Hobbs

Well, just as a matter of empirical fact, this is false, at least if you mean anything beyond a very few, very basic, very general, and very vague points of agreement. It is, as should be blatantly obvious, not the case that almost all humans everywhere have agreed on a universal morality. Now, it does not follow from this fact that there is therefore no such universal morality, just as the fact that there is no full agreement (yet, anyway) in the scientific community as to when, how, and even whether the Big Bang occurred means that it did or didn't happen in one way and not in any other. There could be a universal morality even if there is far from universal agreement as to what it is. The point here is just that there in fact is not such agreement.

But I wasn't arguing against a universal morality, and my argument is compatible with the existence of such. In fact, I did agree that there is in fact at least roughly and in a general sense a universal human morality, even if there isn't really the agreement on what this morality is that you claim. But that should hardly be surprising, giving that we are all members of the same species and that, roughly and in a general sense, the same sorts of things harm or benefit us. My point was that, even if there is such a thing as a universal human morality, there is no need to appeal to a god to explain this, nor does it point to the existence of such a god. The reality of morality, and even of a strictly universal and universally agreed on morality, can be explained merely by pointing out that we are members of the same species, and thus the same sorts of things cause us benefit and harm. There is no need for the god hypothesis to explain or account for this.

As has been pointed out, this is because the definition itself is a subjective concept: many people have many different ideas of what it means. The word 'objective' in other contexts means something along the lines of "of or having to do with a material object as distinguished from a mental concept, idea, or belief." But when the term 'morality' is tacked onto it, 'objective' switches to mean something along the lines of 'absolute'. But by the standard definition of 'objective', Lewis is actually arguing for a thoroughly subjective notion of ethics: as he says, it is dependent on mind, specifically the mind of God. By the standard definition of 'objective', this makes morality not objective, as it is a mental concept. What 'objective moralists' tend to mean by 'objective' would be better labeled as 'absolute', i.e. applying to everyone at all times. But a thoroughly subjective morality backed by an omnipotent god would be absolute but not objective.

The main reason I spend so little time in the "Moral Foundations" file is this strange twisting of the normal meaning of 'objective': it's just too much work to have to deal with people on all sides of the fence who use it {and use it inconsistently with each other) in this strange way.

If that is what an objective moralist would argue, then an objective moralist is, as a matter of obvious fact, wrong: it just is not the case that everyone sees and makes these exceptions on the same grounds. Anyone with a decent knowledge of other cultures should be able to see that quite easily. Again, the fact that there is disagreement does not in itself mean that there is not an absolute, universal standard. But it does mean that even if there is a universal standard, it is in fact far from universally recognized.

If you were to claim that to be an objective moralist means that there is an absolute, universal standard even if not everyone recognizes either that there is such a standard or can agree what that standard is, then you would at least have a claim that may turn out to be true. (And that, as I understand it, is the most common meaning of 'objective morality'.) But if to be an objective moralist is to claim that everyone can and does recognize and agree on this universal standard, then to be an objective moralist is to be in fact wrong: there just isn't this kind of agreement.

And even if it were the case that there really were this sort of complete (or at least nearly complete) agreement on morality, that would not mean that morality is absolute, nor that it is from any source beyond humans, from what is in fact objectively and subjectively beneficial and harmful to us, i.e. what constitutes human flourishing. The lack of agreement does not mean that morality is not real. And the reality of morality does not mean that it is absolute, universal, or from any source outside of humans.

I agree. But neither you nor Lewis has shown that the moral sense indicates something beyond humans. Beyond human instinct alone, yes, but not beyond human thinking, feeling, etc.

As has repeatedly been pointed out, even if you could show universal agreement as to what morality is, that would not show that it is objective: it is possible that we can have the same subjective values. You will need to take a different tack to demonstrate what you are trying to show.

