SeaKayaker

I accidentally posted a message twice (moderators: feel free to delete this post).

[ December 19, 2001: Message edited by: SeaKayaker ]</p>

Jack the Bodiless

SeaKayaker:
Can you elaborate on this, please?

What led you to believe you were doing "something that was wrong"?

And, more importantly, why do you believe your previous presuppositions were "inconsistent"? Do you really mean "inconsistent" rather than "incomplete"? It is certainly true that the MN worldview is incomplete (as is the CP worldview): we don't know everything. But this repeated allegation of inconsistency is getting us nowhere without an example of inconsistency being provided.

Jack the Bodiless

Another thing:
Yes, we do agree: conformity with perception. If I assume I'm always right, I am faced with a problem if I perceive that I've goofed.

However, I say this only because I believe that perception is indeed the ultimate decider. For a Christian presuppositionalist, who has renounced the primacy of perception, I don't see how this worldview can be criticized on any grounds except that it is unbiblical. The "always-rightist" can use the same escape hatch as the Christian presuppositionalist: if perception contradicts the presupposition, then perception is wrong.

If the always-rightist declares that a box contains a pineapple, then it DOES contain a pineapple, even if no pineapple is visible when the box is opened. Contradictions do not arise unless the always-rightist infallibly declares what he will perceive, rather than what IS: even then, such a person is probably capable of deluding himself into actually seeing the pineapple.

It was apparently intended as an absurdity, but how exactly can a Christian presuppositionalist declare this worldview to be internally inconsistent, after renouncing the validity of the usual means of determining this?

Xyzzy

SeaKayaker,

If logic is simply a name for an emergent property of our universe (a physical manifestation of algorithms which convolve percepted reality produced by evolution), we can consistently use it. Can we use a block of wood consistently? A Rock?

The presupposition argument is illogical, therefore it can not be used to explain the source of logic. It is not logical to propose an entity which must implicitly use the laws of the universe to create those same laws.

Any logical proposition can be arbitrarily accepted as true or false. Their consistency with eachother can also be arbitrarily adjusted. Only appeals to practical examples from reality can be used to decide on workable 'non-arbitrary' definitions and rules. Therefore, reality is the source of the non-arbitrary set of rules which form the formal system of logic.

Try to prove that 'a statement and its negative can not both be true' without somehow appealing to some sort of real world example. Even mathematical systems can arbitrarily be 'defined' as true (i.e. 2+2=5 can be arbitrarily defined as valid) until you actually try to use it to keep track of real objects.

Any inconsistent rule can be patched to be consistent with more rules, or just by definition (as faulty logic is still logic) However, logical rules are only useful when they represent convolutions on reality. Arbitrary definitions are 'wrong' because they are not useful and don't allow us to convolve our perceptions and memories in useful ways. Our minds implement useful formal systems such that we can pecept information, store it, and convolve it into survival strategies.

But it only begs 'one' question. It does not beg more than one. Assuming that the universe is ordered the way it is, logic, and the laws of the universe are valid. All we have to do to be consistent is to trust our perceptions.

The theistic argument begs multiple questions. It doesn't answer the source of order question (ultimately, because it doesn't explain where the ordered entity God came from), and it doesn't explain the existence of God, or how he could use order to create order.

God is the source of logic, and God has always existed, therefore logic has always existed. But we can just cut out the middleman and assume that logic has always existed, and leave God out of it. Of course this assumes that Logic is a transcendental entity, which it is not.

If our choice was between "I am always right", and "God Exists", then I would have to agree. "God Exists" is unecessary as the assumption "I am always right" suffices. Adding God into the source of logic question doesn't change it, it just adds yet another presupposition on top of it.

????

SeaKayaker

Jack the Bodiless,

First, I think that you are attributing to the Christian presuppositionalist a lower view of perception than is necessary. Returning to the issue of a global flood, I cannot argue for or against the possibility of a global flood based solely on my perception, for I was not around when it is alleged to have happened, and, I trust, neither were you, but please correct me if I am wrong there. It is through means outside of direct perception that people must work to answer this and similar questions, so disagreeing with their conclusions does not entail totally disregarding perception.

I see that you place a very high value on perception, but what happens if your perceptions are contradictory. In one example, if you look at an oar in the water and see that it looks bent but feel it and it does not feel bent, would that concern you? If your perceptions of something were to differ from someone else’s, would that concern you?

Well, there is an even simpler way for him to solve his problem. He need only say that he never said that he would perceive a pineapple in the box. This immediately becomes true (do not ask me how), and there is no more a contradiction.

Would not the grounds that it is unbiblical be enough to convince the Christian that it is wrong?
What do you mean by “renouncing the validity of the usual means of determining” whether a worldview is consistent? Do you mean renouncing the ultimacy of perception? I am using a method to investigate atheism’s internal consistency, do you not think that one could employ a similar method in the case of the always-rightist.

SeaKayaker

SingleDad

SeaKayaker

This is true, but only to a very limited degree. Since none of us were around when the global flood occured, we cannot establish the direct factuality at all of the existence of the flood. However, if we assume that reality is consistent, then we must assume that an event of the magnitude of the flood must have left evidence: There are things that we could perceive today that would be true if and only if the global flood occured; likewise there are things we could perceive today if and only if the global flood did not occur. It is by perceiving these things that we can establish empirically whether or not the global flood occured in the past.

