Scorpion

Do you realize that you accept here that the conclusion of your reasoning - that the MMN position is self-refuting - is also meaningless?

I give you the benefit of doubt here and assume you really intended to say something else

I have to repeat that (4) is metalogical statement, a statement about the relevance of (1) and (2). What is in question is if "good" in (1) and (2) denote. In (4), when it is said that "good does not exist", it means that the symbol "good" in (1) and (2) does not refer (These kinds of messes are precisely the reason why mixing metalogic with logic should always be regarded with much suspiciousness).
Therefore, if "good" is considered meaningful, (4) is simpy false, and if "good" is considered meaningless, (4) is true. There is no possibility within these constraints that (4) would be meaningless. The only things required for (4) to be meaningful is that the statements (1) and (2) exist and contain the symbol "good".

Err... no, the whole objection specifically claims that good/evil does not denote. If you interpret (4) to mean something else, you're misrepresenting the MMN position.

-S-

Bilbo

mnkbdky writes:

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I am not exactly sure what Bilbo means by use and mention. However, he is certainly mistaken about his claim that, "Locutions of the form 'It is true that p (where "p" is a propositional variable) have little sense.'" "It is true that p" is a statement in and of itself and, therefore, necessarily has truth value. Concider this, "It is true that (ADT) either (1) all dogs have tails or (2) all dogs don't have tails." (DT) is a statement and, thus, has truth value, it may either be true or false. In fact (ADT) is false, for it is possible that only some dogs have tails and other don't. However, the statement, "It is true that, (SDT) either (1) some dogs have tails or (2) some dogs don't," is true. The truth and falsity of (ADT) depends on the truth and falsity of it constituents.
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I drew the distinction to disambiguate your argument. Its precisely because of its ambiguity that the (seemingly specious) inference can be drawn from your [4] to your [2].

Briefly, sentences of the form "It is true that___", are artifacts of natural language that require regimentation if they're to be scrutinized. The distinction here is subtle, but perhaps an example can shed some light.

Consider the following colloquial expression: "It is true that Bob is tall". This statement is ambiguous between:

[1] Bob is tall is true

and,

[1'] 'Bob is tall' is true

Clearly, [1] is meaningless. Its akin to saying something like: "John is hungry is strong", or "It is true that it is true that Bob is tall is true". [1'] on the other hand, has perfectly good sense, because it predicates a property of the statement 'Bob is tall'.

Bearing this distinction in mind, you should be sufficiently equipped to uncloak your *real* disjunctive argument


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Tease this out for me a bit, I am not sure what you are claiming. My initial reading is that you are saying that the relativist will say that the term "Good" does not refer to anything, such as the term "apple" does. Is this correct? If so, then, how does this put him in an ideal position to deny the implications of (4).?
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My remark about the "implications" of (4) was a charitable best guess, since i'm not entirely sure how to render your (A) or your (2) yet. In any case, an argument or inference from (4) to (2) will be complicated by the fact that its not clear your opponents views are amenable to logical treatment of the garden variety.


Oh, my apologies for the delayed response. Life is busy.


Regards,

Bilbo.