And, as I have shown, an objective right and wrong (if by that you mean a real right and wrong as opposed to mere arbitrary subjective preferences) can be accounted for without reference to any gods. All it needs to refer to are the real objective and subjective benefits and harms to humans.

False dichotomy. True, morality is not purely subjective, i.e. it's not a matter of arbitrary individual preferences. I've acknowledged that much. But it is not the case that absolute morality is the only alternative. I could just as easily show that absolute morality does not and cannot exist (to reiterate just one point: how can morality possibly be absolute if 'good' is incommensurable, i.e. if 'good' can conflict with itself, as it obviously does: sometimes you cannot achieve one good without sacrificing another [e.g. mercy necessarily constitutes foregoing justice]) to argue that therefore morality is purely arbitrarily subjective.

But those aren't the only alternatives. In fact, those extreme alternatives can both easily be demonstrated to be thoroughly inadequate. The only way to defend either is to pretend that they are the only two choices and then show that the other is wrong, leaving my favored extreme as the only option available.

{Besides, you said that this shows absolute morality to be morally superior to purely subjective morality. Well, on its own terms, of course. But on the terms of a purely subjective morality, subjective morality would of course be morally superior to absolute morality. You need to find some non-moral grounds to show one system of morality to be superior to another; otherwise you are just begging the question.)

As others have pointed out, sharing values does not make them objective: it is possible for everyone to have the same purely subjective values.

But as a matter of fact, some values are objective while some are subjective. Nourishing food is objectively valuable to me; friendship is subjectively valuable to me (and its subjectivity does not make it any less real or valuable). My valuing them is a conscious awareness that they are valuable, and so is subjective. My values could be wrong, or misguided: I could value something that is not in fact valuable to me, or I could fail to recognize that something else really is valuable to me. Again, real standards for real judgments about subjective values. So, again, from the reality of morality it does not follow that morality is objective, nor that it is universal, nor that it is absolute.

And pointing this out is totally useless if you are trying to argue that morality is absolute. Again, the fact that we share at least some values does not make those values objective or absolute. Nor does the fact that what we value may actually as a matter of objective fact be valuable to us make those values absolute. Nor does any of this require any sort of god to make sense of it.

Once again, you are equivocating your terms, sliding from showing one thing to thinking that you have therefore demonstrated something that is actually quite unrelated. Yes, we share some values. That does not make those values objective: we can have the same subjective values. But even if they are objective, that does not make them absolute, or dependent on anything outside humans for their existence: the fact that we are members of the same species implies that it is quite likely that the same sorts of things will tend to be beneficial or harmful to at least most of us.

I agree that we are better off if we have shared values. That doesn't mean that we do have shared values. And even if we do, that doesn't mean that those shared values are objective. And even if they are, no gods would be required to make them so. But Lewis tries to jump from the first point to asserting the second point and assuming the last point.

That occurs to me, too.

If you didn't get the main points with the explanations attached, should you expect to be able to get the main points when they stand alone, without any explication?


So far, we've looked mainly at alternatives to God as an explanation for morality. But I have a few questions for what Lewis evenually came up with as his explanation. Please try to address these questions, I'd be interested in seeing what you think.

Does God have any reasons for the moral rules he gave us? Or are they just arbitrary, did he just pull them out of his head (or some other part of his anatomy)? If he had reasons, what were those reasons? To what did he appeal to justify saying that X is good or right and Y is bad or wrong? And, if he has reasons, why couldn't we appeal to those reasons ourselves and just bypass God? If he had no reasons, if his moral rules are just his arbitrary subjective whims, then what makes them any better than our arbitrary subjective whims?

Before you answer that they are derived from, or emanate from, his character, or his being, keep in mind that the same sort of thing can be asked of his character. Could his character, or his being, have been different? If not, what constrains his character, and why couldn't we just bypass God and appeal to whatever standards he must live up to? If so, if his being could have been any way at all and whatever emanated from it would be 'good' and 'right' by definition, what makes this any better ground for morality than anything else? Wouldn't it in fact be a worse ground for a morality for humans than one that emanates from humans' being, since at least the latter is directly related to us?

