motives yourself.



Once again, I didn't bring this up. You brought it up, so don't say I am arguing out of anger at god: It is your team that mastered that torture stuff during the Inquisition. And they justified it by your "external standard." If torture is your example of what is really bad, and if the Inquisition justified torture by your external standard, then isn't your external standard bad too?

crc

Norge

I'll start with Charlie, aka wiploc. Not sure I have time for the other two today. Sorry.

I don't imagine that I can convince you, Charlie, but I will still write a response to you, since my purpose for engaging in discussion is the hopes that maybe not today, but one day, you will remember the force of the argument and change your mind. The reason it is difficult to speak to atheists - and I anticipated this, remember - is that the concept you hold of God is emotionally distorted. Notice your language:

"known-to-be-genocidal invisible eccentric"

"rat bastard"

My argument, you remember, had to do with a standard of perfection external to human beings. Because I associated that with God, you dismissed it as an argument because you dismiss God as possessing this standard of perfection. This is because you don't understand the holiness of God and sinfulness of man. In fact, you are probably laughing right now. That's okay, you are entitled to your opinion. I would warn you, however, that if God exists - and I think it very likely that he does - and if he is the Christian God - which again is highly likely for many other reasons you reject (for another day) - then your wishes and desires will be fully satisfied. I don't fully know what it will be like to be separated from God after death. I imagine it will be of a sort of extreme loneliness. And this will be brought on by rebellion against God. What you characterize as God torturing man is actually man torturing himself by his own rebellion against God. You shake your fist at him now and declare that he isn't there. Yet one day you will be allowed to shake your fist as long as you like but you will know that he is there. I fully expect unabated invective aimed at this post, but that's okay. It's just a discussion board after all.

Now, let's turn to your arguments. If you can put aside your antipathy to God for just a moment, let us deal with this idea of an external standard.

You write:

The grounding for morality is God himself, the nature and character of God. Now, I know you think God isn't perfect, but let's leave that aside for just a moment. Let's imagine that he is perfect, which is what I believe. From a purely logical point of view, God's perfection, which is rooted in his character provides not simply the moral imperative to behave morally, but far outstrips any atheistic proposal. Our behavior is measured against his divine commands, which are rooted in his holiness. In addition, a perfect divine being has created beings answerable and accountable to him and they must answer for their actions.

The way they "ought" to behave, then, is driven by a divine standard against which human actions are measured. That's why, by the way, you feel guilty. In spite of the damage to one's conscience, most people have an internal moral compass that guides their behavior. You are right to identify an "oughtness" to moral imperatives, because it is there and it is placed there, in spite of the fact that often it has been severely damaged.

Further, human beings are valuable because they are different from animals, for they bear the image of their creator. I think this is where atheism is simply left in the dust. For the atheist, humans have no more intrinsic value than say, birds or earthworms. No intrinsic value. The vast majority of human beings know this can't be the case. That's one of the reasons why atheism is so unsuccessful, by the way. In fact, Charlie, I think you also know this can't be the case. I think you're working hard to make your own system stand up against the theistic view, but in your gut you know your mum or dad is worth more than that dog over there. I really think you do. And it's not utilitarian, ie. they're worth more because I value them, or they do more good in the world etc. The point is that humans ARE more valuable than other animals.

If they are more valuable, then this fits perfectly within the theistic framework. They are more valuable because God has created them and they reflect his image, though distorted.

You allude to something called the Eurythphro dilemma. Is something good because God says it is or because is it good independent of God? The answer is simply that something is good because good reflects the nature and character of God. God, by his nature is good, and out of this flows our definition of what good is. In simple terms, God is necessarily good. Now, of course, I don't expect you to agree with any of this. It would be nice, though, in your response, if you would ensure you don't argue fallaciously where possible. Eg. you state that:

This is simply logically fallacious. In fact, I would call it a cheap shot and I think, Charlie, you can do better than this. You know perfectly well, that simply because the inquisitors claimed to be acting in the name of God doesn't lead one to conclude that their behavior is justified. You know perfectly well that they may claim whatever they like, but that doesn't justify their behavior unless the claim they make is valid. Which it clearly isn't and you know it isn't.

I don't normally set out my stall like this. I fully expect you to take issue, which is fine. To be fair, though, you should really provide an alternative view to account for the "oughtness" of morality. You clearly believe in this. Given that you don't believe in God, I want to know why with this one life I have, why I should act morally. Fair's fair, Charlie.

Have a wonderful day.

Valmorian

I've never claimed it wasn't objectively true. You're talking about an individual's subjective desires, however, not objective morality.




Why nothing, except for the fact that there are no universally held desires. I have no reason to believe that any statement that states "X is good" is OBJECTIVELY true.

Alonzo Fyfe

It depends on what you mean by "objective value."

If you mean something like "intrinsic value" -- then, no, I am not talking about that type of value. And we are none the worse because of it.

However, a proposition of the form "X desires that P" is an objective fact -- it is a statement about the brain structure of the individual and is a part of the best explanatory and predictive explanation for the agent's action. It is as objective as anything else in science.

The statement "P is desired by X" is just as objective. These are facts about the world.

I see no reason to treat them as if they are inferior to other facts about the world, simply because they are (in fact) facts about brains.



The existence or nonexistence of universal desires is not relevant.

(Okay, you can, if you want, have a conception of "Good" that means "the object of a universal desire," but for the reasons you mentioned such a concept would not have a real-world reference. So, we can scratch this conception of 'good'. And even if there were a universal desire, that which is the object of this desire is still intersubjectively good, not objectively -- in the intrinsic value sense -- good.)

But, all uses of the word 'good' describes a relationship between a state of affairs and a set of desires. Different uses of the word 'good' make a reference to different states of affairs, different desires, and different relationships.

Health, for example, is a value-laden term. Its value component looks at a particular set of states of affairs (physical or mention functioning) and evaluates them according to their capacity to fulfill the desires of the agent whose functioning is being evaluated.

The facts about the physical or mental functioning are objective -- they can be examined and theories can be falsified or verified empirically. The desires themselves are objective -- they are descriptions of brain structure that can also be verified or falsified. We can, thereby, tell objectively if a person is healthy or unhealthy.

The method for determining objectively if a person is good or evil is not much different. It evaluates desires. It evaluates them according to their capacity to fulfill or thwart other desires regardless of who has them (as opposed to merely the desires of the agent or the assessor).



Ultimately, I think you are using "objective" in the intrinsic-value sense, and correctly pointing out that I cannot use this as a way of identifying something as good in the intrinsic-value sense. I cannot. Fine.

But 'objective' has more than one meaning. And there is another meaning of 'objective' (meaning that propositions are true or false and independent of belief).