eh

Good points. I don't think we consciously mean "space" when we say some of the examples you listed below. But one could argue that they do have a spatial meaning,

The universe is a place, and statements could be re-writen as such: "There is no way to understand (in the universe) what it truly means to believe that there is a God unless you believe that there is a God.

But that would get into trouble with statements dealing with abstract concepts, such as mathematics and "truths" that are normally considered to have non-spatial existence.

Neilium

Ki,

Agreed. Both absolute laff riots.

-Neil

King's Indian

Eh,

Even with abstract concepts, we might still think of them spatially. e.g. If we have a concept such as "sanity", don't we, in common-sense terms at least, still think of something like "madness" as outside its boundaries?


Neilium,

Do you know, I never get the feeling that Wittgenstein was happy with doing philosophy? Perhaps he should have stuck with rough trade and cowboy movies (and I only think he was drawn to the latter for the odd glimpse of leather chaps).
And as for Martin: what did Hannah ever see in him? Their story would've made a great sit-com, mind.

Ner-night,
KI

John Page

General usage implies god does not exist (period) either at any place (thus, is not material) or at any time. Slippery fellah!

Neilium

LOL. I get the impression that Wittgenstein simply wasn't happy much of the time, regardless of what he was doing. However, I also sense that the humour in his dry, sarcastic remarks were misunderstood and taken for face value.

Not aware of that. Sounds dishy. Fill me in.

-neil

King's Indian

Ever ready to oblige, me old china.
Martin Heidegger (appointed Grand Muckymuck of Freiburg University during the Third Reich, and owner of some pretty disgusting views [I mean, when they weren't flat-out incomprehensible]) and Hannah Arendt ("Eichmann in Jerusalem") were an item.
Now that I think of it, I remember reading that, after the war, he even asked her to...
...but now I see I have wandered away from the OP somewhat.
Heigh ho.
Take care,
KI

Keith Russell

King's, thanks for the compliment (your assumption that you need to catch up with me). Not sure it's true, but the thought was nice, nonetheless.

Anyway, what if one only ever said 'God' (or unicorns, or elves, etc.) exist(s) only as a concept, but not apart from consciousness in 'external' reality?

Would that solve the 'problem'?

Keith.

King's Indian

Hello, Keith. Hope you’re well.

As for the compliment, you’re welcome. I wasn’t just paying lip-service, though*. The point I had in mind was a banal one, so I wouldn’t be surprised if you were treating the question with more subtlety.
I’ll expand my point a bit, for comment.
If we have the concept, “there lives, away from the prying eyes of folk, the Old Man of the Forest.”. What do we mean? Perhaps something like “One traveller, back from the Tropics, heard tales that there lives a man-beast, a shaggy avatar; he, although covered with a thick pelt, seems almost human…with a cunning that no animal has a right to possess. The natives tell of a time…etc.”
It was probably also a dark and stormy night. Anyway, my point is that I’m not sure that any concept can have no connection with reality, even if that connection only proves to discredit the original concept.
After all, what happened was that some people went into the forest, found an orang-utan, and slapped their foreheads with the heel of their palms. So now, when people say that “the Old Man etc” exists “only as a concept, but not apart from consciousness in 'external' reality”, we recognize that we can say we looked, didn’t find anything in reality that fitted, but found that reality offered us a more useful concept: “orang-utans”
God (by which I mean the Christian one in this case) was also a concept that had meaning for people as really existing, with the power to affect lives here, let alone what comes after. To cut a long story, we looked, found nothing, and found that reality offered us more suitable concepts. Things like credulity, a person (who might’ve existed, might not) whose life provided a focus for intersecting ideas, groups who could use that focus to wield real political power, fear of death, a general need for the faith that gives lives meaning, and so on…
So, yes, we’re both right, in a way. There are concepts that exist only as mental objects, apart from consciousness of external reality. I think I’m trying to say that the application of external reality had a deciding part to play in the matter. What makes these concepts not existing in reality (with its spatiality, etc.) is that we are always free to apply the test of reality to them, so they can’t really be “apart” in its most extreme sense. If reality and “the concept of God” had absolutely nothing in common, then it would be “apples and oranges”, and we couldn’t use the former to decide the truth of the latter.
Even though I rabbited on a bit, I get a nagging feeling I’ve missed something.