The way I see it, morality must be independent of God and his commands and character, or it is just a case of might makes right. Either there are standards for morality which even God must meet, or God's rules become the real, objective, absolute morality only because he's the biggest, baddest mutha on the block and thus he can enforce his morality the way he wants to.

I agree that morality is independent of our unconstrained choice: I can't choose for raping my neighbors' wives to be an act that promotes human flourishing. But I also have to conclude that morality, if it is real, must also be independent of God's choice, for the same reasons. Or, do you think that God could make raping my neighbors' wives a good thing? If not, why not, what constrains him and his character? If so, then how are his arbitrary and unconstrained moral choices any better than mine?

Vorkosigan

And just because we can use cost-benefit analysis to judge each moral act in it's context does not subtract from the fact that morality is not simply a matter of taste.

I missed this one. Luv, cost-benefit analysis is a calculus of moral values. Who determines what is a "cost" and what is a "benefit"? How does one make the final determination? Economic efficiency? Environmental soundness? Political return to the ruling Party? There are as many ways to play with a C-B analysis as there are analysts....there have been numerous critiques of cost-benefit and risk analysis, I could suggest some readings, if you are interested.

In a famous case back in the '60s, the Corps of Engineers was going to build a dam at Diablo Canyon (I think). There was an indian village on the site, to be destroyed. The Corps listed this in the Cost-Benefit Analysis as a "benefit" of the Dma's construction. The Corps argued that since the Indians were getting a "better" village in compensation, clearly the destruction of their tribal home was a benefit....

Michael

Vorkosigan

It's too bad Malaclypse the Younger isn't around this week to jump in here. He's at the Satellite 2002 Conference. He'd luv this conversation. I can hear the sturm und drang of moral strategy theory and moral values theory already.

BTW, Luv, being an atheist does not entail being a subjectivist. There are many fine atheist philosophers who subscribe to various strains of objective moral theory. Michael Martin is one. Ayn Rand is an...er...atheist thinker....who has a philosophy called Objectivism. Unlike Lewis, for whom superciliousness is merely a personality flaw, for Rand it is a whole philosophical position.

Michael

Vorkosigan

Hiya Hobbs! How come you don't post more?

No you don't want to read Lewis on God. Here's how he (mis)represents atheism:

Chapter 6
I have been asked to tell you what Christians believe, and I am going to begin by telling you one thing that Christians do not need to believe. If you are a Christian you do not have to believe that all the other religions are simply wrong all through. If you are an atheist you do have to believe that the main point in all the religions of the whole world is simply one huge mistake. If you are a Christian, you are free to think that all those religions, even the queerest ones, contain at least some hint of the truth. When I was an atheist I had to try to persuade myself that most of the human race have always been wrong about the question that mattered to them most; when I became a Christian I was able to take a more liberal view.

You can only laugh at shit as dumb as this. Actually, atheists nearly all have different takes on different religions. I personally consider the Abrahamic ones to be net evils, while eastern religions to have much more that is good about them. Another atheist will have another take, and of course, many religious systems, such as Buddhism, are atheist (they do not believe in gods). In other words, far from rejecting all religions as wrong, some atheists ARE religious.

It's apparent that both as an atheist and a Christian, Lewis was insufferably supercilious, naive, and uninformed. No wonder he never married until late in life. He must have been hell on his servants.

But, of course, being a Christian does mean thinking that where Christianity differs from other religions, Christianity is right and they are wrong. As in arithmetic--there is only one right answer to a sum, and all other answers are wrong; but some of the wrong answers are much nearer being right than others.

But, they are still all wrong. As the saying runs, the difference between a Christian and an atheist is just one god.

