Freethought & Rationalism Archive

yguy · 06-12-2003, 08:47 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Jesse
Do you think we'd sometimes see people choosing to push the button with no anticipatory brain activity,

Perhaps. It would be interesting to be able to watch the brain activity of a good martial artist in action, since they are necessarily good at not telegraphing their punches.

Quote:

or people failing to push the button even when their brain had already lit up in anticipation?

Sure. Anyone who posts a lot on BB's has at least once started to type something emotionally reactive, then thought better of it.

Normal · 06-12-2003, 09:23 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
The act of making choices does not prove a soul exists. Can you not see the difference between what you are saying the soul does and what logic "does"?

Yes, I'm not saying they are identical, I'm saying they're analogous.

Quote:

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
You could say something, I don't really care what. You're the one claming that a force exists to cause a result.

It is the force behind your decisions. What else do you want me to say?

Quote:

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
The description of the driver is implied in the definition. It is not implied in your definition. I do not believe that this distinction is oblivious to you.

Are you suggesting your definition implies a description of the "driver"?

Again, I'm claiming the soul is metaphysical, which would be beyond physical description. Here is a quote from a previous statement:

Quote:

Originally posted by Normal
The soul, the actual "maker" of those choices, if you will, can not be empirically observed, it is afterall the thing "making" the choices. That is why it is "metaphysical" and lacks empirical evidence. All I have evidence of is the choices, not the chooser.

I can describe the choices, but not the "one" making the choices.

Quote:

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
I don't want you to ascribe any properties to it, necessarily. However, you have voluntarily attributed the property of "driver" to it, so apparently it can be described in physical terms.

And my concern, as I had stated, is not the description of soul, but your position that "soul" and "logic" are equally intangible.

Yes, well you have yet to describe logic in physical terms. If "process" is good enough for logic, "driver" is good enough for the soul. Your problem seems to be that I cannot describe in physical terms what the driver is, which is simply due to the fact that I don't know. All I have evidence of is the choices, and not the chooser. You could describe the chooser through the choices, but as for a physical description, how is that possible?

Quote:

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
Really? So undergoing a lobotomy will have no impact on free will? So no type of neurosurgery will affect you capacity to choose for yourself versus following strict conditioning, or not being able to choose at all?

That would be analogous to ruining the plane a pilot was driving. Just because a plane becomes unoperatable, it does not disprove the existence of a pilot struggling at the wheel.

Quote:

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
Because you say that's what the soul does? I think the soul only acts as the driver, but it's really not the cause of free will. It just appears that way.

Ergo, the soul has NOTHING to do with free will

What is your alternative cause for free will then?

Quote:

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
Interesting...and this has what to do with me?

That was just a counter-argument to your neurology claim.

Quote:

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
Okay - one last time. 'Logic' exists because it is the name we attribute to a process we can demonstrate. 'Logic' does not operate anything - we do.

'Soul' may be a name you give to some fictious process you think might be occurring, but cannot prove. 'Soul' operates something in some way you cannot explain.

So I have an admittedly abstract thing (a name) given to an agree-upon process that we can demonstrate, but takes no action on its own.

You have an unprovable force performing an unprovable task in a unprovable way that cannot be physical, yet it is a force that drives.

Seriously, you see no difference?

I've explained how a soul operates numerous times. Here's a quote:

Quote:

Originally posted by Normal
1. Free will might exist. It is unknown to science.

2. I assume free will exists because I have empirical experience making choices.

3. Free will, defined in my terms as the "existence of choice combined with the power of making a choice", does not account for the gap between the existence of choice, and the execution of choice. That gap I define as the "soul", or in other words, the operator of free will.

By making a choice, the "task" is proven.

Quote:

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
As above - it is implied that "one" refers to a physical entity, specifically a person.

Your definition of "one" does not imply anything, unless you are telling me it is a physcial entity.

No wait...that's exactly the opposite of what you are saying! So how does this dictionary reference counter my point of "one what"?

It implies a metaphysical entity. I've explained this above.

Quote:

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
I thought a soul was a "driver"? How about you decide what a soul is first. Is it a driver or a process or a pilot?

You could think of it in ANY of those terms, it doesn't change at all what it does.

Quote:

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
You did not prove the soul through free will, nor more than I have proven "ghklsa" exist because they control "skhfjgh".

See above. If you have a problem with my proof clearly state what problem it is in the part where I quoted myself above with the 3 steps.

ps418 · 06-12-2003, 09:37 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Normal
That would be analogous to ruining the plane a pilot was driving. Just because a plane becomes unoperatable, it does not disprove the existence of a pilot struggling at the wheel.

