Alonzo Fyfe

"Intrinsic value" is simply the umbrella term that covers the set of more specific concepts of "intrinsic good", "intrinsic bad", and "intrinsic neutral." These are not the concepts that Aristotle got confused.

The concept that Aristotle messed up on are "intrinsic value" and "value independent of consequences". There are many cases in which it makes sense to talk about a value "independent of consequences" where using the phrase "intrinsic value" makes no sense at all.

The reason that X has value is not because of the consequences of X. But it is not because of its intrinsic properties either. There is a third option. Aristotle's presumption that the only options are "dependent on consequences" and "intrinsic properties" is a false dichotomy.

dk

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
The concept that Aristotle messed up on are "intrinsic value" and "value independent of consequences". There are many cases in which it makes sense to talk about a value "independent of consequences" where using the phrase "intrinsic value" makes no sense at all.

dk: Ok, could you please name a few?

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
The reason that X has value is not because of the consequences of X. But it is not because of its intrinsic properties either. There is a third option. Aristotle's presumption that the only options are "dependent on consequences" and "intrinsic properties" is a false dichotomy.

dk: Ok, what is the third option?

dk

Hi Alonzo Fyfe,

I'd like your comment...

1. an end pursued "independent of the consequences".
2. an end valued "independent of consequences"

has two meanings.
Suppose
-A man- knowingly gives his life to save the life of another.
whereas
-B man- knowingly sacrifices his friend to save his own life.


“A man” values life with love, by sacrificing his own life.
“B man” values life with reason by sacrificing his friend’s life.

I submit the intrinsic value "A man" demonstrates isn't life at all, but love. So "A man" proves the intrinsic value of love.

I submit "B man" devalues life by chosing reason over love.

I conclude that...
Life has no intrinsic value, apart from love.

DRFseven

If they seriously doubt that children develop moral systems socially, primarily through their families, then larger social groups (this is rather common knowledge since most people remember their own moral upbringing and give moral instruction to their children in a similar way), then they need to do some research on child development.



Obviously there are many codes and obviously the codes keep changing; this is plain for all to see.

If you are saying that there is some other, true code that exists somewhere as a force, where is it? And why don't we internalize that code instead of the ones we actually acquire through socialization? Are you telling me that we may as well stop the charade of modeling moral behavior for our children and just point them to the one "true" moral code and let them follow that? Surely you see this is absurd. Children DO learn their moral opinions through socialization and they experience them as deep, inherent truths; as a part of themselves.


Again, I am talking about what DOES occur. We DO acquire gut feelings of right and wrong and this is a very handy way for our behavior to have evolved. We don't do a lot of socially-destructive things because we don't WANT TO do them (it "hurts" our conscience). We do many socially-constructive things because we WANT TO do them (it feels good). This eliminates the need to have to be eaten or caused in some other way to die or be hurt for doing things inappropriate to a certain environment.

DRFseven

People who break laws and do not feel they did anything morally wrong lack moral feelings regarding those laws. You mentioned people who do things without moral compunction, right?

You're talking about people who feel that the end justifies the means; that they are entitled to what they are doing due to some sort of retribution, etc. In short, they have been socialized to believe that those sorts of things are not immoral, just as many have been socialized to believe that they are. Do you think it would make the slightest difference in their behavior if they had thought of themselves as belonging to one label (objectivist or subjectivist) instead of another? No, it would not. The objectivist would simply have put those activities in with the "objectively good" group of behaviors based on some rationale, while the subjectivist would have included them in "behaviors that seem right to me" due to some rationale. It's all the same: people experience things, draw conclusions, form opinions based on conclusions, and act on those opinions - that's all we can do.

The AntiChris

Alonzo Fyfe
Well, all I can say is that what you originally said made no sense to me.
If you're attempting to demonstrate a genuine inconsistency your last sentence should read:

On what do you base this assertion?

Chris

Dr. Retard

I don't think subjectivists who behave a certain way are thereby acting as if that behavior is objectively warranted. They're just behaving that way. After all, 'Neither A nor B is objectively better than the other' doesn't imply 'You ought to treat them the same'. This would presuppose that treating them the same is somehow proper. On the contrary, a subjectivist would say that no behavior is any more or less proper than another, since there's no way to objectively compare them.

DRFseven

Because, it's not a lie! To us, A is better than B for various reasons. For instance, I think it's wrong to steal because our society can't tolerate universal stealing. My family modeled that moral lesson and gave me the emotional mandate not to steal, but since I've been an adult, I have been in intellectual agreement and no experience I've had has mitigated that opinion. I understand that there is no objective reason to think our society must survive, but I would like for our society to survive and many people agree. Therefore, I don't think we ought to steal and I think those who do steal should be prosecuted. I further realize that those who don't have a moral compunction against stealing can't help not having one, but think they should be prosecuted anyway to protect our common interests.

Alonzo Fyfe

Yes, A is better than B in the same way that chocolate icecream is better than vanilla icecream.

Nothing can be inferred from a preference for chocolate icecream that allows for the condemnation of those who like vanilla icecream. At best, all one can say about the condemnation of those who like vanilla icecream is "I LIKE condemning those who like vanilla icecream."

In order for any type of inference that those who like something different are to be condemned to make sense, an assumption of objectivity is required.

DRFseven

Have you read any of the previous responses? You keep saying subjectivist moral injunctions don't make sense, but when you get the explanation you respond as if you hadn't read the explanation.

I would like my society to continue; would you? In my opinion, we need to cooperate for this to happen (not kill each other, etc.). Therefore, I will try to influence others to think the same way. A preference for peace is different from a preference for chocolate ice cream in its effect on others. My perception is that ice-cream preference will not determine the outcome of our existence, while other types of behavior (such as anarchy) will. Do you deny this?