The first big division of humanity is into the majority, who believe in some kind of God or gods, and the minority who do not. On this point, Christianity lines up with the majority--lines up with ancient Greeks and Romans, modern savages, Stoics, Platonists, Hindus, Mohammedans, etc., against the modern Western European materialist.

Note that Lewis, with typical ignorance, leaves out Buddhists, Confucians, believers in ESP, and others who accept the extranatural without believing in gods.

The first of these views--the one that thinks God beyond good and evil--is called Pantheism. It was held by the great Prussian philosopher Hegel and, as far as I can understand them, by the Hindus. The other view is held by Jews, Mohammedans and Christians.

Actually, many who call themselves pantheists are atheists. Even in Lewis' time.

But if I did that, then my argument against God collapsed too--for the argument depended on saying that the world was really unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please my fancies. Thus in the very act of trying to prove that God did not exist--in other words, that the whole of reality was senseless -I found I was forced to assume that one part of reality--namely my idea of justice--was full of sense. Consequently atheism turns out to be too simple.

Hmmm....looks like Lewis failed to examine alternatives in a very meaningful way.....

Well, I'm not going to refute this book line by line.

Michael

[ March 08, 2002: Message edited by: turtonm ]</p>

Hobbs

Self with full time job + spouse with full time job + 2-year-old + too many hobbies = not a whole lot of free time. Maybe some day I'll be able to post more than I do.

Also, it's fun for a while, but I can only take so much <img src="graemlins/banghead.gif" border="0" alt="[Bang Head]" /> .

Lewis was never a real atheist.

Actually, I think I have a good argument for that claim, and some day I'll get around to taking the time to write it out and present it here (probably in "Existence of God").

luvluv

Little short on time, guys, but I'll be back later to answer everything more fully.

Hobbs what I meant when I said I was not arguing for Lewis's full point was that I was not here with the intention of convincing you to believe in God because of the evidence of the moral sense. I was simply trying to say that all of this "good for you, not good for me" stuff was false. It appears that what I call objective morality, you call shared subjective values. I see no need to quarell over semantics. I believe that at base you and I agree. All I was saying was that universal values are shared by human beings, and that what is moral is not totally up to the wiles of imagination.

ohwillke says:

"People do not negotiate because they value negotiation over war. They negotiate because they are worried that they, in this particular instance, will lose the war horribly. Perferring losing v. losing big time is hardly a significant value. One can value war very highly and still negotiate."

On those grounds, why would the superior party ever negotiate?

Pompous says:

"Our way of life is a SIGNIFICANT threat to their values, and if no value is any more valuable than any other value, that is to say if we cannot say that there values are wrong, then they are totally justified in trying to destroy us.

Based on their set of values, yes they probably are justified in trying to destroy us. Based on my set of values, we are perfectly justified in fighting back."

This is what I meant. Without, as Hobbs says, a shared subjective set of values, or as I say, an objective standard of value, people can only fight and kill each other as if they were animals incapable of mutual understanding. The scenario you are describing sounds to me very much like the abyss across which the lion and the gazelle face each other. There needs are simply irreconcillable, and their conflict is inevitable. That concept of morality is a threat to the future of the human race. Peace depends on the fact that all humans have the shared subjective value of peace. It will always be in the interest of the strongest party to war if the spoils of the war exceed the cost of waging the war UNLESS both parties share the value of peace. By your definition, the United States would be totally justified in colonizing and exploiting every weaker power in the world. Theoritically by your definition, if there were the existence of such a power that it could impose it's will on others by force, but which had sufficient co-ercive powers for it never to be reciprocated upon them (sufficient markets to defend against embargos or sanctions, sufficient arms to defend against attack) that whatever they did "in their interests" would be moral. That seems to me to be vastly morally inferior to simply having a shared value of peace.

I am sorry I have to go now but I will be back later tonight to elaborate.

Vorkosigan

I was simply trying to say that all of this "good for you, not good for me" stuff was false. It appears that what I call objective morality, you call shared subjective values.