Well, to continue to use the plane/pilot analogy, I think the best interpretation of the facts of many neurological cases is that plane and pilot are both altered, rather than that the pilot is just fine but lacks control of the plane. This is especially so in reversible cases (e.g. reversible cases of Kluver-Bucy syndrome) where the individual themself can describe their own self-perceptions during the 'altered state.'

Quote:

One of the strongest arguments for mind-brain dependence comes from the effects of "brain pacemakers" which electrically stimulate the cerebellum in the brains of psychotics (Hooper and Teresi 154). The following case illustrates these effects:

Another patient, a severely depressed former physicist, was troubled by voices that commanded him to choke his wife. When he got one of Dr. Heath's pacemakers in 1977, the infernal voices vanished, along with his perennial gloom... But his wires eventually broke, and once again his wife was threatened with strangulation. When the gadgetry was mended, so was the man's psyche (Hooper and Teresi 155).

These are just a few examples from neuroscience of the dependence of consciousness on the brain. We know that altering the brain's chemistry can cause drastic personality changes. Schizophrenia and Alzheimer's disease are dramatic examples of mind-brain dependence. If you are thinking of suicide, don't go to a psychiatrist, go to a pharmacologist: A combination of an antidepressant and tryptophan should banish all thoughts of ending your life (Hooper and Teresi 171).

Survival proponents who think that the brain is an instrument of the soul use arguments like the following in an attempt to reconcile physiology and the soul:

A colored glass... [has] only a transmissive function in respect to the light that shines through [it], since [it does not itself] create the rays. The same may be said of an organ, which transforms already existing air into music. In a similar fashion the human body may act as a transmission apparatus for the supernatural soul (Lamont 98).

Corliss Lamont makes it apparent that this rejoinder has no force:

A severe injury to the head, for instance, may change an ordinarily cheerful man into a sullen and morose one subject to sudden fits of homicidal mania. If the brain and body are simply the instruments of the soul, we have to say in such a case that this personality is really still brimming over with joy and benevolence, but that unfortunately these sentiments can only express themselves in dark glances, in peevish complaints and in violent attacks (Lamont 100).

Lamont continues:

Suppose... [he] becomes definitely insane... [and] is convinced he is Napoleon... Are we to say that his real personality is still normal, that his soul is still thinking clearly and healthily, and that as soon as he gets rid of his body by dying he will come to his senses? (100).

The illustrations of the "instrument theory" reveal a fatal flaw:

If the human body corresponds to a colored glass... then the living personality corresponds to the colored light that is the result of the glass... Now while light in general will continue to exist without the colored glass... the specific red or blue or yellow rays that the glass produces... will certainly not persist if the glass [is] destroyed (Lamont 104).

The consequences of the instrument theory are absurd. Throughout aging, specific mental abilities may be irrevocably lost one-by-one,

Yet if instead of the senses being destroyed separately and gradually by disease or accident, they are all simultaneously destroyed by death, the dualistic immortalist asks us to believe that they will go on in some other state with unimpaired, if not greatly improved, capabilities! (Lamont 102).

Paul Edwards asks: "How does the complete destruction of the brain bring about a cure that has so far totally eluded medical science?" (Edwards, "Dependence" 296).

Edwards argues that the instrument theory is inconsistent with Alzheimer's disease:

An Alzheimer patient's brain is severely damaged and most of his mind has disappeared. After his death his brain is not merely damaged but completely destroyed. It is surely logical to conclude that now his mind is also gone (296).

If under certain circumstances the mind cannot survive in life, how can it survive death? Edwards provides a clear illustration of the incompatibility of the instrument theory with the facts of Alzheimer's disease. Prior to her affliction with Alzheimer's, "Mrs. D" was a considerate, compassionate person with a normal functioning mind. Yet,

At about the time when she could no longer recognize her daughter, she beat up [a] paralyzed lady on two or three occasions... [The instrument theory] implies that throughout her affliction with Alzheimer's Mrs. D.'s mind was intact. She recognized her daughter but had lost her ability to express this recognition. She had no wish to beat up an inoffensive paralyzed old woman. On the contrary, 'inside' she was the same considerate person as before the onset of the illness. It is simply that her brain disease prevented her from acting in accordance with her true emotions... [T]hese are the implications of the theory that the mind survives the death of the brain and that the brain is only an instrument for communication. Surely these consequences are absurd (299-300).