Anyway, I think there might be a more interesting thought. God isn’t my favourite example, ‘cause he’s not much use, what with never having existed and all. But what about those mental concepts that are useful and aren’t really “there” in the outside world, like maths?
I suppose, in a way, even the most everyday concepts, like "the number 3” can be said to not really be there in reality (as a tree is, for example), but I want to stick to the unambiguous cases, like “i”. I would welcome your comments on the following.

1) In some sense, they are part of reality: the same way that our perception of reality is, at the same time, part of it. Like all such useful mental tools for dealing with reality, such as our moral sense, science, common-sense etc, they also help us to modify and shape reality.
2) I think this is the only sense in which such mathematical terms can be said to be part of reality. I find it unnecessary to look for mathematical explanations of reality as underlying components of it, in the same way that there isn’t an ideal “stone”, on which the existence of all the real stones in the world owe their existence to (unless you count Brian Jones).

While I’ve collared you, do you have any ideas on the point I made a while back: that concepts like “madness” and “sanity” seem to arrange themselves spatially” (ie “madness” seems to lie outside “sanity”)?
Take care,
KI.

*And I can’t say that my bowels don’t turn to water when I wonder if you are one of the human beings who can think in eleven dimensions…

Keith Russell

King's, I've read quite a bit on the 'embodied mind' concept (Philosophy in the Flesh, by Lakoff and Johnson, for one example).

Yes, we can describe sanity and insanity as 'sets'--with one being a subset of the other, or both sets being independent of the other.

Though we can certainly use such metaphors, we don't have to. One can also describe 'insanity' in its legal sense, meaning that an 'insane' person is one who is accused of a crime, was unable to distinguish right from wrong, at the moment the crime was committed.

We can describe some concepts as 'higher', and others as 'lower', as 'broader' or more 'narrow', etc. (The 'high art' vs. 'low art' metaphor springs to mind...)

But, again, we don't have to. 'High' art can be better described as art which takes as its theme the more 'noble' apsects of human existence (or as art which deals with more abstract, esoteric concepts and themes--rather than with relatively common ideas and themes, etc.--depending on your opinions of art).

Metaphors (whether temporal, spatial, etc.) are nice shortcuts, but I don't believe that they are either primary concepts, or essential ones. In fact, I think that--unless one already has a fairly accurate understanding of the concept being discussed--such metaphors won't be understood.

Keith.

King's Indian

Hi, Keith.

I think I understand what you're saying; and, insofar that I do, I agree completely. Here's how I understand it, and if I've got it wrong, I'd be grateful if you could put me right (Thanks for the book ref, by the way. A good read, I take it?).

We can have ways of describing ideas such as "insanity", or "high art", in exactly the way you describe. They're useful, in the contexts to which they belong. The trouble is, they seem to rely on rather value-laden terms, such as "right", "wrong", "nobility", or the like. When one tries to analyze "high art" so that its concept may be defined by terms that are not prey to subjective definition (in order to obtain a "fairly accurate understanding of the concept being discussed"); then perhaps the more objective one gets, the easier it is to apply metaphors of spatialization.
These metaphors* wouldn't be primary or essential at all: our value-laden ideas would be. As one applies such tools for understanding that can be translated into "spatialization", so one gets away from our everyday relation to external reality with which we started.

So, although we adapt ideas from things that can be found in reality, we change them into concepts that are nowhere found, like "3", or "the set of all objects grouped into 3".

So in saying "God doesn't exist", the fact is that we can change this into something like "God is not a member of (ie outside) the set of 'things humans can objectively determine within the real world' ". This set isn't real, like a tree is. And a putative member defined by a relation to a set isn't either.
So: "God" exists only as a concept. [edited: as long as we consider it objectively. Subjectively, we can think of "God" as real if we decide to interpret burning bushes, volcanoes etc. as signs of his reality. That's rather up to us to decide, I think.]

Sorry, if this seems a bit long-winded. I'm trying to get from where I was to where you are. I thought I needed to catch up with you (if I'm on the right track, that is. If not: bugger).

Take care,
KI.

*Don't get me started on metaphors, by the way. I mean, take an opposition like "literal-metaphorical". Isn't "literal" a metaphor, in that it derives its force from the idea of "letters" (letter of the law etc.)?