No, what you you think is "objective" is actually an arbitrary and subjective definition of that word, and further, you've badly confused two completely different senses of it, as Lewis invited you to.

As both Hobbes and I pointed out, when you say morals are "objective" you could mean either that they exist in the world as facts, or that they are absolutes we all must obey. However, the first does not mean the second.

When Hobbes and I say there are no objective morals, we mean that there are no transcendent absolute morals that we must obey because they are absolute. Further, neither Hobbes, nor Pompous nor myself believes that if a value is "universal" in some sense, it is "objective" in the absolute sense of the word. Luv, we do not even share basic definitions with you.

I see no need to quarell over semantics.

Hobbs (and myself) are not quarreling over semantics. There are fundamental differences between both your beliefs and our beliefs, and your claims and the way things are actually done in the world.

I believe that at base you and I agree.

Possibly there are many areas, if not most, where you and Hobbs agree. However, agreement does not make morals "objective" in either sense of the word.

All I was saying was that universal values are shared by human beings,....

Luv, for the tenth time, humans share few, if any universal morals. This has been proven to you using many empirical facts (humans do not even agree on what actions constitute "moral" actions).

... and that what is moral is not totally up to the wiles of imagination.

Nobody ever said it was. This is a strawman.

Since you are writing to
night, you can respond to the following:

1. Why is a "universal" moral belief the proper definition of an "objective" moral?

2. What is the proper definition of "universal?"

• a. an ideal found in the majority of cultures, and the majority of individuals in each culture.
  
  b. an actual behavior found in the majority of cultures, and the majority of individuals in each culture.
  
  c. an ideal shared by the majority of individuals on earth regardless of proportions in each culture.
  
  d. an actual behavior shared by the majority of individuals on earth regardless of proportions in each culture.
  
  ..and of course, whether you mean only current cultures, or all cultures in human history.

3. Assuming we can agree on the right definition of "universal," if a moral belief is universal, does that mean we must obey it? In addition to being a fact, it is also an imperative? Or simply that it is proof of god? What are you shooting for here?

Michael

[ March 09, 2002: Message edited by: turtonm ]</p>

Pomp

luvluv,

I realize that yours was a quck response, so I'll try not to be too critical.

I was simply trying to say that all of this "good for you, not good for me" stuff was false.

Are you trying to say that something cannot be good for you, yet not good for me? Can you imagine no possible state of affairs that would be beneficial to you, yet detrimental or irrelevant to me?

All I was saying was that universal values are shared by human beings, and that what is moral is not totally up to the wiles of imagination.

Although turtonm has already spoken to this, I would like to reaffirm his point that your argument involves a gross misunderstanding, if not an intentional strawman, of the subjectivist position(s). Subjectivist morality is, in no sense, "up to the wiles of the imagination." First, many of our values, as Hobbs has noted, are structurally necessary or evolutionariily instilled (or instilled by a creator, if you prefer) and not subject to whimsical alteration. Second, the strategies that will lead to the fulfillment of our values are by no means up to our imaginations. Some actions are beneficial to our values and some are detrimental, as a matter of objective fact.

On those grounds, why would the superior party ever negotiate?

In many cases, violent conflict, even when successful, costs more than peaceful negotiation. Negotiation is generally, although not always, a preferable strategy to war.

Without, as Hobbs says, a shared subjective set of values, or as I say, an objective standard of value, people can only fight and kill each other as if they were animals incapable of mutual understanding.

As I have previously pointed out, this is incorrect. We do not need mutual values in order to negotiate. Take the simple hypothetial case of individual A, who values A's survival, and individual B, who values B's survival. A is indifferent to B's survival and vice versa. A and B share no values. In what sense is it impossible for A and B to negotitate an agreement to not kill each other? Shared values are not necessary for mutual understanding in this case, or any other.


The scenario you are describing sounds to me very much like the abyss across which the lion and the gazelle face each other. There needs are simply irreconcillable, and their conflict is inevitable.