Other survival proponents concede the evidence for mind-brain dependence, but try to avoid the implication of personal extinction at death. Douglas Stokes, for example, writes:

[T]he intimate dependency of one's personality on the state of the brain makes it appear unlikely that one's personality and memories could remain largely intact following the destruction of the brain. However, memories, feelings, behavioral dispositions, and other personality traits are probably not the aspects of the mind that should be identified with an unchanging self... It would seem that the self must be what Hart called the 'I thinker,' that entity that thinks one's thoughts, senses one's sensations, feels one's feelings, and remembers one's memories rather than being the thoughts, sensations, feelings, and memories themselves (Stokes 76).

The Case Against Immortality, by Keith Augustine.

Patrick

Jesse · 06-12-2003, 09:43 AM

Normal:
So how are we going to interact with this uploaded brain, and be sure it works, if we don't give it a functioning body? Just run computer tests? Who knows what "information" was lost in the process then.

Yes, I actually said in my earlier post that you would have to give the brain a body--either robotic or in virtual reality. Our experience with totally paralyzed people suggests that human brains totally unable to interact with the world may become catatonic; anyway, if uploads were potentially conscious it would be unethical to torture them by depriving them of a body.

Normal:
I don't see why you put so much faith in the Turing test as a test for the soul. Just demonstrating a few convincing human attributes was enough to fool some people with "ELIZA", so if you make it more advanced of course more people will be fooled, but that doesn't automatically mean "ELIZA" or an uploaded human brain that demonstrates a few characteristics of human behavior does actually have a soul.

I just got through saying a proper test would involve years of close interaction, which would surely compensate for the "ELIZA effect". Tell me, do you feel certain that your friends and family are actually conscious, or that they have the same kind of "soul" that you do? If so, doesn't it have something to do with your regular interaction with them?

Normal · 06-12-2003, 09:46 AM

Those examples could very well fit under the plane being damaged and the pilot losing control. The chemical imbalance in a problem with the plane, not the pilot. Alzheimers and Schizophrenia may merely be broken planes curable through medicine so the pilot can regain proper control.

And I never claimed that the "senses" can go on to another life, that is a concept strongly rooted in the physical sense.

Normal · 06-12-2003, 09:50 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Jesse
Yes, I actually said in my earlier post that you would have to give the brain a body--either robotic or in virtual reality. Our experience with totally paralyzed people suggests that human brains totally unable to interact with the world may become catatonic; anyway, if uploads were potentially conscious it would be unethical to torture them by depriving them of a body.

And our ability to restructure a body suitable for performing these tests is a mere 30 years away? Even in virtual reality?

Quote:

Originally posted by Jesse
I just got through saying a proper test would involve years of close interaction, which would surely compensate for the "ELIZA effect". Tell me, do you feel certain that your friends and family are actually conscious, or that they have the same kind of "soul" that you do? If so, doesn't it have something to do with your regular interaction with them?

And as technology increases we can extend the ELIZA effect for many years possibly. It doesn't mean that we aren't being tricked.

And yes, constant interaction with my family implies they have souls too, but all I really know is cognito ergo sum.

Jesse · 06-12-2003, 09:54 AM

Jesse:
or people failing to push the button even when their brain had already lit up in anticipation?

yguy:
Sure. Anyone who posts a lot on BB's has at least once started to type something emotionally reactive, then thought better of it.

That's completely different. In the experiment, I believe the anticipatory brain activity started a few fractions of a second before the action, while you're talking about an extended action over many seconds or even minutes that you begin and then eventually rethink.

Anyway, there was another element of the precognitive carousel experiment not mentioned in the earlier article--although the subjects saw the slide change immediately before they were conscious of deciding to push the button, they couldn't stop themselves from pushing the button immediately afterwards. I haven't seen a detailed write-up of this experiment so I can't be totally sure it happened in 100% of the cases, but this aspect of it was mentioned in a number of articles about the precognitive carousel, without any exceptions being mentioned. For example:

http://vision1.eee.metu.edu.tr/~visi...alife/ch8.html

Quote:

Researchers have found neural activity just prior to and correlated with the initiation of some action. In one experiment [19], subjects were asked to watch a slide show and were given a button to push when they wished to view the next slide in the sequence. The button, however, did not really control the slide projector, but rather, electrodes attached to the subject detected their 'intention' to change the slide and initiated the change before they had actually pressed the button. Subjects reported that, just as they decided to press the button, they saw the slide change, though, they were unable to stop their finger pressing the button anyway.

and

http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/arc...0/time&obs.htm

Quote:

One might suppose that the patients would notice nothing out of the ordinary, but in fact they were startled by the effect, because it seemed to them as if the slide projector was anticipating their decisions. They reported that just as they were "about to" push the button, but before they had actually decided to do so, the projector would advance the slide--and they would find themselves pressing the button with the worry that it was going to advance the slide twice! The effect was strong, according to Grey Walter's account, but apparently he never performed the dictated follow-up experiment: introducing a variable delay element to see how large a delay had to be incorporated into the triggering in order to eliminate the "precognitive carousel" effect.

