Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Jan Haugland · 12-02-2002, 04:40 AM

Interesting debate. If you will allow me to share a few thoughts on this subject...

To successfully debate the question of free will, we must really know what a will is. And that is related to exactly what a conscious mind is. That is, unfortunately, one of the unsolved questions. We have more or less defined consciousness as whatever we have that can ask that question in the first place.

It has been argued that we do not have a free will if the universe determines our choices, probabilistically or deterministically. I think a lot of the debate on this question stems from a possibly false dichotomy between ourselves and the universe. In reality, we are as much part of the universe as any other entity. If we believe that the brain-mind can be explained wholly naturalistically (as I do), then it is pretty meaningless to talk about "us" as a conscious entity apart from the rest of the universe, and discuss whether or not that entity has "free will."

Whatever collection of atoms and energies make up "me" is at least partially responsible for the actual choices we make. Thus one can argue that "me" makes a choice, and thus have a will that is not determined by any outside forces.

From this, it is possible to argue that the question of free will is meaningless, since without knowing what a conscious mind is we don't know what a "will" is.

[ December 02, 2002: Message edited by: Jan Haugland ]

Theli · 12-02-2002, 10:18 AM

Jan Haugland...

Quote:

If we believe that the brain-mind can be explained wholly naturalistically (as I do), then it is pretty meaningless to talk about "us" as a conscious entity apart from the rest of the universe, and discuss whether or not that entity has "free will."

This is just why physics cannot be used to form a practical definition of "free will", as it portraits the universe as one big process. Wich is one reason why I started this thread in the philosophy forum instead of science. I would think that a working hypothesis when apointing authorship of a choice is to limit it to the last sentient being(s) in the process. To claim that my choice was shared by my mother because she caused it (me), is not practical.
And also that we can lend authority to external conditions, such as time or flip of a coin.
It's importaint to remember that free will is a concept, not an object to be measured.

I hope you stick around.

Theli · 12-02-2002, 10:33 AM

Tronvillian...

Quote:

Freedom is basically lack of constraint, and applies to both choice and will. How can you tell if a choice is free? There is nothing external forcing the choice.

Here's the problem we have found with the the term.
1. What would constitute an external force?
2. A choice completely devoid of external forces is not a choice anymore.

Devilnaut · 12-02-2002, 10:35 AM

tronvillain:

Quote:

4) What is choice? It is selecting one of two or more options identified. If there is no will, there is no choice, so obviously reason must be involved. Neither a vegetable nor a rock can make a choice, but a dog or an ape probably can.

I would say that this is where the issue lies. What seem like options to you are actually not options at all, they only appear to be because of unknown variables. I think this is what people mean when they say we don't "really" have free will. I would agree with them, I'm not sure on what basis you would disagree.

Your compatibilist position seems to entail defining "free will" as "something that appears to be free will from our perspective". Ultimately I don't think it's accurate.

[ December 02, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]

Jan Haugland · 12-02-2002, 10:47 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Theli:
I would think that a working hypothesis when apointing authorship of a choice is to limit it to the last sentient being(s) in the process. To claim that my choice was shared by my mother because she caused it (me), is not practical.
And also that we can lend authority to external conditions, such as time or flip of a coin.

Thanks for your comments. I agree with your clarification.

So, one tentative defintion regarding free will could be something along these lines: Given that the universe is fixed in a specific state, and I am presented with two choices A and B, and it is actually possible that I can choose A or B (ie that is not strictly determined by prior conditions), then I have free will.

tronvillain · 12-02-2002, 11:27 AM

Devilnaut:

Quote:

I would say that this is where the issue lies. What seem like options to you are actually not options at all, they only appear to be because of unknown variables. I think this is what people mean when they say we don't "really" have free will. I would agree with them, I'm not sure on what basis you would disagree.

I do not agree that what seem like options to me are not options at all. You say that they are not options because it is determined that I will not eventually choose them, but I say that they are options because I could choose them if I were otherwise. If my options are "apple pie" or "pumpkin pie", I really do have two options, since while it is determined that I will choose "pumpkin pie", if my preferences were otherwise I would be able to choose "apple pie" instead. This is all normal people really want from "free will."

Quote:

Your compatibilist position seems to entail defining "free will" as "something that appears to be free will from our perspective". Ultimately I don't think it's accurate.

My compatiblist position is that what we have is all we really want or need from "free will." All non-compatiblist definitions of "free will" are either gibberish or someone no rational person would want.

tronvillain · 12-02-2002, 11:43 AM

Theli:

Quote:

Here's the problem we have found with the the term.
1. What would constitute an external force?
2. A choice completely devoid of external forces is not a choice anymore.

Uh, that is more than one problem. You even counted them yourself. *chuckle* Anyway, I do not see either of those as problems - it is simply a matter of limiting the available options. What the options available are (choices which could be made given the correct inclination) is defined by existing external forces, and when external forces decrease our available options we are less free. This is not necessarily a bad thing, since we can only evaluate so many options, and after that we are reduced to randomly picking one.