Human conflict is not inevitable, strictly speaking, because human values are ont inevitably mutually exclusive, as in the case of the lion and gazelle.

Peace depends on the fact that all humans have the shared subjective value of peace.

Refer to the case of A and B. Neither of them values peace, but they both agree to it as a strategy to fulfill the values they do hold.

It will always be in the interest of the strongest party to war if the spoils of the war exceed the cost of waging the war UNLESS both parties share the value of peace.

True. The cases in which spoils exceed cost are rarer than you might think.

By your definition, the United States would be totally justified in colonizing and exploiting every weaker power in the world.

As history has shown, the benefits of colonialism are hardly worth the costs.

Theoritically by your definition, if there were the existence of such a power that it could impose it's will on others by force, but which had sufficient co-ercive powers for it never to be reciprocated upon them (sufficient markets to defend against embargos or sanctions, sufficient arms to defend against attack) that whatever they did "in their interests" would be moral.

Irrelevant, and not quite accurate. If there were a "power" great enough that it were immune to all obstacles and needed no cooperation from other powers then that power would not be bound by what we usually refer to as "morailty." Can you point to any conceivable power that wold be completely immune to retribution?


That seems to me to be vastly morally inferior to simply having a shared value of peace.

It also seems vastly inferior to living forever and never having to work, but it just ain't gonna happen.

[ March 09, 2002: Message edited by: Pompous Bastard ]</p>

Vorkosigan

It will always be in the interest of the strongest party to war if the spoils of the war exceed the cost of waging the war UNLESS both parties share the value of peace.

This is a formulation of the extremely intensively-studied problem of the <a href="http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/PRISDIL.html" target="_blank">Prisoner's Dilemma</a>. It basically asks, when the costs to cheat on an agreement are low and short-term gains are strong, what keeps the cheater from (in Luv's case) pillaging the world? Virtually all social interactions that involve agreements are some variant of this problem.

The answer is, Luv, iteration. Dilemmas of this nature do not happen once. If nations did not exist in time and deal with this over and over again, then you are absolutely right, the dominant one would simply take over the world.

The problem is, Luv, the you have framed the problem incorrectly. International Relations do not occur once, but over and over again, every day. And since the US expects to cooperate with other nations in the future, it has to behave as though it would be a good partner to cooperate with. In other words, it discounts current costs of cooperation against future gains of cooperation, just as you do whenever you keep a promise. The calculus of cost, Luv, is not independent of the future. And your formulation of the problem has no future, and thus, is incomplete.

In scholarly terms, this is known as the <a href="http://www.brembs.net/ipd/ipd.html" target="_blank">Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.</a> When social beings must contract again and again -- the dilemma is iterated -- outcomes are very different than the one Luv predicts, and much more in accord with what we see in the real world.

I suggest you read the two sites I've provided. There is a gigantic and always increasing body of literature on Prisoner's Dilemma games and the evolution of cooperation.

I hope this has partially answered your question. Although there are many fictional treatments of the problem of social cooperation and enforcement, the best in my view is the science fiction story by Eric Frank Russell, the entertaining And Then There Were None...

Michael

luvluv

Pompous says:

"Yes, minor matters of custom such as whether or not women ought to have the same rights as men, whether or not one ought to keep slaves, whether or not certain races or castes ought to have dominance over others."

Out of curiousity, by your definition, should women have rights?

Should one hold slaves, or not?

Should certain castes have dominance over others?\

Also, in defining all morality in matters of self interest, does it not follow that the strong will always have decidedly less morals than the weak, since the strong have less to fear from the consequences of their actions? In saying that a person ought to act in his own benefit to as great an extent as he can and get away with it, aren't you implicitly arguing that might makes right?

you say:

"Please note that my discussion with you so far has centered around the idea that we do, in fact, share certain values with the Nazi regime, which could serve as a reasonable starting point for negotiation with them."