If this is indeed an accurate description of all the subject's reactions, would you say it poses at least a potential challenge to your view of choice and free will?

Normal · 06-12-2003, 09:59 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Jesse
If this is indeed an accurate description of all the subject's reactions, would you say it poses at least a potential challenge to your view of choice and free will?

How does this challenge free will at all? You're just tracing back the functions of the brain that enact a "choice". Not proving if those choices exist.

Am I missing something?

Jesse · 06-12-2003, 10:02 AM

Normal:
And our ability to restructure a body suitable for performing these tests is a mere 30 years away? Even in virtual reality?

Sure, it's not like every part of the body has to be simulated with the same high degree of accuracy as you simulate the brain. It would mainly be sensory and motor nerves that you'd need to simulate pretty accurately, but if you've already studied nerves enough to simulate the entire brain that shouldn't be too much more difficult.

Normal:
And yes, constant interaction with my family implies they have souls too, but all I really know is cognito ergo sum.

OK, my argument is just that you could have the same level of certainty about an upload that you have about your family at present. Most people would consider a theory of the soul that implied a family member was soulless (say, because the theory says that only men have souls) to be too ridiculous to give any serious consideration to, but perhaps you would feel differently.

ps418 · 06-12-2003, 10:03 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Normal
Those examples could very well fit under the plane being damaged and the pilot losing control. The chemical imbalance in a problem with the plane, not the pilot. Alzheimers and Schizophrenia may merely be broken planes curable through medicine so the pilot can regain proper control.

And that's exactly what I'm disagreeing with. I don't think it makes sense to attribute persistent delusions ("I'm Napoelan"), for example, or dramatic alterations in apparently volitional behaviors to a malfunction in the machinery of the 'plane.' I think it makes much more sense to say that the pilot herself has been impaired by the injury. Unless of course the personality and behavior are characteristics of the plane rather than the pilot (ok, I think Ive stretched the analogy a bit too far), which is indeed a possible option.

Patrick

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06-12-2003, 09:43 AM	#294
Jesse Moderator - Science Discussions Join Date: Feb 2001 Location: Providence, RI, USA Posts: 9,908	Normal: So how are we going to interact with this uploaded brain, and be sure it works, if we don't give it a functioning body? Just run computer tests? Who knows what "information" was lost in the process then. Yes, I actually said in my earlier post that you would have to give the brain a body--either robotic or in virtual reality. Our experience with totally paralyzed people suggests that human brains totally unable to interact with the world may become catatonic; anyway, if uploads were potentially conscious it would be unethical to torture them by depriving them of a body. Normal: I don't see why you put so much faith in the Turing test as a test for the soul. Just demonstrating a few convincing human attributes was enough to fool some people with "ELIZA", so if you make it more advanced of course more people will be fooled, but that doesn't automatically mean "ELIZA" or an uploaded human brain that demonstrates a few characteristics of human behavior does actually have a soul. I just got through saying a proper test would involve years of close interaction, which would surely compensate for the "ELIZA effect". Tell me, do you feel certain that your friends and family are actually conscious, or that they have the same kind of "soul" that you do? If so, doesn't it have something to do with your regular interaction with them?

06-12-2003, 09:46 AM	#295
Normal Senior Member Join Date: May 2003 Location: Canada Posts: 639	Those examples could very well fit under the plane being damaged and the pilot losing control. The chemical imbalance in a problem with the plane, not the pilot. Alzheimers and Schizophrenia may merely be broken planes curable through medicine so the pilot can regain proper control. And I never claimed that the "senses" can go on to another life, that is a concept strongly rooted in the physical sense.

06-12-2003, 10:02 AM	#299
Jesse Moderator - Science Discussions Join Date: Feb 2001 Location: Providence, RI, USA Posts: 9,908	Normal: And our ability to restructure a body suitable for performing these tests is a mere 30 years away? Even in virtual reality? Sure, it's not like every part of the body has to be simulated with the same high degree of accuracy as you simulate the brain. It would mainly be sensory and motor nerves that you'd need to simulate pretty accurately, but if you've already studied nerves enough to simulate the entire brain that shouldn't be too much more difficult. Normal: And yes, constant interaction with my family implies they have souls too, but all I really know is cognito ergo sum. OK, my argument is just that you could have the same level of certainty about an upload that you have about your family at present. Most people would consider a theory of the soul that implied a family member was soulless (say, because the theory says that only men have souls) to be too ridiculous to give any serious consideration to, but perhaps you would feel differently.

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