Celsus

What about Japan and the 4 tigers?
To what extent, then do shared values influence identity? At a governmental level, they're not united. But at a popular level, you'll be hard pressed to find Arabs who do not condemn Israeli actions. Struggle against the colonial powers united them for a while (all those dreams of pan-Arab unity, etc.). Are we seeing a new process of social identity formation?
I am not making any normative statements here. I'm just asking whether there is any potential. How long did it take Europe to rid itself of theocracy? How long more for Islam? Is it just a backlash--the "rearguard actions" as Fukuyama puts it? Gurdur knows what I think of Fukuyama. Could I interest you in my discussion on the UN here?
But only in the MENA region did we witness bread riots with several hundred protestors killed in a single day, several times, across several Arab states. All carried out by governments quelling protests for measures they really had little control about. But do the Arabs know?

Joel

Monkeybot

leonarde,

You raise some good points -- I'm certainly not going to absolve the Baathists of all responsibility for the poor state of Iraq and Syria. I certainly don't think it's just western powers that are responsible for these things. On the other hand, you seemed to exclude any influence the US and UK may have had -- perhaps I misread your post, though. When it comes to Iraq, sanctions had a pretty extreme effect -- they made it nearly impossible to repair the national infrastructure, led to starvation, and helped destroy the Iraqi middle class. (FAIR report)

So while I certainly don't think the Baathists are the best thing since sliced bread, I also think you've got to include external factors when discussing why they've failed. That's all.

Monkeybot

Oh and Gurdur:

Thanks for starting an informative, if somewhat disheartening, discussion.

Soyin Milka

This thread is indeed very interesting and informative.

Soyin

Gurdur

This explains why Damascus had a famous medical university while Westerners were still insisting that humans had lobed livers, because pigs did.

Or why the grounds for analytical calculus were laid by Arab mathematicians, or why the grounds for other branches of mathematics were laid by Hindus.

Oh, wait, no, it doesn't.

Celsus

I know we're digressing, but this topic could use more exposure. Perhaps if Vorkosigan could bring his definition of modernity to the table, and also taking into account arguments that we have reached modern or postmodern society.

From the Penguin Dictionary of Sociology:

• Modernity is distinguished on economic, political, social and cultural grounds. For example, modern societies typically have industrial, capitalist economies, democratic political organization and a social structure founded on a division into social classes. There is less agreement on cultural features, which are said to include a tendency to the fragmentation of experience, a commodification and rationalization of all aspects of life, and a speeding up of the pace of daily life. Modernity emphasized regularity and measurement in everyday life. The values of modernity include activism, universalism and affective neutrality. . . . Recently it has been argued that contemporary societies are no longer modern but postmodern.

Obviously the West was the West long before it reached modernity, and the "state of mind" Vorkosigan is thinking of could just as easily be refering to Enlightenment thought. In some sense, modernity refers to the distinct social processes unleashed by the Enlightenment, in other ways, it is a socioeconomic phenomenon.

Arab secularisation was definitely influenced by Ataturk's Turkey, which was in turn influenced by Western models. The idea that only Westernisation could bring progress is now under question by these Islamic societies. The potential to actually question it is enhanced by the successes in East Asia--modernity without westernisation. Secularisation is thus suffering, because it is no longer percieved as the only way. Hence the question of Islamic reform in Iran is important here--has the Islamist project failed, and is it a turn to Westernisation or simply to democratisation? In other words, what failed: the political structure of Islamist governments, or the cultural values of Islam? I think anyone familiar with the MENA region will have much to criticise about both, but mainly from the point of view of political strongmen becoming an outmoded form of government. Democratisation in the Middle East will result in stronger Islamist movements--a sign that the people do not feel that the cultural values of Islam have failed (yet).

Joel

Happy Wonderer

Excellent discussion. One more bit for thought: in interviews with Iranians, I have heard that from their point of view they had given westernization a try. The Shah prohibited traditional modes of thought (jailing women who wore the traditional shawls that I can't ever spell the name of) and executing religious leaders. He persued an aggressive modernization program. Except for the fact that it was run by an opressive, bloody tyrant it is hard to see where pre-revolution Iran was different than any modern western state. (Discuss?)

When we see a woman covered head-to-toe, we think "poor opressed girl." In some cases that is not true -- they are just living their life according to their social morality. When they see a picture of a half-naked 'babe' in one of our mags, they think "poor oppressed girl."

(Oddly enough, I think I have just come up with an example where the Christian religious right, Islamic fundamentalists, and feminists agree!)

hw

Ruy Lopez

Gurdur has linked US military and political initiatives in Iraq to an intensification of militant Islam. Fortunately Gurdur used "militant Islam" which is more appropriate than "Islamic Fundamentalism". As long as we agree that militancy or fundamentalism, in Islam, means no separation of church and state in the mind of the believer.

I tend to back the position that the US might have accelerated the decline of Arab or Islamic(to include Iran) secularism. However I also think that secularism would be pushed aside by militancy just the same given more time. I am actually agreeing with the majority opinion here. An economic factor seems to support the viewpoint.

For those who were around, the 70s and early 80s were a continuous recessionary period, where we got the word stagflation. All sorts of fundamentalism got a shot in the arm from Christian fundies in the US, zionists/Charedis in Israel and most of all Islam, culminating in the Iranian revolution.

There is a fly in the ointment though. While Christians and Jews were buggered by recessions, oil-exporting states were awash with cash. Was it perhaps the perception of the masses that their gov'ts were not sharing the bonanza with them that encouraged fundamentalism?

Anyway, the world is again faced with probably even harder economic times than the 70s. Are we going to see an even more virulent form of fundamentalism from Islam, Christianity and Judaism with all three colliding in the MENA region?

I would welcome all sorts of ideas as I do not know much about this region. It's a bit scary and apocalyptic though.