A fortunate coincidence for you, for it was your original argument, as opposed to the one you subsequently picked up from Hobbs, that we need not share even a single value in order to negotiate for peace. As I have said, by your original argument, the stronger party would never negotiate. Am I to take it that you have abandoned your original position that we need not share values to negotiate? If not, what would compel a vastly superior army to negotiate with an inferior one, if the value of peace was not shared?

you also say:

"This is not true. To stay with the Nazi example, even though I do not share the value of “Aryan purity,” I could certainly suggest that it might be attained more efficiently by means other than those chosen by the Nazi regime. Negotiation proceeds by recognizing what each party values and working out a means to attain it, not by deciding who is 'right' and who is 'wrong.'"

Might I assume then, that you would have no problem with a nation established on the grounds of Aryan purity, a nation which did not allow the participation of non-Aryans in government, if that state was arrived at peacefully. In other words, had Hitler not engaged in war and had he merely expelled the Jews, you would not have a problem with a Nazi state? And if you would disapprove of a peaceful Nazi state, on what grounds would you disapprove of it?


you say:
"Ah, shame. The theist’s best friend."

I absolutely believe that if I can save lives by compelling a man to stop an immoral course of action (like invading Poland) by appealing to his moral sense and shaming him then that is morally superior to your position, which in effect says it is okay for Hitler to do whatever he perceives to be in his best interest. If shame based on shared values can save lives, is it not morally superior to self-interest? And what of the value of shame as a deterant? There are some cases when my bad actions would have no real consequences upon me save a bad conscience. We've probably all had opportunities to engage in sexual activities with certain persons, persons who perhaps wanted more from us (love) than what we wanted from them (sex). Many men have declined to have sex on that ground, though there would be no negative consequence upon him save that of shame. I've had those opportunities myself with women who were fully of age, who I was not afraid of impregnating or catching an STD from, and who had no friends who were friends of mine (through which I could hurt my reputation). In other words, I had nothing to lose by getting what was in my interest (sex), and was held from doing so only by my not desiring to feel shame. What of these situations?

And has it occured to you that shame is not a figment of the imagination, but an actual emotion? Might it not then have some purpose, whether Divine or evolutionary?

turt says:

"Another issue: your "objective morality" is stunningly incomplete. It has to constantly evolve to meet new social, political and technical challenges. Unfortunately New Guinea tribesmen do not have to deal with cloning, Jones Act subsidies, infant industry protection, nuclear waste disposal, flood plain management, and a hundred other urgent questions of public policy. Objectively, those values exist only in industrialized societies, and each one has its own response (China is building dams whilst the US is tearing them down). So Luv, your "objective" values are actually hugely incomplete."

Au contraire, contrarist. You do not need to invent a new value in order to deal with new phenomenon any more then you have to invent a new visual apparatus in order to see things you've never seen before. A person in a primative society encountering cloning or nuclear waste would interpret this new stimuli on the same basis as he had been interpreting how best to divy up the spoils of the hunt. He would do so by seeing what worked best for all men. I think generally all men share some concept of the Golden Rule, and they apply this to new stimuli in the environment as they are exposed to them. They need not share stimuli in order to share the grounds on which to deal with that stimuli.

"I do not believe he was a great thinker at all, though an effective apologist. Lewis was fond of making uniformed pronouncements, did not bother to master the philosophical basis of his arguments, did not consult major figures/texts in the fields he was writing on.....the list is endless. This ignorant, supercilious approach made him an effective apologist, but not a good thinker."

With all due respect, none of your arguments have impressed me as much as his. I am impressed with how much you all think of yourselves, though.

incredibly, you say:

"It's apparent that both as an atheist and a Christian, Lewis was insufferably supercilious, naive, and uninformed. No wonder he never married until late in life. He must have been hell on his servants."