Thomas Ash · 12-02-2002, 11:44 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Starboy:
Hi Thomas:

I agree, the commonly understood meaning of "free choice" is to choose as one wills. Lets call this type of free choice FC1. However, you can also conceive of "free choice" as exercising the freest choice of all, a choice with no influences (including yourself). If the current understanding of the universe is correct it is possible for this kind of "free" choice to exist. Lets call it FC2. Many here object to FC2 because they argue that it does not actually take place in the deciding person�s mind and thus doesn�t belong to them (their choice). I find this notion to be somewhat vague. What constitutes a decision you make verses one made by someone or something else? If the "random" coin was built into your mind vs. one that you carried around with you, would that make a difference as to whether "you" made the decision or the coin did. I see it as a very fine distinction since you are the one who is tasked with making the decision, if you used other aids such as paper and pencil or your finger and a stretch of smooth sand I don't think anyone would question the ownership of the decision. IMO the decision was made because of a "will" that belonged to you, so no matter how it was made as long as it was your "will" that came up with it, it is yours. The ability to use a coin in such a decision simply allows it to be completely "free".

I do think that even if the random number generator is built into your head, that's not properly a choice as in FC1. I find this slightly problematic, as randomness isn't really free will at all, don't you think?

Thomas Ash · 12-02-2002, 11:49 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by xeren:


Well, I never gave the definition of compatibilist free will, i gave an instance of it, and i think my instance is compatible with the compatibilist free will

.

Given the fork in the road example, the person is only going to pick one route because of determinism, but the fact that he COULD HAVE chosen another makes it still free will under the compatibilist definition.

-xeren

Oh, I see. Very, very, bloody clever.

But how would you spell out 'could have'? If what Starboy is calling "classical determinism" is true, then in what sense could you have decided to do something else? Only in the sense that it was an option open to you - ie. physically possible, and no was holding a gun to your head telling you you 'couldn't.'

Thomas Ash · 12-02-2002, 12:40 PM

Theli:

Re: your earlier post on this page, in a sense a vegetable does make a choice, just like a computer following its logic-circuits, just a very scripted, genetically determined one. This raises the question of whether we're 'just' glorified computers/vegetables. I'm unsure.

This raises the question of whether computers are conscious, or have free will, and also the question of whether you have to be conscious to have free will. The former question may scound like tacky science ficition, but it's hard to think of an argument, if the Turing Test was met, and a computer could hold a completely human-like discussion with you, without following Elsa-scripts, for saying it wasn't in some sense conscious. (At least, I can't yet think of one.) I suppose this all boils down to the mysteriousness of consciousness. To the latter question, I'd argue that you don't. In a sense, even a vegetable has free will - whether to move to the sun or not - even though it follows very simple 'decision-making' processes, similar to a vending machine's.

[ December 02, 2002: Message edited by: Thomas Ash ]

12-02-2002, 04:40 AM	#81
Jan Haugland Junior Member Join Date: Oct 2002 Location: Bergen, Norway Posts: 70	Interesting debate. If you will allow me to share a few thoughts on this subject... To successfully debate the question of free will, we must really know what a will is. And that is related to exactly what a conscious mind is. That is, unfortunately, one of the unsolved questions. We have more or less defined consciousness as whatever we have that can ask that question in the first place. It has been argued that we do not have a free will if the universe determines our choices, probabilistically or deterministically. I think a lot of the debate on this question stems from a possibly false dichotomy between ourselves and the universe. In reality, we are as much part of the universe as any other entity. If we believe that the brain-mind can be explained wholly naturalistically (as I do), then it is pretty meaningless to talk about "us" as a conscious entity apart from the rest of the universe, and discuss whether or not that entity has "free will." Whatever collection of atoms and energies make up "me" is at least partially responsible for the actual choices we make. Thus one can argue that "me" makes a choice, and thus have a will that is not determined by any outside forces. From this, it is possible to argue that the question of free will is meaningless, since without knowing what a conscious mind is we don't know what a "will" is. [ December 02, 2002: Message edited by: Jan Haugland ]</p>

12-02-2002, 12:40 PM	#90
Thomas Ash Senior Member Join Date: Oct 2002 Location: Oxford, UK Posts: 820	Theli: Re: your earlier post on this page, in a sense a vegetable does make a choice, just like a computer following its logic-circuits, just a very scripted, genetically determined one. This raises the question of whether we're 'just' glorified computers/vegetables. I'm unsure. This raises the question of whether computers are conscious, or have free will, and also the question of whether you have to be conscious to have free will. The former question may scound like tacky science ficition, but it's hard to think of an argument, if the Turing Test was met, and a computer could hold a completely human-like discussion with you, without following Elsa-scripts, for saying it wasn't in some sense conscious. (At least, I can't yet think of one.) I suppose this all boils down to the mysteriousness of consciousness. To the latter question, I'd argue that you don't. In a sense, even a vegetable has free will - whether to move to the sun or not - even though it follows very simple 'decision-making' processes, similar to a vending machine's. [ December 02, 2002: Message edited by: Thomas Ash ]</p>

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