Indeed based on the perceptual facts we do have today, we must assume either that these perceptual facts are illusory, the regularity of the world is illusory, or that the global flood did not occur. Since we have very strong evidence that our perception is highly accurate and that the world is very regular, the obvious conclusion is that the flood did not occur. Contrawise, to assert that the flood did indeed occur, we must assume either that our perception is entirely unreliable or that the world is completely nonregular.

You are mistaking a conclusion (the oar is straight) from a pair of perceptual facts (the oar appears straight in the air, and appears bent in the water). Indeed from these perceptual facts (and others), we can conclude that water refracts light. The perceptual fact of the oar appearing bent is caused by the ontological reality of the refractive properties of water. These perceptions are not contradictory since they occur under different circumstances. For a perceptual fact to be contradictory, we would have to perceive both the straightness and the bent-ness of the oar at the same time.

The point is that if you examine CP, MN, and AR (always-rightism) according to your criteria, you will find that all of them are internally consistent, yet mutually exclusive.

Even if you examine Surrealism (where mutually contradictory assertions can be both true), the Surrealist will simply reply that you are merely importing the criterion of noncontradiction from your own metaphysical system, you are not performing an honest internal criticism.

[ December 23, 2001: Message edited by: SingleDad ]</p>

Jack the Bodiless

SeaKayaker:

If I choose to assume the primacy of perception, then any apparent inconsistency in my perceptions is a problem as long as it remains unresolved. I am faced with three options:

1. Perception is unreliable.
2. I am perceiving a real transformation.
3. I am perceiving something that is altering the image.

If I continue in my presupposition that perception is reliable, this can reveal further information about the cause of the transformation or distortion, opening up new knowledge. This is how we know about refraction. Another example is wave/particle duality in physics: the perception that light can act as waves AND as particles was an initially confusing contradiction that contributed to quantum theory, which led in turn to the microprocessor in your computer.
It should not be enough to convince the Christian presuppositionalist that the worldview is internally inconsistent. As CPists frequently use "not in my worldview" as a defense, I'm surprised at your use of an imported criterion there.

ANY worldview is internally consistent if it includes rejection of the means of determining inconsistency. Similarly, ANY worldview can be declared "internally" inconsistent if the examiner is allowed to import "special" (external) criteria for determining this. There must be a common standard of evaluation. Normally, conformity to perception is that standard (and this must include the resolution of apparent inconsistencies). Without that standard... well, what's the point?

SeaKayaker

SingleDad,

Sorry for the delay, but midterms are keeping me busy (four down, three to go).

A better way for me to word my statement would have been to say that it would look bent (visual sensory) but feel straight (tactile sensory). I realize that this does not show that perception is totally unreliable, but I just thought that it was an interesting observation.

Do you think that all of these worldviews are internally consistent? In our discussions, we have been dealing mainly with metaphysics, but this is only one part of a worldview. A worldview must also encompass beliefs on epistemology and morality. I think that, if you take these three aspects of a worldview into account, you will find metaphysical naturalism inconsistent. That is the basis of my argument. It is easier to just try to deal with one aspect of a worldview at a time, as many people today are fond of doing, but we must not forget that those different aspects must consistently fit together, too.

I do not think that anyone can live without presupposing the law of non-contradiction, but if someone does, he bars himself from rational discussion, so I would not be discussing much with him.

Soli Deo Gloria,
SeaKayaker

SeaKayaker

Jack the Bodiless,

I am sorry, but I was answering the question of why I could say that it is morally wrong (from the Christian worldview), not of why it is logically unsound.

On what basis can you say that accordance with perception is the best way to analyze a worldview? There are aspects of a worldview that we cannot evaluate by seeing if it is internally consistent (morality comes to mind), so I think that this is a rather poor system. Also, you fail to address the question of why perception is accurate. Thus, I find that internal consistency, which I see as a necessary transcendental to our rational (well, maybe) discussion.

Soli Deo Gloria,
SeaKayaker

bgponder

Seak'er, hello and hope your midterms fare well,

I don't know why it is that I just cannot get mad at you for holding CP, like I do at poor theophilus. It's a mystery, but shame on me anyway.

I know you've been busy and haven't had time to answer my last post, and I also know that Jack the Bodiless needs no help, but again I need the practice, and I want to jump in here in regard to something you said to him:

Well actually I think Jack said that perception was a standard and, if we "convolve"(ain't that a cool word Xyzzy uses? I had to look it up--means basically "roll or twist together"), anyway, if we convolve the first two definitions for "standard" in my Webster's, I think we have an answer/rebut to the first point in your quote above.

standard: 1. an object considered by an authority or by general consent as a basis of comparison; an approved model. 2. anything, as a rule or principle, that is used as a basis for judgement: They tried to establish standards for a new philosophical approach. {This really was the example sentence, synchronicitously enough.}

For the second point, I would say that perception is the prime way to analyze/evaluate morality. How is it not? You will read the Bible, accept it as truth (I dare not say that you accept it before you read it, do you?), compare what you find there with what you see in the world, and find your belief justified. I will hear, read and otherwise perceive from what goes on in the world the things necessary to form my moral views. All perception, or at least dependent upon it.

Now for that ubiquitous CP "Why"--the best thing I can think of right now seems lame even to me, and more than a pseudo-tautology, but I still think it appropriate: Perception is accurate as an evaluation of worldviews because we can perceive the things of the world that matter most to us. If it were not so, we wouldn't be here.

Mater Matuta dirige nos,
but really Peace & cornbread Barry

[edited fer grammer]

[ January 16, 2002: Message edited by: bgponder ]</p>