I'd like to meet you one day. From your posts, you must be a perfect human being. Congratulations, it must be nice.

you say:

"There is nothing you can point to that would compel me to adopt your standards, except force."

Not even reason?

To your questions:

1) I don't understand the question.

2) Probably c.

3) Nothing much, I just always wanted to see what an avowed atheist would make of Lewis argument. I admit, I am intestinally repulsed by applied subjectivism, that is to say, people who excuse their bad behavior by saying that there is no such thing. Many of the arguments you folks are making sound good on paper, I just find them distatsteful when used by a man who will not support his children or by a wife who will not be faithful to her husband. Like all good religions, the doctrine of subjectivism can be dangerous in the hands of fools. It assumes that people can even determine what is in their best interests, or the world's, and it is obvious they generally cannot.

Hobbs:

Interesting questions. I thought C.S. put his opinions on the matter in this book, but I think I may be confusing that with another of his books called "Letters to Malcom, Chiefly on Prayer". At any rate, it may suprise you to know that I do not think that God cares a great deal about morality. I think He wants us to love one another. Paul himself said that the law was the mere schoolmaster (one translation even says baby-sitter) until we learn to love on another. Paul implies, as I believe Nietczhe said, that once we all love each other perfectly we will need no right and wrong. It might well be remembered that Jesus was hardest on petty rule-keepers like the Saducees and Pharisees. I don't think human kind is here to learn to behave, I think we are here to learn to love each other, which if we did, would obliterate the need for a moral law or even a moral sense. When Jesus was asked for the greatest commandments, he replied "to love God, and to love your neighbor as yourself, for in this are all the law and the prophets." The actual individual laws are simply meant as guides to show men (who are trying to learn to love each other) what your behaviour would look like IF you actually loved God, your neighbor, and yourself. As is key in Christian doctrine, the actual perfect performance of morality is not as important as love towards people. My personal philosophy on that point is to say that God would rather men commit love than abstain from evil.

Lewis, at any rate, said that he did not believe morality to be arbitrary to God's commands. He did not believe that if God had said that murder was good, that murder would therefore be good. He felt that God was subject to his own commands, that He himself was good.

I suppose, the answer to the question of why we can't bypass God and go to the reasons, would be because God exists. Also, I tend to believe that what God wants is a relationship with the children he loves, not simply obedience. Like any good parent, God wants to be intimate with his children, he does not simply want them to be "good" little strangers.

you say:

"The way I see it, morality must be independent of God and his commands and character, or it is just a case of might makes right. Either there are standards for morality which even God must meet, or God's rules become the real, objective, absolute morality only because he's the biggest, baddest mutha on the block and thus he can enforce his morality the way he wants to."

As I said, I believe and I think C.S. believed that God is subject to his own laws. But God is a bad mutha (shut yo' mouth). But I'm just talking about God...

you say:

"I agree that morality is independent of our unconstrained choice: I can't choose for raping my neighbors' wives to be an act that promotes human flourishing."

This is why I say that we already agree as much as we are going to. That's about all I was saying.

On that note, have you ever read "The Problem of Pain"? That's by Lewis also and I think explains this. Like you folks, he is saying that God basically lives in a society (of sorts) with us, and there are just certain things that are right when dealing with groups of people. The answer to why God is beholden to his own laws is that He is in society with us. Perhaps He is also, as you say, acting in His own self-interest in doing so, because His interest is to be in a relationship with us. You are probably underestimating His love for us, and His desire for us to participate freely in a relationship with Him, as his motives.

But the problem of pain, if online, is a great book dealing with the question: if there is a God who is both good and all-poweful, how is there evil in the world? And since there is evil in the world, does that not suggest that God lacks goodness, or power, or both? Lewis tackles that question. That would be a good thread to have a discussion on, as I believe that this one has nearly run it's course. Would you folks care to read it?

[ March 09, 2002: Message edited by: luvluv ]

[ March 09, 2002: Message edited by: luvluv ]</p>